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EVIDENCE INCLUDED IN A SETTLEMENT LETTER PROPERLY ADMITTED AT TRIAL, MISSING WITNESS JURY INSTRUCTION RE A WITNESS LIVING IN FLORIDA WAS ERROR, EXPERT TESTIMONY WHICH RELIED IN PART ON INADMISSIBLE HEARSAY WAS PROPERLY ADMITTED (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, affirming the denial of summary judgment and the denial of the motion to set aside the verdict in this probate action, determined evidence included in a settlement letter and hearsay relied upon an expert witness were properly admitted. The court further found that the missing witness jury instruction for the decedent’s treating doctors was proper, but the missing witness jury instruction for the attorney who drafted the will, who lives in Florida, was (harmless) error. The jury revoked preliminary letters:

Although CPLR 4547 precludes presentation of evidence of settlement negotiations, it expressly exempts exclusion of evidence, which is otherwise discoverable, solely because such evidence was presented during the course of settlement negotiations.

The list of paintings that was signed by proponent as part of the settlement conference in Shanghai was admitted into evidence because it included a factual admission that proponent possessed a painting that he accused objectant of stealing. Thus, its use at trial was permissible, notwithstanding that the factual statement was contained in a settlement document … . …

The court’s missing witness charge with respect to the attorney, Jerome Kamerman, was in error. Mr. Kamerman was living in Florida at the time of trial and was unavailable to proponents … . …

A psychiatrist’s opinion may be received in evidence even though some of the information on which it is based is inadmissible hearsay, if the hearsay is “of a kind accepted in the profession as reliable in forming a professional opinion, or if it comes from a witness subject to full cross-examination on [] trial” … . The court properly permitted the expert to testify, despite his conversations with objectant, since she was subject to full cross-examination at trial. Matter of Chi-ChuanFile Wang, 2018 NY Slip Op 04090, First Dept 6-7-18

​CIVIL PROCEDURE (EVIDENCE INCLUDED IN A SETTLEMENT LETTER PROPERLY ADMITTED AT TRIAL, MISSING WITNESS JURY INSTRUCTION RE A WITNESS LIVING IN FLORIDA WAS ERROR, EXPERT TESTIMONY WHICH RELIED IN PART ON INADMISSIBLE HEARSAY WAS PROPERLY ADMITTED (FIRST DEPT))/EVIDENCE (EVIDENCE INCLUDED IN A SETTLEMENT LETTER PROPERLY ADMITTED AT TRIAL, MISSING WITNESS JURY INSTRUCTION RE A WITNESS LIVING IN FLORIDA WAS ERROR, EXPERT TESTIMONY WHICH RELIED IN PART ON INADMISSIBLE HEARSAY WAS PROPERLY ADMITTED (FIRST DEPT))/TRUSTS AND ESTATES (EVIDENCE INCLUDED IN A SETTLEMENT LETTER PROPERLY ADMITTED AT TRIAL, MISSING WITNESS JURY INSTRUCTION RE A WITNESS LIVING IN FLORIDA WAS ERROR, EXPERT TESTIMONY WHICH RELIED IN PART ON INADMISSIBLE HEARSAY WAS PROPERLY ADMITTED (FIRST DEPT))/SETTLEMENT NEGOTIATIONS  (EVIDENCE INCLUDED IN A SETTLEMENT LETTER PROPERLY ADMITTED AT TRIAL, MISSING WITNESS JURY INSTRUCTION RE A WITNESS LIVING IN FLORIDA WAS ERROR, EXPERT TESTIMONY WHICH RELIED IN PART ON INADMISSIBLE HEARSAY WAS PROPERLY ADMITTED (FIRST DEPT))/CPLR 4547 (EVIDENCE INCLUDED IN A SETTLEMENT LETTER PROPERLY ADMITTED AT TRIAL, MISSING WITNESS JURY INSTRUCTION RE A WITNESS LIVING IN FLORIDA WAS ERROR, EXPERT TESTIMONY WHICH RELIED IN PART ON INADMISSIBLE HEARSAY WAS PROPERLY ADMITTED (FIRST DEPT))/JURY INSTRUCTIONS (MISSING WITNESSES, EVIDENCE INCLUDED IN A SETTLEMENT LETTER PROPERLY ADMITTED AT TRIAL, MISSING WITNESS JURY INSTRUCTION RE A WITNESS LIVING IN FLORIDA WAS ERROR, EXPERT TESTIMONY WHICH RELIED IN PART ON INADMISSIBLE HEARSAY WAS PROPERLY ADMITTED (FIRST DEPT))/MISSING WITNESS INSTRUCTION (EVIDENCE INCLUDED IN A SETTLEMENT LETTER PROPERLY ADMITTED AT TRIAL, MISSING WITNESS JURY INSTRUCTION RE A WITNESS LIVING IN FLORIDA WAS ERROR, EXPERT TESTIMONY WHICH RELIED IN PART ON INADMISSIBLE HEARSAY WAS PROPERLY ADMITTED (FIRST DEPT))/EXPERT OPINION (EVIDENCE INCLUDED IN A SETTLEMENT LETTER PROPERLY ADMITTED AT TRIAL, MISSING WITNESS JURY INSTRUCTION RE A WITNESS LIVING IN FLORIDA WAS ERROR, EXPERT TESTIMONY WHICH RELIED IN PART ON INADMISSIBLE HEARSAY WAS PROPERLY ADMITTED (FIRST DEPT))/HEARSAY (EXPERT OPINION, EVIDENCE INCLUDED IN A SETTLEMENT LETTER PROPERLY ADMITTED AT TRIAL, MISSING WITNESS JURY INSTRUCTION RE A WITNESS LIVING IN FLORIDA WAS ERROR, EXPERT TESTIMONY WHICH RELIED IN PART ON INADMISSIBLE HEARSAY WAS PROPERLY ADMITTED (FIRST DEPT))

