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ALTHOUGH THE FINDING MOTHER WAS MENTALLY ILL WAS NOT APPEALABLE AS OF RIGHT, BECAUSE OF THE STIGMA THE COURT DEEMED THE NOTICE OF APPEAL TO BE A REQUEST FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL AND HEARD THE APPEAL (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department noted that a finding mother is mentally ill within the meaning of the Social Services Law is not, as a nondispositional order, appealable as of right. However, because of the stigma attached to the finding, the court deemed the notice of appeal to be a request for leave to appeal and granted it. The mental illness finding was affirmed:

Although this nondispositional order is not appealable as of right (see Family Ct Act § 1112[a]), the finding that the mother is mentally ill within the meaning of Social Services Law § 384-b constitutes a permanent and significant stigma that might impact her status in future proceedings … . Accordingly, the Court, on its own motion, deems the notice of appeal to be a request for leave to appeal, and hereby grants leave to appeal … . Matter of Chad Nasir S. (Charity Simone S.), 2018 NY Slip Op 00026, First Dept 1-2-18

APPEALS (FAMILY LAW, SOCIAL SERVICES LAW, ALTHOUGH THE FINDING MOTHER WAS MENTALLY ILL WAS NOT APPEALABLE AS OF RIGHT, BECAUSE OF THE STIGMA THE COURT DEEMED THE NOTICE OF APPEAL TO BE A REQUEST FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL AND HEARD THE APPEAL (FIRST DEPT))/FAMILY LAW (APPEALS, SOCIAL SERVICES LAW, ALTHOUGH THE FINDING MOTHER WAS MENTALLY ILL WAS NOT APPEALABLE AS OF RIGHT, BECAUSE OF THE STIGMA THE COURT DEEMED THE NOTICE OF APPEAL TO BE A REQUEST FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL AND HEARD THE APPEAL (FIRST DEPT))/MENTAL ILLNESS (APPEALS, FAMILY LAW, ALTHOUGH THE FINDING MOTHER WAS MENTALLY ILL WAS NOT APPEALABLE AS OF RIGHT, BECAUSE OF THE STIGMA THE COURT DEEMED THE NOTICE OF APPEAL TO BE A REQUEST FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL AND HEARD THE APPEAL (FIRST DEPT))/SOCIAL SERVICES LAW (APPEALS, MENTAL ILLNESS, FAMILY LAW, ALTHOUGH THE FINDING MOTHER WAS MENTALLY ILL WAS NOT APPEALABLE AS OF RIGHT, BECAUSE OF THE STIGMA THE COURT DEEMED THE NOTICE OF APPEAL TO BE A REQUEST FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL AND HEARD THE APPEAL (FIRST DEPT))

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COURT WAS REQUIRED TO INFORM DEFENDANT OF THE DEPORTATION CONSEQUENCES OF HIS PLEA, DESPITE DEFENDANT’S ERRONEOUS STATEMENT TO THE COURT THAT HE IS A US CITIZEN, DEFENDANT ALLOWED TO MOVE TO VACATE HIS PLEA (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Manzanet-Daniels, over an extensive dissent, determined defendant should be afforded the opportunity to move to vacate his guilty plea because the court did not inform him of the deportation consequences. Although the probation report indicated defendant was not a US citizen and was undocumented, the defendant, who had a history of mental illness, told the court, when asked, the he was a US citizen. The First Department held that all defendants must be informed of the deportation consequences for non-citizens:

In People v Peque (22 NY3d 168 [2013]…), the Court of Appeals held that before accepting a plea, due process requires that a court “apprise a defendant that, if the defendant is not an American citizen, he or she may be deported as a consequence of a guilty plea to a felony” … . The Court reasoned that “fundamental fairness . . . requires a trial court to make a noncitizen defendant aware of the risk of deportation because deportation frequently results from a noncitizen's guilty plea and constitutes a uniquely devastating deprivation of liberty” … . Accordingly, “a noncitizen defendant convicted of a removable crime can hardly make a voluntary and intelligent choice among the alternative courses of action'” unless informed of the possibility of deportation … .

