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TOWN’S ISSUANCE OF A POSITIVE DECLARATION WITH THE REQUIREMENT THAT THE LANDOWNER SUBMIT A DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT DID NOT RAISE A JUSTICIABLE CONTROVERY WHICH COULD BE REVIEWED BY A COURT.

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Rivera, determined the town board's issuing a positive declaration under the State Environmental Quality Review Act (SEQRA) and imposing a DEIS (draft environmental impact statement) requirement on a landowner seeking a nonconforming use did not raise a justiciable controversy.   Although the creation of a DEIS imposes a financial cost on the landowner, it is only the initial step in the SEQRA review process and is not, therefore, ripe for review. The landowner relied on Matter of Gordon v Rush, 100 NY2d 236, to argue review was appropriate. The court explained why Gordon did not apply:

This Court [in Gordon] concluded that the Board's administrative action was ripe for judicial review because the Board's SEQRA declaration imposed an obligation on the petitioners to prepare and submit a DEIS, after they “had already been through the coordinated review process and a negative declaration had been issued by the DEC as lead agency,” and where no apparent further proceedings would remedy the injury caused by the unnecessary and unauthorized expenditures associated with conducting a DEIS … . Thus, Gordon's analysis and its import must be considered in light of the Court's recognition that the administrative action in that case was potentially unauthorized because “the Board may not have had jurisdiction to conduct its own SEQRA review,” given the existence of a prior negative declaration by a facially appropriate lead agency … . Matter of Ranco Sand & Stone Corp. v Vecchio, 2016 NY Slip Op 02477, CtApp 3-31-16

ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (TOWN'S ISSUANCE OF A POSITIVE DECLARATION WITH THE REQUIREMENT THAT THE LANDOWNER SUBMIT A DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT DID NOT RAISE A JUSTICIABLE CONTROVERSY WHICH COULD BE REVIEWED BY A COURT)/LAND USE (TOWN'S ISSUANCE OF A POSITIVE DECLARATION WITH THE REQUIREMENT THAT THE LANDOWNER SUBMIT A DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT DID NOT RAISE A JUSTICIABLE CONTROVERSY WHICH COULD BE REVIEWED BY A COURT)/ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (STATE ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY REVIEW ACT, TOWN'S ISSUANCE OF A POSITIVE DECLARATION WITH THE REQUIREMENT THAT THE LANDOWNER SUBMIT A DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT DID NOT RAISE A JUSTICIABLE CONTROVERSY WHICH COULD BE REVIEWED BY A COURT)/STATE ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY REVIEW ACT (SEQRA) (TOWN'S ISSUANCE OF A POSITIVE DECLARATION WITH THE REQUIREMENT THAT THE LANDOWNER SUBMIT A DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT DID NOT RAISE A JUSTICIABLE CONTROVERSY WHICH COULD BE REVIEWED BY A COURT)/ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT (TOWN'S ISSUANCE OF A POSITIVE DECLARATION WITH THE REQUIREMENT THAT THE LANDOWNER SUBMIT A DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT DID NOT RAISE A JUSTICIABLE CONTROVERSY WHICH COULD BE REVIEWED BY A COURT)

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DEFENSE COUNSEL’S DECISION TO FOREGO A REQUEST TO REOPEN THE SUPPRESSION HEARING BASED UPON TRIAL TESTIMONY WAS SUPPORTED BY A SOUND STRATEGIC REASON, COUNSEL WAS THEREFORE NOT INEFFECTIVE.

