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FOR CAUSE CHALLENGE TO JUROR SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED, TRIAL JUDGE DID NOT MAKE A SUFFICIENT INQUIRY WHEN THE JUROR EXPRESSED DOUBT SHE COULD BE FAIR.

The First Department, over a two-justice dissent, determined defense counsel’s “for cause” challenge to a juror (Ms. J) should have been granted. Two of the juror’s siblings had been the victims of serious crimes. Although the juror, at one point, indicated she could be fair, she subsequently expressed doubt and the trial judge did not make any further inquiry at that point:

 

While it is true that the trial judge in this case asked Ms. J. on October 5, 2011 whether the crimes suffered by her siblings would affect her ability to be fair, the judge did not repeat this inquiry the next day when Ms. J. repeated her belief that her siblings’ experience might affect her ability to be fair. Defense counsel’s general inquiry into whether Ms. J. would have difficulty returning a not guilty verdict if she had a reasonable doubt was insufficient to elicit an unequivocal assurance of her impartiality, as this questioning failed to confront the very issue she had raised: that her siblings’ experiences would affect her, thus making it less likely that she might have any reasonable doubt. Just as defense counsel’s venire-wide inquiry in Arnold did not directly address a prospective juror’s personal bias, in this case, defense counsel’s general inquiry about reasonable doubt did not directly address the concerns of bias raised by Ms. J. on October 6, 2011.

…[W]e [also] find that the totality of Ms. J.’s responses did not indicate that she could set aside what happened to her brother and sister. People v Small, 2016 NY Slip Op 08293, 1st Dept 12-8-16

 

CRIMINAL LAW (FOR CAUSE CHALLENGE TO JUROR SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED, TRIAL JUDGE DID NOT MAKE A SUFFICIENT INQUIRY WHEN THE JUROR EXPRESSED DOUBT SHE COULD BE FAIR)/JURORS (CRIMINAL, FOR CAUSE CHALLENGE TO JUROR SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED, TRIAL JUDGE DID NOT MAKE A SUFFICIENT INQUIRY WHEN THE JUROR EXPRESSED DOUBT SHE COULD BE FAIR)

 

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WRITTEN AGREEMENT REQUIREMENT IN POLICY FOR ADDITIONAL INSUREDS DID NOT REQUIRE AN EXECUTED AGREEMENT.

The First Department determined the “written agreement” requirement in an insurance policy did not mean a “signed agreement.” Here a purchase order required that the owner’s property manager, Newmark, be named as an additional insured. The purchase order did not have signature lines and was not signed. The court held the unsigned purchase order was a “written agreement” within the meaning of the policy language:

Defendant contends that Newmark and the owner are not additional insureds because the purchase order/agreement was unsigned. However, defendant’s policy merely requires a “written” contract, not a “signed” one. By contrast, in Cusumano v Extell Rock, LLC (86 AD3d 448 [1st Dept 2011]), the policy said, “The following are also an insured when you … have agreed, in writing, in a contract or agreement that another person or organization be added as an additional insured on your policy, provided the injury or damage occurs subsequent to the execution of the contract or agreement” … . As the motion court in Cusumano found, the insurer analogous to defendant in the case at bar “expressly included the word executed’ in[] its Policy, thereby requiring that any agreement by Regions to add a person/organization as an additional insured be memorialized in a signed contract” … . * * *

Under the circumstances, the court did not err by finding that the unsigned purchase order constituted a written contract for purposes of the additional insured endorsement … . Zurich Am. Ins. Co. v Endurance Am. Speciality Ins. Co., 2016 NY Slip Op 08313, 1st Dept 12-8-16

 

CONTRACT LAW (INSURANCE POLICY, WRITTEN AGREEMENT REQUIRED BY POLICY FOR ADDITIONAL INSUREDS DID NOT REQUIRE AN EXECUTED AGREEMENT)/INSURANCE LAW (WRITTEN AGREEMENT REQUIRED BY POLICY FOR ADDITIONAL INSUREDS DID NOT REQUIRE AN EXECUTED AGREEMENT)/ADDITIONAL INSUREDS (WRITTEN AGREEMENT REQUIRED BY POLICY FOR ADDITIONAL INSUREDS DID NOT REQUIRE AN EXECUTED AGREEMENT)

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EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL DOCTRINE ADEQUATELY PLED, LAW FIRM MAY BE PROHIBITED FROM ARGUING THE ASSIGNMENT IT DREW UP FOR PLAINTIFF DID NOT ASSIGN PLAINTIFF THE RIGHT TO BRING A MALPRACTICE ACTION AGAINST IT.

