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DEFENDANT’S REQUEST TO QUESTION WITNESSES WITH THE AID OF STANDBY COUNSEL WAS NOT AN UNEQUIVOCAL REQUEST TO REPRESENT HIMSELF REQUIRING A SEARCHING INQUIRY, DEFENDANT’S WISH TO PRESENT PSYCHIATRIC TESTIMONY TO QUESTION THE VOLUNTARINESS OF HIS CONFESSION WAS PROPERLY DENIED BECAUSE CPL 250.10 NOTICE WAS NOT PROVIDED (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge DiFiore, over two dissenting opinions, determined (1) defendant, who wanted to question witnesses with the aid of standby counsel, did not make an unequivocal request to represent himself requiring a searching inquiry by the court, and (2) the defendant, who did not notify the People of his wish to present psychiatric testimony (required by CPL 250.10), was properly precluded from presenting psychiatric testimony for the purpose of calling into question the voluntariness of his confession:

Defendant urges that a court presented with a request to proceed pro se with “standby counsel” should make an in-depth inquiry whether defendant still desires to represent himself, once defendant is informed that dual representation will not be provided. We hold that further colloquy by the trial court is not constitutionally required when a defendant remains equivocal, despite having been informed by the court on more than one occasion that his right to self-representation includes a waiver of the right to an attorney, as here. When a defendant asks to proceed “pro se with standby counsel” and the trial court explains the scope of the right to proceed pro se, and specifically denies the defendant’s request for hybrid representation, the better practice would be to again ask the defendant if he or she still wants to proceed without counsel. Nevertheless, “[w]hile such inquiries may be the better practice, we will not compel courts to engage in any particular catechism” before denying an equivocal request to proceed pro se because “[n]either our Constitution nor our precedent requires it” … . * * *

Defendant narrowly construes the phrase “any other defense” in CPL 250.10 (1) (c) to be limited to psychiatric evidence offered in support of a complete defense to an element of the crime, such as mens rea; he does not interpret the statute to include a defense strategy to offer evidence that allows the jury to negate the prosecution’s evidence of guilt. As explained below, this argument ignores the legislative intent, our precedent espousing the very purpose of notice, and the fact that, if a defendant’s confession was the primary evidence of guilt and the defendant raises the issue of voluntariness at trial, then voluntariness could be a complete defense to the crime … . Notably, our Court has previously labeled a defendant’s challenge to the voluntariness of his statement pursuant to CPL 710.70 a “defense” … . People v Silburn, 2018 NY Slip Op 02286, CtApp 4-3-18