BICYCLIST STRUCK BY SIDE OF TRUCK MAKING A LEFT TURN ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT, PLAINTIFF NEED NOT SHOW FREEDOM FROM COMPARATIVE FAULT (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department determined plaintiff bicyclist was entitled to summary judgment in this traffic accident case. Plaintiff was struck by the passenger side door of a truck making a left turn:

While traveling on a bicycle, plaintiff collided with the passenger side of defendants’ northbound truck as it turned left into plaintiff’s path at the intersection of St. Nicholas Avenue and 155th Street in New York County. Plaintiff submitted evidence showing that defendant was negligent by making a left turn without ensuring that it was safe to do so (see Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1141…).

Moreover, plaintiff is not required to demonstrate the absence of his own comparative fault to obtain partial summary judgment on defendant’s liability … .  Bermeo v Time Warner Entertainment Co., 2018 NY Slip Op 03927, First Dept 6-5-18

​NEGLIGENCE (TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS, BICYCLIST STRUCK BY SIDE OF TRUCK MAKING A LEFT TURN ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT, PLAINTIFF NEED NOT SHOW FREEDOM FROM COMPARATIVE FAULT (FIRST DEPT))/TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS (BICYCLIST STRUCK BY SIDE OF TRUCK MAKING A LEFT TURN ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT, PLAINTIFF NEED NOT SHOW FREEDOM FROM COMPARATIVE FAULT (FIRST DEPT))/BICYCLISTS (TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS, BICYCLIST STRUCK BY SIDE OF TRUCK MAKING A LEFT TURN ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT, PLAINTIFF NEED NOT SHOW FREEDOM FROM COMPARATIVE FAULT (FIRST DEPT))/COMPARATIVE FAULT  (TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS, BICYCLIST STRUCK BY SIDE OF TRUCK MAKING A LEFT TURN ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT, PLAINTIFF NEED NOT SHOW FREEDOM FROM COMPARATIVE FAULT (FIRST DEPT))

INJURY FROM SIX INCH FALL OF 500 POUND BEAM COVERED BY LABOR LAW 240 (1), POWER TO STOP WORK FOR SAFETY REASONS INSUFFICIENT BASIS FOR LIABILITY UNDER LABOR LAW 200 (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, modifying Supreme Court, determined plaintiff was entitled to summary judgment on his Labor Law 240 (1) cause of action and the construction manager (Structure Tone), although it had the power to stop work for safety reasons, was entitled to summary judgment on the Labor Law 200 cause of action:

Plaintiff was injured … when he and three other workers were attempting to load a 500-pound steel I-beam into an internal freight elevator at a construction site in order to transport it from the 18th floor to the ground floor. The elevator was four feet wide and five feet deep, with an eight foot ceiling, while the beam was 12 feet long. The workers opened a hatch on top of the elevator, and were attempting to stand the beam on its end, with the high end extending through the open hatch, when the beam fell down half a foot onto plaintiff’s shoulder. …

Plaintiff submitted evidence showing that he was engaged in an activity covered by the statute, that defendants failed to provide an adequate safety device to protect him, and that such violation was a proximate cause of the accident … . The half foot that the steel I-beam dropped onto plaintiff’s shoulder is not de minimis, given the I-beam’s weight and since the hazard was one directly flowing from the application of the force of gravity to a person … . * * *

Although Structure Tone had the authority to stop work at the construction site for safety reasons, this is “insufficient to raise a triable issue of fact with respect to whether [Structure Tone] exercised the requisite degree of supervision and control over the work being performed to sustain a claim under Labor Law § 200 or for common-law negligence” … . Villanueva v 114 Fifth Ave. Assoc. LLC, 2018 NY Slip Op 03928, First Dept 6-5-18

​LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW (INJURY FROM SIX INCH FALL OF 500 POUND BEAM COVERED BY LABOR LAW 240 (1), POWER TO STOP WORK FOR SAFETY REASONS INSUFFICIENT BASIS FOR LIABILITY UNDER LABOR LAW 200 (FIRST DEPT))

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HUSBAND ENTITLED TO REVOKE HIS CONSENT TO USE OF A FROZEN EMBRYO, EMBRYO AWARDED TO HUSBAND FOR SOLE PURPOSE OF DISPOSAL IN THIS DIVORCE ACTION (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff husband, in this divorce action, was entitled to the frozen embryo for the sole purpose of disposal:

… [Husband and wife] engaged the services of [New Hope Fertility Center, NHF] in the hope of conceiving a child via implantation of cryopreserved embryos in the wife’s uterus. … [T]hey signed an agreement with NHF entitled “Consent for the Cryopreservation of Human Embryo(s)” (the Consent Agreement). …

Paragraph 7 of the Consent Agreement is entitled “Voluntary Participation” and provides “I/We may withdraw my/our consent and discontinue participation at any time . . . .” Paragraph 16, entitled “Authorization,” provides, “This consent will remain in effect until such time as I notify NHF in writing of my/our wish to revoke such consent.” …

In Kass v Kass (91 NY2d 554 [1998]), the Court of Appeals determined that agreements between donors participating in IVF [in vitro fertilization] should be enforced pursuant to general rules of contract interpretation. … The Consent Agreement specifies that participation in the procedures involving cryopreservation of embryos is voluntary and that either party may withdraw consent at any time. … The provisions permitting either party to revoke consent are not limited to cryopreservation, but permit either party to withdraw consent to participation in the entire IVF process. … [T]he Consent Agreement does not indicate that the court has plenary authority to determine ownership of the embryo in the event of divorce … . Finkelstein v Finkelstein, 2018 NY Slip Op 03926, First Dept 6-5-18

​FAMILY LAW (IN VITRO FERTILIZATION, FROZEN EMBRYO, HUSBAND ENTITLED TO REVOKE HIS CONSENT TO USE OF A FROZEN EMBRYO, EMBRYO AWARDED TO HUSBAND FOR SOLE PURPOSE OF DISPOSAL IN THIS DIVORCE ACTION (FIRST DEPT))/CONTRACT LAW (FAMILY LAW, IN VITRO FERTILIZATION, FROZEN EMBRYO, HUSBAND ENTITLED TO REVOKE HIS CONSENT TO USE OF A FROZEN EMBRYO, EMBRYO AWARDED TO HUSBAND FOR SOLE PURPOSE OF DISPOSAL IN THIS DIVORCE ACTION (FIRST DEPT))/IN VITRO FERTILIZATION (FAMILY LAW. FROZEN EMBRYO, HUSBAND ENTITLED TO REVOKE HIS CONSENT TO USE OF A FROZEN EMBRYO, EMBRYO AWARDED TO HUSBAND FOR SOLE PURPOSE OF DISPOSAL IN THIS DIVORCE ACTION (FIRST DEPT))/EMBRYO, FROZEN (FAMILY LAW, IN VITRO FERTILIZATION, HUSBAND ENTITLED TO REVOKE HIS CONSENT TO USE OF A FROZEN EMBRYO, EMBRYO AWARDED TO HUSBAND FOR SOLE PURPOSE OF DISPOSAL IN THIS DIVORCE ACTION (FIRST DEPT))