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Abdus-Salaam, over an extensive two-judge dissenting opinion, determined defense counsel's failure to request the reopening of the suppression hearing based upon trial testimony did not constitute ineffective assistance. The Appellate Division had previously reversed the trial court's suppression of defendant's statements. At trial the detective who took the statements from the defendant gave an account which differed from the detective's hearing testimony. The inconsistent testimony related to the second of the two statements made by the defendant during interrogation. In response to defendant's motion to vacate the judgment of conviction on ineffective-assistance grounds, the People provided an affidavit from defense counsel which explained the strategy underlying the decision to forego a request to reopen the suppression hearing. “… Counsel averred that he had believed that defendant's second statement would almost certainly be admitted into evidence at trial and that therefore he had focused on using the exculpatory preface of the first statement to cast doubt on the probative worth of defendant's more incriminating subsequent comments.” The court found the explanation of the defense strategy to be sound:

Defense counsel did not deprive defendant of the effective assistance of counsel when he decided not to move to reopen the suppression hearing … . Because the Appellate Division had rejected counsel's original arguments for suppression of the [second] statement prior to trial and cited a number of factors that remained extant throughout the proceedings in this case, counsel reasonably thought that the statement would be admitted into evidence regardless of any new developments, and instead of making what he sensibly thought was a longshot motion to reopen the hearing, he decided to use the exculpatory portion of defendant's first statement to undermine the credibility of the second statement and place it in context. People v Gray, 2016 NY Slip Op 02476, CtApp 3-31-16

CRIMINAL LAW (DEFENSE COUNSEL'S DECISION TO FOREGO A REQUEST TO REOPEN THE SUPPRESSION HEARING BASED UPON TRIAL TESTIMONY WAS SUPPORTED BY A SOUND STRATEGIC REASON, COUNSEL WAS THEREFORE NOT INEFFECTIVE)/ATTORNEYS (CRIMINAL LAW, DEFENSE COUNSEL'S DECISION TO FOREGO A REQUEST TO REOPEN THE SUPPRESSION HEARING BASED UPON TRIAL TESTIMONY WAS SUPPORTED BY A SOUND STRATEGIC REASON, COUNSEL WAS THEREFORE NOT INEFFECTIVE)/INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE (CRIMINAL LAW, DEFENSE COUNSEL'S DECISION TO FOREGO A REQUEST TO REOPEN THE SUPPRESSION HEARING BASED UPON TRIAL TESTIMONY WAS SUPPORTED BY A SOUND STRATEGIC REASON, COUNSEL WAS THEREFORE NOT INEFFECTIVE)/EVIDENCE (CRIMINAL LAW, DEFENSE COUNSEL'S DECISION TO FOREGO A REQUEST TO REOPEN THE SUPPRESSION HEARING BASED UPON TRIAL TESTIMONY WAS SUPPORTED BY A SOUND STRATEGIC REASON, COUNSEL WAS THEREFORE NOT INEFFECTIVE)

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FAILURE TO MOVE TO SUPPRESS WEAPON CONSTITUTED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE.

The Court of Appeals determined defendant, who was charged with criminal possession of a weapon, was not afforded effective assistance of counsel in that defense counsel did not move to suppress the weapon. The matter was remitted for a suppression hearing. The underlying facts were not addressed in the decision. People v Bilal, 2016 NY Slip Op 02475, CtApp 3-31-16

CRIMINAL LAW (FAILURE TO MOVE TO SUPPRESS WEAPON CONSTITUTED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE)/EVIDENCE (CRIMINAL LAW, FAILURE TO MOVE TO SUPPRESS WEAPON CONSTITUTED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE)/ATTORNEYS (CRIMINAL LAW, FAILURE TO MOVE TO SUPPRESS WEAPON CONSTITUTED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE)

NYS OFFICE OF PARKS, RECREATION AND HISTORIC PRESERVATION DID NOT EXCEED ITS AUTHORITY WHEN IT PROHIBITED SMOKING IN SOME SMALL PARKS WITHIN NEW YORK CITY AND ON A SMALL PERCENTAGE OF THE 330,000-ACRE PARK SYSTEM.

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Fahey, determined the NYS Office of Parks, Recreation and Historic Preservation (OPRHP) did not exceed its authority when it prohibited smoking in seven small parks in New York City and in less than five percent of the 330,000-acre state park system. The court went through the factors outlined in Boreali v Axelrod, 71 NY2d 1, which were described as follows:

… [Under Boreali] the circumstances to be considered are whether (1) “the agency did more than balanc[e] costs and benefits according to preexisting guidelines,' but instead made value judgments entail[ing] difficult and complex choices between broad policy goals' to resolve social problems” … ; (2) “the agency merely filled in details of a broad policy or if it wrote on a clean slate, creating its own comprehensive set of rules without benefit of legislative guidance' ” …; (3) “the legislature has unsuccessfully tried to reach agreement on the issue, which would indicate that the matter is a policy consideration for the elected body to resolve” …; and (4) “the agency used special expertise or competence in the field to develop the challenged regulation[]” … .