​CRIMINAL LAW (DEFENDANT’S REQUEST TO QUESTION WITNESSES WITH THE AID OF STANDBY COUNSEL WAS NOT AN UNEQUIVOCAL REQUEST TO REPRESENT HIMSELF REQUIRING A SEARCHING INQUIRY, DEFENDANT’S WISH TO PRESENT PSYCHIATRIC TESTIMONY TO QUESTION THE VOLUNTARINESS OF HIS CONFESSION WAS PROPERLY DENIED BECAUSE CPL 250.10 NOTICE WAS NOT PROVIDED (CT APP))/ATTORNEYS (DEFENDANT’S REQUEST TO QUESTION WITNESSES WITH THE AID OF STANDBY COUNSEL WAS NOT AN UNEQUIVOCAL REQUEST TO REPRESENT HIMSELF REQUIRING A SEARCHING INQUIRY (CT APP))/EVIDENCE (CRIMINAL LAW, PSYCHIATRIC OPINION, DEFENDANT’S WISH TO PRESENT PSYCHIATRIC TESTIMONY TO QUESTION THE VOLUNTARINESS OF HIS CONFESSION WAS PROPERLY DENIED BECAUSE CPL 250.10 NOTICE WAS NOT PROVIDED (CT APP))/PSYCHIATRIC OPINION (CRIMINAL LAW,  DEFENDANT’S WISH TO PRESENT PSYCHIATRIC TESTIMONY TO QUESTION THE VOLUNTARINESS OF HIS CONFESSION WAS PROPERLY DENIED BECAUSE CPL 250.10 NOTICE WAS NOT PROVIDED (CT APP))/EXPERT OPINION (CRIMINAL LAW, PSYCHIATRIC OPINION, DEFENDANT’S WISH TO PRESENT PSYCHIATRIC TESTIMONY TO QUESTION THE VOLUNTARINESS OF HIS CONFESSION WAS PROPERLY DENIED BECAUSE CPL 250.10 NOTICE WAS NOT PROVIDED (CT APP))/PRO SE (CRIMINAL LAW, DEFENDANT’S REQUEST TO QUESTION WITNESSES WITH THE AID OF STANDBY COUNSEL WAS NOT AN UNEQUIVOCAL REQUEST TO REPRESENT HIMSELF REQUIRING A SEARCHING INQUIRY (CT APP))/NOTICE (CRIMINAL LAW, CPL 250.10, PSYCHIATRIC OPINION, DEFENDANT’S WISH TO PRESENT PSYCHIATRIC TESTIMONY TO QUESTION THE VOLUNTARINESS OF HIS CONFESSION WAS PROPERLY DENIED BECAUSE CPL 250.10 NOTICE WAS NOT PROVIDED (CT APP))/CONFESSIONS (CRIMINAL LAW, VOLUNTARINESS, ,PSYCHIATRIC OPINION, DEFENDANT’S WISH TO PRESENT PSYCHIATRIC TESTIMONY TO QUESTION THE VOLUNTARINESS OF HIS CONFESSION WAS PROPERLY DENIED BECAUSE CPL 250.10 NOTICE WAS NOT PROVIDED (CT APP))/WAIVER (RIGHT TO COUNSEL, CRIMINAL LAW, DEFENDANT’S REQUEST TO QUESTION WITNESSES WITH THE AID OF STANDBY COUNSEL WAS NOT AN UNEQUIVOCAL REQUEST TO REPRESENT HIMSELF REQUIRING A SEARCHING INQUIRY (CT APP))/CPL 250.10  (CRIMINAL LAW, VOLUNTARINESS, ,PSYCHIATRIC OPINION, DEFENDANT’S WISH TO PRESENT PSYCHIATRIC TESTIMONY TO QUESTION THE VOLUNTARINESS OF HIS CONFESSION WAS PROPERLY DENIED BECAUSE CPL 250.10 NOTICE WAS NOT PROVIDED (CT APP))/WAIVER (RIGHT TO COUNSEL, CRIMINAL LAW, DEFENDANT’S REQUEST TO QUESTION WITNESSES WITH THE AID OF STANDBY COUNSEL WAS NOT AN UNEQUIVOCAL REQUEST TO REPRESENT HIMSELF REQUIRING A SEARCHING INQUIRY (CT APP))

NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT, IN RESPONSE TO A FREEDOM OF INFORMATION LAW (FOIL) REQUEST, PROPERLY REFUSED TO CONFIRM OR DENY THE EXISTENCE OF SURVEILLANCE RECORDS ON COUNTERTERRORISM GROUNDS (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge DiFiore, over a partial dissenting opinion and a two-judge dissenting opinion, determined that the New York City Police Department, pursuant to a request for records of surveillance of Talib Abdur-Rashid, Samir Hahsmi, a mosque and a university student association, properly refused to confirm or deny such records existed:

The agency denied the requests, stating in each case that the information, “if possessed by the NYPD”, would be protected from disclosure under various statutory exemptions, including the law enforcement, public safety and personal privacy provisions. After the NYPD adhered to those decisions on administrative appeal, petitioners commenced separate CPLR article 78 proceedings challenging the determinations. Petitioners asserted that the NYPD was engaged in an ongoing domestic surveillance program in which, as alleged in press articles, it had targeted Muslim individuals, places of worship, businesses, schools, student groups and the like. It was in this context that petitioners attempted to ascertain whether they were subjects of surveillance or investigation, noting that they had supplied certifications of identity waiving their personal privacy interests and authorizing the NYPD to release responsive records to their attorneys. …

The NYPD’s response, although styled as a motion to dismiss the petition in each case, did not assert a procedural objection but defended the FOIL responses on the merits. The agency explained the basis for its denial of the FOIL requests and its refusal to disclose whether it possessed responsive documents in a 22-page affidavit of its Chief of Intelligence, Thomas Galati. Without offering any specific information relating to petitioners, Chief Galati described the NYPD’s ongoing and wide-ranging counterterrorism efforts, acknowledging that the agency was actively engaged in covert surveillance and other intelligence gathering in its effort to preempt acts of terrorism in New York City, which remains a prime target in the wake of the World Trade Center attacks. The Galati affidavit averred that disclosure of whether the NYPD possesses records responsive to the FOIL requests would necessarily reveal whether petitioners had been the subjects of its investigation, information which — particularly if aggregated — would provide unprecedented and invaluable information concerning NYPD counterterrorism strategies, operations, tactics and techniques to those planning future terrorist attacks. The Galati affidavit also averred that the NYPD intelligence strategies are monitored by individuals and organizations with the goal of developing counterintelligence measures, and the greatest vulnerability to the NYPD Intelligence Bureau is the release of even “seemingly innocuous information” which would inexorably reveal sources from which information is gathered by the NYPD. Matter of Abdur-Rashid v New York City Police Dept., 2018 NY Slip Op 02206, CtApp 3-29-18

FREEDOM OF INFORMATION LAW (FOIL) (NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT PROPERLY REFUSED TO CONFIRM OR DENY THE EXISTENCE OF SURVEILLANCE RECORDS ON COUNTERTERRORISM GROUNDS (CT APP))/POLICE (FOIL, SURVEILLANCE, COUNTERTERRORISM,  (NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT PROPERLY REFUSED TO CONFIRM OR DENY THE EXISTENCE OF SURVEILLANCE RECORDS ON COUNTERTERRORISM GROUNDS (CT APP))/SURVEILLANCE (POLICE, COUNTERTERRORISM, FOIL, NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT PROPERLY REFUSED TO CONFIRM OR DENY THE EXISTENCE OF SURVEILLANCE RECORDS ON COUNTERTERRORISM GROUNDS (CT APP))/COUNTERTERRORISM (SURVEILLANCE, POLICE, FOIL, NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT PROPERLY REFUSED TO CONFIRM OR DENY THE EXISTENCE OF SURVEILLANCE RECORDS ON COUNTERTERRORISM GROUNDS (CT APP))

TEN-YEAR, AS OPPOSED TO A FIVE-YEAR, PROBATION SENTENCE FOR A YOUTHFUL OFFENDER SEXUAL ABUSE ADJUDICATION IS SUPPORTED BY THE STATUTORY LANGUAGE (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Wilson, determined that the statutory language supported a ten-year, as opposed to a five-year, probation sentence for a youthful offender’s (Teri W’s) sexual abuse adjudication:

The version of [the] statute in effect when Teri W. committed her offense provided that “For a felony, other than a class A-II felony defined in article two hundred twenty of this chapter or the class B felony defined in section 220.48 of this chapter, or any other class B felony defined in article two hundred twenty of this chapter committed by a second felony drug offender, or a sexual assault, the period of probation shall be five years” … . Pursuant to the exception above, “[f]or a felony sexual assault, the period of probation shall be ten years” … . * * *

Because [the relevant] definition includes sex offenses that are class E felonies, a probation period of 10 years for a felony sexual assault is a sentence “authorized to be imposed upon a person convicted of a class E felony” … . Concordantly, Penal Law § 65.00 (3) (a) (i) exempts “sexual assaults” from the shorter probationary period applicable to non-sexual assault class E felonies. People v Teri W., 2018 NY Slip Op 02210, CtApp 3-29-18

CRIMINAL LAW (YOUTHFUL OFFENDER, TEN-YEAR, AS OPPOSED TO A FIVE-YEAR, PROBATION SENTENCE FOR A YOUTHFUL OFFENDER SEXUAL ABUSE ADJUDICATION IS SUPPORTED BY THE STATUTORY LANGUAGE (CT APP))/SENTENCING (YOUTHFUL OFFENDER, TEN-YEAR, AS OPPOSED TO A FIVE-YEAR, PROBATION SENTENCE FOR A YOUTHFUL OFFENDER SEXUAL ABUSE ADJUDICATION IS SUPPORTED BY THE STATUTORY LANGUAGE (CT APP))/YOUTHFUL OFFENDER (TEN-YEAR, AS OPPOSED TO A FIVE-YEAR, PROBATION SENTENCE FOR A YOUTHFUL OFFENDER SEXUAL ABUSE ADJUDICATION IS SUPPORTED BY THE STATUTORY LANGUAGE (CT APP))/SEXUAL OFFENSES (YOUTHFUL OFFENDER, TEN-YEAR, AS OPPOSED TO A FIVE-YEAR, PROBATION SENTENCE FOR A YOUTHFUL OFFENDER SEXUAL ABUSE ADJUDICATION IS SUPPORTED BY THE STATUTORY LANGUAGE (CT APP))PROBATION (YOUTHFUL OFFENDER, SEXUAL OFFENSE, TEN-YEAR, AS OPPOSED TO A FIVE-YEAR, PROBATION SENTENCE FOR A YOUTHFUL OFFENDER SEXUAL ABUSE ADJUDICATION IS SUPPORTED BY THE STATUTORY LANGUAGE (CT APP))

