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LAW OFFICE FAILURE DEEMED A REASONABLE EXCUSE, DEFAULT JUDGMENT VACATED.

The First Department determined law office failure was a proper basis for vacating a default judgment (the underlying case was deemed meritorious):

Under certain circumstances, law office failure may provide a reasonable excuse for a default … . At oral argument, respondents essentially conceded that, in this e-filed case, their office failed to regularly check its email and, as a result, was unaware of the motion court’s order that gave rise to the default. Respondents’ excuse was sufficiently particularized and there is no evidence of wilful or contumacious conduct on their part … . Matter of Rivera v New York City Dept. of Sanitation, 2016 NY Slip Op 05837, 1st Dept 8-18-16

CIVIL PROCEDURE (LAW OFFICE FAILURE DEEMED A REASONABLE EXCUSE, DEFAULT JUDGMENT VACATED)/DEFAULT JUDGMENT (LAW OFFICE FAILURE DEEMED A REASONABLE EXCUSE, DEFAULT JUDGMENT VACATED)/LAW OFFICE FAILURE (LAW OFFICE FAILURE DEEMED A REASONABLE EXCUSE, DEFAULT JUDGMENT VACATED)

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FINDING THAT LIQUOR LICENSEE WAS AWARE OF THE PRESENCE OF DRUGS NOT SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE; RARE DISCUSSION OF THAT ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDING STANDARD OF PROOF.

The First Department, over an extensive two-justice dissent, determined the evidence did not support the finding, by the New York State Liquor Authority, the licensee was aware of the presence of illegal drugs on the licensed premises. The decision is instructive about the “substantial evidence” standard of proof in administrative proceedings. The majority held the “substantial evidence” standard was not met:

The dissent points to the testimony of petitioner’s head of security that when security guards were on patrol they would sometimes have a staff member, who was not trained to pat people down, watch the door, as allowing an inference to be drawn that lax security measures led to the presence of drugs at the scene. This however, is purely speculative and not based on the record. The quantity of drugs recovered was very small. The uncontroverted police testimony was that the drugs could easily been have secreted on an individual. There was no evidence that the patrons entering the premises were not subjected to a patdown or that given the packaging, a patdown would have detected drugs. Substantial evidence, which has been characterized as a “minimal standard” or as comprising a “low threshold,” must consist of such relevant proof, within the whole record, “as a reasonable mind may accept as adequate to support a conclusion or ultimate fact” … , it does not, however, “rise from bare surmise, conjecture, speculation or rumor” … . Matter of Home Run KTV Inc. v New York State Liq. Auth., 2016 NY Slip Op 05834, 1st Dept 8-18-16

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (FINDING THAT LIQUOR LICENSEE WAS AWARE OF THE PRESENCE OF DRUGS NOT SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE; RARE DISCUSSION OF THAT ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDING STANDARD OF PROOF)/EVIDENCE (ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, FINDING THAT LIQUOR LICENSEE WAS AWARE OF THE PRESENCE OF DRUGS NOT SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE; RARE DISCUSSION OF THAT ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDING STANDARD OF PROOF)/NYS LIQUOR AUTHORITY (ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, FINDING THAT LIQUOR LICENSEE WAS AWARE OF THE PRESENCE OF DRUGS NOT SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE; RARE DISCUSSION OF THAT ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDING STANDARD OF PROOF)/LIQUOR LICENSE (ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, FINDING THAT LIQUOR LICENSEE WAS AWARE OF THE PRESENCE OF DRUGS NOT SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE; RARE DISCUSSION OF THAT ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDING STANDARD OF PROOF)

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FRAUD ALLEGATIONS RELATED TO SALE OF DEFECTIVE RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE BACKED SECURITIES SUFFICIENT TO WITHSTAND MOTION TO DISMISS.

