You are here: / Court of Appeals

Tag Archive for: Court of Appeals

FOIL REQUESTS TO THE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH FOR DISCLOSURE OF DECEDENTS’ MEDICAL HISTORY, CAUSE OF DEATH, LOCATION OF INTERMENT, AND WHETHER THEY WERE BURIED, CREMATED, OR MADE AN ANATOMICAL GIFT, CONSTITUTE AN UNWARRANTED INVASION OF PRIVACY (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Rivera, over a dissenting opinion (three judges), determined certain categories of death-related information kept by the Department of Health (DOH) are exempt from disclosure pursuant to the Freedom of Information Law (FOIL):

The issue on appeal is whether certain information about decedents that is retained and indexed by the New York State Department of Health (DOH) is subject to disclosure under the Freedom of Information Law (FOIL). DOH already publishes an online database that contains a decedent’s first and last name, middle initial, date of death, age at death, gender, state file number, and residence code for deaths from 1957 to 1972. Petitioner requests disclosure of these same categories of information and any additional indexed categories of information, beyond those DOH has chosen to publish, for deaths from all available years through 2017.

Based on the record before us, we conclude DOH has shown that disclosure of a decedent’s medical history, cause of death, location of interment, and whether they were buried, cremated, or made an anatomical gift, would constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, and this information is therefore exempt from disclosure under FOIL. Matter of Reclaim the Records v New York State Dept. of Health, 2025 NY Slip Op 03102, CtApp 5-22-25

 

A NYC LOCAL LAW REQUIRING REDUCTIONS IN GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS FROM LARGE BUILDINGS IS NOT PREEMPTED BY THE STATE’S CLIMATE LEADERSHIP AND COMMUNITY PROTECTION ACT (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, reversing the Appellate Division, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Cannataro, determined the NYC Local Law requiring reductions in greenhouse gas emissions from large buildings was not preempted the the state’s Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act:

The State Constitution grants local governments the power to enact “local laws not inconsistent with the provisions of th[e] constitution or any general law” relating to certain specified subjects, including the “safety, health and well-being of [the locality’s] persons or property” (NY Const, art IX, § 2 [c] [ii] [10]; see also Municipal Home Rule Law § 10 [1] [ii] [a] [12]). State law can preempt local law in one of two ways: either through conflict preemption, which occurs when the local and State laws directly conflict, or field preemption, which occurs “when a local government legislates in a field for which the State Legislature has assumed full regulatory responsibility” … . Plaintiffs have not argued conflict preemption; their sole claim before us is that the State has preempted the field of regulating greenhouse gas emissions. * * *

Rather than demonstrating an intent to preempt the field of regulating greenhouse gas emissions, the Climate Act recognizes that local government plays an important role in this area. The Act does not expressly prohibit local regulation of emissions. To the contrary, the Act’s legislative findings evince a sense of urgency concerning the implementation of mitigation measures in general and further express the legislature’s intent to “encourage other jurisdictions to implement complementary greenhouse gas reduction strategies” … . The Act also directs the Climate Action Council to identify and consider measures taken by other jurisdictions, including localities, when developing the Scoping Plan … . The absence of any statement that local efforts would be superseded is particularly significant here given that Local Law No. 97 was enacted before the Climate Act, as well as the recognized and longstanding involvement of localities in regulating matters of environmental concern affecting the health and safety of the community, such as air pollution … . Further reflecting the Act’s embrace of complementary local action, as noted above, it contains a savings clause stating that it does not relieve any entity from, as relevant here, compliance with other applicable local laws and regulations … . Glen Oaks Vil. Owners, Inc. v City of New York, 2025 NY Slip Op 03101, CtApp 5-22-25

Practice Point: Consult this opinion for insight into the criteria for “field preemption,” i.e., the state’s intention to regulate an area exclusively to the exclusion of any local laws or regulations. Here a NYC Local Law regulating greenhouse gas emissions from buildings was not preempted by the state’s Climate Act.