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DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE DID NOT UTTERLY REFUTE PLAINTIFF’S CORRESPONDENCE-EVIDENCE THAT AN EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT HAD BEEN ENTERED AND BREACHED BY THE DEFENDANT, DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS PROPERLY DENIED (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Stein, determined that an exchange of correspondence supported plaintiff’s allegation of the existence of an employment contract and a breach of that contract. The documentary evidence submitted by the defendant did not utterly refute the allegations in the complaint. Therefore the defendant’s motion to dismiss was properly denied:

… [W]e conclude that, based on all the documentary evidence proffered by defendant, a reasonable fact-finder could determine that a binding contract was formed. Ertel’s [the CEO’S] initial email to plaintiff stated that “[t]he terms of our offer are the same [as the] terms of your existing contract” — apart from “a clarification” concerning an issue that plaintiff characterizes as minor — and outlined the core terms that were included in the 2009 Agreement. He added that, if plaintiff had “[a]ny further questions” he should consult his “existing contract.” Inasmuch as this email explained that “the terms of the offer” were to be nearly identical to the terms of plaintiff’s existing contract, a reasonable fact-finder could interpret it as evincing an objective manifestation of defendant’s intent to enter into a bargain, such that plaintiff was justified “in understanding that his assent to that bargain [was] invited and [would] conclude it”… . Put differently, it could reasonably be inferred that Ertel’s email constituted a valid offer by defendant. In response to that email, plaintiff wrote “I accept. pls [sic] send contract,” to which Ertel replied, “Mazel. Looking forward to another great run.”… Affording plaintiff the benefit of every favorable inference, this exchange — in essence, we “offer” and “I accept,” followed by an arguably congratulatory exclamation, coupled with a forward-looking statement about the next stage of the parties’ continuing relationship — sufficiently evinces an objective manifestation of an intent to be bound for purposes of surviving a motion to dismiss … . Although Ertel’s email referenced one outstanding “clarification,” the parties’ further communications indicate that such clarification was incorporated into the first draft of the new agreement sent by Zeliger [general counsel] to plaintiff, and no evidence was offered to suggest that plaintiff resisted that change to the terms of the 2009 Agreement. We reject defendant’s argument that plaintiff’s contract claim should have been dismissed because the additional correspondence defendant proffered in support of its motion to dismiss reflects a lack of mutual assent to material terms — such as plaintiff’s minimum guaranteed compensation and the length of the non-compete term — and that this indefiniteness renders the purported contract invalid as a matter of law. As the Appellate Division concluded, that correspondence does not conclusively refute contract formation … . Kolchins v Evolution Mkts., Inc., 2018 NY Slip Op 02209, CtApp 3-29-18

CONTRACT LAW (CORRESPONDENCE, DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE DID NOT UTTERLY REFUTE PLAINTIFF’S CORRESPONDENCE-EVIDENCE THAT AN EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT HAD BEEN ENTERED AND BREACHED BY THE DEFENDANT, DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS PROPERLY DENIED (CT APP))/EMPLOYMENT LAW (CONTRACT LAW, DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE DID NOT UTTERLY REFUTE PLAINTIFF’S CORRESPONDENCE-EVIDENCE THAT AN EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT HAD BEEN ENTERED AND BREACHED BY THE DEFENDANT, DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS PROPERLY DENIED (CT APP))/CIVIL PROCEDURE (MOTION TO DISMISS, DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE DID NOT UTTERLY REFUTE PLAINTIFF’S CORRESPONDENCE-EVIDENCE THAT AN EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT HAD BEEN ENTERED AND BREACHED BY THE DEFENDANT, DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS PROPERLY DENIED (CT APP))/CPLR 3211 (DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE DID NOT UTTERLY REFUTE PLAINTIFF’S CORRESPONDENCE-EVIDENCE THAT AN EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT HAD BEEN ENTERED AND BREACHED BY THE DEFENDANT, DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS PROPERLY DENIED (CT APP))/CORRESPONDENCE (CONTRACT LAW,  DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE DID NOT UTTERLY REFUTE PLAINTIFF’S CORRESPONDENCE-EVIDENCE THAT AN EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT HAD BEEN ENTERED AND BREACHED BY THE DEFENDANT, DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS PROPERLY DENIED (CT APP))/EMAILS (CONTRACT LAW,  DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE DID NOT UTTERLY REFUTE PLAINTIFF’S CORRESPONDENCE-EVIDENCE THAT AN EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT HAD BEEN ENTERED AND BREACHED BY THE DEFENDANT, DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS PROPERLY DENIED (CT APP))/LETTERS (CONTRACT LAW,  DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE DID NOT UTTERLY REFUTE PLAINTIFF’S CORRESPONDENCE-EVIDENCE THAT AN EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT HAD BEEN ENTERED AND BREACHED BY THE DEFENDANT, DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS PROPERLY DENIED (CT APP))