The First Department determined plaintiff had sufficiently alleged fraud and aiding and abetting fraud in connection with defendants’ sale of defective residential mortgage backed securities (RMBS):

Defendants argue that in order to establish justifiable reliance, plaintiffs were required to allege that they sought additional information from defendants about the truthfulness of the representations made in the offering documents or that they requested the loan files for the loans underlying the RMBS. The level of due diligence advocated by defendants requires a prospective purchaser to assume that the credit ratings assigned to the securities were fraudulent and to verify them through a detailed retracing of the steps undertaken by the underwriter and credit rating agency. We do not require this heightened due diligence standard to support justifiable reliance in a pleading concerning such sales of securities by prospectus … .

… The element of scienter, that is, the requirement that the defendant knew of the falsity of the representation being made to the plaintiff, is, of course, the element most likely to be within the sole knowledge of the defendant and least amenable to direct proof” … . All that is required to defeat a motion to dismiss a fraud claim for lack of scienter is “a rational inference of actual knowledge” … . The allegations that defendants were informed about defects in the loans they were securitizing because they obtained this information through their own due diligence are sufficient to plead scienter … .  IKB Intl. S.A. v Morgan Stanley, 2016 NY Slip Op 05779, 1st Dept 8-11-16

FRAUD (FRAUD ALLEGATIONS RELATED TO SALE OF DEFECTIVE RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE BACKED SECURITIES SUFFICIENT TO WITHSTAND MOTION TO DISMISS)/SECURITIES (FRAUD ALLEGATIONS RELATED TO SALE OF DEFECTIVE RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE BACKED SECURITIES SUFFICIENT TO WITHSTAND MOTION TO DISMISS)/RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE BACKED SECURITIES (FRAUD ALLEGATIONS RELATED TO SALE OF DEFECTIVE RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE BACKED SECURITIES SUFFICIENT TO WITHSTAND MOTION TO DISMISS)

OSTENSIBLE NON EMPLOYER WAS NOT A JOINT EMPLOYER SUBJECT TO EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LIABILITY; CRITERIA FOR JOINT EMPLOYER STATUS EXPLAINED.

The First Department determined defendant non employer was not a “joint employer” such that defendant could be liable for employment discrimination under the Human Rights Law. The court explained the “joint employer” criteria:

In determining whether an ostensible non employer is actually a “joint employer” for purposes of employment discrimination claims under the State and City Human Rights Laws (HRLs), numerous Federal District Courts have applied the “immediate control” test … . Under the “immediate control” formulation, a “joint employer relationship may be found to exist where there is sufficient evidence that the defendant had immediate control over the other company’s employees,” and particularly the defendant’s control “over the employee in setting the terms and conditions of the employee’s work.” “Relevant factors” in this exercise “include commonality of hiring, firing, discipline, pay, insurance, records, and supervision.” Of these factors, “the extent of the employer’s right to control the means and manner of the worker’s performance is the most important factor.” If such control is established, other factors “are then of marginal importance” … . Brankov v Hazzard, 2016 NY Slip Op 05778, 1st Dept 8-11-16

EMPLOYMENT LAW (DISCRIMINATION, OSTENSIBLE NON EMPLOYER WAS NOT A JOINT EMPLOYER SUBJECT TO EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LIABILITY; CRITERIA FOR JOINT EMPLOYER STATUS EXPLAINED)/JOINT RMPLOYER (EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION, OSTENSIBLE NON EMPLOYER WAS NOT A JOINT EMPLOYER SUBJECT TO EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LIABILITY; CRITERIA FOR JOINT EMPLOYER STATUS EXPLAINED)/HUMAN RIGHTS LAW (DISCRIMINATION, OSTENSIBLE NON EMPLOYER WAS NOT A JOINT EMPLOYER SUBJECT TO EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LIABILITY; CRITERIA FOR JOINT EMPLOYER STATUS EXPLAINED)

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IN THIS ACTION STEMMING FROM DEFECTIVE RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE BACKED SECURITIES, MORGAN STANLEY’S ALLEGED FAILURE TO NOTIFY PLAINTIFF OF THE DISCOVERY OF DEFECTIVE SECURITIES IS AN INDEPENDENT BREACH OF CONTRACT; GROSS NEGLIGENCE CAUSE OF ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED DESPITE SOLE REMEDY CONTRACTUAL PROVISION.

