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QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER THE INADEQUATE HEIGHT OF A GUARDRAIL ALONG THE STAIRWELL WAS THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF PLANTIFF’S FALL, HEIGHT WAS BELOW THAT MANDATED BY THE NATIONAL FIRE PROTECTION ASSOCIATION (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department determined defendant's motion for summary judgment in this slip and fall case was properly denied. The plaintiff presented evidence that the proximate cause of his stairway fall over the guardrail was the inadequate height of the guardrail:

… [P]laintiff raised an issue of fact by submitting an affidavit by an expert engineer who averred that the stairwell violated National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) No. 101. NFPA No. 101, which was listed in the “Generally Accepted Standards Applicable to the State Building Construction Code” in effect at the time of the hotel's construction, advocated the construction of a 42-inch-high guardrail along the stairwell. The record shows that the existing guardrail was no more than 32 inches high. A violation of NFPA No. 101, which was “applicable by reference in the [State] Building Construction Code – not incorporation – would constitute some evidence of negligence and may establish a standard of care” … . …

Defendants failed to establish prima facie that they did not have constructive notice of a dangerous or defective condition. They argue that the stairwell complied with applicable building codes and that they never received any violations regarding the stairwell. However, their claimed compliance with applicable building codes is not dispositive of whether they breached their common-law duty of care … . Moreover, the existence of a guardrail less than 42 inches high, although not in violation of a particular mandatory code, was obvious and had existed for a sufficient time for defendants to discover and remedy it. Contrary to defendants' argument, plaintiff's inability to identify the cause of his slip or trip on the stairs, which made him lose his balance and go over the rail, is not fatal to his claims, given the evidence supporting his contention that the proximate cause of his … injuries was the lack of a 42-inch guardrail. In any event, there can be more than one proximate cause of an accident. Sussman v MK LCP Rye LLC, 2018 NY Slip Op 06143, First Dept 9-19-18

NEGLIGENCE (SLIP AND FALL, QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER THE INADEQUATE HEIGHT OF A GUARDRAIL ALONG THE STAIRWELL WAS THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF PLANTIFF'S FALL, HEIGHT WAS BELOW THAT MANDATED BY THE NATIONAL FIRE PROTECTION ASSOCIATION (FIRST DEPT))/EVIDENCE (NEGLIGENCE, SLIP AND FALL, STAIRWELL, QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER THE INADEQUATE HEIGHT OF A GUARDRAIL ALONG THE STAIRWELL WAS THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF PLANTIFF'S FALL, HEIGHT WAS BELOW THAT MANDATED BY THE NATIONAL FIRE PROTECTION ASSOCIATION (FIRST DEPT))/SLIP AND FALL ( STAIRWELL, QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER THE INADEQUATE HEIGHT OF A GUARDRAIL ALONG THE STAIRWELL WAS THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF PLANTIFF'S FALL, HEIGHT WAS BELOW THAT MANDATED BY THE NATIONAL FIRE PROTECTION ASSOCIATION (FIRST DEPT))GUARDRAILS (STAIRWELL, SLIP AND FALL, QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER THE INADEQUATE HEIGHT OF A GUARDRAIL ALONG THE STAIRWELL WAS THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF PLANTIFF'S FALL, HEIGHT WAS BELOW THAT MANDATED BY THE NATIONAL FIRE PROTECTION ASSOCIATION (FIRST DEPT))

PLAINTIFF, AS A THIRD PARTY BENEFICIARY OF THE AGREEMENT, HAD STANDING TO BRING THE BREACH OF CONTRACT ACTION, DESPITE THE BOILERPLATE EXCLUSION OF THIRD PARTY BENEFICIARIES (SECOND DEPT).

The First Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Singh too complex to fairly summarize here, reversing Supreme Court, determined that plaintiff was a third-party beneficiary to the contract, despite the boilerplate exclusion of third-party beneficiaries:

…[W]e reject defendant's contention that plaintiff does not have standing to sue for breach of the [agreement] because it is not a party to that agreement. Plaintiff is an intended third-party beneficiary of the [agreement], as that agreement explicitly refers to plaintiff and grants it enforceable rights. Accordingly, the [agreement's] boilerplate exclusion of third-party beneficiaries does not apply to plaintiff, and this action may not be properly dismissed for lack of standing … . MPEG LA, LLC v Samsung Elecs. Co., Ltd., 2018 NY Slip Op 06147, First Dept 9-19-18 