IMAGE IN VIDEO GAME NOT RECOGNIZABLE AS PLAINTIFF, CIVIL RIGHTS LAW (RIGHT TO PRIVACY) CAUSES OF ACTION PROPERLY DISMISSED (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Fahey, determined that, although the image of a person (an avatar) in a video game can constitute a portrait within the meaning of the Civil Rights Law, the image in this case was not recognizable as the plaintiff, Lindsay Lohan. “Inasmuch as she did not provide written consent for the use of what she characterizes as her portrait and her voice in GTAV [Grand Theft Auto V], plaintiff commenced this action seeking, among other things, compensatory and punitive damages for invasion of privacy in violation of Civil Rights Law §§ 50 and 51:”

The primary questions on this appeal are whether an avatar (that is, a graphical representation of a person, in a video game or like media) may constitute a “portrait” within the meaning of Civil Rights Law §§ 50 and 51 and, if so, whether the images in question in the video game central to this matter are recognizable as plaintiff. We conclude a computer generated image may constitute a portrait within the meaning of that law. We also conclude, however, that the subject images are not recognizable as plaintiff, and that the amended complaint, which contains four causes of action for violation of privacy pursuant to Civil Rights Law §§ 50 and 51, was properly dismissed. Lohan v Take-Two Interactive Software, Inc., 2018 NY Slip Op 02208, CtApp 3-29-18

CIVIL RIGHTS LAW (IMAGE IN VIDEO GAME NOT RECOGNIZABLE AS PLAINTIFF, CIVIL RIGHTS LAW (RIGHT TO PRIVACY) CAUSES OF ACTION PROPERLY DISMISSED (CT APP))/PORTRAITS (CIVIL RIGHTS LAW, IMAGE IN VIDEO GAME NOT RECOGNIZABLE AS PLAINTIFF, CIVIL RIGHTS LAW (RIGHT TO PRIVACY) CAUSES OF ACTION PROPERLY DISMISSED (CT APP))/VIDEO GAMES (CIVIL RIGHTS LAW, IMAGE IN VIDEO GAME NOT RECOGNIZABLE AS PLAINTIFF, CIVIL RIGHTS LAW (RIGHT TO PRIVACY) CAUSES OF ACTION PROPERLY DISMISSED (CT APP))/AVATARS  (CIVIL RIGHTS LAW, IMAGE IN VIDEO GAME NOT RECOGNIZABLE AS PLAINTIFF, CIVIL RIGHTS LAW (RIGHT TO PRIVACY) CAUSES OF ACTION PROPERLY DISMISSED (CT APP))

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PURPORTED DISSOLUTION OF THE PARTNERSHIP VIOLATED THE PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT, PLAINTIFFS NOT ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY’S FEES, GOODWILL REDUCTION SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD, MINORITY DISCOUNT APPLIED (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, in a comprehensive opinion by Judge Fahey, over a two-judge partial dissenting opinion, determined that the defendant’s attempt to dissolve a partnership violated the partnership agreement, the plaintiffs were not entitled to attorney’s fees, the reduction for goodwill was supported by the record, the lack-of-marketability discount issue was not preserved, and the minority discount was applicable. The dissent agreed with everything except the applicability of the minority discount:

… [Parties to a partnership agreement generally have the right to contract around a provision of the Partnership Law, provided of course they do so in language that is “clear, unequivocal and unambiguous”… . No particular magic words need be recited, provided that the parties’ intent is clear.  * * *

Here, the Agreement stated that the Partnership “shall continue until it is terminated as hereinafter provided,” and, in a subsequent provision, stated that the Partnership would dissolve upon “[t]he election by the Partners to dissolve the Partnership” or “[t]he happening of any event which makes it unlawful for the business of the Partnership to be carried on or for the Partners to carry it on in Partnership.” The partners clearly intended that the methods provided in the Agreement for dissolution were the only methods whereby the partnership would dissolve in accordance with the Agreement, and by implication that unilateral dissolution would breach the Agreement. In other words, the Agreement contemplated dissolution only in two instances, leaving no room for other means of dissolution that would be in accordance with its terms. * * *