PLAINTIFF’S FAILURE TO SATISFY A NON-MATERIAL CONDITION PRECEDENT DID NOT JUSTIFY THE AWARD OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO DEFENDANT (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the failure to satisfy a non-material condition precedent, which did not prejudice the defendant, did not justify summary judgment in favor of defendant:

It is undisputed that plaintiff failed to satisfy a condition precedent to recovering disputed costs for extra work on which defendant forced price reductions. Although plaintiff gave detailed written statements contesting defendant’s determinations of the fair and reasonable value of the extra work pursuant to section 8.01(B), it failed to give verified statements pursuant to section 11.03(A) of the contractual General Conditions.

Nevertheless, we conclude that plaintiff should be excused from the non-occurrence of that condition, because otherwise it would suffer a disproportionate forfeiture, and the occurrence of the condition was not a material part of the agreed exchange … . Defendant does not argue that plaintiff failed to document the costs of the claimed extra work, to provide timely notice of its claims for extra work, or to provide timely notice of its objections to defendant’s rejections of and price reductions on the claimed extra work. Nor does it contend other than in conclusory terms that plaintiff’s failure to submit verified written statements was prejudicial to it. Moreover, the cases on which defendant relies did not consider whether the failure to strictly comply with a condition precedent should be excused to avoid a disproportionate forfeiture under the circumstances of a case such as this, where the noncompliance is de minimis and defendant has shown no prejudice whatsoever … . Danco Elec. Contrs., Inc. v Dormitory Auth. of the State of N.Y., 2018 NY Slip Op 03935, First Dept 6-5-18

​CONTRACT LAW (PLAINTIFF’S FAILURE TO SATISFY A NON-MATERIAL CONDITION PRECEDENT DID NOT JUSTIFY THE AWARD OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO DEFENDANT (FIRST DEPT))/CONDITION PRECEDENT (CONTRACT LAW, PLAINTIFF’S FAILURE TO SATISFY A NON-MATERIAL CONDITION PRECEDENT DID NOT JUSTIFY THE AWARD OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO DEFENDANT (FIRST DEPT))

UNDER PENNSYLVANIA LAW PLAINTIFF ASSUMED THE RISK OF INJURY ON A TRAMPOLINE WITH MULTIPLE JUMPERS (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department determined defendant’s motion for summary judgment in this Pennsylvania trampoline injury case was properly granted. Under Pennsylvania law, plaintiff assumed the risk of injury on the trampoline:

The record demonstrates conclusively that defendant cannot be held liable under Pennsylvania law for the injuries that plaintiff alleges she sustained while a guest at his Pennsylvania home when another guest jumping on a trampoline lost control and fell on her. A property owner may be held liable to “social guests,” as opposed to “business visitors” … , only if he “knows or has reason to know of the [dangerous] condition and should realize that it involves an unreasonable risk of harm” and “fails to exercise reasonable care to make the condition safe, or to warn the licensees of the condition and the risk involved,” and the guests “do not know or have reason to know of the condition and the risk involved” … . Plaintiff’s deposition testimony and affidavit demonstrate that she understood the risks involved in using the trampoline, including the risks of using it with multiple jumpers. Ramos v Hamelburg, 2018 NY Slip Op 03913, First Dept 5-31-18

​NEGLIGENCE (ASSUMPTION OF THE RISK, UNDER PENNSYLVANIA LAW PLAINTIFF ASSUMED THE RISK OF INJURY ON A TRAMPOLINE WITH MULTIPLE JUMPERS (FIRST DEPT))/ASSUMPTION OF THE RISK (TRAMPOLINES, UNDER PENNSYLVANIA LAW PLAINTIFF ASSUMED THE RISK OF INJURY ON A TRAMPOLINE WITH MULTIPLE JUMPERS (FIRST DEPT))/TRAMPOLINES (ASSUMPTION OF THE RISK, UNDER PENNSYLVANIA LAW PLAINTIFF ASSUMED THE RISK OF INJURY ON A TRAMPOLINE WITH MULTIPLE JUMPERS (FIRST DEPT))