Defendant's statement to the court that he was a citizen did not absolve the court of its obligations pursuant to Peque. Notably, Peque did not condition the need to give this warning on whether or not the court has reason to believe the defendant is not a citizen. The warning mandated by Peque is required whether the defendant is a citizen or not. Indeed, the Court of Appeals recognized that in order to protect the rights of the large number of noncitizen defendants pleading guilty to felonies in the state, it was necessary to “make all defendants aware that, if they are not United States citizens,” pleading guilty to a felony might lead to deportation … . People v Palmer, 2018 NY Slip Op 00638, First Dept 1-2-18

CRIMINAL LAW (DEPORTATION, COURT WAS REQUIRED TO INFORM DEFENDANT OF THE DEPORTATION CONSEQUENCES OF HIS PLEA, DESPITE DEFENDANT'S ERRONEOUS STATEMENT TO THE COURT THAT HE IS A US CITIZEN, DEFENDANT ALLOWED TO MOVE TO VACATE HIS PLEA (FIRST DEPT))/IMMIGRATION (CRIMINAL LAW, COURT WAS REQUIRED TO INFORM DEFENDANT OF THE DEPORTATION CONSEQUENCES OF HIS PLEA, DESPITE DEFENDANT'S ERRONEOUS STATEMENT TO THE COURT THAT HE IS A US CITIZEN, DEFENDANT ALLOWED TO MOVE TO VACATE HIS PLEA (FIRST DEPT))/DEPORTATION CRIMINAL LAW, COURT WAS REQUIRED TO INFORM DEFENDANT OF THE DEPORTATION CONSEQUENCES OF HIS PLEA, DESPITE DEFENDANT'S ERRONEOUS STATEMENT TO THE COURT THAT HE IS A US CITIZEN, DEFENDANT ALLOWED TO MOVE TO VACATE HIS PLEA (FIRST DEPT))/PLEA, MOTION TO VACATE (CRIMINAL LAW, DEPORTATION, COURT WAS REQUIRED TO INFORM DEFENDANT OF THE DEPORTATION CONSEQUENCES OF HIS PLEA, DESPITE DEFENDANT'S ERRONEOUS STATEMENT TO THE COURT THAT HE IS A US CITIZEN, DEFENDANT ALLOWED TO MOVE TO VACATE HIS PLEA (FIRST DEPT))

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PLAINTIFF ENTITLED TO CONSIDERATION WHETHER ENFORCING THE AGREEMENT TO ARBITRATE THIS EMPLOYMENT DISPUTE WOULD, BECAUSE OF THE COSTS INVOLVED, EFFECTIVELY PRECLUDE PLAINTIFF FROM PURSUING HIS CLAIM (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff was entitled to consideration whether compliance with the agreement to arbitrate would, because of the costs involved, effectively prohibit plaintiff from pursing his claim alleging untimely payment of wages:

… [T]he court erred in failing to address plaintiff’s contention that, because of his financial circumstances, requiring him to arbitrate, and to do so in Florida, would preclude him from pursuing his claims (Matter of Brady v Williams Capital Group, L.P., 14 NY3d 459 [2010]). Acknowledging the “strong state policy favoring arbitration [] and the equally strong policy requiring the invalidation of such agreements when they contain terms that could preclude a litigant from vindicating his/her statutory rights in the arbitral forum” … , the Court of Appeals in Brady held, as here relevant, that,

“in this context, the issue of a litigant’s financial ability [to arbitrate] is to be resolved on a case-by-case basis and that the inquiry should at minimum consider the following questions: (1) whether the litigant can pay the arbitration fees and costs; (2) what is the expected cost differential between arbitration and litigation in court; and (3) whether the cost differential is so substantial as to deter the bringing of claims in the arbitral forum. Although a full hearing is not required in all situations, there should be a written record of the findings pertaining to a litigant’s financial ability” … .