We conclude … that to award fees to plaintiffs would be to contradict New York’s well-established adoption of the American Rule that “the prevailing litigant ordinarily cannot collect . . . attorneys’ fees from its unsuccessful opponents” … . Contrary to Supreme Court, the standard is not which party was “more responsible” for the litigation. Attorneys’ fees are treated as “incidents of litigation” … . * * *

A minority discount is a standard tool in valuation of a financial interest, designed to reflect the fact that the price an investor is willing to pay for a minority ownership interest in a business, whether a corporation or a partnership, is less because the owner of a minority interest lacks control of the business. Congel v Malfitano, 2018 NY Slip Op 02119, CtApp 3-27-18

PARTNERSHIP LAW (PURPORTED DISSOLUTION OF THE PARTNERSHIP VIOLATED THE PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT, PLAINTIFFS NOT ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY’S FEES, GOODWILL REDUCTION SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD, MINORITY DISCOUNT APPLIED (CT APP))/DISSOLUTION OF PARTNERSHIP (PURPORTED DISSOLUTION OF THE PARTNERSHIP VIOLATED THE PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT, PLAINTIFFS NOT ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY’S FEES, GOODWILL REDUCTION SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD, MINORITY DISCOUNT APPLIED (CT APP))/ATTORNEYS (ATTORNEY’S FEES, PARTNERSHIP LAW, PURPORTED DISSOLUTION OF THE PARTNERSHIP VIOLATED THE PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT, PLAINTIFFS NOT ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY’S FEES, GOODWILL REDUCTION SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD, MINORITY DISCOUNT APPLIED (CT APP))/GOODWILL REDUCTION (PARTNERSHIP LAW, PURPORTED DISSOLUTION OF THE PARTNERSHIP VIOLATED THE PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT, PLAINTIFFS NOT ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY’S FEES, GOODWILL REDUCTION SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD, MINORITY DISCOUNT APPLIED (CT APP))/LACK OF MARKETABILITY DISCOUNT (PARTNERSHIP LAW, PURPORTED DISSOLUTION OF THE PARTNERSHIP VIOLATED THE PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT, PLAINTIFFS NOT ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY’S FEES, GOODWILL REDUCTION SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD, MINORITY DISCOUNT APPLIED (CT APP))/MINORITY DISCOUNT (PARTNERSHIP LAW, PURPORTED DISSOLUTION OF THE PARTNERSHIP VIOLATED THE PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT, PLAINTIFFS NOT ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY’S FEES, GOODWILL REDUCTION SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD, MINORITY DISCOUNT APPLIED (CT APP))

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IN THIS LONG TERM ENVIRONMENTAL CONTAMINATION CASE, THE INSURER IS NOT LIABLE TO THE INSURED FOR LOSSES ATTRIBUTABLE TO TIME PERIODS WHEN LIABILITY INSURANCE WAS UNAVAILABLE (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, affirming the Appellate Division, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Stein, determined the insured, Keyspan Gas, not the insurer, Century, bore the risk of damages from environmental contamination during the years that coverage for such damage was not available:

The liability underlying this insurance dispute emanates from environmental contamination caused by manufactured gas plants (MGPs) owned and operated by KeySpan’s predecessor … .Gas production at the sites began in the late 1880s and early 1900s. After operations ceased decades later, the New York Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC) determined that there had been long-term, gradual environmental damage at both sites due to contaminants, such as tar, seeping nto the ground and leeching into groundwater. The DEC required KeySpan to undertake costly remediation efforts … . …

… [Environmental contamination] coverage was not available to utilities until approximately 1925, and … a “sudden and accidental pollution exclusion” was later generally adopted by the insurance industry sometime in or after October 1970. Thus, KeySpan argued, the allocation should not take into account any years prior to the availability, or after the unavailability, of the applicable coverage. * * *

… [T]he Appellate Division … [held] that “under the insurance policies at issue, Century does not have to indemnify KeySpan for losses that are attributable to time periods when liability insurance was otherwise unavailable in the marketplace” … . * * *

The policyholder is the one who allegedly caused the injury and, therefore, who ultimately will be financially responsible should insurance prove insufficient” … . …

