The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Fahey, over a dissent, affirmed the defendants’ enterprise corruption convictions. The enterprise here involved a doctor and a chiropractor (the defendants), medical clinics, faked accidents, faked injuries, kickbacks to lawyers, fraudulent insurance claims, etc. The court explained that there is no requirement that the People prove the enterprise would continue in the absence of a key participant to demonstrate the “continuity” element of the enterprise, i.e., that the “structure [of the enterprise is] distinct from the predicate illicit pattern.” In addition, the majority determined an acknowledged jury-instruction error (using “and” instead of “or”) was unpreserved, and rejected an ineffective assistance argument which was based on the failure to object to the erroneous jury charge.  In rejecting the ineffective assistance argument, the majority noted that whether the jury-instruction error was reversible was a close question. If the error had been clearly reversible, the majority explained, the ineffective assistance argument would have prevailed. The dissent argued that the jury-instruction error was preserved and constituted reversible error. The jury-instruction and ineffective assistance discussions, like the enterprise corruption discussion, are extensive and substantive.  With respect to the proof requirements for the “continuity” element of enterprise corruption, the court wrote:

Were the People required to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that a criminal enterprise would survive the removal of a key participant, it would be impossible in most cases to demonstrate the existence of a criminal enterprise. Except where the leading participant was in fact removed some time before the enterprise disbanded, the People would be expected to prove an unknowable proposition concerning a counterfactual scenario in which events occurred differently from the actual world. We have never required such an exercise. Moreover, there is no reason to treat a criminal structure as less deserving of enhanced penalty if its key figure is so essential to the organization that his or her absence would threaten its criminal agenda. A criminal enterprise is no less a criminal enterprise if it has a powerful leader. Finally, if we were to require a criminal enterprise to be able to survive the removal of a key figure, criminal organizations could avoid enhanced penalties simply by placing all control in the hands of one person. It cannot have been the intent of the Legislature to allow such a loophole.

Instead, what is meant by the continuity element of the statute is that to be a criminal enterprise, an organization must continue “beyond the scope of individual criminal incidents” (Penal Law § 460.10 [3]), and must possess “constancy and capacity exceeding the individual crimes committed under the association’s auspices or for its purposes” … . In other words, the requirement is not that the group would continue in the absence of a key participant, but rather that it continues to exist beyond individual criminal incidents. A team of people who unite to carry out a single crime or a brief series of crimes may lack structure and criminal purpose beyond the criminal actions they carry out; such an ad hoc group is not a criminal enterprise. If a group persists, however, in the form of a “structured, purposeful criminal organization” (id. at 659), beyond the time required to commit individual crimes, the continuity element of criminal enterprise is met. People v Keschner, 2015 NY Slip Op 05596, CtApp 6-30-15