Our statement of the relevant principles of law does not end with the articulation of the Boreali factors. Those considerations, we have observed, are not to be applied rigidly … . In fact, they “are not mandatory, need not be weighed evenly, and are essentially guidelines for conducting an analysis of an agency's exercise of power” … . Indeed, “we treat the circumstances as overlapping, closely related factors that, taken together, support the conclusion that an agency has crossed th[e] line [into legislative territory]” … . We also “center [any Boreali analysis] on the theme that it is the province of the people's elected representatives, rather than appointed administrators, to resolve difficult social problems by making choices among competing ends' “… . Matter of NYC C.L.A.S.H., Inc. v New York State Off. of Parks, Recreation & Historic Preserv., 2016 NY Slip Op 02479, CtApp 3-31-16

ADMINSITRATIVE LAW (NYS OFFICE OF PARKS, RECREATION AND HISTORIC PRESERVATION DID NOT EXCEED ITS AUTHORITY WHEN IT PROHIBITED SMOKING IN SOME SMALL PARKS WITHIN NEW YORK CITY AND ON A SMALL PERCENTAGE OF THE 330,000-ACRE PARK SYSTEM)/STATE PARKS (NYS OFFICE OF PARKS, RECREATION AND HISTORIC PRESERVATION DID NOT EXCEED ITS AUTHORITY WHEN IT PROHIBITED SMOKING IN SOME SMALL PARKS WITHIN NEW YORK CITY AND ON A SMALL PERCENTAGE OF THE 330,000-ACRE PARK SYSTEM)/SMOKING PROHIBITION (NYS OFFICE OF PARKS, RECREATION AND HISTORIC PRESERVATION DID NOT EXCEED ITS AUTHORITY WHEN IT PROHIBITED SMOKING IN SOME SMALL PARKS WITHIN NEW YORK CITY AND ON A SMALL PERCENTAGE OF THE 330,000-ACRE PARK SYSTEM)

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IT WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION, AS A MATTER OF LAW, TO EXCLUDE EVIDENCE OF THIRD-PARTY CULPABILITY IN THE FORM OF STATEMENTS AGAINST PENAL INTEREST.

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Stein, over an extensive dissenting opinion by Judge Fahey, determined the defendant should have been allowed to submit evidence of third-party culpability and ordered a new trial in this felony murder/rape case. The majority acknowledged the evidence against defendant was overwhelming. However, the third-party culpability evidence—hearsay admissions about the crime allegedly made to the declarant's cellmate in prison—qualified as statements against penal interest. Applying a balancing test, the Court of Appeals concluded the probative value of the hearsay was such that it was an abuse of discretion, as a matter of law, to exclude it:

Where, as here, the defendant makes an offer of proof to the court explaining the basis for a third-party culpability defense and connecting the third-party to the crime, and the probative value of the evidence “plainly outweighs the dangers of delay, prejudice and confusion,” then it is “error as a matter of law” to preclude the defendant from presenting such proof to the jury… .People v DiPippo, 2016  NY Slip Op 02279, CtApp 3-29-16