 

,

THE EVIDENCE THAT DEFENDANT HAD SEXUALLY ASSAULTED THE VICITM’S TWO SISTERS WAS PROPERLY ADMITTED UNDER MOLINEUX IN THIS RAPE PROSECUTION; DEFENDANT ADMITTED HAVING ROUGH SEX WITH THE VICTIM AND CLAIMED IT WAS CONSENSUAL; THE PRIOR CRIME EVIDENCE WAS NOT ADMITTED TO PROVE DEFENDANT HAD SEX WITH THE VICTIM. BUT RATHER TO PROVE HIS STATE OF MIND, HIS INTENT TO HAVE NONCONSENSUAL SEX BY FORCE (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Singas, over two concurrences, affirming defendant’s rape conviction, determined the evidence defendant had sexually assaulted the victim’s sisters was admissible under Molineux. Defendant admitted having sex with the victim, characterizing it as consensual rough sex. The evidence of the prior assaults on the victim’s sisters was not offered to prove defendant had sex with the victim, but rather to prove the defendant’s state of mind, his intent:

​This Court has consistently deemed Molineux evidence admissible where a defendant offers a theory of defense that assumes the underlying conduct but disputes that the defendant possessed the requisite guilty intent or state of mind in the commission of said conduct … . This rule makes sense because the focus in that situation “is not on the actual doing of the act, for the act is either conceded or established by other evidence. Rather, the element in issue is the actor’s state of mind, and evidence of other similar acts is admitted under this exception because no particular intent can be inferred from the nature of the act committed” … .​ * * *​

Defendant presented a theory at trial that the sexual act was consensual. Thus, the primary question for the jury was not whether sexual intercourse occurred but whether defendant possessed the requisite intent: did he intend to have sexual intercourse with the victim without her consent and did he intend to use forcible compulsion to do so. That defendant had previously sexually assaulted the victim’s sisters—defendant’s other sisters-in-law—under hauntingly similar circumstances “has obvious relevance as tending to refute defendant’s claim of an innocent state of mind” … . It tends to make “the innocent explanation improbable” … .

Additionally, the unique facts of this case render the Molineux evidence relevant as background information pertaining to the nature of defendant’s relationship with the victim and the dynamics of the family at large … . During the charged rape, defendant stated: “I am waiting for all your sister. I want to do like this. So I am waiting for this time.” Isolated, this statement may leave the jury puzzled. The Molineux evidence fills that gap and provides clarity and context for the jury. Further, defendant threatened to rape one of A.A.’s sisters if she told anyone what defendant did, and A.A. did disclose defendant’s assault on her to multiple members of the family, making evidence of that assault particularly illuminating … . Lastly, defense counsel suggested during opening argument that this family may have been engaging in “inner family marriages,” thus rendering defendant’s relationships with the other women in the family pertinent. People v Hu Sin, 2025 NY Slip Op 03100, CtApp 5-22-25

Practice Point: Consult this decision for clear examples of when evidence of prior similar crimes is admissible under Molineux. Here defendant claimed the rough sex with the victim was consensual. Evidence of prior sexual assaults on the victim’s sisters was admissible to prove defendant intended to have sex by force without the victim’s consent.

 

,

CLAIMANT’S SEXUAL ABUSE CONVICTION WAS VACATED AFTER THE ALLEGED VICTIM RECANTED; CLAIMANT BROUGHT AN ACTION AGAINST THE STATE PURSUANT TO COURT OF CLAIMS ACT SECTION 8-B FOR UNJUST CONVICTION AND IMPRISONMENT; THE COURT OF CLAIMS PROPERLY FOUND CLAIMANT DID NOT PROVE HIS INNOCENCE BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Halligan, over a dissenting opinion, affirming the dismissal of claimant’s action for unjust conviction and imprisonment, determined claimant, whose sexual abuse conviction was vacated after the alleged victim recanted, did not prove his innocence by clear and convincing evidence. The opinion is fact-specific and cannot be fairly summarized here:

Tuckett filed this claim against the State, seeking damages for unjust conviction and imprisonment pursuant to Court of Claims Act § 8-b. Tuckett needed to “prove by clear and convincing evidence” the remaining two elements of his claim: that “he did not commit any of the acts charged in the accusatory instrument” and that “he did not by his own conduct cause or bring about his conviction” (Court of Claims Act § 8-b [5] [c], [d]). * * *

A claimant who asserts a damages claim against the State under section 8-b must prove their innocence by clear and convincing evidence. That task “is certainly not a simple one” … . After hearing from and observing Tuckett and N.M. (the alleged victim), the Court of Claims determined that the accusations were credible and the recantation was not, and that Tuckett therefore failed to carry his burden. We see no reversible error in that decision. Tuckett v State of New York, 2025 NY Slip Op 03099, CtApp 5-20-25

Practice Point: An action against the state for unjust conviction and imprisonment pursuant to Court of Claims Act section 8-b requires that the claimant prove his or her innocence by clear and convincing evidence. Here the testimony of the alleged victim, who had recanted his allegations of sexual abuse, was not enough.