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PLAINTIFF ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON HIS LABOR LAW 240 (1) CAUSE OF ACTION, UNTIMELY CROSS MOTION CAN BE CONSIDERED ONLY TO THE EXTENT THE ISSUES RAISED ARE THE SAME AS THE ISSUES RAISED IN PLAINTIFF’S SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department determined plaintiff was entitled to summary judgment on his Labor Law 240 (1) cause of action. Plaintiff was standing on a scaffold when a masonry stone fell on the scaffold and the planks collapsed. The court noted that defendants’ untimely cross motion for summary judgment was properly considered only to the extent the issues were identical to the issues raised in plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment:

This Court may consider the merits of defendants’ untimely cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint to the extent it sought dismissal of the Labor Law § 240(1) claim, because it is based on the same issues raised in plaintiff’s motion … However, the remainder of the motion, seeking dismissal of Labor Law § 241(6), Labor Law § 200 and common law negligence claims cannot be considered because it does not address issues nearly identical to those raised in the timely motion and defendants did not demonstrate good cause for the delay … .

Plaintiff is entitled to summary judgment as to liability on his Labor Law § 240(1) claim. He established, prima facie, that he was engaged in an activity falling within the statute, and that defendants failed to provide him proper safety equipment, either in the form of a scaffold that could withstand the force of a falling masonry stone … , or any other appropriate safety device. Plaintiff further demonstrated that defendants’ failure to provide an appropriate safety device was the proximate cause of the accident, and defendants have failed to raise an issue of fact. Jarama v 902 Liberty Ave. Hous. Dev. Fund Corp., 2018 NY Slip Op 03897, First Dept 5-31-18

​LABOR LAW -CONSTRUCTION LAW (PLAINTIFF ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON HIS LABOR LAW 240 (1) CAUSE OF ACTION, UNTIMELY CROSS MOTION CAN BE CONSIDERED ONLY TO THE EXTENT THE ISSUES RAISED ARE THE SAME AS THE ISSUES RAISED IN PLAINTIFF’S SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION (FIRST DEPT))/CIVIL PROCEDURE (SUMMARY JUDGMENT, UNTIMELY CROSS MOTION CAN BE CONSIDERED ONLY TO THE EXTENT THE ISSUES RAISED ARE THE SAME AS THE ISSUES RAISED IN PLAINTIFF’S SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION (FIRST DEPT))/SUMMARY JUDGMENT ( UNTIMELY CROSS MOTION CAN BE CONSIDERED ONLY TO THE EXTENT THE ISSUES RAISED ARE THE SAME AS THE ISSUES RAISED IN PLAINTIFF’S SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION (FIRST DEPT))

PLAINTIFF ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON HIS LABOR LAW 240 (1) CAUSE OF ACTION, PLAINTIFF FELL THROUGH AN OPENING COVERED BY A PIECE OF PARTICLE BOARD (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment on his Labor Law 240 (1) cause of action should have been granted. Plaintiff fell through an opening covered by a piece of particle board:

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There is no issue of fact as to whether it was foreseeable that the particle board covering an escape hatch on top of the elevator car where plaintiff was required to work would collapse when traversed by him … . It is not dispositive that the escape hatch covering was not intended to serve as a safety device protecting workers from elevation-related risks. Rather, since plaintiff’s work exposed him to such risks, he was required to be provided with adequate safety devices in compliance with Labor Law § 240(1) … . Giancola v Yale Club of N.Y. City, 2018 NY Slip Op 03901, First Dept 5-31-18

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LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW (PLAINTIFF ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON HIS LABOR LAW 240 (1) CAUSE OF ACTION, PLAINTIFF FELL THROUGH AN OPENING COVERED BY A PIECE OF PARTICLE BOARD (FIRST DEPT))

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PLAINTIFF MADE A SUFFICIENT START DEMONSTRATING NEW YORK HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE DEFENDANTS TO WARRANT JURISDICTIONAL DISCLOSURE AND A HEARING (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff had made a sufficient showing that New York may have jurisdiction over the defendants to warrant jurisdictional disclosure:

