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DEFENSE COUNSEL, DURING VOIR DIRE, RELIED ON THE PEOPLE’S REPRESENTATION THAT THE COMPLAINANT WOULD NOT TESTIFY, BEFORE OPENING STATEMENTS DEFENSE COUNSEL WAS INFORMED THE COMPLAINANT WOULD TESTIFY, NEW TRIAL ORDERED (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing defendant’s conviction, determined defense counsel had relied, during voir dire, on the People’s representation that the complainant could not be located and would not testify. After voir dire, but before opening statements, defense counsel was informed the complainant had been found and would testify:

The People had omitted the complainant from their witness list because they were unable to locate him in the two years between the incident and the trial. However, after the jury was selected, and just before opening arguments, they advised the court that they had located the complainant, and the court permitted him to testify the next day.

Defense counsel clearly “relied to her detriment on her expectation that the People would not call this witness,” the sole eyewitness to the incident, and was substantially prejudiced by the change of course… . Defense counsel had used voir dire to question jurors about other issues, including their ability to evaluate videotape evidence, believing that this would be the main evidence in the case, and she had not questioned prospective jurors about their ability to impartially evaluate a victim’s testimony. In addition, because the defense had represented to the jury during voir dire that no complainant would appear, the complainant’s appearance at trial would undermine the defense’s credibility.

Thus, as counsel pointed out, her questioning and selection of jurors was geared entirely to a trial without the complainant’s testimony, and was totally unsuited to a trial with his testimony. People v Kyser, 2018 NY Slip Op 01160, Frist Dept 2-20-18

CRIMINAL LAW (DEFENSE COUNSEL, DURING VOIR DIRE, RELIED ON THE PEOPLE’S REPRESENTATION THAT THE COMPLAINANT WOULD NOT TESTIFY, BEFORE OPENING STATEMENTS DEFENSE COUNSEL WAS INFORMED THE COMPLAINANT WOULD TESTIFY, NEW TRIAL ORDERED (FIRST DEPT))/VOIR DIRE (CRIMINAL LAW, DEFENSE COUNSEL, DURING VOIR DIRE, RELIED ON THE PEOPLE’S REPRESENTATION THAT THE COMPLAINANT WOULD NOT TESTIFY, BEFORE OPENING STATEMENTS DEFENSE COUNSEL WAS INFORMED THE COMPLAINANT WOULD TESTIFY, NEW TRIAL ORDERED (FIRST DEPT))/WITNESSES (CRIMINAL LAW, DEFENSE COUNSEL, DURING VOIR DIRE, RELIED ON THE PEOPLE’S REPRESENTATION THAT THE COMPLAINANT WOULD NOT TESTIFY, BEFORE OPENING STATEMENTS DEFENSE COUNSEL WAS INFORMED THE COMPLAINANT WOULD TESTIFY, NEW TRIAL ORDERED (FIRST DEPT))

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QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER RESIDENT EXERCISED INDEPENDENT JUDGMENT IN THIS MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CASE, MAKING THE RESIDENT AND HOSPITAL POTENTIALLY LIABLE (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department determined there was a question of fact whether a resident exercised independent judgment in this medical malpractice case, making the resident and his employer (the hospital) potentially liable. Plaintiff’s decedent was intoxicated when given Valium:

Plaintiff’s decedent was brought into St. Barnabas Hospital by the police in an intoxicated and agitated condition. He was then chemically sedated with Valium. Two and one-half hours later, he “flatlined,” and, while resuscitative efforts were made, he did not awaken and was declared “brain dead” four days later.

Appellants contend that Dr. McGrath cannot be held liable for medical malpractice because, as a resident, he did not exercise independent medical judgment when he chose the type and dosage of sedative to use on decedent. However, the deposition testimony of the attending physician, defendant Dr. Rao, raised an issue of fact as to whether Dr. McGrath was permitted to, and in fact did, exercise independent medical judgment in deciding on the amount and type of sedation to administer, so that he may be held liable, and St. Barnabas Hospital may be held vicariously liable … . Burnett-Joseph v McGrath, 2018 NY Slip Op 01137, First Dept 2-15-18