Applying the foregoing standard, we hold that plaintiff has made a preliminary showing that the fee sharing and venue provisions in the arbitration agreement have the effect of precluding him from pursuing his statutory wage claim in arbitration …

… While Brady did not expressly address this issue, by extension of its logic, the risk of plaintiff having to pay defendant’s attorneys’ fees, if it prevails, may be taken into account in considering whether the total costs associated with arbitration preclude plaintiff from pursuing his claim in the arbitral forum. Adams v Kent Sec. of N.Y., Inc., 2017 NY Slip Op 09274, First Dept 12-28-17

 

STEP WAS OPEN AND OBVIOUS AND THEREFORE WAS NOT ACTIONABLE IN THIS SLIP AND FALL CASE (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the single eight inch step which allegedly caused plaintiff to fall was open and obvious and, therefore, not actionable:

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Defendants established prima facie entitlement to summary judgment based on evidence that the single 8″ step onto the furniture display platform in defendants’ showroom — on which plaintiff wife tripped — was an illuminated, open and obvious condition which was readily observable by reasonable use of one’s senses … .Plaintiff wife, together with her family, had navigated the single step onto the furniture display platforms earlier that shopping day, and also during an uneventful visit to the same showroom just a few weeks prior to the date of her accident. There was no evidence to indicate that the single step, in its design, placement and maintenance, was inherently dangerous, and the defendants’ use of warning signs to give notice of the step’s presence did not, standing alone, render the steps unsafe.

Plaintiffs have not presented any proof that negligence on the part of defendants in the design, construction or maintenance of the subject step contributed to her fall, or that alleged showroom distractions support grounds to find liability on defendants’ part under the circumstances presented … . Faber v Place Furniture, Inc., 2017 NY Slip Op 09265, First Dept 12-28-17

 

NEGLIGENCE (SLIP AND FALL, STEP WAS OPEN AND OBVIOUS AND THEREFORE WAS NOT ACTIONABLE IN THIS SLIP AND FALL CASE (FIRST DEPT))/SLIP AND FALL (STEP WAS OPEN AND OBVIOUS AND THEREFORE WAS NOT ACTIONABLE IN THIS SLIP AND FALL CASE (FIRST DEPT))/OPEN AND OBVIOUS (STEP, SLIP AND FALL,  STEP WAS OPEN AND OBVIOUS AND THEREFORE WAS NOT ACTIONABLE IN THIS SLIP AND FALL CASE (FIRST DEPT))/STEPS (SLIP AND FALL,  STEP WAS OPEN AND OBVIOUS AND THEREFORE WAS NOT ACTIONABLE IN THIS SLIP AND FALL CASE (FIRST DEPT))

PRESENCE OF LOOSE GRANULES WHICH CAUSED PLAINTIFF TO SLIP TO HIS KNEES VIOLATED INDUSTRIAL CODE, PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON HIS LABOR LAW 241(6) CAUSE OF ACTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined plaintiff was entitled to summary judgment on his Labor Law 241 (6) cause of action because the presence of loose material on a roof which cause plaintiff to slip to his knees violated an industrial code provision:

 

The record demonstrates that the loose granules on the roof surface that caused plaintiff to slip were not integral to the structure or the work … , but were an accumulation of debris from which § 23-1.7(e)(2) requires work areas to be kept free … .. Thus, plaintiff is entitled to summary judgment as to liability on the Labor Law § 241(6) cause of action insofar as it is predicated upon § 23-1.7(e)(2). Lester v JD Carlisle Dev. Corp., 2017 NY Slip Op 09259, First Dept 12-28-17

 

LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW (PRESENCE OF LOOSE GRANULES WHICH CAUSED PLAINTIFF TO SLIP TO HIS KNEES VIOLATED INDUSTRIAL CODE, PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON HIS LABOR LAW 241(6) CAUSE OF ACTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FIRST DEPT))/INDUSTRIAL CODE (LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW, PRESENCE OF LOOSE GRANULES WHICH CAUSED PLAINTIFF TO SLIP TO HIS KNEES VIOLATED INDUSTRIAL CODE, PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON HIS LABOR LAW 241(6) CAUSE OF ACTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FIRST DEPT))