CONTRACT LAW (PLAINTIFF, AS A THIRD PARTY BENEFICIARY OF THE AGREEMENT, HAD STANDING TO BRING THE BREACH OF CONTRACT ACTION, DESPITE THE BOILERPLATE EXCLUSION OF THIRD PARTY BENEFICIARIES (FIRST DEPT))/THIRD PARTY BENEFICIARY (CONTRACT LAW, PLAINTIFF, AS A THIRD PARTY BENEFICIARY OF THE AGREEMENT, HAD STANDING TO BRING THE BREACH OF CONTRACT ACTION, DESPITE THE BOILERPLATE EXCLUSION OF THIRD PARTY BENEFICIARIES (FIRST DEPT))

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A PENALTY OR DISGORGEMENT STEMMING FROM IMPROPER PROFIT-TAKING BY BEAR STEARNS IS NOT AN INSURABLE LOSS, EVEN IF THE BENEFITS OF THE PROFIT-TAKING WENT TO OTHERS AND NOT TO BEAR STEARNS (SECOND DEPT).

The First Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Andrias, determined that the requirement that Bear Stearns repay $160,000,000 constituted a penalty (disgorgement) for improper profit-taking, even where the benefits went to others and not Bear Stearns,  and therefore was not a “loss” for which Bear Stearns' insurer was liable:

The law of the case is applicable to “legal determinations that were necessarily resolved on the merits in a prior decision” … . On the prior appeal, the Court of Appeals stated that “the Insurers do not earnestly dispute that the claims fall within the policy's definition of Loss” … , but did not rely on the policy language in denying defendants' motions. Instead it focused on the public policy issue. Furthermore, the doctrine does not apply where a motion for summary judgment follows a motion to dismiss that was not converted to a motion for summary judgment pursuant to CPLR 3212(c)… .

Even if the Court of Appeals' prior determination is viewed as addressing the contractual issue, “while the law of the case doctrine is intended to foster orderly convenience' . . ., it is not an absolute mandate which limits an appellate court's power to reconsider issues where there are extraordinary circumstances, such as subsequent evidence affecting the prior determination or a change of law'” … . Here, the United States Supreme Court's decision in [Kokesh v Securities and Exchange Commission (_ US_, 137 S Ct 1635 [2017])], characterizing SEC disgorgement as a penalty, represents such a change of law. * * *… Kokesh has now provided the missing precedent, establishing that disgorgement is a penalty, whether it is linked to the wrongdoer's gains or gains that went to others. In Kokesh, the Supreme Court, emphasizing that when a sanction “can only be explained as . . . serving either retributive or deterrent purposes,” it is a “punishment,” rejected the SEC's argument that disgorgement is remedial because it simply puts the defendant back in the position “he would have occupied had he not broken the law.” J.P. Morgan Sec., Inc. v Vigilant Ins. Co., 2018 NY Slip Op 06146, First Dept 9-19-18

INSURANCE LAW (SECURITIES, A PENALTY OR DISGORGEMENT STEMMING FROM IMPROPER PROFIT-TAKING BY BEAR STEARNS IS NOT AN INSURABLE LOSS, EVEN IF THE BENEFITS OF THE PROFIT-TAKING WENT TO OTHERS AND NOT TO BEAR STEARNS (FIRST DEPT))/SECURITIES (INSURANCE LAW, A PENALTY OR DISGORGEMENT STEMMING FROM IMPROPER PROFIT-TAKING BY BEAR STEARNS IS NOT AN INSURABLE LOSS, EVEN IF THE BENEFITS OF THE PROFIT-TAKING WENT TO OTHERS AND NOT TO BEAR STEARNS (FIRST DEPT))/DISGORGEMENT (INSURANCE LAW, SECURITIES, A PENALTY OR DISGORGEMENT STEMMING FROM IMPROPER PROFIT-TAKING BY BEAR STEARNS IS NOT AN INSURABLE LOSS, EVEN IF THE BENEFITS OF THE PROFIT-TAKING WENT TO OTHERS AND NOT TO BEAR STEARNS (FIRST DEPT))

REMOVING RENTED AIR CONDITIONING EQUIPMENT FROM A HOSPITAL CONSTITUTED A COVERED “ALTERATION” WITHIN THE MEANING OF LABOR LAW 240 (1) (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Gesmer, determined that plaintiff's decedent was engaged in an “alteration” within the meaning of Labor Law 240 (1) when he was crushed by an air conditioning unit (a chiller) that was being hoisted. A hospital had rented the chiller as a supplement to the air conditioning system during the warmer months. The chiller was being readied for return to the lessor when the accident happened. The court found that air conditioning is essential to the functioning of the hospital, noting that operating rooms must be kept at 62 degrees:

Here, the work being performed was a significant change to the hospital's air conditioning system, which the hospital must operate in warm weather in order to meet its regulatory requirements. Like the application of “bomb blast” film to the lobby windows in Belding, the deinstallation and removal of the rented chiller “altered the configuration or composition of the structure by changing the way the [hospital buildings] react to . . . the elements” (Belding, 14 NY3d at 753). Moreover, like the dismantling and removal of the air handlers in [Panek v County of Albany, 99 NY2d 452 (2003)], disconnecting and removing the rented chiller and generator was a significant undertaking, was not simple, routine, or cosmetic, and fundamentally altered the function of a significant building system, the hospital's air conditioning system. As in Panek, the project took more than a day to complete. The qualifying work in both Belding and Panek appears to have been performed by one person. In contrast, here, the work was complex enough that it required the labor of employees of the hospital, the contractor and the multiple subcontractors. It required shutting off the valves on the hospital's chilled water supply and return in the mechanical room, unbolting and unscrewing approximately 125 feet of heavy, nonbending hose from the chilled water supply and riser; draining the water from the hoses and standby chiller; dismantling the scaffolding that served as a bridge carrying the hoses from the mechanical room over the sidewalk to the chiller; dismantling the fencing around the chiller and generator; closing the street outside the hospital; using lifting equipment to lower the hoses from the roof; and using a boom, chains, shackles, slings, and hooks to raise the trailer and chiller so that the decedent and his coworker could remove the wood blocks that leveled the trailer and chiller, in order to allow for the trailer to be removed. Under these circumstances, we find that the work decedent was engaged in constituted an alteration under Labor Law § 240. Mananghaya v Bronx-Lebanon Hosp. Ctr. 2018 NY Slip Op 06061. First Dept 9-13-18

LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW (REMOVING RENTED AIR CONDITIONING EQUIPMENT FROM A HOSPITAL CONSTITUTED A COVERED “ALTERATION” WITHIN THE MEANING OF LABOR LAW 240 (1) (FIRST DEPT))/ALTERATION (LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW, REMOVING RENTED AIR CONDITIONING EQUIPMENT FROM A HOSPITAL CONSTITUTED A COVERED “ALTERATION” WITHIN THE MEANING OF LABOR LAW 240 (1) (FIRST DEPT))/AIR-CONDITIONING EQUIPMENT (LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW, REMOVING RENTED AIR CONDITIONING EQUIPMENT FROM A HOSPITAL CONSTITUTED A COVERED “ALTERATION” WITHIN THE MEANING OF LABOR LAW 240 (1) (FIRST DEPT))

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INSURER OF RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIES NOT ENTITLED TO RECOVER ALL CLAIMS PAID OUT AS A RESULT OF 50% OF THE UNDERLYING MORTGAGES GOING INTO DEFAULT UNDER A FRAUD THEORY, ONLY A BREACH OF CONTRACT THEORY WAS AVAILABLE (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, modifying Supreme Court, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Manzanet-Daniels, determined plaintiff insurer's (MBAI's) motion for summary judgment should have been denied in its entirety in this action stemming from the insuring of residential mortgage-backed securities. MBAI sought to recover all the payments made after more than 50% of the mortgages underlying the securities went into default:

MBIA seeks “Claims Payment Damages” and “Repurchase Damages.” The “Claims Payment Damages” consist of “all claims payments that MBIA has made . . . [or] will likely incur,” and are designed to put MBIA in the same position it would have been in had the policy never been issued. As such, they constitute rescissory damages and are not recoverable by plaintiff monoline insurer seeking redress under an irrevocable policy. We have made clear that an insurer is “not entitled to damages amounting to all claims payments it made or will make under the policies,” inasmuch as such damages are “rescissory damages to which the insurer is not entitled” … .

“Repurchase Damages” represent the difference between the claims payments MBIA made or is projected to incur, and those MBIA would have made had [defendant] Credit Suisse repurchased nonconforming lines, i.e., those that breached the representations and warranties.

While such repurchase damages are in theory recoverable, the fraud claim was nonetheless correctly dismissed. It has long been the rule that parties may not assert fraud claims seeking damages that are duplicative of those recoverable on a cause of action for breach of contract (see e.g. Manas v VMS Assoc., LLC, 53 AD3d 451, 454 [1st Dept 2008]). As we noted in Manas, fraud damages are meant to redress a different harm than damages on a cause of action for breach of contract. Contract damages are meant to restore the nonbreaching party to as good a position as it would have been in had the contract been performed; fraud damages are meant to indemnify losses suffered as a result of the fraudulent inducement … . Where all of the damages are remedied through the contract claim, the fraud claim is duplicative and must be dismissed … . * * *

… [T]he order of the Supreme Court … [which] granted defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing the fraudulent inducement claim, denied so much of plaintiff's motion for summary judgment as sought a ruling that an insurer does not have to prove loss causation in connection with a fraudulent inducement claim, granted so much of plaintiff's motion as sought a ruling on the meaning of the “No Monetary Default” representation and the “Mortgage Loan Schedule” representation in the Pooling and Service Agreement for the subject residential mortgage-backed securitization transaction, and denied plaintiff's motion to supplement the record in opposition to defendants' motion, should be modified, on the law, to deny plaintiff's motion as to the meaning of the representations, and otherwise affirmed … . MBIA Ins. Corp. v Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC, 2018 NY Slip Op 06060, First Dept 9-13-18

INSURANCE LAW (SECURITIES, INSURER OF RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIES NOT ENTITLED TO RECOVER ALL CLAIMS PAID OUT AS A RESULT OF 50% OF THE UNDERLYING MORTGAGES GOING INTO DEFAULT UNDER A FRAUD THEORY, ONLY A BREACH OF CONTRACT THEORY WAS AVAILABLE (FIRST DEPT))/CONTRACT LAW (INSURANCE LAW, SECURITIES, INSURER OF RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIES NOT ENTITLED TO RECOVER ALL CLAIMS PAID OUT AS A RESULT OF 50% OF THE UNDERLYING MORTGAGES GOING INTO DEFAULT UNDER A FRAUD THEORY, ONLY A BREACH OF CONTRACT THEORY WAS AVAILABLE (FIRST DEPT))/SECURITIES (INSURANCE LAW,  INSURER OF RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIES NOT ENTITLED TO RECOVER ALL CLAIMS PAID OUT AS A RESULT OF 50% OF THE UNDERLYING MORTGAGES GOING INTO DEFAULT UNDER A FRAUD THEORY, ONLY A BREACH OF CONTRACT THEORY WAS AVAILABLE (FIRST DEPT))/FRAUD (INSURANCE LAW, SECURITIES, INSURER OF RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIES NOT ENTITLED TO RECOVER ALL CLAIMS PAID OUT AS A RESULT OF 50% OF THE UNDERLYING MORTGAGES GOING INTO DEFAULT UNDER A FRAUD THEORY, ONLY A BREACH OF CONTRACT THEORY WAS AVAILABLE (FIRST DEPT))/RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE BACKED SECURITIES (INSURER OF RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIES NOT ENTITLED TO RECOVER ALL CLAIMS PAID OUT AS A RESULT OF 50% OF THE UNDERLYING MORTGAGES GOING INTO DEFAULT UNDER A FRAUD THEORY, ONLY A BREACH OF CONTRACT THEORY WAS AVAILABLE (FIRST DEPT))

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SIDEWALK DEFECT WAS NOT TRIVIAL AS A MATTER OF LAW, TRIVIALITY IS NOT A QUESTION OF DIMENSIONS ALONE, DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS SLIP AND FALL CASE PROPERLY DENIED (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department determined that Supreme Court properly denied the defendants' motion for summary judgment in this sidewalk trip and fall case. There was a question of fact, raised by the plaintiff's expert, whether the defect was trivial as a matter of law:

… [P]laintiff submitted an affidavit from an expert engineer who … found that the sidewalk flags had a vertical height differential of over one half inch. … [P]laintiff's expert opined that this differential and the dimension of the opening at the expansion joint created a “trap-like hazardous condition and [was] a known cause of trip and fall accidents.” The expert further opined that the condition of the sidewalk had been in a noticeable state of disrepair for at least one year prior to plaintiff's fall, and therefore, defendants should have been aware of the unsafe condition.

The motion court properly rejected defendants' argument that the sidewalk defect was trivial as a matter of law and denied defendants' motion for summary judgment, finding issues of fact. The Court of Appeals has held “that there is no “minimal dimension test” or per se rule that a defect must be of a certain minimum height or depth in order to be actionable' . . . and therefore [] granting summary judgment to a defendant based exclusively on the dimensions[s] of the . . . defect is unacceptable'”… . Thus, a finding of triviality, as a matter of law, must “be based on all the specific facts and circumstances of the case, not size alone” … . For this reason, the Court of Appeals has noted that “whether a dangerous or defective condition exists on the property of another so as to create liability . . . is generally a question of fact for the jury” … .

Here, the crux of defendants' triviality argument is that the defect was physically insignificant. However, as already noted, case law prohibits us from basing a finding of triviality on size alone. Indeed, before the burden can shift to the plaintiff, defendants “must make a prima facie showing that the defect is, under the circumstances, physically insignificant and that the characteristics of the defect or the surrounding circumstances do not increase the risks it poses” … .  Suarez v Emerald 115 Mosholu LLC, 2018 NY Slip Op 06059, First Dept 9-13-18

NEGLIGENCE (SIDEWALK DEFECT WAS NOT TRIVIAL AS A MATTER OF LAW, TRIVIALITY IS NOT A QUESTION OF DIMENSIONS ALONE, DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS SLIP AND FALL CASE PROPERLY DENIED (FIRST DEPT))/SLIP AND FALL (SIDEWALK DEFECT WAS NOT TRIVIAL AS A MATTER OF LAW, TRIVIALITY IS NOT A QUESTION OF DIMENSIONS ALONE, DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS SLIP AND FALL CASE PROPERLY DENIED (FIRST DEPT))/TRIVIAL DEFECT (SLIP AND FALL, SIDEWALK DEFECT WAS NOT TRIVIAL AS A MATTER OF LAW, TRIVIALITY IS NOT A QUESTION OF DIMENSIONS ALONE, DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS SLIP AND FALL CASE PROPERLY DENIED (FIRST DEPT))/SIDEWALKS (SLIP AND FALL, SIDEWALK DEFECT WAS NOT TRIVIAL AS A MATTER OF LAW, TRIVIALITY IS NOT A QUESTION OF DIMENSIONS ALONE, DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS SLIP AND FALL CASE PROPERLY DENIED (FIRST DEPT))

SENTENCING JUDGE MAY HAVE MISTAKENLY BELIEVED THE MINIMUM PERIOD OF POST RELEASE SUPERVISION (PRS) WAS FIVE YEARS WHEN IT ACTUALLY WAS TWO AND A HALF YEARS, MATTER SENT BACK FOR RESENTENCING (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, over a dissent, sent the case back for resentencing because it appeared the sentencing judge was under the misimpression the minimum period of post release supervision (PRS) was five years, when the minimum was two and a half years:

At the time of defendant's plea, the court, counsel, and the prosecution believed defendant was a predicate felony offender. The plea offer contained the mandatory five-year term of PRS for a second felony offender convicted of a first violent felony offense (see Penal Law §§ 70.00[6], 70.45[2][f]). At sentencing, however, when defense counsel stated that defendant was not, in fact, a predicate felon, the sentencing court asked whether defendant's status as a first felony offender “change[d] our circumstances.” Defense counsel responded, “I think the minimum is still three and a half.” The court later asked, “Is there any reason that I should not impose the sentence of three-and- one-half years plus five years of post-release supervision?” Defense counsel replied, “Even if it was not quote unquote agreed upon, that would have been the best Your Honor could have given.” As indicated, the defense counsel's statement was correct as to the prison term, but not as to the period of PRS. People v Holmes, 2018 NY Slip Op 06055, First Dept 9-13-18

CRIMINAL LAW (SENTENCING JUDGE MAY HAVE MISTAKENLY BELIEVED THE MINIMUM PERIOD OF POST RELEASE SUPERVISION (PRS) WAS FIVE YEARS WHEN IT ACTUALLY WAS TWO AND A HALF YEARS, MATTER SENT BACK FOR RESENTENCING (FIRST DEPT))/POST RELEASE SUPERVISION (PRS)  (SENTENCING JUDGE MAY HAVE MISTAKENLY BELIEVED THE MINIMUM PERIOD OF POST RELEASE SUPERVISION (PRS) WAS FIVE YEARS WHEN IT ACTUALLY WAS TWO AND A HALF YEARS, MATTER SENT BACK FOR RESENTENCING (FIRST DEPT))

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NYC HUMAN RIGHTS LAW PROTECTS AGAINST TERMINATION BASED UPON AN EMPLOYEE’S MARRIAGE TO A PARTICULAR PERSON WHO HAD LEFT TO WORK FOR A COMPETITOR, THERE WAS NO NEED TO ALLEGE THAT THE EMPLOYER WAS BIASED AGAINST MARRIED COUPLES GENERALLY (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Acosta, in a matter of first impression, determined that terminating a person the employer (Fidessa) believed was married to another employee who had left to work for a competing employer stated a cause of action for discrimination based upon marital status under the New York City Human Rights Law:

The City HRL states, in relevant part: “It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice: (a) For an employer or an employee or agent thereof, because of the actual or perceived . . . marital status . . .(2) To refuse to hire or employ or to bar or to discharge from employment such person or (3) To discriminate against such person in compensation or in terms, conditions or privileges of employment” … .

From the complaint it appears that Fidessa treated plaintiff and his partner differently from [a] similarly situated couple based on its perception that they were married to one another and the members of the other couple were not. Thus, the question is whether discrimination based on “marital status” encompasses discrimination based on marital status in relation to a person relevant to Fidessa. In other words, is an employer prohibited from discharging an employee because of the employee's marriage to a particular person.

For the purposes of this analysis, the fact that defendant was not alleged to be “biased against” married couples in all circumstances is of no moment: the factor in terminating plaintiff's employment was plaintiff's marital status in relation to the employee who left the company. Thus, plaintiff's termination was based on his marital status. Morse v Fidessa Corp., 2018 NY Slip Op 05975, First Dept 9-6-18

HUMAN RIGHTS LAW (EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION, NYC HUMAN RIGHTS LAW PROTECTS AGAINST TERMINATION BASED UPON AN EMPLOYEE'S MARRIAGE TO A PARTICULAR PERSON WHO HAD LEFT TO WORK FOR A COMPETITOR, THERE WAS NO NEED TO ALLEGE THAT THE  EMPLOYER WAS BIASED AGAINST MARRIED COUPLES GENERALLY  (FIRST DEPT))/EMPLOYMENT LAW (EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION, NYC HUMAN RIGHTS LAW PROTECTS AGAINST TERMINATION BASED UPON AN EMPLOYEE'S MARRIAGE TO A PARTICULAR PERSON WHO HAD LEFT TO WORK FOR A COMPETITOR, THERE WAS NO NEED TO ALLEGE THAT THE  EMPLOYER WAS BIASED AGAINST MARRIED COUPLES GENERALLY  (FIRST DEPT))/ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION, NYC HUMAN RIGHTS LAW PROTECTS AGAINST TERMINATION BASED UPON AN EMPLOYEE'S MARRIAGE TO A PARTICULAR PERSON WHO HAD LEFT TO WORK FOR A COMPETITOR, THERE WAS NO NEED TO ALLEGE THAT THE  EMPLOYER WAS BIASED AGAINST MARRIED COUPLES GENERALLY  (FIRST DEPT))/MARITAL STATUS (EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION, NYC HUMAN RIGHTS LAW PROTECTS AGAINST TERMINATION BASED UPON AN EMPLOYEE'S MARRIAGE TO A PARTICULAR PERSON WHO HAD LEFT TO WORK FOR A COMPETITOR, THERE WAS NO NEED TO ALLEGE THAT THE  EMPLOYER WAS BIASED AGAINST MARRIED COUPLES GENERALLY  (FIRST DEPT))

PLAINTIFF’S LADDER WAS PLACED ON A MUDDY WATERY SURFACE IN A TUNNEL AND IT SLIPPED OUT FROM UNDER HIM, PLAINTIFFS’ SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION ON THE LABOR LAW 240 (1) CAUSE OF ACTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department determined plaintiff was entitled to summary judgment on his Labor Law 240 (1) cause of action. Plaintiff was using a ladder on a muddy, watery surface in a tunnel when it slipped out from under him:

… [P]laintiffs were entitled to summary judgment on the issue of liability on the § 240(1) claim as against the MTA. The record establishes that the ladder that was provided to plaintiff failed to provide proper protection for him to perform the elevation-related task of re-positioning the stadium light, and MTA's opposition failed to raise a triable issue of fact … . Contrary to the contention that an issue of fact exists as to whether a platform was available to secure the ladder to, there is nothing in the record to support that. In fact the engineer merely testified that there “may or may not have been” platforms available to tie the ladder to. Gordon v City of New York, 2018 NY Slip Op 05972, First Dept 9-6-18

LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW (PLAINTIFF'S LADDER WAS PLACED ON A MUDDY WATERY SURFACE IN A TUNNEL AND IT SLIPPED OUT FROM UNDER HIM, PLAINTIFFS' SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION ON THE LABOR LAW 240 (1) CAUSE OF ACTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FIRST DEPT))/LADDERS (LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW, PLAINTIFF'S LADDER WAS PLACED ON A MUDDY WATERY SURFACE IN A TUNNEL AND IT SLIPPED OUT FROM UNDER HIM, PLAINTIFFS' SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION ON THE LABOR LAW 240 (1) CAUSE OF ACTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FIRST DEPT))

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POST-JUDGMENT MOTION TO VACATE A SENTENCE IMPOSED UNDER AN INCORRECT PREDICATE-FELONY-DESIGNATION THAT WAS LESS SEVERE THAN THE SENTENCE REQUIRED BY THE CORRECT PREDICATE-FELONY DESIGNATION PROPERLY DENIED (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department determined defendant could not, in a post-judgment motion, contest a predicate-felony-based sentence that resulted in a less severe sentence than the correct predicate-felony-designation would have required. Courts have previously held appeals on this ground could not be brought. The First Department applied the same logic to defendant's post-judgment motion to vacate his sentence pursuant to Criminal Procedure Law 440.20:

… 21 years later, defendant claims that he was unlawfully sentenced as a second felony offender, when he should have been sentenced as a second violent felony offender. His argument is that the court erred in his favor by imposing a lesser predicate felony adjudication than the one required by his prior record. It is apparent that defendant seeks a resentencing in order to “to upset sequentiality for purposes of determining whether the conviction . . . can serve as a predicate for multiple felony offender status” … .

As defendant was not “adversely affected” by any perceived error by the court in sentencing him, and, indeed, benefitted from the imposition of a less serious predicate status, defendant's CPL 440.20 claim must be rejected without consideration of the merits of his argument that the court erred when it pronounced sentence.(CPL 470.15[1] …).

… [C]ourts [have relied] upon CPL 470.15(1) to deny direct appeals from sentences that were equal to or shorter than the sentence the defendant would have received if the alleged error in sentence had not occurred. We hold today that CPL 470.15(1) equally bars appeals from motions which challenge such alleged sentencing errors. To do otherwise would lead to the anomalous result that a defendant could achieve a result by motion which could not be obtained on a direct appeal. People v McNeil, 2018 NY Slip Op 05970, First Dept 9-6-18

Similar issues and result in People v Francis, 2018 NY Slip Op 05971, First Dept 9-6-18.

CRIMINAL LAW (POST-JUDGMENT MOTION TO VACATE A SENTENCE IMPOSED UNDER AN INCORRECT PREDICATE-FELONY-DESIGNATION THAT WAS LESS SEVERE THAN THE SENTENCE REQUIRED BY THE CORRECT PREDICATE-FELONY DESIGNATION PROPERLY DENIED (FIRST DEPT))/APPEALS (CRIMINAL LAW, POST-JUDGMENT MOTION TO VACATE A SENTENCE IMPOSED UNDER AN INCORRECT PREDICATE-FELONY-DESIGNATION THAT WAS LESS SEVERE THAN THE SENTENCE REQUIRED BY THE CORRECT PREDICATE-FELONY DESIGNATION PROPERLY DENIED (FIRST DEPT)).VACATE SENTENCE, MOTION TO (POST-JUDGMENT MOTION TO VACATE A SENTENCE IMPOSED UNDER AN INCORRECT PREDICATE-FELONY-DESIGNATION THAT WAS LESS SEVERE THAN THE SENTENCE REQUIRED BY THE CORRECT PREDICATE-FELONY DESIGNATION PROPERLY DENIED (FIRST DEPT))/SENTENCING  (POST-JUDGMENT MOTION TO VACATE A SENTENCE IMPOSED UNDER AN INCORRECT PREDICATE-FELONY-DESIGNATION THAT WAS LESS SEVERE THAN THE SENTENCE REQUIRED BY THE CORRECT PREDICATE-FELONY DESIGNATION PROPERLY DENIED (FIRST DEPT))

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