 

, , ,

HERE DEFENDANT MADE A TIMELY REQUEST TO REPRESENT HIMSELF WHICH WAS DENIED WITHOUT ANY INQUIRY; DEFENDANT WAS DENIED HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO SELF-REPRESENTATION (CT APP). ​

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Rivera, over a dissenting opinion (three judges), reversing defendant’s convictions and ordering a new trial, determined that the judge’s failure to conduct an inquiry before denying defendant’s request to represent himself violated his constitutional right to self-representation:

A defendant has a constitutional right to proceed pro se (see US Const Amend VI; NY Const, art I, § 6; see also CPL 170.10 [6], 180.10 [5], 210.15 [5] [codifying a defendant’s constitutional right to self-representation]). Defendant invoked that right when he informed Supreme Court that he “would like to represent [him]self” at his upcoming trial. People v McIntyre (36 NY2d 10 [1974]) and its progeny required that the court make a searching inquiry into defendant’s unequivocal and timely request to proceed pro se, to determine whether that request was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. Contrary to that rule, the court immediately denied defendant’s request without inquiry, and it expressly refused to consider any further request until the day of trial. The court’s failure to inquire into defendant’s request violated his constitutional right to self-representation. Therefore, we reverse and grant defendant a new trial.

On June 4, 2018, the parties appeared for trial. * * * This colloquy followed:

THE DEFENDANT: I’m going to go cocounsel.
THE COURT: I can’t hear you.
THE DEFENDANT: Cocounsel. I’m going to go cocounsel.
THE COURT: Cocounsel?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
THE COURT: What is that?
THE DEFENDANT: Meaning I’m going to represent myself in this case.
THE COURT: You mean pro se.
THE DEFENDANT: Yes. I will be going pro se at trial. I will be representing myself acting as my own.
THE COURT: You made no application before me.
THE DEFENDANT: I never said I wanted a trial by jurors. I never told this individual that I wanted a trial by jurors.
THE COURT: You know, Mr. Lewis, I’m assuming now you’re trying to play games with this court. . . . I’ll continue with this trial. If you want to speak to [defense counsel] about certain issues, I’ll hear [defense counsel] tomorrow morning.”

The following morning, the court invited defendant to raise any issues before proceeding with jury selection. Defendant asserted again that he did not want defense counsel to represent him, alleging that counsel was ineffective, had a conflict of interest, and was not working on his behalf. The court only responded, “[o]kay. Nicely done,” and continued the proceeding. People v Lewis, 2025 NY Slip Op 03011, CtApp 5-20-25

Practice Point: A defendant has a constitutional right to self-representation. A judge must conduct a “searching inquiry” upon a timely request.​

 

,

MOTHER’S APPEALS FROM EXPIRED PERMANENCY HEARING ORDERS (RE: CHILDREN’S PLACEMENT IN FOSTER CARE) WERE PROPERLY DISMISSED AS MOOT, TWO COMPREHENSIVE DISSENTING OPINIONS (THREE DISSENTING JUDGES) (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Troutman, over two comprehensive dissenting opinions (three judges), determined the Appellate Division had properly dismissed mother’s appeals of expired permanency hearing orders (re: children’s placement in foster care) as moot, and properly declined to hear the appeals under an exception to the mootness doctrine:

Generally, ” ‘an appeal will be considered moot unless the rights of the parties will be directly affected by the determination of the appeal and the interest of the parties is an immediate consequence of the judgment’ ” … . Here, the Appellate Division properly determined that the mother’s appeals are moot. At the time the Appellate Division entered its decisions, both permanency hearing orders were “superseded by subsequent permanency hearing orders, which continued the child’s placement in foster care” … . * * *

… [T]he Appellate Division did not abuse its discretion in determining that the issues raised below were “not sufficiently substantial or novel to warrant an exercise of [its] exceptional discretion to retain the appeal despite mootness” … . Matter of Joshua J. (Tameka J.), 2025 NY Slip Op 03010, CtApp 5-20-25

Practice Point: Consult this opinion for concise explanations of the appellate mootness doctrine and the application of an exception to the mootness doctrine.