NEGLIGENCE (MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER RESIDENT EXERCISED INDEPENDENT JUDGMENT IN THIS MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CASE, MAKING THE RESIDENT AND HOSPITAL POTENTIALLY LIABLE (FIRST DEPT))/MEDICAL MALPRACTICE (QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER RESIDENT EXERCISED INDEPENDENT JUDGMENT IN THIS MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CASE, MAKING THE RESIDENT AND HOSPITAL POTENTIALLY LIABLE (FIRST DEPT))/INDEPENDENT JUDGMENT (MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER RESIDENT EXERCISED INDEPENDENT JUDGMENT IN THIS MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CASE, MAKING THE RESIDENT AND HOSPITAL POTENTIALLY LIABLE (FIRST DEPT))/RESIDENTS (MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER RESIDENT EXERCISED INDEPENDENT JUDGMENT IN THIS MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CASE, MAKING THE RESIDENT AND HOSPITAL POTENTIALLY LIABLE (FIRST DEPT))/HOSPITALS (MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER RESIDENT EXERCISED INDEPENDENT JUDGMENT IN THIS MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CASE, MAKING THE RESIDENT AND HOSPITAL POTENTIALLY LIABLE (FIRST DEPT))

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ELEVATOR MALFUNCTION WAS NOT THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF PLAINTIFF’S DECEDENT’S DEATH, PLAINTIFF’S DECEDENT HAD SUFFERED CARDIAC ARREST BEFORE SHE WAS TRANSFERRED TO THE ELEVATOR, HOUSING AUTHORITY’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department determined the New York City Housing Authority’s (NYCHA’s) motion for summary judgment in this negligent elevator-maintenance case should have been granted. Plaintiff’s decedent had an asthma attack and suffered cardiac arrest in her apartment. When moving plaintiff’s decedent to an ambulance, the building elevator malfunctioned and stopped for at least several minutes. The NYCHA did not demonstrate that the elevator was in good working order or that the NYCHA had no notice the elevator malfunctioned. However, the NYCHA was able to demonstrate the elevator malfunction was not the proximate cause of plaintiff’s decedent’s death. The evidence supported the conclusion death occurred in the apartment:

… NYCHA presented unrefuted evidence demonstrating that the decedent’s cardiac rhythm was asystole, a dire form of cardiac arrest in which the heart stops beating and there is no electrical activity in the heart, and that she showed no signs of life in the hour between the arrival of emergency personnel and her transfer into the elevator, despite the emergency responders’ continuous resuscitative efforts. Furthermore, NYCHA’s medical expert stated that “[t]he prolonged and unsuccessful resuscitative course in an asystolic patient is associated with an extremely poor outcome” and that “the decedent’s obesity made resuscitative efforts more difficult and further reduced [her] likelihood of survival.” Thus, he opined, “within a reasonable degree of medical certainty[,]. .. the outcome for the decedent would [not] have changed had the transport time within the elevator been shorter.”

By these facts and its expert’s opinion, NYCHA demonstrated its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by showing that the stoppage of its elevator, and resulting delay of the decedent’s arrival at the hospital, were not a proximate cause of the decedent’s death. Lebron v New York City Hous. Auth., 2018 NY Slip Op 01116, First Dept 2-15-18

NEGLIGENCE (ELEVATOR MAINTENANCE, LANDLORD-TENANT, ELEVATOR MALFUNCTION WAS NOT THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF PLAINTIFF’S DECEDENT’S DEATH, PLAINTIFF’S DECEDENT HAD SUFFERED CARDIAC ARREST BEFORE SHE WAS TRANSFERRED TO THE ELEVATOR, HOUSING AUTHORITY’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FIRST DEPT))/ELEVATORS (NEGLIGENCE, LANDLORD-TENANT, ELEVATOR MALFUNCTION WAS NOT THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF PLAINTIFF’S DECEDENT’S DEATH, PLAINTIFF’S DECEDENT HAD SUFFERED CARDIAC ARREST BEFORE SHE WAS TRANSFERRED TO THE ELEVATOR, HOUSING AUTHORITY’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FIRST DEPT))/LANDLORD-TENANT (ELEVATORS, NEGLIGENCE, ELEVATOR MALFUNCTION WAS NOT THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF PLAINTIFF’S DECEDENT’S DEATH, PLAINTIFF’S DECEDENT HAD SUFFERED CARDIAC ARREST BEFORE SHE WAS TRANSFERRED TO THE ELEVATOR, HOUSING AUTHORITY’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FIRST DEPT))/PROXIMATE CAUSE (ELEVATOR MALFUNCTION, LANDLORD-TENANT,  ELEVATOR MALFUNCTION WAS NOT THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF PLAINTIFF’S DECEDENT’S DEATH, PLAINTIFF’S DECEDENT HAD SUFFERED CARDIAC ARREST BEFORE SHE WAS TRANSFERRED TO THE ELEVATOR, HOUSING AUTHORITY’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FIRST DEPT))