CRIMINAL LAW (IT WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION, AS A MATTER OF LAW, TO EXCLUDE EVIDENCE OF THIRD-PARTY CULPABILITY IN THE FORM OF STATEMENTS AGAINST PENAL INTEREST)/EVIDENCE (CRIMINAL LAW, IT WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION, AS A MATTER OF LAW, TO EXCLUDE EVIDENCE OF THIRD-PARTY CULPABILITY IN THE FORM OF STATEMENTS AGAINST PENAL INTEREST)/HEARSAY (CRIMINAL LAW, IT WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION, AS A MATTER OF LAW, TO EXCLUDE EVIDENCE OF THIRD-PARTY CULPABILITY IN THE FORM OF STATEMENTS AGAINST PENAL INTEREST)/STATEMENT AGAINST PENAL INTEREST  (CRIMINAL LAW, IT WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION, AS A MATTER OF LAW, TO EXCLUDE EVIDENCE OF THIRD-PARTY CULPABILITY IN THE FORM OF STATEMENTS AGAINST PENAL INTEREST)/THIRD-PARTY CULPABILITY (CRIMINAL LAW, IT WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION, AS A MATTER OF LAW, TO EXCLUDE EVIDENCE OF THIRD-PARTY CULPABILITY IN THE FORM OF STATEMENTS AGAINST PENAL INTEREST)

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PEOPLE DID NOT DELIBERATELY CALL WITNESS FOR THE SOLE PURPOSE OF ELICITING THE ASSERTION OF THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION; PEOPLE’S OWN WITNESS PROPERLY IMPEACHED WITH PRIOR STATEMENT; EXPERT TESTIMONY ON EFFECT OF EVENT STRESS ON IDENTIFICATION PROPERLY PRECLUDED.

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Pigott, determined (1) the People did not improperly call an eyewitness to the shooting to invoke his privilege against self-incrimination in front of the jury; (2) the People were properly allowed to impeach the eyewitness with his statement made to police at the time of the incident; and (3) expert testimony offered by the defense on the effect of “event stress” on the identification of the defendant was properly precluded. A Frye hearing was not required before preclusion. The expert witness was allowed to testify about “weapon focus” and “witness confidence.” With respect to a witness' invocation of the privilege against self-incrimination in front of the jury, the court explained the analytical criteria:

The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution directs that no person “shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself” (US Const Amend V). When a witness invokes the Fifth Amendment privilege in front of the jury, “the effect of the powerful but improper inference of what the witness might have said absent the claim of privilege can neither be quantified nor tested by cross-examination, imperiling the defendant's right to a fair trial” … . It is therefore reversible error for the trial court to permit the prosecutor to deliberately call a witness for the sole purpose of eliciting a claim of privilege … . The critical inquiry is whether the prosecution exploited the witness's invocation of the privilege, either by attempting “to build its case on inferences drawn from the witness's assertion of the privilege” or utilizing those inferences to “unfairly prejudice [the] defendant by adding 'critical weight' to the prosecution's case in a form not subject to cross-examination” … . People v Berry, 2016 NY Slip Op 02283, CtApp 3-29-16

CRIMINAL LAW (PEOPLE DID NOT DELIBERATELY CALL WITNESS FOR THE SOLE PURPOSE OF ELICITING THE ASSERTION OF THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION)/CRIMINAL LAW (PEOPLE'S OWN WITNESS PROPERLY IMPEACHED WITH PRIOR STATEMENT)/CRIMINAL LAW (EXPERT TESTIMONY ON EFFECT OF EVENT STRESS ON IDENTIFICATION PROPERLY PRECLUDED)/EVIDENCE (CRIMINAL LAW, PEOPLE DID NOT DELIBERATELY CALL WITNESS FOR THE SOLE PURPOSE OF ELICITING THE ASSERTION OF THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION)/EVIDENCE (CRIMINAL LAW, PEOPLE'S OWN WITNESS PROPERLY IMPEACHED WITH PRIOR STATEMENT)/EVIDENCE (CRIMINAL LAW, EXPERT TESTIMONY ON EFFECT OF EVENT STRESS ON IDENTIFICATION PROPERLY PRECLUDED)/IDENTIFICATION (CRIMINAL LAW, EXPERT TESTIMONY ON EFFECT OF EVENT STRESS ON IDENTIFICATION PROPERLY PRECLUDED)

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REDACTED STATEMENT OF CO-DEFENDANT IMPLICATED DEFENDANT IN VIOLATION OF BRUTON RULE, CONVICTION REVERSED.