 

, ,

PURSUANT TO THE “INTERNAL AFFAIRS” DOCTRINE, PLAINTIFF, A NEW YORK CORPORATION AND BENEFICIAL OWNER OF SHARES IN BARCLAYS, AN ENGLISH CORPORATION, DID NOT HAVE STANDING TO BRING A DERIVATIVE SUIT ON BEHALF OF BARCLAYS AGAINST OFFICERS AND MANAGERS OF A NEW YORK AFFILIATE OF BARCLAYS IN NEW YORK (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Cannataro, over a comprehensive dissenting opinion, determined that the Business Corporation Law (BCL)  (sections 626(a) and 1319(a)(2)) has not displaced the “internal affairs” doctrine, a choice-of-law rule providing that the substantive law of the place of incorporation governs disputes about the rights and relationships of corporate shareholders and managers. The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower courts’ rulings that plaintiff, a New York corporation and a beneficial owner of shares in England-based Barclays, did not have standing to sue, on behalf of Barclays, directors and officers of Barclays New York-based affiliate in New York:

The corporation at the center of this appeal is Barclays PLC (Barclays), a bank holding company incorporated under the laws of England and Wales and headquartered in London. Plaintiff Ezrasons, Inc. is a New York corporation and a beneficial owner of Barclays shares. In 2021, plaintiff commenced this action on behalf of Barclays against almost four-dozen current and former Barclays directors and officers and a New York-based affiliate, Barclays Capital Inc. (BCI). The complaint alleged that the individual defendants, aided and abetted by BCI, breached fiduciary duties owed to Barclays under English law, causing significant injuries to the company. * * *

Supreme Court granted defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint, explaining that under the internal affairs doctrine, foreign law governs the question of whether a plaintiff has the right to sue corporate management on behalf of a foreign corporation. The court rejected plaintiff’s argument that the legislature intended to override that choice-of-law rule when it enacted sections 626 (a) and 1319 (a) (2) of the BCL, agreeing with four decades of case law holding that those provisions “simply confer[] jurisdiction upon New York courts over derivative suits on behalf of out-of-state corporations, but do[ ] not require application of New York law in such suits” … .

The Appellate Division unanimously affirmed, agreeing with Supreme Court that plaintiff lacks standing to pursue this shareholder derivative action on behalf of Barclays … . … [T]he Appellate Division rejected plaintiff’s argument that sections 626 (a) and 1319 (a) (2) displace the internal affairs doctrine and preclude application of English standing law … . Ezrasons, Inc. v Rudd, 2025 NY Slip Op 03008, CtApp 5-20-25

Practice Point: Business Corporation Law sections 626(a) and 1319(a)(2) do not displace the “internal affairs” doctrine which provides that the substantive law of the place of incorporation (England in this case) governs disputes about the rights and relationships of corporate shareholders and managers. Here a New York corporation which holds shares of an English corporation could not sue the officers and managers of a New York affiliate of the English corporation in New York.​

 

, ,

THERE IS NO FEDERAL SEX-OFFENDER-REGISTRATION REGIME; THEREFORE A FEDERAL CHILD-PORNOGRAPHY CONVICTION DOES NOT CONSTITUTE A “FELONY IN ANY OTHER JURISDICTION FOR WHICH THE OFFENDER IS REQUIRED TO REGISTER AS A SEX OFFENDER” WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE CORRECTION LAW; DEFENDANT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN CLASSIFIED AS A “SEXUALLY VIOLENT OFFENDER” BASED UPON THE “FOREIGN-FELONY” PROVISION OF THE CORRECTION LAW (CT APP). ​

The Court of Appeals, reversing (modifying) the Appellate Division, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Cannataro, determined defendant should not have been classified as a sexually violent offender because his federal child pornography conviction did not require registration as a sex offender. The Correction Law defines a “sexually violent offender” to include a defendant who has been convicted of a felony in a foreign jurisdiction and is required to register as a sex offender in that jurisdiction. Because there is no federal sex-offender-registration regime, the foreign-conviction provision of the Correction Law does not apply here:

The primary issue on this appeal from a Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA) risk assessment determination is whether defendant was properly designated as a sexually violent offender under Correction Law § 168-a (3). SORA defines three circumstances under which such a designation is appropriate. Relevant here is the third circumstance: where a defendant stands convicted of “a felony in any other jurisdiction for which the offender is required to register as a sex offender in the jurisdiction in which the conviction occurred” (Correction Law § 168-a [3] [b]). A plain reading of the statutory language, and application of our precedent in this area, establish that defendant was not required to register as a sex offender in the jurisdiction in which his conviction occurred and, therefore, was improperly designated as sexually violent. * * *

Applying the clear and unambiguous statutory language in this case, defendant cannot be designated as “sexually violent” because he was not required to register as a sex offender in the jurisdiction in which his conviction occurred. This is so because the federal government does not maintain a sex offender registry of the sort that states are required to operate by federal mandate. Although the federal government maintains two sex offender databases, the information contained in them merely represents a collection of registration information acquired from registries maintained by individual state and territorial jurisdictions (see 34 USC § § 20921; 20922). People v Sherlock, 2025 NY Slip Op 02966, CtApp 5-15-25

Practice Point: There is no federal sex-offender-registration regime. Therefore a federal child pornography conviction does not constitute a “felony in any other jurisdiction for which the offender is required to register as a sex offender” within the meaning of the Correction Law. Therefore a federal child pornography conviction does not trigger a “sexually violent offender” SORA designation.