… [P]laintiff made a “sufficient start” in establishing that New York courts have jurisdiction over defendants to warrant jurisdictional disclosure and a hearing… . On his motion to renew, plaintiff submitted sufficient evidence to warrant a finding of jurisdiction on the papers alone (… CPLR 2221[e], [f]). The evidence shows that plaintiff was hired by defendants, a corporation and two individuals, all residents of Louisiana, after an in-person meeting in New York and that defendants engaged in extensive communications with him by telephone, email, in-person meetings, and document exchanges for two years while he was in New York representing them in various matters. Mischel v Safe Haven Enters., LLC, 2018 NY Slip Op 03902, First Dept 5-31-18

​CIVIL PROCEDURE (JURISDICTION, PLAINTIFF MADE A SUFFICIENT START DEMONSTRATING NEW YORK HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE DEFENDANTS TO WARRANT JURISDICTIONAL DISCLOSURE AND A HEARING (FIRST DEPT))/JURISDICTION (CIVIL PROCEDURE, PLAINTIFF MADE A SUFFICIENT START DEMONSTRATING NEW YORK HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE DEFENDANTS TO WARRANT JURISDICTIONAL DISCLOSURE AND A HEARING (FIRST DEPT))/LONG ARM JURISDICTION (PLAINTIFF MADE A SUFFICIENT START DEMONSTRATING NEW YORK HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE DEFENDANTS TO WARRANT JURISDICTIONAL DISCLOSURE AND A HEARING (FIRST DEPT))/SUFFICIENT START (LONG ARM JURISDICTION, PLAINTIFF MADE A SUFFICIENT START DEMONSTRATING NEW YORK HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE DEFENDANTS TO WARRANT JURISDICTIONAL DISCLOSURE AND A HEARING (FIRST DEPT))

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CITY NOT LIABLE FOR SLIP AND FALL IN CROSSWALK DURING STORM, ALLEGED FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH SNOW REMOVAL PROTOCOLS AND FAILURE TO APPLY SALT BEFORE THE STORM ARE NOT GROUNDS FOR LIABILITY (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department determined the city could not be held liable for a slip and fall in a crosswalk while a storm was in progress:

The certified expert report [plaintiff] submitted does not address how the City created or exacerbated the icy condition of the crosswalk and only states that it was created during the heavy snow falling when the accident happened … . Plaintiff’s claim that the City may be held liable for failing to adhere to its snow removal protocols is unpersuasive, because liability “cannot be based on the violation of an internal rule imposing a higher standard of care than the law, at least where there is no showing of detrimental reliance by the plaintiff” … . Nor can the City be held liable for failing to salt the roadway before the storm, because such alleged inaction does not constitute an affirmative act of negligence that caused, created or exacerbated the icy condition … . Mimikos v City of New York, 2018 NY Slip Op 03813, First Dept 5-29-18

​NEGLIGENCE (MUNICIPAL LAW, SLIP AND FALL, CITY NOT LIABLE FOR SLIP AND FALL IN CROSSWALK DURING STORM, ALLEGED FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH SNOW REMOVAL PROTOCOLS AND FAILURE TO APPLY SALT BEFORE THE STORM ARE NOT GROUNDS FOR LIABILITY (FIRST DEPT))/SLIP AND FALL (MUNICIPAL LAW, CITY NOT LIABLE FOR SLIP AND FALL IN CROSSWALK DURING STORM, ALLEGED FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH SNOW REMOVAL PROTOCOLS AND FAILURE TO APPLY SALT BEFORE THE STORM ARE NOT GROUNDS FOR LIABILITY (FIRST DEPT))/MUNICIPAL LAW (SLIP AND FALL, CITY NOT LIABLE FOR SLIP AND FALL IN CROSSWALK DURING STORM, ALLEGED FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH SNOW REMOVAL PROTOCOLS AND FAILURE TO APPLY SALT BEFORE THE STORM ARE NOT GROUNDS FOR LIABILITY (FIRST DEPT))/INTERNAL RULES (STANDARD OF CARE, SLIP AND FALL, CITY NOT LIABLE FOR SLIP AND FALL IN CROSSWALK DURING STORM, ALLEGED FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH SNOW REMOVAL PROTOCOLS AND FAILURE TO APPLY SALT BEFORE THE STORM ARE NOT GROUNDS FOR LIABILITY (FIRST DEPT))

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