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Gische, in an action stemming from the sale of defective residential mortgage backed securities, determined defendant’s (Morgan Stanley’s) alleged failure to notify plaintiff of the discovery of defective securities constituted an independent breach of contract claim. The First Department further determined, despite the purported “sole remedy” contractual provision, the cause of action for gross negligence was adequately pled and should not have been dismissed:

… [U]nder similar RMBS agreements, a seller’s failure to provide the trustee with notice of material breaches it discovers in the underlying loans states an independently breached contractual obligation, allowing a plaintiff to pursue separate damages … .

… Where parties contractually agree to a limitation on liability, that provision is enforceable, even against claims of a party’s own ordinary negligence … . The purpose of provisions that limit liability or remedies available in the event of breach is to “allocat[e] the risk of economic loss in the event that the contemplated transaction is not fully executed” … . Courts will generally honor the remedies that the parties have contractually agreed to … . There are exceptions to this rule of law, however, and as a matter of long standing public policy, a party may not insulate itself from damages caused by its “grossly negligent conduct” … . Used in this context, “gross negligence” differs in kind, and not only degree, from claims of ordinary negligence. “It is conduct that evinces a reckless disregard for the rights of others or smacks’ of intentional wrongdoing” … . Morgan Stanley Mtge. Loan Trust 2006-13ARX v Morgan Stanley Mtge. Capital Holdings LLC, 2016 NY Slip Op 05781, 1st Dept 8-11-16

CONTRACT LAW (IN THIS ACTION STEMMING FROM DEFECTIVE RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE BACKED SECURITIES, MORGAN STANLEY’S ALLEGED FAILURE TO NOTIFY PLAINTIFF OF THE DISCOVERY OF DEFECTIVE SECURITIES IS AN INDEPENDENT BREACH OF CONTRACT; GROSS NEGLIGENCE CAUSE OF ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED DESPITE SOLE REMEDY CONTRACTUAL PROVISION)/SECURITIES (IN THIS ACTION STEMMING FROM DEFECTIVE RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE BACKED SECURITIES, MORGAN STANLEY’S ALLEGED FAILURE TO NOTIFY PLAINTIFF OF THE DISCOVERY OF DEFECTIVE SECURITIES IS AN INDEPENDENT BREACH OF CONTRACT; GROSS NEGLIGENCE CAUSE OF ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED DESPITE SOLE REMEDY CONTRACTUAL PROVISION)/NEGLIGENCE  (IN THIS ACTION STEMMING FROM DEFECTIVE RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE BACKED SECURITIES, MORGAN STANLEY’S ALLEGED FAILURE TO NOTIFY PLAINTIFF OF THE DISCOVERY OF DEFECTIVE SECURITIES IS AN INDEPENDENT BREACH OF CONTRACT; GROSS NEGLIGENCE CAUSE OF ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED DESPITE SOLE REMEDY CONTRACTUAL PROVISION)/GROSS NEGLIGENCE (IN THIS ACTION STEMMING FROM DEFECTIVE RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE BACKED SECURITIES, MORGAN STANLEY’S ALLEGED FAILURE TO NOTIFY PLAINTIFF OF THE DISCOVERY OF DEFECTIVE SECURITIES IS AN INDEPENDENT BREACH OF CONTRACT; GROSS NEGLIGENCE CAUSE OF ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED DESPITE SOLE REMEDY CONTRACTUAL PROVISION)/RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE BACKED SECURITIES (IN THIS ACTION STEMMING FROM DEFECTIVE RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE BACKED SECURITIES, MORGAN STANLEY’S ALLEGED FAILURE TO NOTIFY PLAINTIFF OF THE DISCOVERY OF DEFECTIVE SECURITIES IS AN INDEPENDENT BREACH OF CONTRACT; GROSS NEGLIGENCE CAUSE OF ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED DESPITE SOLE REMEDY CONTRACTUAL PROVISION

DOCTRINE OF INDEFINITENESS IMPROPERLY APPLIED TO ORAL CONTRACT; BOTH QUANTUM MERUIT AND BREACH OF CONTRACT PROPERLY PLED WHERE DEFENDANTS DENY EXISTENCE OF CONTRACT.