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DEFENDANT’S PRO SE MOTION TO VACATE HIS CONVICTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DENIED WITHOUT A HEARING BASED UPON THE ABSENCE OF AN ATTORNEY AFFIDAVIT, DEFENDANT ALLEGED HIS ATTORNEY DID NOT ACCURATELY INFORM HIM OF THE DEPORTATION CONSEQUENCES OF THE GUILTY PLEA AND THE FACTS CORROBORATED THE ALLEGATION (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Gesmer, determined defendant’s motion to vacate his conviction (by guilty plea) should not have been denied without a hearing. The pro se papers were deemed sufficient to raise the issues of ineffective assistance (failure to accurately inform defendant of the deportation consequences of the plea) and prejudice should defendant be deported after he had successfully sought asylum. The court found that the absence of an attorney affidavit from the motion to vacate papers was explained and should have been excused. Although defendant pled to endangering the welfare of a child, his attorney allowed an allocution on the elements of sexual abuse in the first degree:

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Here, the absence of an affidavit by defendant’s counsel does not support the summary denial of defendant’s motion for three reasons.

First, defendant’s allegations are corroborated by other parts of the record … . They are corroborated by defendant’s application to naturalize, postplea, which exposed him to detection by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), since he certainly would not have made the application if he had known that he was in any danger of deportation. In addition, counsel’s failure to object to the court’s unnecessary allocution on the elements of sexual abuse in the first degree … suggests that counsel may not have accurately understood the consequences of the plea.

Second, where, as here, defendant’s application is adverse and hostile to his trial attorney, “[r]equir[ing] the defendant to secure an affidavit, or explain his failure to do so, is wasteful and unnecessary” … .

Third, in any event, defendant explained the absence of an affidavit by his counsel … . People v Mebuin, 2017 NY Slip Op 09276, First Dept 12-28-17

 

CRIMINAL LAW (DEFENDANT’S PRO SE MOTION TO VACATE HIS CONVICTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DENIED WITHOUT A HEARING BASED UPON THE ABSENCE OF AN ATTORNEY AFFIDAVIT, DEFENDANT ALLEGED HIS ATTORNEY DID NOT ACCURATELY INFORM HIM OF THE DEPORTATION CONSEQUENCES OF THE GUILTY PLEA AND THE FACTS CORROBORATED THE ALLEGATION (FIRST DEPT))/VACATE CONVICTION, MOTION TO  (DEFENDANT’S PRO SE MOTION TO VACATE HIS CONVICTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DENIED WITHOUT A HEARING BASED UPON THE ABSENCE OF AN ATTORNEY AFFIDAVIT, DEFENDANT ALLEGED HIS ATTORNEY DID NOT ACCURATELY INFORM HIM OF THE DEPORTATION CONSEQUENCES OF THE GUILTY PLEA AND THE FACTS CORROBORATED THE ALLEGATION (FIRST DEPT))/ATTORNEYS (CRIMINAL LAW, INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE, DEFENDANT’S PRO SE MOTION TO VACATE HIS CONVICTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DENIED WITHOUT A HEARING BASED UPON THE ABSENCE OF AN ATTORNEY AFFIDAVIT, DEFENDANT ALLEGED HIS ATTORNEY DID NOT ACCURATELY INFORM HIM OF THE DEPORTATION CONSEQUENCES OF THE GUILTY PLEA AND THE FACTS CORROBORATED THE ALLEGATION (FIRST DEPT))/INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE (DEFENDANT’S PRO SE MOTION TO VACATE HIS CONVICTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DENIED WITHOUT A HEARING BASED UPON THE ABSENCE OF AN ATTORNEY AFFIDAVIT, DEFENDANT ALLEGED HIS ATTORNEY DID NOT ACCURATELY INFORM HIM OF THE DEPORTATION CONSEQUENCES OF THE GUILTY PLEA AND THE FACTS CORROBORATED THE ALLEGATION (FIRST DEPT))

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THE NEGLIGENCE ACTION AGAINST THE AGENCY WHICH PLACED A BABY IN A FOSTER HOME WHERE THE BABY WAS INJURED BY THE TEENAGED BOYFRIEND OF THE FOSTER MOTHER’S DAUGHTER PROPERLY SURVIVED SUMMARY JUDGMENT (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Gesmer, over a two-justice dissenting opinion, determined the negligence action against the Jewish Child Care Association (JCCA) properly survived summary judgment. The JCCA placed a 29-week-old child with a foster mother (Pineda). The child was left in the care of the teenaged boyfriend of Pineda’s daughter and suffered brain damage at the hands of the boyfriend:

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The record suggests that JCCA may have been negligent in at least five respects. First, the agency placed the child in Ms. Pineda’s home when he was a newborn, even though it had previously determined that children under five should not be placed with her because she was working or looking for work, and that her home required “stabilizing,” because her 16 year-old-daughter had recently given birth to a baby with special needs. Second, JCCA failed to ensure that an appropriate child care plan was in place after it had determined that Ms. Pineda was employed outside the home, as the applicable regulation requires… .. Moreover, there is no evidence that JCCA had ever advised Ms. Pineda that she needed to seek approval of her child care plan. Third, JCCA had notice, prior to the date on which the child was injured, that at least one unauthorized person was caring for him, but failed to take any action to rectify this, violating its own rules and the relevant regulation … . Fourth, JCCA’s contract with Ms. Pineda stated merely that she was not to leave the infant plaintiff without competent supervision. This violates the applicable regulation, entitled “Certification or approval of foster family homes,” which requires agencies to have foster parents acknowledge in writing that they will not “leave children under the age of 10 years alone without competent adult supervision” … . Moreover, Ms. Pineda testified that she was never advised that she was not permitted to leave a foster child in the care of someone under 18. Finally, … JCCA had failed to visit the home for a three-month period, in violation of its own requirement of at least two contacts per month, with at least one to take place in the home. Under these circumstances, a jury could find that, had the agency followed the applicable regulations and its own rules, the special needs infant plaintiff might never have been left alone with a teenager already caring for his own special needs infant, and who was prohibited from caring for the infant foster child.

Where the acts of a third person intervene between a defendant’s negligent conduct and a plaintiff’s injury, the causal connection between the two is not severed as a matter of law. Rather, liability turns on whether the intervening act is a normal or foreseeable consequence of the situation created by the defendant’s negligence. De’L. A. v City of New York, 2017 NY Slip Op 08897, First Dept 12-21-17

 

NEGLIGENCE (THE NEGLIGENCE ACTION AGAINST THE AGENCY WHICH PLACED A BABY IN A FOSTER HOME WHERE THE BABY WAS INJURED BY THE TEENAGE BOYFRIEND OF THE FOSTER MOTHER’S DAUGHTER PROPERLY SURVIVED SUMMARY JUDGMENT (FIRST DEPT))/FOSTER CARE (NEGLIGENCE, PLACEMENT AGENCY, THE NEGLIGENCE ACTION AGAINST THE AGENCY WHICH PLACED A BABY IN A FOSTER HOME WHERE THE BABY WAS INJURED BY THE TEENAGE BOYFRIEND OF THE FOSTER MOTHER’S DAUGHTER PROPERLY SURVIVED SUMMARY JUDGMENT (FIRST DEPT))/PLACEMENT AGENCY (FOSTER CARE, THE NEGLIGENCE ACTION AGAINST THE AGENCY WHICH PLACED A BABY IN A FOSTER HOME WHERE THE BABY WAS INJURED BY THE TEENAGE BOYFRIEND OF THE FOSTER MOTHER’S DAUGHTER PROPERLY SURVIVED SUMMARY JUDGMENT (FIRST DEPT))/FAMILY LAW (FOSTER CARE, PLACEMENT AGENCY, THE NEGLIGENCE ACTION AGAINST THE AGENCY WHICH PLACED A BABY IN A FOSTER HOME WHERE THE BABY WAS INJURED BY THE TEENAGE BOYFRIEND OF THE FOSTER MOTHER’S DAUGHTER PROPERLY SURVIVED SUMMARY JUDGMENT (FIRST DEPT))