8 TO 12 INCH HEIGHT DIFFERENTIAL NOT ACTIONABLE, LABOR LAW 240 (1) CAUSE OF ACTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff’s Labor Law 240 (1) cause of action should have been dismissed. Plaintiff was injured when a cart he was moving slipped off a makeshift ramp. The height differential was 8 to 12 inches, which did not present an actionable elevation-related risk:

Plaintiff was allegedly injured in the course of rolling a four-wheeled cart filled with about 100 to 200 pounds of materials over an unsecured, makeshift plywood ramp which bridged an approximately five- or six-inch gap between a truck bed to a loading dock, when the ramp slipped out of place and landed on the truck bed, and the cart descended, pulling on plaintiff’s arms and causing injuries. Plaintiff admitted that the vertical distance from the surface of the truck bed to the surface of the dock was about 8 to 12 inches, which under the circumstances, does not constitute a physically significant elevation differential covered by Labor Law § 240(1) … . Plaintiff’s injury was not proximately caused by a failure to protect him from any elevation-related risks posed by the distance of almost four feet from the floor to the surface of the dock, since plaintiff remained on the dock while the cart became wedged in the gap between the truck bed and the dock, and there is no evidence that the gap was large enough to pose a significant risk of any hazardous descent to the floor. Sawczyszyn v New York Univ., 2018 NY Slip Op 01120, First Dept 2-15-18

LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW (8 TO 12 INCH HEIGHT DIFFERENTIAL NOT ACTIONABLE, LABOR LAW 240 (1) CAUSE OF ACTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED (FIRST DEPT))/ELEVATION-RELATED RISK (LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW, 8 TO 12 INCH HEIGHT DIFFERENTIAL NOT ACTIONABLE, LABOR LAW 240 (1) CAUSE OF ACTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED (FIRST DEPT))

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EVIDENCE OF SERIOUS PHYSICAL INJURY INSUFFICIENT IN THIS GANG ASSAULT CASE (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department determined the proof of serious physical injury in this gang assault case was insufficient:

The evidence was legally insufficient to establish that the injuries sustained by the victim constituted serious physical injury (see Penal Law § 10.00[10]), an element of gang assault in the first degree … . Although there was testimony that the victim still had some physical effects of the assault at the time of trial, the evidence on this was limited and, in any event, the record before the jury did not show that the injury was such that a reasonable observer would find the victim’s appearance distressing or objectionable … . It is also undisputed that the victim’s injuries did not impair his general health … . People v Garay, 2018 NY Slip Op 01117, First Dept 2-15-18

CRIMINAL LAW (EVIDENCE, EVIDENCE OF SERIOUS PHYSICAL INJURY INSUFFICIENT IN THIS GANG ASSAULT CASE (FIRST DEPT))/EVIDENCE (CRIMINAL LAW, EVIDENCE OF SERIOUS PHYSICAL INJURY INSUFFICIENT IN THIS GANG ASSAULT CASE (FIRST DEPT))/PHYSICAL INJURY (CRIMINAL LAW, EVIDENCE, EVIDENCE OF SERIOUS PHYSICAL INJURY INSUFFICIENT IN THIS GANG ASSAULT CASE (FIRST DEPT))

EVIDENCE OF DEBRIS ON FLOOR WAS SUFFICIENT TO RAISE A QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER DEFENDANTS WERE LIABLE UNDER LABOR LAW 241(6) AND 200, PLAINTIFF STEPPED INTO A HOLE BUT DID NOT KNOW WHETHER THE HOLE WAS OBSCURED BY THE DEBRIS (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined defendants were not entitled to summary judgment on the Labor Law 241(6) and Labor Law 200 causes of action. Plaintiff testified he stepped into a hole. He testified the floor was strewn with debris but he did not know if the hole was covered by debris. The court noted that a defendant need not supervise or control plaintiff’s work to be liable under Labor Law 200:

In support of his Labor Law § 241(6) claim against the owner defendants, plaintiff relies 12 NYCRR 23-1.7(e)(2), which states: “Working Areas. The parts of floors, platforms and similar areas where persons work or pass shall be kept free from accumulations of dirt and debris and from scattered tools and materials and from sharp projections insofar as may be consistent with the work being performed.”