 

,

THE LAWSUIT BROUGHT BY PLAINTIFF BENEFICIARY AGAINST DEFENDANT TRUSTEE DID NOT CHALLLENGE THE TRUST, BUT RATHER SOUGHT TO ENFORCE THE PROVISIONS OF THE TRUST; THEREFORE THE LAWSUIT DID NOT TRIGGER THE IN TERROREM CLAUSE (WHICH DISPOSSES A BENEFICIARY WHO SEEKS TO NULLIFY THE TRUST); THERE WAS A THREE-JUDGE DISSENT (CT APP). ​

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Rivera, over a three-judge dissent, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined the lawsuit brought by plaintiff beneficiary of the estate (Carlson) against the trustee (Colangelo) did not trigger the “in terrorem” clause in the will and the trust. Therefore the provisions of the will and the trust remained enforceable by the plaintiff and the plaintiff was entitled to the real property bequeathed to her. The opinion is fact-specific and cannot be fairly summarized here:

The trust includes an in terrorem clause, which dispossesses a beneficiary or other challenger who contests or seeks to nullify the trust. The issue on this appeal is whether plaintiff triggered the clause when she commenced the underlying action against the trustee and thereby forfeited her bequests. * * *

We conclude that because plaintiff’s lawsuit seeks to enforce the Trust provisions as written and intended by the grantor, plaintiff did not attempt to nullify the Trust or challenge its terms. Thus, plaintiff did not violate the in terrorem clause and defendant is not entitled to summary judgment. We further conclude that plaintiff has established her right to summary judgment on her first cause of action regarding her ownership rights to the Premises and her motion should be granted to that extent. Carlson v Colangelo, 2025 NY Slip Op 02264, CtApp 4-17-25

Practice Point: Consult this opinion for insight into when a lawsuit against a trustee triggers an in terrorem clause in the trust document. Here the majority concluded the lawsuit did not challenge the trust but rather sought to enforce the provisions of the trust. Therefore the in terrorem clause was not triggered.

 

, ,

IN THIS CHILD VICTIMS ACT NEGLIGENT-SUPERVISON ACTION AGAINST THE COUNTY, THE PLAINTIFF DID NOT RAISE A QUESTION OF FACT ABOUT WHETHER THE COUNTY HAD NOTICE OF A SOCIAL SERVICES CASEWORKER’S SEXUAL ABUSE OR PROPENSITY FOR SEXUAL ABUSE OF CHILDREN (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, affirming the dismissal of this Child Victims Act suit against the county, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Wilson, over a comprehensive dissenting opinion, determined the plaintiff did not raise a question of fact about whether the county had actual or constructive notice that a Department of Social Services caseworker (Hoch) had sexually abused children or had a propensity for the sexual abuse of children. Therefore, the plaintiff did not make out a prima facie “negligent supervision” cause of action:

In the summer of 1993, the parents of 11-year-old Michael Nellenback had him designated as a person in need of supervision (PINS) and placed in the care of Madison County’s Department of Social Services. The Madison County Department of Social Services assigned caseworker Karl Hoch to the Nellenback case. According to Mr. Nellenback, over the next three years, Mr. Hoch repeatedly sexually abused and assaulted him. It turned out that Mr. Hoch had sexually abused several other children to whose cases he was assigned.

In 2019, Mr. Nellenback filed suit against Madison County under the claim-revival provision of the Child Victims Act, alleging that that the County was negligent in hiring, supervising, and retaining Mr. Hoch. The sole issue on appeal is whether Mr. Nellenback raised a triable issue of fact on his negligent supervision claim. We hold that he did not: Even viewed in the light most favorable to Mr. Nellenback, the evidence was insufficient to prove the County was on notice of the abuse and that it negligently placed Mr. Hoch in a position to cause harm. * * *

… [T]here was neither evidence that the County had any knowledge of Mr. Hoch’s abuse before the report of his abuse of another child in 1996, nor any evidence the County was aware of any conduct that could have alerted them to the potential for harm. Nellenback v Madison County, 2025 NY Slip Op 02263, CtApp 4-17-25

Practice Point: This is a fact-specific opinion which analyzes the proof necessary to raise a question of fact whether a county social services department had constructive notice of its caseworker’s propensity for the sexual abuse of children. The majority, over an extensive dissent, determined the evidence relied on by the plaintiff was not sufficient to raise a question of fact.

 

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy