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Tag Archive for: First Department

Evidence, Labor Law-Construction Law

THE COLLAPSE OF A NEIGHBORING STRUCTURE WAS FORESEEABLE; PLAINTIFF, WHO WAS STRUCK BY A PIECE OF CONCRETE FROM THE STRUCTURE, WAS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE LABOR LAW 240(1) CAUSE OF ACTION (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the collapse of a neighboring structure which resulted in a piece of concrete striking the plaintiff, was foreseeable. Therefore the plaintiff was entitled to summary judgment on the Labor Law 240(1) cause of action:

Contrary to defendants’ position, the event was foreseeable, rendering Labor Law § 240(1) applicable and summary judgment on that claim appropriate … . Whether the collapse of a permanent structure is foreseeable is analyzed “not in a strict negligence sense, but in the sense of foreseeability of exposure to an elevation-related risk” … . Here, the possibility of insecurity in the foundation developing after adjacent demolition was well known to defendants, as evinced by the need for a support plan in the first instance. As noted by an expert engaged by defendants themselves in earlier motion practice, photographs of the facade showed poorly consolidated and deteriorated concrete with numerous voids, obvious discontinuities, several cold unbonded joints, and the appearance of having been constructed without steel reinforcing bars. It was thus foreseeable that the newly exposed and unsupported wall, or a portion thereof, would fail.

Moreover, plaintiffs established that [plaintiff’s] injuries were caused by the lack of any safety device of the kind enumerated in Labor Law § 240(1) to secure the neighboring foundation. Plaintiffs’ expert established that defendants failed to properly underpin the foundation of the adjoining building by bracing and shoring the “poor conditions of the concrete and the obvious presence of cold joints within the excavated pins of the underpinning work.” Moises-Ortiz v FDB Acquisition LLC, 2025 NY Slip Op 05746, First Dept 10-16-25

Practice Point: Here the collapse of the neighboring structure, injuring plaintiff, was foreseeable, entitling plaintiff to summary judgment on his Labor Law 240(1) cause of action.

 

October 16, 2025
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2025-10-16 11:53:462025-10-23 09:24:54THE COLLAPSE OF A NEIGHBORING STRUCTURE WAS FORESEEABLE; PLAINTIFF, WHO WAS STRUCK BY A PIECE OF CONCRETE FROM THE STRUCTURE, WAS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE LABOR LAW 240(1) CAUSE OF ACTION (FIRST DEPT).
Attorneys, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Evidence

DEFENSE COUNSEL’S MISUNDERSTANDING OF THE ELEMENTS OF A CHARGED OFFENSE RESULTED IN THE PRESENTATION OF EVIDENCE BY THE DEFENDANT WHICH PROVED THE COMMISSION OF THE OFFENSE; DEFENSE COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE; NEW TRIAL ORDERED (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing defendant’s conviction and ordering a new trial, determined defense counsel was ineffective for failing to understand the nature of one of the criminal charges and presenting evidence which proved defendant’s commission of the charged offense. “Penal Law § 120.05(7) provides that a person is guilty of assault in the second degree when “[h]aving been charged with or convicted of a crime and while confined in a correctional facility, . . . with intent to cause physical injury to another person, he causes such injury to such person or to a third person” … . Defendant presented evidence he intended to punch another inmate but struck a corrections officer, thereby proving all the elements of the offense:

… [T]he record reveals that defense counsel’s trial strategy rested on the erroneous theory that defendant could not be found guilty of the charged offense if it could be proved that the correction officer was not the intended target of the assault. At trial, defense counsel called his client to testify. Defendant testified that while incarcerated, he became involved in an altercation with another inmate. He explained that during the encounter, he threw a “sucker punch” at that inmate, but in so doing, struck the correction officer instead. Defendant averred that the correction officer was not his intended target.

During summation, defense counsel compounded this error by incorrectly stating the required elements of Penal Law § 120.05(7) and declaring that in order to find defendant guilty of the charge, it must be proved that defendant intended to hit the correction officer. However, proving that the intended target of the assault was the correction officer is not a material element of the crime charged. Thus, counsel’s defense strategy constituted an admission to the jury of the elements necessary to prove the assault in the second-degree count (see Penal Law § 120.05[7]). Moreover, defense counsel’s argument to the court that he did not believe that the prosecution could amend its theory based on defendant’s testimony demonstrated yet another critical misunderstanding, of settled New York law that pertained to the entire defense strategy … . People v Calderon, 2025 NY Slip Op 05755, First Dept 10-16-25