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined questions of fact precluded summary judgment in favor of defendants. Plaintiff alleged breach of an oral contract and quantum meruit (unjust enrichment) causes of action. Although there was no express agreement that plaintiff was entitled to payment for work done before termination, the doctrine of indefiniteness should not have been applied to dismiss the breach of contract claim. In addition, because defendants alleged there was no enforceable contract, plaintiff’s quantum meruit cause of action should not have been dismissed. Plaintiff does not have to elect a remedy (breach of contract or quantum meruit) in that circumstance. With regard to the breach of oral contract cause of action, the court wrote:

An oral agreement may be enforceable as long as the terms are clear and definite and the conduct of the parties evinces mutual assent “sufficiently definite to assure that the parties are truly in agreement with respect to all material terms” … . However, not all terms of a contract need be fixed with absolute certainty, and courts will not apply the doctrine of indefiniteness to “defeat the reasonable expectations of the parties in entering into the contract” … . Where “there may exist an objective method for supplying the missing terms needed to calculate the alleged compensation owed plaintiff,” a claimed oral agreement is “not as a matter of law unenforceable for indefiniteness” … . Kramer v Greene, 2016 NY Slip Op 05776, 1st Dept 8-11-16

CONTRACT LAW (DOCTRINE OF INDEFINITENESS IMPROPERLY APPLIED TO ORAL CONTRACT; BOTH QUANTUM MERUIT AND BREACH OF CONTRACT PROPERLY PLED WHERE DEFENDANTS DENY EXISTENCE OF CONTRACT)/INDEFINITENESS DOCTRINE (CONTRACT LAW, DOCTRINE OF INDEFINITENESS IMPROPERLY APPLIED TO ORAL CONTRACT)/QUANTUM MERUIT (BOTH QUANTUM MERUIT AND BREACH OF CONTRACT PROPERLY PLED WHERE DEFENDANTS DENY EXISTENCE OF CONTRACT)/UNJUST ENRICHMENT (BOTH QUANTUM MERUIT AND BREACH OF CONTRACT PROPERLY PLED WHERE DEFENDANTS DENY EXISTENCE OF CONTRACT)/ORAL CONTRACT (DOCTRINE OF INDEFINITENESS IMPROPERLY APPLIED TO ORAL CONTRACT; BOTH QUANTUM MERUIT AND BREACH OF CONTRACT PROPERLY PLED WHERE DEFENDANTS DENY EXISTENCE OF CONTRACT)

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CONTRACT PROVISION WHICH PURPORTED TO EXTEND THE ACCRUAL OF BREACH OF CONTRACT CAUSES OF ACTION STEMMING FROM SALE OF RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE BACKED SECURITIES DEEMED UNENFORCEABLE AS AGAINST PUBLIC POLICY; ACTION TIME-BARRED.

The First Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Acosta, determined breach of contract causes of action stemming from contracts for the sale of defective residential mortgage backed securities were time-barred. The court rejected as against public policy contractual provisions which purported to extend the accrual of the causes of action:

In this appeal, we must decide whether the statute of limitations bars a breach of contract action that was brought more than six years after the seller made allegedly false representations and warranties as to loans underlying residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS). We find that dismissal of the action is mandated by the Court of Appeals’ decision in ACE Sec. Corp., Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2006-SL2 v DB Structured Prods., Inc. (25 NY3d 581 [2015]), which sets forth a clear rule that a breach of contract claim in an RMBS put-back action accrues on the date the allegedly false representations and warranties were made. Notwithstanding the parties’ sophistication and their assent to a contract provision specifying a set of conditions that would have delayed the cause of action’s accrual, we find that the accrual provision is unenforceable as against public policy, because it is tantamount to extending the statute of limitations based on an imprecise “discovery” rule, which the Court of Appeals has consistently rejected in the commercial sphere … . Moreover, the accrual provision does not compel defendant to undertake a promised future performance, separate from its obligations to cure or repurchase defective loans, so as to trigger the statute of limitations anew; nor does it contemplate a substantive condition precedent to defendant’s performance that would delay accrual of the breach of contract claim … . Deutsche Bank Natl. Trust Co. v Flagstar Capital Mkts. Corp., 2016 NY Slip Op 05780, 1st Dept 8-11-16

CIVIL PROCEDURE (STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS, CONTRACT PROVISION WHICH PURPORTED TO EXTEND THE ACCRUAL OF BREACH OF CONTRACT CAUSES OF ACTION STEMMING FROM SALE OF RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE BACKED SECURITIES DEEMED UNENFORCEABLE AS AGAINST PUBLIC POLICY; ACTION TIME-BARRED)/STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS (CONTRACT PROVISION WHICH PURPORTED TO EXTEND THE ACCRUAL OF BREACH OF CONTRACT CAUSES OF ACTION STEMMING FROM SALE OF RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE BACKED SECURITIES DEEMED UNENFORCEABLE AS AGAINST PUBLIC POLICY; ACTION TIME-BARRED)/SECURITIES (RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE BACKED SECURITIES, CONTRACT PROVISION WHICH PURPORTED TO EXTEND THE ACCRUAL OF BREACH OF CONTRACT CAUSES OF ACTION STEMMING FROM SALE OF RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE BACKED SECURITIES DEEMED UNENFORCEABLE AS AGAINST PUBLIC POLICY; ACTION TIME-BARRED)/RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE BACKED SECURITIES (STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS, CONTRACT PROVISION WHICH PURPORTED TO EXTEND THE ACCRUAL OF BREACH OF CONTRACT CAUSES OF ACTION STEMMING FROM SALE OF RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE BACKED SECURITIES DEEMED UNENFORCEABLE AS AGAINST PUBLIC POLICY; ACTION TIME-BARRED)

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NONSIGNATORY WHICH RECEIVED A DIRECT BENEFIT FROM AN AGREEMENT WITH AN ARBITRATION PROVISION IS SUBJECT TO ARBITRATION (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department determined defendant, Gordon, was entitled to compel arbitration with an entity which was not a party to the document with the arbitration provision. Plaintiff, BGC Notes, loaned $700,000 to Gordon as part of an employment arrangement with another related entity, BGC Financial. The employment agreement contained the arbitration clause and the note for the loan required resolution of any disputes in the courts. Although BGC Notes was not was not a party to the employment agreement, it was deemed to receive a direct benefit from the employment agreement. Therefore BGC Notes was subject to the arbitration clause in the agreement:

Although BGC Notes was not a signatory to the employment agreement, which is the document actually containing the arbitration provision, BGC Notes nonetheless received a “direct benefit” directly traceable to the employment agreement … . Specifically, section 3(d) of the employment agreement provides that BGC Financial would “cause” BGC Notes to make a loan to Gordon by way of the very note that BGC Notes sues upon in this action, and BGC Notes received all the benefits that an entity ordinarily receives upon the giving of a loan … . Thus, BGC Notes derived benefits from the employment agreement, and BGC Notes’ contention that section 3(d) conferred a benefit only to Gordon, and at most an “indirect” benefit to BGC Notes itself, belies the terms of the employment agreement … . BGC Notes, LLC v Gordon, 2016 NY Slip Op 05775, 1st Dept 8-11-16

ARBITRATION (NONSIGNATORY WHICH RECEIVED A DIRECT BENEFIT FROM AN AGREEMENT WITH AN ARBITRATION PROVISION IS SUBJECT TO ARBITRATION)/CONTRACT LAW (ARBITRATION, NONSIGNATORY WHICH RECEIVED A DIRECT BENEFIT FROM AN AGREEMENT WITH AN ARBITRATION PROVISION IS SUBJECT TO ARBITRATION)

QUESTIONS OF FACT WHETHER ZIP LINE WAS DEFECTIVE AND WHETHER PLAINTIFF KNEW OR SHOULD HAVE KNOWN OF THE RISKS OF USING THE ZIP LINE.

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, over an extensive dissent, determined questions of fact about whether a zip line was negligently constructed and whether the risks of using the zip line were obvious precluded summary judgment in favor of defendant. Defendant (Skoler) designed and built the zip line with plaintiff’s assistance. Plaintiff alleged the braking system did not work when he used the zip line and he was injured when he struck the end-point tree and fell off the seat onto a boulder:

Plaintiff concedes that, had he merely lost his grip and fallen off the seat while riding the zip line, he would be barred from recovery because that is an inherent risk of zip-lining. However, his claim is not that he fell victim to such a common hazard. Rather, it is that the zip line was negligently constructed by defendant and that he had no way of knowing that. A person cannot be said to have assumed the risk of being injured by faulty equipment when he was unaware that the equipment was faulty … .

The record is replete with facts that prevent us from determining, as a matter of law, that any risk encountered by plaintiff was inherent in zip-lining and not enhanced by Skoler’s negligence, or that it was, or should have been, obvious to plaintiff. Even in granting the motion, the motion court conceded that there was evidence that the brake malfunctioned. Indeed, plaintiff testified that he failed to slow down as Skoler had done only moments before, even though his ride was not otherwise any different from Skoler’s. Thus, we can assume for purposes of this motion that the brake failed … . Zelkowitz v Country Group, Inc., 2016 NY Slip Op 05732, 1st Dept 8-4-16

 

NEGLIGENCE (QUESTIONS OF FACT WHETHER ZIP LINE WAS DEFECTIVE AND WHETHER PLAINTIFF KNEW OR SHOULD HAVE KNOWN OF THE RISKS OF USING THE ZIP LINE)/ASSUMPTION OF THE RISK (QUESTIONS OF FACT WHETHER ZIP LINE WAS DEFECTIVE AND WHETHER PLAINTIFF KNEW OR SHOULD HAVE KNOWN OF THE RISKS OF USING THE ZIP LINE)/ZIP LINE (QUESTIONS OF FACT WHETHER ZIP LINE WAS DEFECTIVE AND WHETHER PLAINTIFF KNEW OR SHOULD HAVE KNOWN OF THE RISKS OF USING THE ZIP LINE)

PRELIMINARY CONFERENCE (PC) ORDER SETTING TEMPORARY MAINTENANCE WHICH DEVIATED FROM THE PRESUMPTIVE AMOUNT INVALID; UPWARD MODIFICATION PROPER.

The First Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Acosta, affirming Supreme Court, determined a preliminary conference (PC) order directing temporary maintenance of $250 per week was invalid, and an upward modification of the temporary maintenance to $7500 per month was proper. The PC ($250 per week) deviated from the presumptive award of temporary maintenance, did not specify the reasons for the deviation, and did not include the amount of temporary maintenance which would have been in accordance with Domestic Relations Law 236:

 

Because the temporary maintenance terms in the PC order deviated from the presumptive award of temporary maintenance without providing the statutorily required recitals, the terms are unenforceable … . Moreover, because the remaining terms of the PC order are intertwined with the temporary maintenance terms, the entire order is invalid … . Anonymous v Anonymous, 2016 NY Slip Op 05736, 1st Dept 8-4-16

FAMILY LAW (PRELIMINARY CONFERENCE (PC) ORDER SETTING TEMPORARY MAINTENANCE WHICH DEVIATED FROM THE PRESUMPTIVE AMOUNT INVALID; UPWARD MODIFICATION PROPER)/MAINTENANCE (FAMILY LAW, PRELIMINARY CONFERENCE (PC) ORDER SETTING TEMPORARY MAINTENANCE WHICH DEVIATED FROM THE PRESUMPTIVE AMOUNT INVALID; UPWARD MODIFICATION PROPER)/TEMPORARY MAINTENANCE (FAMILY LAW, PRELIMINARY CONFERENCE (PC) ORDER SETTING TEMPORARY MAINTENANCE WHICH DEVIATED FROM THE PRESUMPTIVE AMOUNT INVALID; UPWARD MODIFICATION PROPER)

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