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff had adequately pled that the defendant law firm was equitably estopped from arguing an assignment, which was drawn up by the law firm, did not assign to plaintiff the right to bring a malpractice action against the law firm. The law firm had missed a deadline. Although the assignment could not be interpreted to include the malpractice claim, the equitable estoppel doctrine could be applied to prohibit the law firm from arguing the issue:

The motion court correctly found that the subject assignment, which merely transferred the assignor’s “entire right, title and interest in and to the [call] option contained in Paragraph 8 of” another contract, did not explicitly assign tort claims … . The assignment is not ambiguous; even if it were (and if we therefore considered parol evidence), an unexpressed understanding does not suffice … .

However, accepting plaintiff’s affidavit in opposition to defendants’ motion as true, we find that plaintiff sufficiently pleaded that defendants should be equitably estopped from arguing that the assignment did not assign tort claims. Contrary to defendants’ contention, estoppel can be based on silence as well as conduct … . Under these circumstances, where defendants drafted the assignment at a time when it represented … plaintiff, and that interpreting the assignment to exclude tort claims would mean that neither the assignor nor plaintiff, the assignee, would be able to sue defendants for malpractice for failing to exercise the call option in a timely manner, we find that the “special circumstances” exception to the privity requirement applies … . Deep Woods Holdings LLC v Pryor Cashman LLP, 2016 NY Slip Op 08156, 1st Dept 12-6-16

NEGLIGENCE (LEGAL MALPRACTICE, EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL DOCTRINE ADEQUATELY PLED, LAW FIRM MAY BE PROHIBITED FROM ARGUING THE ASSIGNMENT IT DREW UP FOR PLAINTIFF DID NOT ASSIGN PLAINTIFF THE RIGHT TO BRING A MALPRACTICE ACTION AGAINST IT)/LEGAL MALPRACTICE EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL DOCTRINE ADEQUATELY PLED, LAW FIRM MAY BE PROHIBITED FROM ARGUING THE ASSIGNMENT IT DREW UP FOR PLAINTIFF DID NOT ASSIGN PLAINTIFF THE RIGHT TO BRING A MALPRACTICE ACTION AGAINST IT)/CONTRACT LAW (ASSIGNMENT, EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL DOCTRINE ADEQUATELY PLED, LAW FIRM MAY BE PROHIBITED FROM ARGUING THE ASSIGNMENT IT DREW UP FOR PLAINTIFF DID NOT ASSIGN PLAINTIFF THE RIGHT TO BRING A MALPRACTICE ACTION AGAINST IT)/ASSIGNMENT (LEGAL MALPRACTICE, EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL DOCTRINE ADEQUATELY PLED, LAW FIRM MAY BE PROHIBITED FROM ARGUING THE ASSIGNMENT IT DREW UP FOR PLAINTIFF DID NOT ASSIGN PLAINTIFF THE RIGHT TO BRING A MALPRACTICE ACTION AGAINST IT)/ATTORNEYS (MALPRACTICE, EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL DOCTRINE ADEQUATELY PLED, LAW FIRM MAY BE PROHIBITED FROM ARGUING THE ASSIGNMENT IT DREW UP FOR PLAINTIFF DID NOT ASSIGN PLAINTIFF THE RIGHT TO BRING A MALPRACTICE ACTION AGAINST IT)/EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL (LEGAL MALPRACTICE, EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL DOCTRINE ADEQUATELY PLED, LAW FIRM MAY BE PROHIBITED FROM ARGUING THE ASSIGNMENT IT DREW UP FOR PLAINTIFF DID NOT ASSIGN PLAINTIFF THE RIGHT TO BRING A MALPRACTICE ACTION AGAINST IT)/CIVIL PROCEDURE (EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL DOCTRINE ADEQUATELY PLED, LAW FIRM MAY BE PROHIBITED FROM ARGUING THE ASSIGNMENT IT DREW UP FOR PLAINTIFF DID NOT ASSIGN PLAINTIFF THE RIGHT TO BRING A MALPRACTICE ACTION AGAINST IT)

TERMINATION SHOCKS THE CONSCIENCE, TEACHER SUGGESTED STUDENTS’ ANSWERS ON A STANDARDIZED TEST MIGHT BE WRONG.

The First Department, over a dissent, determined a teacher’s assisting several students on a standardized test did not warrant termination:

While petitioner’s behavior in suggesting to several students that some of their answers might be wrong demonstrated a lapse in judgment, petitioner did not provide the students with the correct answers and there is no evidence that the incident was anything but a one-time mistake … . Prior to her termination in October 2014, petitioner, a tenured teacher who had worked for respondent since 2003, had an unblemished record and, as the OSI investigator testified, was considered to be a good teacher … . Moreover, the record is devoid of evidence that would suggest petitioner could not remedy her behavior. Matter of Bolt v New York City Dept. of Educ., 2016 NY Slip Op 08158, 1st Dept 12-6-16

EDUCATION-SCHOOL LAW (TERMINATION TOO SEVERE A SANCTION, TEACHER SUGGESTED STUDENTS’ ANSWERS ON A STANDARDIZED TEST MIGHT BE WRONG)/TEACHERS (TERMINATION TOO SEVERE A SANCTION, TEACHER SUGGESTED STUDENTS’ ANSWERS ON A STANDARDIZED TEST MIGHT BE WRONG)/EMPLOYMENT LAW (TEACHERS, TERMINATION TOO SEVERE A SANCTION, TEACHER SUGGESTED STUDENTS’ ANSWERS ON A STANDARDIZED TEST MIGHT BE WRONG)/STANDARDIZED TESTS (TERMINATION TOO SEVERE A SANCTION, TEACHER SUGGESTED STUDENTS’ ANSWERS ON A STANDARDIZED TEST MIGHT BE WRONG)

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THE DECISION TO CALL OR NOT CALL A WITNESS IS ENTIRELY THE PROVINCE OF DEFENSE COUNSEL, WHETHER OR NOT THE DEFENDANT AGREES.

The First Department determined defendant was not deprived of his right to call his codefendant as a witness. Although he strongly expressed his wish to do so, defense counsel properly exercised professional judgment in deciding against calling the witness:

“If defense counsel solely defers to a defendant, without exercising his or her professional judgment, on a decision that is for the attorney, not the accused, to make because it is not fundamental, the defendant is deprived of the expert judgment of counsel to which the Sixth Amendment entitles him or her” … . Whether to call a witness is a strategic decision to be made by defense counsel … . Moreover, counsel had a sound reason for not calling the codefendant, who, in his plea allocution, had implicated defendant in the drug sale. To the extent defendant is claiming ineffective assistance of counsel, that claim is likewise without merit … . People v Sheard, 2016 NY Slip Op 08186, 1st Dept 12-6-16

 

CRIMINAL LAW (THE DECISION TO CALL OR NOT CALL A WITNESS IS ENTIRELY THE PROVINCE OF DEFENSE COUNSEL, WHETHER OR NOT THE DEFENDANT AGREES)/ATTORNEYS (CRIMINAL, THE DECISION TO CALL OR NOT CALL A WITNESS IS ENTIRELY THE PROVINCE OF DEFENSE COUNSEL, WHETHER OR NOT THE DEFENDANT AGREES)

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DEFENDANT ENTITLED TO A HEARING ON HIS MOTION TO VACATE HIS CONVICTION, HE ADEQUATELY ALLEGED DEFENSE COUNSEL GAVE HIM WRONG INFORMATION ABOUT THE DEPORTATION CONSEQUENCES OF A GUILTY PLEA VERSUS A CONVICTION AFTER TRIAL.

The First Department determined defendant was entitled to hearing on his motion to vacate the judgment of conviction. Defendant alleged he was erroneously told he would not be deported if he pled guilty to a drug sale, but could be deported if convicted after trial:

This case presents factual issues requiring a hearing into whether defendant was deprived of effective assistance of counsel under People v McDonald (1 NY3d 109 [2003]) by way of erroneous and prejudicial immigration advice. Defendant alleges that his attorney erroneously advised him that if he pleaded guilty to a drug sale count with a sentence of probation, he would not be subject to deportation, but if he refused the plea offer, proceeded to trial and lost, he would go to prison and then be deported. Defendant’s claim is corroborated, to some extent, by statements made to present counsel by the attorney who represented defendant at the time of the plea … . The standard “no other promises” disclaimer in defendant’s plea allocution does not, as a matter of law, defeat his claim of erroneous legal advice. This case warrants a hearing at which defendant may establish the advice he actually received regarding the deportation consequences of his plea. …

This case also warrants a hearing on the prejudice prong of defendant’s claim. Defendant made a sufficient showing to raise an issue of fact as to whether he could have rationally rejected the plea offer under all the circumstances of the case, including the serious consequences of deportation and his incentive to remain in the United States … . Further, defendant sufficiently alleges that if immigration consequences had been factored into the plea bargaining process, counsel might have been able to negotiate a different plea agreement that would not have resulted in automatic deportation. People v Santos, 2016 NY Slip Op 08169, 1st Dept 12-6-16

 

CRIMINAL LAW (DEFENDANT ENTITLED TO A HEARING ON HIS MOTION TO VACATE HIS CONVICTION, HE ADEQUATELY ALLEGED DEFENSE COUNSEL GAVE HIM WRONG INFORMATION ABOUT THE DEPORTATION CONSEQUENCES OF A GUILTY PLEA VERSUS A CONVICTION AFTER TRIAL)/ATTORNEYS (INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE, DEFENDANT ENTITLED TO A HEARING ON HIS MOTION TO VACATE HIS CONVICTION, HE ADEQUATELY ALLEGED DEFENSE COUNSEL GAVE HIM WRONG INFORMATION ABOUT THE DEPORTATION CONSEQUENCES OF A GUILTY PLEA VERSUS A CONVICTION AFTER TRIAL)/INEFFECTICE ASSISTANCE (DEFENDANT ENTITLED TO A HEARING ON HIS MOTION TO VACATE HIS CONVICTION, HE ADEQUATELY ALLEGED DEFENSE COUNSEL GAVE HIM WRONG INFORMATION ABOUT THE DEPORTATION CONSEQUENCES OF A GUILTY PLEA VERSUS A CONVICTION AFTER TRIAL)/VACATE CONVICTION, MOTION TO (DEFENDANT ENTITLED TO A HEARING ON HIS MOTION TO VACATE HIS CONVICTION, HE ADEQUATELY ALLEGED DEFENSE COUNSEL GAVE HIM WRONG INFORMATION ABOUT THE DEPORTATION CONSEQUENCES OF A GUILTY PLEA VERSUS A CONVICTION AFTER TRIAL)

PLAINTIFF ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON LABOR LAW 240 (1) CAUSE OF ACTION, LADDER KICKED OUT FROM UNDER HIM.

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff was entitled to summary judgment on his Labor Law 240 (1) cause of action. There was evidence the ladder kicked out from under plaintiff. There was no need to show the ladder was defective. It was enough the ladder was not secured:

Plaintiff established his entitlement to partial summary judgment on his Labor Law § 240(1) claim through witnesses’ testimony that the ladder from which he was descending suddenly kicked out to the left, resulting in his fall … . Contrary to the motion court’s finding, plaintiff was not required to demonstrate that the ladder was defective in order to satisfy his prima facie burden … .

In opposition, defendants failed to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether plaintiff was the sole proximate cause of the accident. Plaintiff was not responsible for setting up the ladder, and there was no testimony establishing the existence of any other readily available, adequate safety devices at the work site … . Furthermore, given the undisputed testimony that the ladder kicked out because it was unsecured, the testimony that plaintiff unsafely descended from the ladder by carrying pipe fittings in his arms established, at most, “contributory negligence, a defense inapplicable to a Labor Law § 240(1) claim” … . Fletcher v Brookfield Props., 2016 NY Slip Op 08105, 1st Dept 12-1-16

 

LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW (PLAINTIFF ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON LABOR LAW 240 (1) CAUSE OF ACTION, LADDER KICKED OUT FROM UNDER HIM)/LADDERS (PLAINTIFF ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON LABOR LAW 240 (1) CAUSE OF ACTION, LADDER KICKED OUT FROM UNDER HIM)

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THE FINDING THAT PETITIONER’S CHILD WAS IN IMMINENT DANGER OF ABUSE, BASED SOLELY UPON A SHOPLIFTING INCIDENT, WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE, PETITIONER’S NAME SHOULD NOT BE ON A LIST WHICH WILL MAKE IT DIFFICULT TO CONTINUE HER CAREER IN CHILD CARE.

The First Department, over a two-justice dissent, determined the administrative law judge’s (ALJ’s) finding that petitioner’s (mother’s) child was in imminent danger of harm was not supported by the evidence. Petitioner was caught shoplifting (wearing clothes under her clothes). At the time her five-year-old son was with her, and he too was wearing clothes under his clothes. The shoplifting charges were reduced to a violation and the record was sealed. Petitioner had no other contact with the criminal justice system. The child was deemed well cared for and happy. The issue was whether the petitioner’s name should be maintained on a list (“indicated” child abuse) which will make it difficult for her to continue her career in child care:

Under New York’s child protective scheme, a report of suspected child abuse or neglect will be marked “indicated” if the local agency determines after investigation that there is “some credible evidence of the alleged abuse or maltreatment” (Social Services Law § 412[7]). All childcare agencies and other agencies licensed by the state to provide certain services to children are required to inquire whether applicants for employment or to become foster or adoptive parents are subjects of indicated reports (Social Services Law § 424-a). An agency may choose to hire or approve persons on the list of those with indicated reports, but if it does, the agency must “maintain a written record, as part of the application file or employment record, of the specific reasons why such person was determined to be appropriate” for approval (Social Services Law § 424-a[2][a]). The names of subjects of indicated reports remain on the list until 10 years after the youngest child referred to in the report turns 18, unless earlier expunged (Social Services Law § 422[6]). * * *

… [T]he ALJ’s determination that petitioner’s actions were reasonably related to a position in childcare, the field of study petitioner is pursuing, was not rational. The legal standards for determining whether a child is maltreated … are repeated in the Guidelines. The ALJ failed to set forth his consideration of the relevant Guidelines for making such a determination, many of which, as the motion court pointed out, weighed in petitioner’s favor, including factors 2 (the seriousness and extent of any injury to child), 3 (harmful effect on the child of the subject’s actions or inactions), 5 (time since most recent incident of maltreatment), 6 (number of indicated incidents of abuse or maltreatment), 8(a) (whether the acts have been repeated), and 10 (whether reported behavior involved serious injury to, or death of, a child). The single factor the ALJ discussed, factor 8(b), “any information produced . . . in regard to . . . rehabilitation,” failed to consider that all of the evidence at the hearing indicated that petitioner has never been convicted of any crime…; no further [shoplifting] incidents had occurred; petitioner had no prior history with ACS (NYC Administration for Children’s Services); all of her family members interviewed expressed surprise at her behavior on the occasion leading to the report; and she told the caseworker she had “learned her lesson.” Matter of Natasha W. v New York State Off. of Children & Family Servs., 2016 NY Slip Op 08099, 1st Dept 12-1-16

FAMILY LAW (FINDING THAT PETITIONER’S CHILD WAS IN IMMINENT DANGER OF ABUSE, BASED SOLELY UPON A SHOPLIFTING INCIDENT, WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE, PETITIONER’S NAME SHOULD NOT BE ON A LIST WHICH WILL MAKE IT DIFFICULT TO CONTINUE HER CAREER IN CHILD CARE)/SOCIAL SERVICES LAW (CHILD ABUSE, FINDING THAT PETITIONER’S CHILD WAS IN IMMINENT DANGER OF ABUSE, BASED SOLELY UPON A SHOPLIFTING INCIDENT, WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE, PETITIONER’S NAME SHOULD NOT BE ON A LIST WHICH WILL MAKE IT DIFFICULT TO CONTINUE HER CAREER IN CHILD CARE)/CHILD ABUSE (FINDING THAT PETITIONER’S CHILD WAS IN IMMINENT DANGER OF ABUSE, BASED SOLELY UPON A SHOPLIFTING INCIDENT, WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE, PETITIONER’S NAME SHOULD NOT BE ON A LIST WHICH WILL MAKE IT DIFFICULT TO CONTINUE HER CAREER IN CHILD CARE)/CHILD CARE (FINDING THAT PETITIONER’S CHILD WAS IN IMMINENT DANGER OF ABUSE, BASED SOLELY UPON A SHOPLIFTING INCIDENT, WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE, PETITIONER’S NAME SHOULD NOT BE ON A LIST WHICH WILL MAKE IT DIFFICULT TO CONTINUE HER CAREER IN CHILD CARE)

CUSTODY AWARD REVERSED, FACTORS ERRONEOUSLY RELIED UPON BY FAMILY COURT EXPLAINED IN DETAIL. 

The First Department, reversing Family Court, determined mother, not father, should be awarded sole legal custody of the child:

The Family Court Judge presiding over the trial of this complex and long-running custody matter was clearly concerned with the child’s best interests and wrestled with concerns about the mother’s history of mental health issues, and the effect on the child of a “temporary” award of custody to the father, issued years prior to assignment of the case to the trial judge. However, a thorough review of the record does not provide a sound and substantial basis for the award of custody to the father, and requires an award of custody to the mother. * * *

In its award of custody to the father, the Family Court erred in several respects. First, it gave substantial weight to the fact that the father had temporary custody of the child for four years and nine months. This fact should not have been a basis, without more, for a final custody award. * * *

Secondly, the Family Court gave excessive weight to the parties’ financial circumstances, noting that their finances favored the father because the father works, and the mother is unemployed and receives Supplemental Security Income (SSI). * * *

Third, there is no support for the Family Court’s finding that the neutral forensic evaluator “made an initial superficial assessment of the parties at the commencement of his evaluative process, cast his lot with [the mother], and worked from that point to present his findings in her favor.” * * *

Fourth, Family Court’s concern about the mother’s mental health history is understandable, but its conclusions disregard crucial evidence and its determination is not in the child’s best interests. In March 2015, when the trial was completed, the mother was in remission, had not been hospitalized since November 2010, and, in the five years since then, had been compliant with treatment by her psychiatrist and therapist. * * *

Fifth, [the child’s]  close relationship to her siblings, all of whom reside with her mother, also weighs in favor of awarding custody to the mother, since “the stability and companionship to be gained from keeping the children together is an important factor for the court to consider” in making a custody determination …, because “[y]oung brothers and sisters need each other’s strengths and association in their everyday and often common experiences, and to separate them, unnecessarily, is likely to be traumatic and harmful” … . …

Finally, Family Court improperly considered this a relocation case, governed by Matter of Tropea v Tropea (87 NY2d 727, 740-741 [1996]). However, since there has been no prior custody order, Tropea does not govern, and relocation should have been considered as one factor in determining the child’s best interests … . Matter of Michael B. (Lillian B.), 2016 NY Slip Op 08101, 1st Dept 12-1-16

 

FAMILY LAW (CUSTODY AWARD REVERSED, FACTORS ERRONEOUSLY RELIED UPON BY FAMILY COURT EXPLAINED IN DETAIL)/CUSTODY (CUSTODY AWARD REVERSED, FACTORS ERRONEOUSLY RELIED UPON BY FAMILY COURT EXPLAINED IN DETAIL)

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COUNTERCLAIMS ALLEGING ENTITLEMENT TO A NONDISCRETIONARY BONUS PRECLUDED BY TERMS OF EMPLOYEE HANDBOOK.

The First Department, over an extensive dissent, determined the terms of the employee handbook, signed by the plaintiff, precluded counterclaims alleging an oral promise to pay an annual bonus:

The operative employee handbook stating, inter alia, that bonuses were paid at the sole discretion of plaintiff, and the acknowledgment of the handbook’s terms signed by defendant, conclusively refute the counterclaims based on the alleged oral promise to pay an annual nondiscretionary bonus … .

Nor was the discretionary bonus policy modified by the alleged oral agreement. As defendant’s acknowledgment makes clear, “[N]o supervisor, manager or other representative of [plaintiff] has the authority to make any verbal promises, commitments, or statements of any kind regarding the Company’s policies, procedures, or any other issues that are legally binding on the Company.”

The quasi-contractual counterclaims based on the alleged agreement are likewise precluded by the discretionary bonus policy … .

The alleged oral promise to pay acquisition proceeds, however, was not established to be a “bonus” within the scope of the discretionary bonus policy. The complaint alleges that the promised payment was not performance-based, but was an inducement to keep defendant from quitting … . The breach of contract counterclaim based on this alleged promise is nonetheless barred because the promise was not in writing, as required by the broad language of the acknowledgment … .

The quasi-contractual counterclaims, to the extent predicated on an alleged agreement to pay acquisition proceeds, likewise fail. Such claims require an element of reasonable reliance on a promise, a reasonable expectation of compensation, or an inequity, all of which are negated where, as here, the plaintiff receives adequate compensation and signed a written acknowledgment confirming the fact that no representative of plaintiff had authority to make legally binding verbal promises … . Newmark & Co. Real Estate, Inc. v Frischer, 2016 NY Slip Op 08100, 1st Dept 12-1-16

EMPLOYMENT LAW (COUNTERCLAIMS ALLEGING ENTITLEMENT TO A NONDISCRETIONARY BONUS PRECLUDED BY TERMS OF EMPLOYEE HANDBOOK)/CONTRACT LAW (EMPLOYMENT LAW, COUNTERCLAIMS ALLEGING ENTITLEMENT TO A NONDISCRETIONARY BONUS PRECLUDED BY TERMS OF EMPLOYEE HANDBOOK)/BONUSES (EMPLOYMENT LAW, COUNTERCLAIMS ALLEGING ENTITLEMENT TO A NONDISCRETIONARY BONUS PRECLUDED BY TERMS OF EMPLOYEE HANDBOOK)

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