Practice Point: Here, defense counsel’s failure to understand the elements of a charged offense constituted ineffective assistance, resulting in reversal and a new trial.​

 

October 16, 2025
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2025-10-16 11:53:382025-10-21 09:12:16DEFENSE COUNSEL’S MISUNDERSTANDING OF THE ELEMENTS OF A CHARGED OFFENSE RESULTED IN THE PRESENTATION OF EVIDENCE BY THE DEFENDANT WHICH PROVED THE COMMISSION OF THE OFFENSE; DEFENSE COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE; NEW TRIAL ORDERED (FIRST DEPT).
Civil Procedure, Evidence, Judges

A JUDGE CANNOT ORDER DISCOVERY IN A FOREIGN JURISDICTION WHICH IS A SIGNATORY TO THE HAGUE CONVENTION WITHOUT COMPLYING WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE CONVENTION (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the judge should not have ordered discovery of a nonparty’s electronic devices in a foreign jurisdiction without complying with the Hague Convention. The nonparty, de Putron, resides in the island country of Jersey in the United Kingdom:

… Supreme Court improperly directed the discovery of de Putron’s electronic devices. First, “when discovery is sought from a nonparty in a foreign jurisdiction [that is a signatory to the Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters … , application of the . . . Convention . . . is virtually compulsory” … . An order directing discovery of such a party without complying with the Hague Convention is therefore an “improper assertion of power beyond the . . . Court’s jurisdiction” … . As it is undisputed that de Putron is a nonparty in a foreign jurisdiction that is a signatory to the Hague Convention, Supreme Court lacked the power to direct discovery of his electronic devices without complying with the Hague Convention. Dorilton Capital Mgt. LLC v Stilus LLC, 2025 NY Slip Op 05744, First Dept 10-16-25

Practice Point: Here discovery of a foreign nonparty’s electronic devices was improperly ordered by the judge. The country in which the nonparty resided was a signatory to the Hague Convention. Compliance with the Convention is a prerequisite to any discovery order.

 

October 16, 2025
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2025-10-16 08:37:202025-10-22 16:59:15A JUDGE CANNOT ORDER DISCOVERY IN A FOREIGN JURISDICTION WHICH IS A SIGNATORY TO THE HAGUE CONVENTION WITHOUT COMPLYING WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE CONVENTION (FIRST DEPT).
Civil Procedure, Cooperatives, Corporation Law, Fiduciary Duty

WITH RESPECT TO A RESIDENTIAL COOPERATIVE, INDIVIDUAL MEMBERS OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS CAN BE SUED BY A SHAREHOLDER FOR BREACH OF A FIDUCIARY DUTY, BUT THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS IS NOT AMENABLE TO SUIT APART FROM A SUIT AGAINST THE CORPORATION (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Scarpulla, determined the board of directors of a residential cooperative is not amenable to a lawsuit separate and apart from a suit against the cooperative. Here plaintiff shareholder sued the board of directors for breach of fiduciary duty after the dismissal of a similar suit against the directors individually:

New York trial courts have explicitly held that a board of directors is not an entity that may be sued separately from the corporation … . * * *

Applying the Business Corporation Law … , the residential cooperative board of defendant … is not an entity with the capacity to sue and be sued separate and apart from the corporation on whose behalf it acts. * * *

While a shareholder cannot assert allegations of breach of fiduciary duty against a board of directors, a shareholder may assert the claim against the individual directors … . Here, plaintiff originally brought breach of fiduciary duty causes of action against fourteen of the individual board members and the corporation … . Those causes of action were largely dismissed, and plaintiff may not simply replace those parties with “the board” to revive those now dismissed claims. Tahari v 860 Fifth Ave. Corp., 2025 NY Slip Op 05584, First Dept 10-8-25

Practice Point: This opinion clarifies the law. The board of directors of a corporation is not amenable to suit for breach of a fiduciary duty separate and apart from a suit against the corporation. However, individual members of the board of directors may be sued for breach of a fiduciary duty.