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Stein, over a two-judge dissenting opinion, determined the redacted statement of a co-defendant (Villanueva), in its written form, left no doubt that the statement implicated defendant in this gang-assault murder case.  The error was not harmless and defendant's conviction was therefore reversed:

… [T]he written statement was not “effectively redacted so that the jury would not interpret its admissions as incriminating the nonconfessing defendant[s]” … . Rather, the statement, with large, “blank [spaces] prominent on its face, . . . 'facially incriminat[ed]'” a codefendant because it “involve[d] inferences that a jury ordinarily could make immediately, even were the confession the very first item introduced at trial” … . Any juror “wonder[ing] to whom the blank might refer need[ed] only lift his [or her] eyes to [Villanueva's codefendants], sitting at counsel table, to find what [would] seem the obvious answer” … . In our view, the replacement of the identifying descriptors of defendant with blank spaces did not leave “the slightest doubt as to whose name[] had been blacked out, but even if there had been, that blacking out itself would have not only laid the doubt but underscored the answer” … , particularly after the court instructed the jury that it was not to speculate about the redactions in any way. The redacted statement both “indicat[ed] to the jury that the original statement contained actual names” or clearly identifying descriptors and, “even if the very first item introduced at trial[,] [it] would immediately inculpate [a codefendant] in the charged crime”  … . Therefore, we conclude that its admission violated the Bruton rule. People v Cedeno, 2016 NY Slip Op 02281, CtApp 3-29-16

Similar issue and result in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Rivera, over a three-judge dissenting opinion— People v Johnson, 2016 NY Slip Op 02282, CtApp 3-29-16

CRIMINAL LAW (REDACTED STATEMENT OF CO-DEFENDANT IMPLICATED DEFENDANT IN VIOLATION OF BRUTON RULE, CONVICTION REVERSED)/EVIDENCE (CRIMINAL LAW, REDACTED STATEMENT OF CO-DEFENDANT IMPLICATED DEFENDANT IN VIOLATION OF BRUTON RULE, CONVICTION REVERSED)/EVIDENCE (CRIMINAL LAW, REDACTED STATEMENT OF CO-DEFENDANT IMPLICATED DEFENDANT IN VIOLATION OF BRUTON RULE, CONVICTION REVERSED)/BRUTON RULE (CRIMINAL LAW, REDACTED STATEMENT OF CO-DEFENDANT IMPLICATED DEFENDANT IN VIOLATION OF BRUTON RULE, CONVICTION REVERSED)

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PROCEDURE USED TO EXCUSE PROSPECTIVE JURORS ON HARDSHIP GROUNDS WAS NOT A MODE OF PROCEEDINGS ERROR; FAILURE TO OBJECT TO PROSECUTOR’S APPEAL TO GENDER BIAS DID NOT CONSTITUTE INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE.

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Pigott, over an extensive dissenting opinion by Judge Rivera, determined the procedure used by the trial judge to excuse prospective jurors on hardship grounds was not a mode of proceedings error warranting reversal in the absence of preservation. At the outset of jury selection, the judge told the prospective jurors the trial might take five days. Anyone who felt they could not sit for five days was then allowed to leave the courtroom with the clerk who would evaluate the extent of the hardship.  The Court of Appeals held the hardship questioning occurred prior to formal voir dire and did not concern a prospective juror's fitness to serve, thereby distinguishing cases where the judge was absent during formal voir dire. The Court of Appeals further determined defense counsel's failure to object to the prosecutor's remarks in summation which appealed to gender bias did not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. The defendant in this assault /burglary case was a woman, as was the victim. The victim's boyfriend was the father of defendant's children. To counter the defendant's argument that the attacker was a male, the prosecutor told the jury the case was about “jealousy” and “obsession” and “only a woman” would inflict “this kind of injury.” With respect to the juror-hardship issue, the court explained:

Preservation is particularly important in a case like this because the defense, faced with the prospect that certain prospective jurors were claiming that they were unable to serve due to hardship, may very well have made a strategic decision not to challenge the procedure because he did not want to risk having those prospective jurors end up on the jury when it became apparent that they did not wish to serve. If defense counsel had an objection to the procedure employed by the trial court, he should have voiced it so that the court could have corrected any alleged error. People v King, 2016 NY Slip Op 02278, CtApp 3-29-16