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DEFENDANT’S CONVICTION SUPPORTED BY THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE, DETAILED DISCUSSION OF THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE ANALYSIS, DISSENT DISAGREED (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Kahn, over a two-justice dissenting opinion, determined that defendant’s conviction in this murder case was supported by the weight of the evidence. The dissent argued that defendant’s videotaped statement supported the justification defense and no other evidence presented by the People refuted it. The opinion includes a comprehensive discussion of the appellate court’s weight of the evidence analysis:

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Weight of the evidence review involves a two-step approach. (People v Romero, 7 NY3d 633, 643 [2006]). First, the Court must determine whether, based on all the credible evidence, an acquittal would not have been unreasonable (id.; People v Bleakley, 69 NY2d 490, 495 [1987]). If so, then the appellate court must weigh the relative probative force of conflicting testimony and the relative strength of conflicting inferences that may be drawn from the testimony … . That step is performed by weighing the evidence against the elements as charged to the jury … . The evidence must be of such weight and credibility as to convince the Court that the jury’s finding of the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt was justified … . * * *

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Viewing all of the record evidence in light of the first prong of the Romero-Bleakley standard, had the jury credited defendant’s account of the events surrounding the shooting, it could have reasonably found that defendant was, as the trial court instructed, “justified in the use of deadly physical force, . . . hav[ing] honestly believed that it was necessary to defend himself from what he honestly believed to be the use or imminent use of such force by Steven Mari and [that] a reasonable person in the defendant’s position, knowing what the defendant knew, and being in the same circumstances would have believed that too.” Thus, had the jury credited defendant’s statement, it would not have been unreasonable for the jury to have acquitted defendant … .

Turning to the second step of the Romero-Bleakley analysis, at the outset, there is no basis for disturbing the jury’s rejection of defendant’s videotaped statement. Defendant’s statements … were materially inconsistent, and defied credulity. People v Sanchez, 2017 NY Slip Op 08899, First Dept 12-21-17

 

CRIMINAL LAW (WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE, DEFENDANT’S CONVICTION SUPPORTED BY THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE, DETAILED DISCUSSION OF THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE ANALYSIS, DISSENT DISAGREED (FIRST DEPT))/EVIDENCE (CRIMINAL LAW, WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE, DEFENDANT’S CONVICTION SUPPORTED BY THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE, DETAILED DISCUSSION OF THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE ANALYSIS, DISSENT DISAGREED (FIRST DEPT))/APPEALS (CRIMINAL LAW, WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE, DEFENDANT’S CONVICTION SUPPORTED BY THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE, DETAILED DISCUSSION OF THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE ANALYSIS, DISSENT DISAGREED (FIRST DEPT))/WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE (CRIMINAL LAW, APPEALS, DEFENDANT’S CONVICTION SUPPORTED BY THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE, DETAILED DISCUSSION OF THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE ANALYSIS, DISSENT DISAGREED (FIRST DEPT))

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UNDER THE TERMS OF THE LIMITED LIABILITY AGREEMENT, THE ESTATE OF A DECEASED MEMBER OF THE LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY (LLC) WAS NOT A MEMBER OF THE LLC AND THEREFORE COULD NOT PARTICIPATE IN THE RUNNING OF THE LLC OR INSPECT ITS BOOKS AND WAS NOT OWED A FIDUCIARY DUTY (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Kapnick, determined the limited liability agreement controlled in this action by the estate of a member of the limited liability company (LLC) against the LLC.  Under the terms of the agreement the estate of the deceased member (Alex) was not a member of the LLC and therefore could not participate in the running of the company, could not demand to inspect the LLC’s books, and was not owed a fiduciary duty:

Ultimately, the parties disagree on the Estate’s rights and status under the LLC Agreement … . The Estate contends that it stepped into Alex’s shoes upon his death, and that it possesses all of his rights and privileges as a Member under the LLC Agreement. Defendants, on the other hand, contend that under the terms of the LLC Agreement, the Estate is considered the successor in interest of a Withdrawing Member (Alex) with rights only to potential distributions, and no rights to control or participate in the running of the company. Estate of Calderwood v ACE Group Intl. LLC, 2017 NY Slip Op 08750, First Dept 12-14-17

TRUSTS AND ESTATES (DEATH OF MEMBER OF LLC, UNDER THE TERMS OF THE LIMITED LIABILITY AGREEMENT, THE ESTATE OF A DECEASED MEMBER OF THE LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY (LLC) WAS NOT A MEMBER OF THE LLC AND THEREFORE COULD NOT PARTICIPATE IN THE RUNNING OF THE LLC OR INSPECT ITS BOOKS AND WAS NOT OWED A FIDUCIARY DUTY (FIRST DEPT))/LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY (TRUSTS AND ESTATES, DEATH OF A MEMBER, UNDER THE TERMS OF THE LIMITED LIABILITY AGREEMENT, THE ESTATE OF A DECEASED MEMBER OF THE LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY (LLC) WAS NOT A MEMBER OF THE LLC AND THEREFORE COULD NOT PARTICIPATE IN THE RUNNING OF THE LLC OR INSPECT ITS BOOKS AND WAS NOT OWED A FIDUCIARY DUTY (FIRST DEPT))/CORPORATION LAW (LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY, DEATH OF A MEMBER, UNDER THE TERMS OF THE LIMITED LIABILITY AGREEMENT, THE ESTATE OF A DECEASED MEMBER OF THE LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY (LLC) WAS NOT A MEMBER OF THE LLC AND THEREFORE COULD NOT PARTICIPATE IN THE RUNNING OF THE LLC OR INSPECT ITS BOOKS AND WAS NOT OWED A FIDUCIARY DUTY (FIRST DEPT))

PHOTOGRAPH OF SIDEWALK DEFECT RAISED A QUESTION OF FACT ABOUT CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE IN THIS SLIP AND FALL CASE, DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined that the long-time existence of the sidewalk defect could be inferred from the photograph. Defendants were therefore not able to show the absence of constructive notice and defendants’ motion for summary judgment in this slip and fall case should not have been granted:

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Owner defendants failed to make a prima facie showing that they lacked actual or constructive notice of the defect in the sidewalk that allegedly caused plaintiff to trip and fall … . A jury could infer from plaintiff’s photograph of the defective condition that the condition existed for a sufficient length of time for owner defendants to have discovered it and had time to repair it … .

In opposition, plaintiff raised an issue of fact as to whether the defect was actionable and not trivial. A photograph of the sidewalk at the time of plaintiff’s accident showed the condition of the sidewalk to be well-worn, with cracks between the slabs, and the defect shown in close-up appeared to be capable of causing plaintiff to trip and fall … . Flanders v Sedgwick Ave. Assoc., LLC, 2017 NY Slip Op 08718, First Dept 12-14-17

 

NEGLIGENCE (SLIP AND FALL, SIDEWALKS, PHOTOGRAPH OF SIDEWALK DEFECT RAISED A QUESTION OF FACT ABOUT CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE IN THIS SLIP AND FALL CASE, DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FIRST DEPT))/SIDEWALKS (SLIP AND FALL, PHOTOGRAPH OF SIDEWALK DEFECT RAISED A QUESTION OF FACT ABOUT CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE IN THIS SLIP AND FALL CASE, DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FIRST DEPT))/SLIP AND FALL (SIDEWALKS, PHOTOGRAPH OF SIDEWALK DEFECT RAISED A QUESTION OF FACT ABOUT CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE IN THIS SLIP AND FALL CASE, DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FIRST DEPT))

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