… Although plaintiff could not state with certainty whether or not the garbage and debris actually covered the hole, when his extensive deposition testimony is viewed in its entirety, an inference may be drawn that strewn garbage and debris obscured his view of the floor and hid the hole from him, even if it did not actually cover it, thereby creating a hazardous condition. …

“Where an existing defect or dangerous condition caused the injury, liability [under Labor Law § 200] attaches if the owner or general contractor created the condition or had actual or constructive notice of it” … . Proof of the defendants’ supervision and control over a plaintiff’s work is not required … . Licata v AB Green Gansevoort, LLC, 2018 NY Slip Op 01023, First Dept 2-13-18

LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW (EVIDENCE OF DEBRIS ON FLOOR WAS SUFFICIENT TO RAISE A QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER DEFENDANTS WERE LIABLE UNDER LABOR LAW 241(6) AND 200, PLAINTIFF STEPPED INTO A HOLE BUT DID NOT KNOW WHETHER THE HOLE WAS OBSCURED BY THE DEBRIS (FIRST DEPT))

PLAINTIFF’S DECEDENT WAS PROVIDED WITH A SAFETY LINE AND A HARNESS WHICH HE WAS NOT USING WHEN HE FELL THROUGH A SKYLIGHT, FAILURE TO USE THE SAFETY LINE WAS THE SOLE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE FALL, DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE LABOR LAW 240 (1) CAUSE OF ACTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined that defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the Labor Law 240 (1) cause of action should have been granted. Plaintiff’s decedent was provided with a harness and told to remain tied off at all times. Plaintiff fell through an opening in the roof when he was not tied off:

Contrary to plaintiff’s argument, a fall through an unguarded opening in the floor of a construction site constitutes a violation of Labor Law § 240(1) only where a safety device adequate to prevent such a fall was not provided … .. A safety line and harness may be an adequate safety device for a person working over an open area or near an elevated edge … .

Defendants established prima facie that plaintiff’s decedent was the sole proximate cause of his accident with evidence that a harness and safety rope system was in place on the roof, that the decedent had been instructed to remain tied off at all times while on the roof, and that he could not have reached the skylight through which he fell if he had remained tied off. Guaman v City of New York, 2018 NY Slip Op 01025, First Dept 2-13-15

LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW (PLAINTIFF’S DECEDENT WAS PROVIDED WITH A SAFETY LINE AND A HARNESS WHICH HE WAS NOT USING WHEN HE FELL THROUGH A SKYLIGHT, FAILURE TO USE THE SAFETY LINE WAS THE SOLE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE FALL, DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE LABOR LAW 240 (1) CAUSE OF ACTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FIRST DEPT))/SOLE PROXIMATE CAUSE (LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW, PLAINTIFF’S DECEDENT WAS PROVIDED WITH A SAFETY LINE AND A HARNESS WHICH HE WAS NOT USING WHEN HE FELL THROUGH A SKYLIGHT, FAILURE TO USE THE SAFETY LINE WAS THE SOLE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE FALL, DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE LABOR LAW 240 (1) CAUSE OF ACTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FIRST DEPT))/SAFETY LINE (LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW, PLAINTIFF’S DECEDENT WAS PROVIDED WITH A SAFETY LINE AND A HARNESS WHICH HE WAS NOT USING WHEN HE FELL THROUGH A SKYLIGHT, FAILURE TO USE THE SAFETY LINE WAS THE SOLE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE FALL, DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE LABOR LAW 240 (1) CAUSE OF ACTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FIRST DEPT))

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ALL RISK ARTWORK INSURANCE DID NOT COVER DEFECTIVE TITLE, ALLEGATIONS DID NOT DEMONSTRATE A FIDUCIARY RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INSURED AND BROKERS (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department determined an all-risk artwork insurance policy did not cover contractual liability to purchasers of stolen art which was returned to the owner. In addition, the court determined the allegations in the complaint against the insurance brokers were insufficient to allege a fiduciary relationship:

“[D]efective title is clearly not a physical loss or damage . . . from any external cause” … . Despite the fact that the phrase “loss or damage” in the policy was not qualified by terms such as “direct” or “physical,” “[w]e may not, under the guise of strict construction, rewrite a policy to bind the insurer to a risk that it did not contemplate and for which it has not been paid” … . “Title insurance has been regarded as a separate type of contract not falling within any of the three basic classes of insurance. . . . It is not reasonable to interpret a policy so broadly that it becomes another type of policy altogether” … . …

The … causes of action, against the insurance broker defendants, were properly dismissed, with leave to replead  … for a “special relationship” with the broker defendants … . “Although the parties’ relationship lasted a considerable period of time and defendant [broker] assured plaintiff that his insurance needs were being met, these circumstances are not so exceptional as to support imposition of a fiduciary duty upon defendant”… . A longstanding relationship alone is insufficient to establish a special relationship between plaintiff and the broker defendants. Dae Assoc., LLC v AXA Art Ins. Corp., 2018 NY Slip Op 01026, First Dept 2-13-18

INSURANCE LAW (ALL RISK ARTWORK INSURANCE DID NOT COVER DEFECTIVE TITLE, ALLEGATIONS DID NOT DEMONSTRATE A FIDUCIARY RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INSURED AND BROKERS (FIRST DEPT))/ARTWORK, STOLEN (INSURANCE LAW, STOLEN ARTWORK, ALL RISK ARTWORK INSURANCE DID NOT COVER DEFECTIVE TITLE, ALLEGATIONS DID NOT DEMONSTRATE A FIDUCIARY RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INSURED AND BROKERS (FIRST DEPT))/BROKERS (INSURANCE LAW, ALL RISK ARTWORK INSURANCE DID NOT COVER DEFECTIVE TITLE, ALLEGATIONS DID NOT DEMONSTRATE A FIDUCIARY RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INSURED AND BROKERS (FIRST DEPT))/FIDUCIARY DUTY (INSURANCE LAW, BROKERS, ALL RISK ARTWORK INSURANCE DID NOT COVER DEFECTIVE TITLE, ALLEGATIONS DID NOT DEMONSTRATE A FIDUCIARY RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INSURED AND BROKERS (FIRST DEPT))/TITLE (INSURANCE LAW, STOLEN ARTWORK, ALL RISK ARTWORK INSURANCE DID NOT COVER DEFECTIVE TITLE, ALLEGATIONS DID NOT DEMONSTRATE A FIDUCIARY RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INSURED AND BROKERS (FIRST DEPT))/SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP (INSURANCE LAW, BROKERS, ALL RISK ARTWORK INSURANCE DID NOT COVER DEFECTIVE TITLE, ALLEGATIONS DID NOT DEMONSTRATE A FIDUCIARY RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INSURED AND BROKERS (FIRST DEPT))

PLAINTIFF’S SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION PROPERLY GRANTED IN THIS LABOR LAW 240(1) ACTION, PLAINTIFF WAS ATTEMPTING TO EMPTY A 300 POUND BIN INTO A DUMPSTER, FIVE TO SEVEN FOOT HEIGHT DIFFERENTIAL NOT DE MINIMUS (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department determined plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment in this Labor Law 240(1) action was properly granted. Plaintiff was attempting to lift a 300-pound laundry bin to empty debris into a dumpster. There were no safety devices and the five-to-seven foot height differential was not de minimus. Miller v 177 Ninth Ave. Condominium, 2018 NY Slip Op 00905, First Dept 2-8-18

 

LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW (PLAINTIFF’S SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION PROPERLY GRANTED IN THIS LABOR LAW 240(1) ACTION, PLAINTIFF WAS ATTEMPTING TO EMPTY A 300 POUND BIN INTO A DUMPSTER, FIVE TO SEVEN FOOT HEIGHT DIFFERENTIAL NOT DE MINIMUS (FIRST DEPT))

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PLAINTIFF DID NOT DEMONSTRATE ANY BASIS FOR IN PERSONAM OR IN REM JURISDICTION BY THE NEW YORK COURTS, PROCEEDING TO ENFORCE AN ALBANIAN MONEY JUDGMENT PURSUANT TO ARTICLE 53 OF THE CPLR SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, in an extensive full-fledged opinion by Justice Friedman, reversing Supreme Court, determined New York courts did not have jurisdiction to enforce an Albanian judgment. The opinion is too detailed to fairly summarize here. The court explained the criteria for the enforcement of foreign money judgments under article 53 of the CPLR (Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act), and the applicability of Daimler AG v Bauman, 571 US ___, 134 S Ct 746 (2014) and Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank PJSC v Saad Trading, Contr. & Fin. Servs. Co.m 117 AD3d 609 (1st Dept 2014) to a CPLR article 53 proceeding. The plaintiff did not claim it had any basis for in personam or in rem jurisdiction in New York and relied upon the Abu Dhabi case for the argument such a jurisdictional demonstration was not required:

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To go beyond Abu Dhabi and hold, as [plaintiff] urges, that no jurisdictional nexus is ever required for a proceeding under article 53, even if the defendant asserts substantive defenses to recognition of the foreign judgment, would be a substantial departure from the prior general understanding of the law. For example, the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law takes the position that the creditor on a foreign country judgment “must establish a basis for the exercise of jurisdiction by the enforcing court over the judgment debtor or his property” (§ 481, Comment g). AlbaniaBEG Ambient Sh.p.k. v Enel S.p.A., 2018 NY Slip Op 00928, First Dept 2-8-18

CIVIL PROCEDURE (FOREIGN MONEY JUDGMENTS, PLAINTIFF DID NOT DEMONSTRATE ANY BASIS FOR IN PERSONAM OR IN REM JURISDICTION BY THE NEW YORK COURTS, PROCEEDING TO ENFORCE AN ALBANIAN MONEY JUDGMENT PURSUANT TO ARTICLE 53 OF THE CPLR SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED (FIRST DEPT))/DEBTOR-CREDITOR  (FOREIGN MONEY JUDGMENTS, PLAINTIFF DID NOT DEMONSTRATE ANY BASIS FOR IN PERSONAM OR IN REM JURISDICTION BY THE NEW YORK COURTS, PROCEEDING TO ENFORCE AN ALBANIAN MONEY JUDGMENT PURSUANT TO ARTICLE 53 OF THE CPLR SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED (FIRST DEPT))/CORPORATION LAW (FOREIGN MONEY JUDGMENTS, PLAINTIFF DID NOT DEMONSTRATE ANY BASIS FOR IN PERSONAM OR IN REM JURISDICTION BY THE NEW YORK COURTS, PROCEEDING TO ENFORCE AN ALBANIAN MONEY JUDGMENT PURSUANT TO ARTICLE 53 OF THE CPLR SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED (FIRST DEPT))/FOREIGN MONEY JUDGMENTS (PLAINTIFF DID NOT DEMONSTRATE ANY BASIS FOR IN PERSONAM OR IN REM JURISDICTION BY THE NEW YORK COURTS, PROCEEDING TO ENFORCE AN ALBANIAN MONEY JUDGMENT PURSUANT TO ARTICLE 53 OF THE CPLR SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED (FIRST DEPT))/JURISDICTION (CIVIL PROCEDURE, FOREIGN MONEY JUDGMENTS, PLAINTIFF DID NOT DEMONSTRATE ANY BASIS FOR IN PERSONAM OR IN REM JURISDICTION BY THE NEW YORK COURTS, PROCEEDING TO ENFORCE AN ALBANIAN MONEY JUDGMENT PURSUANT TO ARTICLE 53 OF THE CPLR SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED (FIRST DEPT))/CPLR ARTICLE 53  (FOREIGN MONEY JUDGMENTS, PLAINTIFF DID NOT DEMONSTRATE ANY BASIS FOR IN PERSONAM OR IN REM JURISDICTION BY THE NEW YORK COURTS, PROCEEDING TO ENFORCE AN ALBANIAN MONEY JUDGMENT PURSUANT TO ARTICLE 53 OF THE CPLR SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED (FIRST DEPT))

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