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IN THIS PROSECUTION ALLEGING DEFENDANT CELL PHONE COMPANY’S UNDERPAYMENT OF SALES TAX, DEFENDANT WAS ENTITLED TO THE SALES TAX RETURNS OF OTHER CELL PHONE SERVICE PROVIDERS.

The First Department determined defendant Sprint Communications was entitled to the state’s sales tax returns and records of other providers of mobile telecommunications voice services, but with the names of the providers redacted.  The action was brought by the state and alleged the underpayment of sales tax:

The People claim that they will use only material obtained from third-party discovery and that they have disclosed those materials to defendants. However, the fact that the People have chosen to restrict the materials they will use to prosecute defendants does not mean that defendants must restrict the materials they will use to defend themselves. Moreover, defendants cannot obtain … [the] documents from third parties.

If a document that shows another cell phone company’s or DTF’s position about debundling, etc., happens to mention the other cell phone company’s name, the People may not withhold the entire document. … Instead, the People should replace the taxpayers’ names with “Cell Phone Company No. 1” and “Cell Phone Company No. 2,” or the like. People v Sprint Communications Inc., 2017 NY Slip Op 01801, 1st Dept 3-15-17

 

TAX LAW (IN THIS PROSECUTION ALLEGING DEFENDANT CELL PHONE COMPANY’S UNDERPAYMENT OF SALES TAX, DEFENDANT WAS ENTITLED TO THE SALES TAX RETURNS OF OTHER CELL PHONE SERVICE PROVIDERS)/SALES TAX (CELL PHONE SERVICE PROVIDERS, IN THIS PROSECUTION ALLEGING DEFENDANT CELL PHONE COMPANY’S UNDERPAYMENT OF SALES TAX, DEFENDANT WAS ENTITLED TO THE SALES TAX RETURNS OF OTHER CELL PHONE SERVICE PROVIDERS)/CELL PHONE SERVICE PROVIDERS (SALES TAX, IN THIS PROSECUTION ALLEGING DEFENDANT CELL PHONE COMPANY’S UNDERPAYMENT OF SALES TAX, DEFENDANT WAS ENTITLED TO THE SALES TAX RETURNS OF OTHER CELL PHONE SERVICE PROVIDERS)

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PRODUCTS LIABILITY ACTION AGAINST ELEVATOR MANUFACTURER SHOULD HAVE SURVIVED SUMMARY JUDGMENT, LABOR LAW 240(1) INAPPLICABLE TO ELEVATOR ACCIDENT.

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined there was a question fact whether a defective elevator part caused the elevator to fall when plaintiff, who was repairing the elevator, was in the elevator car. The court further determined plaintiff’s Labor Law 240(1) was properly dismissed because securing the elevator to prevent a fall would have made repairing the elevator impossible:

… [P]aintiff raised issues of fact whether the shim was defective and a cause of the accident and whether there was a failure to warn. Plaintiff’s expert opined that the cracked shoe caused the elevator car to get wedged in the hoistway in the manner that plaintiff described, and … [an] engineer involved in the design of the elevator acknowledged that the car could come out of the rails and get hung up if a guide shoe cracked while the elevator was descending. The engineer also testified that, after a previous instance in which a similar guide shoe by the same manufacturer had cracked because bolts had been over-tightened, [the manufacturer] had redesigned the shim in 2003 to prevent the guide shoe from cracking because of over-tightening of the bolts, but had made no effort to notify customers whose elevators had the older shims.

The elevator was not a safety device within the meaning of Labor Law § 240(1) … . Plaintiff’s reliance on McCrea v Arnlie Realty Co. LLC (140 AD3d 427 [1st Dept 2016]) is unavailing. In that case, the elevator on which the plaintiff was engaged in repair work fell onto the plaintiff because it had not been secured. In this case, plaintiff was inside the elevator, riding up and down to test it. To the extent plaintiff may have been engaged in “repair” within the meaning of Labor Law § 240(1), the statute does not apply, because any securing device would have defeated the purpose of his work by precluding him from riding the elevator … . Versace v 1540 Broadway L.P., 2017 NY Slip Op 01813, 1st Dept 3-15-17

 

PRODUCTS LIABILITY (PRODUCTS LIABILITY ACTION AGAINST ELEVATOR MANUFACTURER SHOULD HAVE SURVIVED SUMMARY JUDGMENT, LABOR LAW 240(1) INAPPLICABLE TO ELEVATOR ACCIDENT)/ELEVATORS (PRODUCTS LIABILITY ACTION AGAINST ELEVATOR MANUFACTURER SHOULD HAVE SURVIVED SUMMARY JUDGMENT, LABOR LAW 240(1) INAPPLICABLE TO ELEVATOR ACCIDENT)/LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW (PRODUCTS LIABILITY ACTION AGAINST ELEVATOR MANUFACTURER SHOULD HAVE SURVIVED SUMMARY JUDGMENT, LABOR LAW 240(1) INAPPLICABLE TO ELEVATOR ACCIDENT)

QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER FAILURE TO SAND OR SALT STEPS CREATED OR EXACERBATED A DANGEROUS CONDITION.

The First Department, finding that summary judgment was properly denied in this slip and fall case, noted that there was a question of fact whether the failure to sand or salt the steps created or exacerbated a dangerous condition:

Plaintiff alleges that she was injured when she slipped on icy steps in front of defendants’ residence. The record shows that defendant Kenneth Clarke testified that sheets of icy rain had been falling all morning on the day of the accident, and that the steps had been cleared earlier that morning by a man he had hired to clear snow and ice. However, plaintiff and a neighbor who lived across the street testified that there was no precipitation on the morning of the accident, but that it had snowed two and three days earlier. Plaintiff also stated that she had not seen the man defendant had hired to clear the steps, either after the previous snowfall or that morning, although she was home and would have been aware of his presence. Moreover, there are conflicting opinions of expert meteorologists regarding the weather conditions on the morning of plaintiff’s fall. Under these circumstances, summary judgment was properly denied, since triable issues of fact exist as to whether there was a storm in progress on the morning of plaintiff’s accident, which would have suspended defendants’ obligation to clear the steps of snow and ice … .

Furthermore, assuming that there was no storm in progress, the record also presents issues of fact as to whether anyone acting on defendants’ behalf ever inspected and cleared the steps, either on the morning of the accident or after the prior snowfall, and, if so, whether such person’s “failure to place sand or salt on the stairs created or exacerbated a dangerous condition” after the prior storm … . Arroyo v Clarke, 2017 NY Slip Op 01809, 1st Dept 3-15-17

 

NEGLIGENCE (QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER FAILURE TO SAND OR SALT STEPS CREATED OR EXACERBATED A DANGEROUS CONDITION)/SLIP AND FALL (QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER FAILURE TO SAND OR SALT STEPS CREATED OR EXACERBATED A DANGEROUS CONDITION)

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LATE NOTICE OF CLAIM SHOULD HAVE BEEN ALLOWED DESPITE LACK OF A REASONABLE EXCUSE AND DEFENDANT’S LACK OF KNOWLEDGE OF THE INJURY.

The First Department determined plaintiff’s motion for leave to file a late notice of claim against the NYC Housing Authority should have been granted, despite the lack of a reasonable excuse and defendant’s lack of knowledge of the injury. The infant plaintiff was nine months old when he was burned by an exposed water pipe.  The infancy and the lack of prejudice to the defendant warranted allowing the claim to be filed after a 10-month delay:

The infant plaintiff was approximately nine months old at the time that he allegedly sustained injuries as a result of an exposed hot water pipe in his family’s apartment, in a building owned and operated by defendant. This infancy weighs in favor of granting leave to serve a late notice of claim, regardless of the lack of a nexus between the delay and infancy … . In addition, defendant failed to address plaintiff’s showing that defendant would not be substantially prejudiced by the 10-month delay in seeking leave since the condition of the exposed pipes remained unchanged from the time of the accident … . Given these factors, which the motion court failed to address, and given the remedial nature of the statute, the motion court improvidently exercised its discretion in dismissing the infant plaintiff’s claim … . Eboni B. v New York City Hous. Auth., 2017 NY Slip Op 01816, 1st De[t 3-15-17

MUNICIPAL LAW (LATE NOTICE OF CLAIM SHOULD HAVE BEEN ALLOWED DESPITE LACK OF A REASONABLE EXCUSE AND DEFENDANT’S LACK OF KNOWLEDGE OF THE INJURY)/NOTICE OF CLAIM (LATE NOTICE OF CLAIM SHOULD HAVE BEEN ALLOWED DESPITE LACK OF A REASONABLE EXCUSE AND DEFENDANT’S LACK OF KNOWLEDGE OF THE INJURY)/NEGLIGENCE (MUNICIPAL LAW, LATE NOTICE OF CLAIM SHOULD HAVE BEEN ALLOWED DESPITE LACK OF A REASONABLE EXCUSE AND DEFENDANT’S LACK OF KNOWLEDGE OF THE INJURY)

PLAINTIFF ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON HIS LABOR LAW 240(1) CAUSE OF ACTION, FALL FROM A-FRAME LADDER.

The First Department determined plaintiff was entitled to summary judgment on his Labor Law 240(1) cause of action. Plaintiff fell when the A-frame ladder moved when he was standing on it:

Plaintiff established his entitlement to partial summary judgment on the Labor Law § 240(1) claim through his testimony that he was injured when the A-frame ladder on which he was standing moved underneath him as he applied pressure to it while trying to remove part of the drop ceiling he was demolishing … . Plaintiff was not required to show that the ladder was defective or that he actually fell off the ladder to satisfy his prima facie burden … .

Defendants failed to raise a triable issue of fact whether plaintiff was the sole proximate cause of the accident. There is no testimony in the record as to whether there were other readily available, adequate safety devices at the accident site that plaintiff declined to use … . Moreover, the evidence establishes that the ladder twisted underneath plaintiff because it was unsecured, not because he misused it, and that defendants provided no other safety devices for his use. At most, plaintiff’s application of pressure to the ladder while engaged in the work he was directed to do, which caused it to twist, was comparative negligence, no defense to a section 240(1) claim … . “Regardless of the method employed by plaintiff to remove [the drop ceiling], the ladder provided to him was not an adequate safety device for the task he was performing” … . Messina v City of New York, 2017 NY Slip Op 01823, 1st Dept 3-15-17

 

LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW (PLAINTIFF ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON HIS LABOR LAW 240(1) CAUSE OF ACTION, FALL FROM A-FRAME LADDER)/LADDERS (LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW, PLAINTIFF ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON HIS LABOR LAW 240(1) CAUSE OF ACTION, FALL FROM A-FRAME LADDER)

TILTING A SKID FROM A VERTICAL POSITION ONTO A DOLLY IS COVERED UNDER LABOR LAW 240(1), QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER A SAFETY DEVICE WAS REQUIRED.

The First Department determined Labor Law 240(1) applied to the task of tilting a skid from a vertical position to a dolly.  However, there was a question of fact whether the skid was heavy enough to require a safety device:

Plaintiff was injured when he and a coworker attempted to move a wooden skid from a vertical position onto an A-frame dolly by tilting it at a 45-degree angle on one corner and toppling it onto the dolly. While plaintiff hoisted his side of the skid overhead with his arms, his coworker apparently lost his grip, and the skid fell on plaintiff, causing tears in his arm and shoulder.

That plaintiff and the skid were on the same level does not bar application of Labor Law § 240(1) … .

However, contrary to plaintiff’s argument, a triable issue of fact exists as to the weight of the skid and, therefore, whether a safety device was required under the statute. Natoli v City of New York, 2017 NY Slip Op 01818, 1st Dept 3-15-17

LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW (TILTING A SKID FROM A VERTICAL POSITION ONTO A DOLLY IS COVERED UNDER LABOR LAW 240(1), QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER A SAFETY DEVICE WAS REQUIRED)

QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER BOUNCER WAS ACTING WITHIN THE SCOPE OF HIS EMPLOYMENT WHEN HE THREW PLAINTIFF TO THE GROUND.

The First Department determined defendant bar’s motion for summary judgment dismissing plaintiff’s respondeat superior claim was properly denied. Plaintiff was thrown to the ground by the bar’s bouncer. There was a question of fact whether the bouncer was acting within the scope of his employment:

Plaintiff was assaulted by a security guard/bouncer in the employ of defendant after plaintiff, who had been denied admittance to defendant’s bar because of perceived intoxication, grabbed the baseball cap from the bouncer’s head. Less than 30 seconds elapsed between plaintiff taking the cap and the bouncer throwing plaintiff to the ground, which occurred approximately 10 feet from the entrance to defendant’s bar. On this record, it cannot be concluded, as a matter of law, that the bouncer was acting outside the scope of his employment at the time of the assault … . Salem v MacDougal Rest. Inc., 2017 NY Slip Op 01832, 1st Dept 3-15-17

EMPLOYMENT LAW (NEGLIGENCE, QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER BOUNCER WAS ACTING WITHIN THE SCOPE OF HIS EMPLOYMENT WHEN HE THREW PLAINTIFF TO THE GROUND)/RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR (NEGLIGENCE, QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER BOUNCER WAS ACTING WITHIN THE SCOPE OF HIS EMPLOYMENT WHEN HE THREW PLAINTIFF TO THE GROUND)

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WITNESS’S DISAVOWED IDENTIFICATION OF ANOTHER AS THE PERPETRATOR COULD NOT BE USED AFFIRMATIVELY BY THE DEFENDANT AS EVIDENCE OF THIRD-PARTY CULPABILITY.

The First Department determined a witness’s disavowed identification of another as the perpetrator could not be used as evidence of third-party culpability:

The court providently exercised its discretion in ruling that defendant could not, in the absence of additional evidence, argue that the person initially identified by the witness was the actual perpetrator … , and this ruling did not deprive defendant of a fair trial or the right to present a defense. The court did not preclude defendant from introducing evidence of third-party culpability; on the contrary, it expressly invited defendant to introduce certain evidence of that nature. Rather than precluding a third-party culpability defense, the court providently ruled that such a defense could not, without more, be supported by the disavowed identification, which the witness explained as a deliberate falsehood. Defendant received a full opportunity to explore the misidentification and all surrounding circumstances, and to use these matters to attack the witness’s credibility. While defendant cites additional evidence that would have supported the claim that the misidentified man was the actual perpetrator, he was free to introduce this evidence at trial but failed to do so. Even if the court had permitted defendant to specifically argue third-party culpability in summation, defendant would not have been entitled to argue about matters not in evidence. People v Francis, 2017 NY Slip Op 01817, 1st Dept 3-15-17

CRIMINAL LAW (WITNESS’S DISAVOWED IDENTIFICATION OF ANOTHER AS THE PERPETRATOR COULD NOT BE USED AFFIRMATIVELY BY THE DEFENDANT AS EVIDENCE OF THIRD-PARTY CULPABILITY)/EVIDENCE (CRIMINAL LAW, WITNESS’S DISAVOWED IDENTIFICATION OF ANOTHER AS THE PERPETRATOR COULD NOT BE USED AFFIRMATIVELY BY THE DEFENDANT AS EVIDENCE OF THIRD-PARTY CULPABILITY)/THIRD PARTY CULPABILITY (CRMINAL LAW, (WITNESS’S DISAVOWED IDENTIFICATION OF ANOTHER AS THE PERPETRATOR COULD NOT BE USED AFFIRMATIVELY BY THE DEFENDANT AS EVIDENCE OF THIRD-PARTY CULPABILITY)

FAILURE TO GIVE SUPPLEMENTAL INSTRUCTIONS TO CLARIFY THE SHARED INTENT REQUIREMENTS FOR ACCOMPLICE LIABILITY DEPRIVED DEFEFNDANTS OF A FAIR TRIAL.

The First Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Renwick, over a full-fledged dissenting opinion, determined (in the interest of justice) the two defendants were deprived of a fair trial by the failure of the trial judge give supplemental instructions to clarify the requirements for robbery convictions under an accomplice (shared intent) theory. One of the two defendants stole three rings from a small shop. The other struck the shopkeeper after she confronted them. The jury made repeated requests for clarification of the intent criteria. In response to each request the trial court read the elements of the robbery charges and accomplice liability:

With regard to Telesford, the issue of intent was critical in one respect. The evidence adduced at trial undeniably established that Telesford assaulted the complainant. To sustain a conviction for robbery in the second degree based upon accessorial liability, however, the evidence, when viewed in a light most favorable to the prosecution, must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Telesford acted with the mental culpability necessary to commit the robbery and that, in furtherance thereof, he solicited, requested, commanded, importuned or intentionally aided the principal to commit such crime … . Thus, in this case, an inference that Telesford helped Celestine commit the robbery, based on his role as an accomplice, would have been insufficient to prove the requisite intent to steal, in the absence of a specific finding that Telesford intended to do more than commit an assault … .

With regard to Celestine, the issue of intent was critical in a different respect. Undeniably, the evidence established beyond a reasonable doubt that Celestine took the three rings. Such conduct, however, by itself, constituted no more than a larceny, absent proof that either defendant used force to take or retain the stolen items. Although, as indicated, Telesford did use force to attack the victim, in order to convict either defendant of robbery, the jury needed to find that the violent attack on the victim, by Telesford, was not a mere response to insults and being spat upon by the victim, but that it was rather part and parcel to the taking or retaining of the stolen items. In other words, the jury had to find that Celestine intended to use force to retain the ring(s), either by using his own force or taking advantage of Telesford use of force … . People v Telesford, 2017 NY Slip Op 01836, 1st Dept 3-15-17

 

CRIMINAL LAW (FAILURE TO GIVE SUPPLEMENTAL INSTRUCTIONS TO CLARIFY THE SHARED INTENT REQUIREMENTS FOR ACCOMPLICE LIABILITY DEPRIVED DEFEFNDANTS OF A FAIR TRIAL)/JURY INSTRUCTIONS (CRIMINAL LAW, FAILURE TO GIVE SUPPLEMENTAL INSTRUCTIONS TO CLARIFY THE SHARED INTENT REQUIREMENTS FOR ACCOMPLICE LIABILITY DEPRIVED DEFEFNDANTS OF A FAIR TRIAL)/ACCOMPLICE LIABILITY (FAILURE TO GIVE SUPPLEMENTAL INSTRUCTIONS TO CLARIFY THE SHARED INTENT REQUIREMENTS FOR ACCOMPLICE LIABILITY DEPRIVED DEFEFNDANTS OF A FAIR TRIAL)/SHARED INTENT (CRIMINAL LAW, FAILURE TO GIVE SUPPLEMENTAL INSTRUCTIONS TO CLARIFY THE SHARED INTENT REQUIREMENTS FOR ACCOMPLICE LIABILITY DEPRIVED DEFEFNDANTS OF A FAIR TRIAL)

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PUTBACK ACTION STEMMING FROM THE PURCHASE OF RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE BACKED SECURITIES SURVIVED MOTIONS TO DISMISS.

The First Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Renwick, determined the action alleging breach of warranties and representations in connection with the purchase of residential mortgage backed securities (RMBS) properly survived motions to dismiss. The opinion is fact-specific and turns on the terms of the contracts.  The issues, all of which survived the dismissal motions, were summarized by the court as follows:

This appeal stems from a transaction involving residential mortgage backed securities (RMBS). Plaintiff, the administrator of the securitized trust, seeks to enforce the loan repurchase rights, more commonly referred to as putback rights, against defendant sponsor of the securitized transaction for breach of the representations and warranties defendant made regarding the quality of the mortgage loans. This action raises a number of issues that regularly recur in putback actions, including whether the action was timely commenced, whether or not the action is unripe for failing to comply with a condition precedent to commencement of the action, and whether plaintiff adequately pleaded a cause of action for breach of the representations and warranties. This action also raises an issue of first impression of whether enforcement of putback rights is within the exclusive domain of a RMBS’s trustee so as to deny plaintiff Securities Administrator standing to commence this action. Natixis Real Estate Capital Trust 2007-HE2 v Natixis Real Estate Holdings, LLC, 2017 NY Slip Op 01796, 1st Dept 3-9-17

SECURITIES (PUTBACK ACTION STEMMING FROM THE PURCHASE OF RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE BACKED SECURITIES SURVIVED MOTIONS TO DISMISS)/CONTACT LAW (PUTBACK ACTION STEMMING FROM THE PURCHASE OF RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE BACKED SECURITIES SURVIVED MOTIONS TO DISMISS)/RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE BACKED SECURITIES (PUTBACK ACTION STEMMING FROM THE PURCHASE OF RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE BACKED SECURITIES SURVIVED MOTIONS TO DISMISS)/PUTBACK ACTIONS (RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE BACKED SECURITIES, PUTBACK ACTION STEMMING FROM THE PURCHASE OF RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE BACKED SECURITIES SURVIVED MOTIONS TO DISMISS)

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