CRIMINAL LAW (ALLOWING CLERK TO EVALUATE JURORS' REQUESTS TO BE EXCUSED ON HARDSHIP GROUNDS WAS NOT A MODE OF PROCEEDINGS ERROR)/APPEALS (CRIMINAL LAW, ALLOWING CLERK TO EVALUATE JURORS' REQUEST TO BE EXCUSED FROM SITTING ON HARDSHIP GROUNDS WAS NOT A MODE OF PROCEEDINGS ERROR)/ATTORNEYS (FAILURE TO OBJECT TO PROSECUTOR'S APPEAL TO GENDER BIAS DID NOT CONSTITUTE INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE)/INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL (FAILURE TO OBJECT TO PROSECUTOR'S APPEAL TO GENDER BIAS DID NOT CONSTITUTE INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE)

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PROPERTY DEVELOPMENT BASED UPON AN INVALID PERMIT DOES NOT GIVE RISE TO A VESTED RIGHT IN THE DEVELOPED PROPERTY.

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Pigott, determined petitioner did not acquire a vested right to an advertising sign erected pursuant to an invalid permit which was later revoked by the city (NYC). The court further determined the proper procedure for seeking approval for the sign is an application for a variance. Whether petitioner relied in good faith on the invalid permit could be considered in the variance proceeding:

“[A]n owner of real property can acquire a common law vested right to develop property in accordance with prior zoning regulations when, in reliance on a 'legally issued permit,' the landowner 'effect[s] substantial changes and incur[s] substantial expenses to further the development' and '[t]he landowner's actions relying on [the] valid permit [are] so substantial that the municipal action results in serious loss rendering the improvements essentially valueless'” … .

Vested rights cannot be acquired, however, where there is reliance on an invalid permit … . When a permit is wrongfully issued in the first instance, the vested rights doctrine does not prevent the municipality from revoking the permit to correct its error. Because the 2008 permit was unlawfully issued, petitioner could not rely on it to acquire vested rights. Matter of Perlbinder Holdings, LLC v Srinivasan, 2016 NY Slip Op 02122, CtApp 3-24-16

ZONING (PROPERTY DEVELOPMENT BASED UPON AN INVALID PERMIT DOES NOT GIVE RISE TO A VESTED RIGHT IN THE DEVELOPED PROPERTY)

EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES JUSTIFIED WARRANTLESS SEARCH OF A BACKPACK.

The Court of Appeals determined the warrantless search of appellant's backpack when appellant was handcuffed and seated in the police car was justified by exigent circumstances. Prior to searching the backpack, the officer had determined the presence of a weapon by feel. It is not clear from the facts described how “exigent circumstances”—stemming from a legitimate concern for officer safety—arose after the appellant was handcuffed:

When the touching revealed the shape of a gun in the bag, appellant was arrested. Appellant became agitated and upset, and resisted being handcuffed, such that two officers were required to handcuff him. Notably, the officers knew that on the occasion of appellant's prior arrest he had started to walk away while being handcuffed. By this time, a crowd had gathered, yelling at the officers, who placed appellant in their police vehicle. Once in the vehicle, one of the officers opened and searched the backpack. He found what was later confirmed to be an air pistol. Significantly, the unmarked police vehicle had no partition, and the officer who searched the bag was seated next to appellant on the back seat.

In these circumstances, there is record support for the conclusion that the officers reasonably believed that appellant might gain possession of a weapon, so that exigent circumstances — a legitimate concern about the safety of the arresting officers — justified the warrantless search of appellant's backpack. Matter of Kenneth S., 2016 NY Slip Op 02123, CtApp 3-24-16

CRIMINAL LAW (EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES, A CONCERN FOR OFFICER SAFETY, JUSTIFIED WARRANTLESS SEARCH OF BACKPACK)/SEARCHES AND SEIZURES (EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES, A CONCERN FOR OFFICER SAFETY, JUSTIFIED WARRANTLESS SEARCH OF BACKPACK)

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