 

October 8, 2025
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2025-10-08 10:21:582025-10-11 10:45:10WITH RESPECT TO A RESIDENTIAL COOPERATIVE, INDIVIDUAL MEMBERS OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS CAN BE SUED BY A SHAREHOLDER FOR BREACH OF A FIDUCIARY DUTY, BUT THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS IS NOT AMENABLE TO SUIT APART FROM A SUIT AGAINST THE CORPORATION (FIRST DEPT).
Civil Procedure, Education-School Law, Negligence

IN THIS CHILD VICTIMS ACT CASE ALLEGING SEXUAL ABUSE BY A TEACHER, PLAINTIFF-STUDENT’S DEMAND FOR PUNITIVE DAMAGES AGAINST THE SCHOOL PROPERLY SURVIVED THE MOTION TO DISMISS, BUT THE DEMAND FOR PUNITIVE DAMAGES AGAINST THE DIOCESE DID NOT; CRITERIA EXPLAINED (FIRST DEPT). ​

The First Department, over a dissent, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Kapnick, over a dissenting opinion, affirmed the denial of the school’s and the Episcopal Diocese’s motions to dismiss the complaint in this Child Victims Act action stemming from the alleged sexual abuse of plaintiff-student by a teacher (Mr. Bravo). The majority affirmed the denial of the motion to dismiss the request for punitive damages against the school but dismissed the demand for punitive damages against the Diocese. The dissent argued the demand for punitive damages against the school should also have been dismissed:

Plaintiff’s demand for punitive damages against the School was … properly sustained at this prediscovery stage of the litigation … . Contrary to the dissent’s position, this Court has found claims for punitive damages may be appropriate in certain negligence cases … . Specifically,”[p]unitive damages in actions involving negligent hiring, retention, or supervision generally require conduct evincing a high degree of moral culpability, so flagrant as to transcend simple carelessness, or which constitutes willful or wanton negligence or recklessness so as to evince a conscious disregard for the rights of others” … . A “conscious disregard” requires knowledge, or actual notice, of the potential of harm to others … . The complaint alleges that the School was given actual notice that Mr. Bravo was sexually abusing plaintiff and then failed to adequately investigate the allegations to such an extent that suggests ulterior motives. Further, the dissent is mistaken in its belief that plaintiff’s denial of the abuse during a meeting with school administrators negates the actual notice received by the School from the parents of her friends and a therapist, which, by itself, triggered a statutorily required response that the School did not fully implement … . * * *

Given that punitive damages are “awarded only in ‘singularly rare cases,'” they are appropriately reserved for those cases which allege that the defendants, despite having actual knowledge of the perpetrator’s propensity for the sexual abuse of children, concealed that knowledge or otherwise knowingly underresponded to that information so as to suggest that they dismissed all concern for the rights of others in favor of their own self-interest … . As plaintiff here has not alleged the knowledge required to infer any improper state of mind on behalf of the Episcopal Diocese, her demand for punitive damages against the Episcopal Diocese should be dismissed … . C.R. v Episcopal Diocese of N.Y., 2025 NY Slip Op 05144, First Dept 9-25-25

Practice Point: Consult this decision for a discussion of the allegations in a Child Victims Act complaint which will support the denial of a motion to dismiss a request for punitive damages.

 

September 25, 2025
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2025-09-25 14:36:212025-09-29 09:02:05IN THIS CHILD VICTIMS ACT CASE ALLEGING SEXUAL ABUSE BY A TEACHER, PLAINTIFF-STUDENT’S DEMAND FOR PUNITIVE DAMAGES AGAINST THE SCHOOL PROPERLY SURVIVED THE MOTION TO DISMISS, BUT THE DEMAND FOR PUNITIVE DAMAGES AGAINST THE DIOCESE DID NOT; CRITERIA EXPLAINED (FIRST DEPT). ​
Attorneys, Evidence, Family Law, Judges

AN ATTORNEY SHOULD BE DISQUALIFIED UNDER THE ADVOCATE-WITNESS RULE WHEN THE ATTORNEY’S TESTIMONY IS NECESSARY TO PROVE ISSUES IN DISPUTE, NOT THE CASE HERE (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined the husband’s attorney, Smith, should not have been disqualified on the ground he would be called as a witness at trial. The appellate division determined Smith’s testimony was not relevant to the financial issues in the divorce action. Therefore Smith should not have been disqualified on the basis that his testimony would be necessary at trial:

The advocate-witness disqualification rules contained in the Code of Professional Responsibility provide guidance, but are not binding authority for courts in determining whether a party’s attorney should be disqualified during litigation … . “Disqualification of a law firm during litigation implicates not only the ethics of the profession but also the substantive rights of the litigants. Disqualification denies a party’s right to representation by the attorney of its choice” … . In considering whether to disqualify counsel, the court must consider a litigant’s right to select his own counsel and the fairness and effect of disqualification in the particular factual setting … . Whether to disqualify an attorney rests in the sound discretion of the trial court … . However, an attorney should be disqualified only when his or her testimony is necessary to prove the issues in dispute … . The party seeking or supporting disqualification need not show that counsel’s continued representation would prejudice his or her client where the court finds that counsel’s testimony is necessary on his or her client’s behalf … . De Luca v De Luca, 2025 NY Slip Op 05146, First Dept 9-25-25

Practice Point: Here the proposed testimony by the attorney was not necessary to prove issues in dispute. Therefore the attorney should not have been disqualified.

 

September 25, 2025
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2025-09-25 14:15:552025-09-29 08:25:17AN ATTORNEY SHOULD BE DISQUALIFIED UNDER THE ADVOCATE-WITNESS RULE WHEN THE ATTORNEY’S TESTIMONY IS NECESSARY TO PROVE ISSUES IN DISPUTE, NOT THE CASE HERE (FIRST DEPT).
Administrative Law, Education-School Law

EXPULSION OF PETITIONER-STUDENT FROM THE PHYSICIAN ASSISTANT PROGRAM “SHOCKED [THE COURT’S] SENSE OF FAIRNESS;” PETITONER WAS REINSTATED IN GOOD STANDING (FIRST DEPT). ​

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the student’s petition to vacate her college’s determination to expel her from the physician assistant program should have been granted. The petitioner-student had written recommendations for friends seeking admission to the program. Although the recommendations clearly indicated the petitioner was still a student, the digitally generated designation PA-C (Physician Assistant-Certified) appeared on the recommendations instead of PA-S (Physician Assistant -Student). The First Department found expulsion was not supported by the record and ordered the student reinstated in good standing:

“It is well settled that a court may not substitute its judgment for that of the board or body it reviews unless the decision under review is arbitrary and unreasonable and constitutes an abuse of discretion . . .” … . A review of the record makes it clear that the faculty members of the College’s Professional Conduct Review Committee and Academic Performance Committee unreasonably failed to view the totality of the circumstances and abused their discretion. This mistake harmed no one; petitioner consistently maintained that the mistake was inadvertent, as supported by petitioner’s digital signature on the letter with her student email address as well as the multiple references in the accompanying CASPA form to petitioner as a “student”; and the typographical mistake of the use of PA-C was rectified on all documentation … .

Pursuant to the College’s policy, petitioner’s inadvertent mistake simply warranted counseling or, at worst, probation. Here, the College’s imposition of the ultimate academic sanction of expulsion is “so disproportionate to the offense as to shock our sense of fairness” … as to warrant its vacatur. Matter of Mirza v College of Mount St. Vincent, 2025 NY Slip Op 05156, First Dept 9-25-25

Practice Point: Here the appellate court found that the expulsion of a college student “shock[ed] our sense of fairness.” The court vacated the expulsion and reinstated the student in good standing.

 

September 25, 2025
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2025-09-25 13:47:072025-09-28 14:15:45EXPULSION OF PETITIONER-STUDENT FROM THE PHYSICIAN ASSISTANT PROGRAM “SHOCKED [THE COURT’S] SENSE OF FAIRNESS;” PETITONER WAS REINSTATED IN GOOD STANDING (FIRST DEPT). ​
Evidence, Family Law

EXCESSIVE ABSENCES FROM SCHOOL SUPPORTED THE EDUCATIONAL NEGLECT FINDINGS, BUT NEGLECT BECAUSE OF MENTAL ILLNESS WAS NOT DEMONSTRATED (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing (modifying) Family Court, determined that, although the petitioner demonstrated the parents educationally neglected the children, the petitioner did not demonstrate father neglected the children because of his mental illness:

A preponderance of the evidence supports Family Court’s finding that parents educationally neglected the children (see Family Court Act §§ 1012[f][i][B], 1046[b][i]). During the fall 2022 term and the previous school year, both children were absent more than half of the school days, and evidence of excessive unexcused absences from school will support a finding of neglect … . Even crediting the father’s testimony that he made efforts to ensure the children attended school, we find that petitioner provided sufficient evidence to establish that the father educationally neglected the children … . Despite years of outreach from the children’s schools, the father failed to follow up, attend important meetings, or obtain proffered services. School records indicated that the children’s academic progress suffered due to excessive absences and tardiness; both children were failing classes and not progressing towards annual goals. Under these circumstances, even though the father spoke with school personnel, inquired about assistance, and ultimately requested a reevaluation for one of the children, he nevertheless failed to take adequate steps to prevent the children from experiencing significant educational delays resulting from poor attendance … .

… [P]etitioner did not satisfy its burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the father neglected the children because of his mental illness … . Although the father did not dispute that he suffered from depression, he testified that he was engaged in mental health treatment, including therapy and medication, and petitioner did not provide either documentary evidence or expert testimony demonstrating that the father’s mental illness interfered with his “judgment and parenting abilities” or connecting the father’s depression with his inadequate efforts to ensure the children attended school, thereby placing the children at imminent risk of physical, mental or emotional impairment” … . Matter of S.M.W. (J.R.M.), 2025 NY Slip Op 05181, First Dept 9-25-25

Practice Point: Consult this decision for a rare discussion of the criteria for “educational” and “mental-illness” neglect of children.

 

September 25, 2025
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2025-09-25 10:58:232025-09-28 13:46:59EXCESSIVE ABSENCES FROM SCHOOL SUPPORTED THE EDUCATIONAL NEGLECT FINDINGS, BUT NEGLECT BECAUSE OF MENTAL ILLNESS WAS NOT DEMONSTRATED (FIRST DEPT).
Attorneys, Civil Procedure

PLAINTIFF’S COUNSELS “AFFIRMATION OF GOOD FAITH” WAS DEFICIENT; PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO STRIKE AN AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff’s motion to strike an affirmative defense was not supported by a sufficient “affirmation of good faith” from plaintiff’s counsel:

The court should have denied plaintiff’s motion to strike the answer because the affirmation of good faith from plaintiff’s counsel failed to comply with Uniform Rules for Trial Courts (22 NYCRR) § 202.20-f(b). Counsel states only perfunctorily that defendants failed to comply with four court orders for a deposition and that he contacted defendants on a certain date to confirm the deposition. Counsel failed to attest that he conducted an in-person or telephonic conference as required by 22 NYCRR 202.20-f(b) … . While counsel’s affirmation in support of the motion provides additional explanations, such as that “[they] made an effort” to contact defendants’ counsel and that “[their] office made [an] effort to confirm the deposition,” the affirmation fails to specify the mode of communications, by whom or to whom the communications were made, whether any messages were left, and whether counsel followed up with the attempt to confirm the deposition (see 22 NYCRR 202.7[a], [c] … . Servan v ES Bldrs. Group LLC, 2025 NY Slip Op 05184, First Dept 9-25-25

Practice Point: Consult this decision for the required contents of plaintiff’s counsel’s “affirmation of good faith” detailing efforts to resolve the issues with defendant’s counsel before moving to strike an affirmative defense. Here the affirmation was deemed deficient, requiring denial of the motion.

 

September 25, 2025
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2025-09-25 10:40:462025-09-28 10:57:16PLAINTIFF’S COUNSELS “AFFIRMATION OF GOOD FAITH” WAS DEFICIENT; PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO STRIKE AN AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FIRST DEPT).
Civil Procedure, Evidence, Judges, Negligence

DEFENDANT AND A WITNESS SAID THE LIGHT WAS RED, PLAINTIFF SAID THE LIGHT WAS GREEN, SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS PRECLUDED, CREDIBILTY CANNOT BE CONSIDERED (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court in this intersection bicycle-vehicle accident case, reminds us that credibility plays no role in a summary judgment ruling. Plaintiff, the bicyclist, alleged he entered the intersection with a green light. Defendant and a witness alleged plaintiff entered the intersection against a red light. The conflicting evidence required denial of defendants’ motion for summary judgment:

The parties’ conflicting versions of how the accident occurred preclude summary judgment … . It is well settled that a “court’s role in deciding a motion for summary judgment is issue finding, not issue determination. . . . Moreover, [i]t is not the court’s function on a motion for summary judgment to assess credibility” … . Plaintiff’s version of events “is not incredible as a matter of law, and the different versions of the facts submitted by the parties raise[ ] credibility questions for a jury to resolve” … . Wachtel v Alan Joel Communications, Inc., 2025 NY Slip Op 05053, First Dept 9-23-25

Practice Point: Credibility plays no role at the summary judgment stage.

 

September 23, 2025
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2025-09-23 10:37:372025-09-28 10:40:40DEFENDANT AND A WITNESS SAID THE LIGHT WAS RED, PLAINTIFF SAID THE LIGHT WAS GREEN, SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS PRECLUDED, CREDIBILTY CANNOT BE CONSIDERED (FIRST DEPT).
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