… “[T]he very essence of pro rata allocation is that the insurance policy language limits indemnification to losses and occurrences during the policy period” … . Keyspan Gas E. Corp. v Munich Reins. Am., Inc., 2018 NY Slip Op 02116, CtApp 3-27-18

INSURANCE LAW (IN THIS LONG TERM ENVIRONMENTAL CONTAMINATION CASE, THE INSURER IS NOT LIABLE TO THE INSURED FOR LOSSES ATTRIBUTABLE TO TIME PERIODS WHEN LIABILITY INSURANCE WAS UNAVAILABLE (CT APP))/ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (INSURANCE LAW, IN THIS LONG TERM ENVIRONMENTAL CONTAMINATION CASE, THE INSURER IS NOT LIABLE TO THE INSURED FOR LOSSES ATTRIBUTABLE TO TIME PERIODS WHEN LIABILITY INSURANCE WAS UNAVAILABLE (CT APP))/POLLUTION (INSURANCE LAW, (IN THIS LONG TERM ENVIRONMENTAL CONTAMINATION CASE, THE INSURER IS NOT LIABLE TO THE INSURED FOR LOSSES ATTRIBUTABLE TO TIME PERIODS WHEN LIABILITY INSURANCE WAS UNAVAILABLE (CT APP))/UTILITIES (INSURANCE LAW, ENVIRONMENTAL CONTAMINATION, IN THIS LONG TERM ENVIRONMENTAL CONTAMINATION CASE, THE INSURER IS NOT LIABLE TO THE INSURED FOR LOSSES ATTRIBUTABLE TO TIME PERIODS WHEN LIABILITY INSURANCE WAS UNAVAILABLE (CT APP))

UNAMBIGUOUS POLICY LANGUAGE REQUIRED A WRITTEN CONTRACT WITH ANY ADDITIONAL INSURED, BECAUSE THERE WAS NO WRITTEN CONTRACT, THERE WAS NO COVERAGE (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Stein, over an extensive two-judge dissent, determined that the language of the policy which required a written contract with an additional insured (Gilbane JV) was unambiguous and precluded coverage:

The relevant portion of the Liberty policy is the “Additional Insured-By Written Contract” provision, which reads:

“WHO IS AN INSURED (Section II) is amended to include as an insured any person or organization with whom you have agreed to add as an additional insured by written contract but only with respect to liability arising out of your operations or premises owned by or rented to you.”… . …

… [T]he endorsement would have the meaning Gilbane JV desires if the word “with” had been omitted. Omitting “with,” the phrase would read: “. . . any person or organization whom you have agreed by written contract to add . . .”, and Gilbane JV’s position would have merit. But [the general contractor] and Liberty included that preposition in the contract between them, and we must give it its ordinary meaning. Here, the “with” can only mean that the written contract must be “with” the additional insured. Gilbane Bldg. Co./TDX Constr. Corp. v St. Paul Fire & Mar. Ins. Co., 2018 NY Slip Op 02117, CtApp 3-27-18

INSURANCE LAW (UNAMBIGUOUS POLICY LANGUAGE REQUIRED A WRITTEN CONTRACT WITH ANY ADDITIONAL INSURED, BECAUSE THERE WAS NO WRITTEN CONTRACT, THERE WAS NO COVERAGE (CT APP))/CONTRACT LAW (INSURANCE LAW, UNAMBIGUOUS POLICY LANGUAGE REQUIRED A WRITTEN CONTRACT WITH ANY ADDITIONAL INSURED, BECAUSE THERE WAS NO WRITTEN CONTRACT, THERE WAS NO COVERAGE (CT APP))

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THERE WAS SUPPORT IN THE RECORD FOR THE LOWER COURTS’ FINDING THE ARRESTING OFFICERS COMPLIED WITH THE DEBOUR STREET STOP REQUIREMENTS, A MIXED QUESTION OF LAW AND FACT, EXTENSIVE DISSENTING OPINION (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, in a short memorandum decision, over an extensive two-judge dissenting opinion by Judge Rivera, determined the record supported the trial court’s finding that the stop and search of the defendant, in an apartment building, met the DeBour street stop criteria:

Police were conducting a vertical patrol of a New York City Housing Authority building in a high crime area and interviewing tenants in search of a robbery suspect in an investigation unrelated to this case. Defendant got off the elevator, observed the police officers — who were approximately eight feet away with shields displayed — and immediately retreated into the elevator. Defendant ignored an officer’s request that he hold the door and instead “kept pushing the button” and the elevator doors closed. In light of this behavior, as well as the building’s history of narcotics and trespass activity, the police followed defendant to determine whether he lived in the building. Rather than respond to the officer’s questions, defendant turned away from the police to face the wall, held his head down with the hood of his sweatshirt over his head, and kept his hands hidden inside his sweatshirt. The officer immediately noticed a large bulge in defendant’s right arm, which defendant held stiffly and straight down from his body in an unnatural position. … When the officer touched the defendant’s wrist, he felt a metal object, lifted the sleeve of the defendant’s shirt, saw the point of a blade, and ordered him to “drop it.” Defendant did not comply and officers had to pull the weapon — a two-foot-long machete — from defendant’s shirt. Minutes later, the officer learned of a recent robbery in the area involving a machete-wielding suspect wearing clothing matching that worn by defendant.

The issue on appeal to this Court, whether the police conduct conformed to De Bour, presents a mixed question of law and fact …  Accordingly, “our review is limited to whether there is evidence in the record supporting the lower courts’ determinations” … . …  People v Perez, 2018 NY Slip Op 02118, CtApp 3-27-18

CRIMINAL LAW (STREET STOPS, THERE WAS SUPPORT IN THE RECORD FOR THE LOWER COURTS’ FINDING THE ARRESTING OFFICERS COMPLIED WITH THE DEBOUR STREET STOP REQUIREMENTS, A MIXED QUESTION OF LAW AND FACT, EXTENSIVE DISSENTING OPINION (CT APP))/STREET STOPS (CRIMINAL LAW, THERE WAS SUPPORT IN THE RECORD FOR THE LOWER COURTS’ FINDING THE ARRESTING OFFICERS COMPLIED WITH THE DEBOUR STREET STOP REQUIREMENTS, A MIXED QUESTION OF LAW AND FACT, EXTENSIVE DISSENTING OPINION (CT APP))/DEBOUR (CRIMINAL LAW, STREET STOPS, THERE WAS SUPPORT IN THE RECORD FOR THE LOWER COURTS’ FINDING THE ARRESTING OFFICERS COMPLIED WITH THE DEBOUR STREET STOP REQUIREMENTS, A MIXED QUESTION OF LAW AND FACT, EXTENSIVE DISSENTING OPINION (CT APP))/SEARCH AND SEIZURE (CRIMINAL LAW, STREET STOPS,  THERE WAS SUPPORT IN THE RECORD FOR THE LOWER COURTS’ FINDING THE ARRESTING OFFICERS COMPLIED WITH THE DEBOUR STREET STOP REQUIREMENTS, A MIXED QUESTION OF LAW AND FACT, EXTENSIVE DISSENTING OPINION (CT APP))/APPEALS (CRIMINAL LAW, COURT OF APPEALS, MIXED QUESTION OF LAW AND FACT, THERE WAS SUPPORT IN THE RECORD FOR THE LOWER COURTS’ FINDING THE ARRESTING OFFICERS COMPLIED WITH THE DEBOUR STREET STOP REQUIREMENTS, A MIXED QUESTION OF LAW AND FACT, EXTENSIVE DISSENTING OPINION (CT APP))/MIXED QUESTION OF LAW AND FACT (CRIMINAL LAW, COURT OF APPEALS,  THERE WAS SUPPORT IN THE RECORD FOR THE LOWER COURTS’ FINDING THE ARRESTING OFFICERS COMPLIED WITH THE DEBOUR STREET STOP REQUIREMENTS, A MIXED QUESTION OF LAW AND FACT, EXTENSIVE DISSENTING OPINION (CT APP))

MAJORITY DEEMED THE DISMISSAL OF THE BB GUN POSSESSION CHARGE PRIOR TO SUBMITTING THE HANDGUN POSSESSION CHARGE TO THE JURY PROPER, STRONG DISSENT ARGUED THE DEFENDANT’S ADMISSION OF POSSESSION OF THE BB GUN TAINTED THE JURY’S CONSIDERATION OF THE MORE SERIOUS CHARGE (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, in a brief memorandum decision, over a comprehensive two-judge dissenting opinion by Judge Rivera, affirmed defendant’s conviction for unlawful possession of a weapon. Defendant was charged with possession of a BB gun and a handgun (Taurus). The judge dismissed the BB gun charge prior to submission of the handgun charge to the jury:

The trial court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing the non-inclusory charge of unlawful possession of an air pistol or rifle which related to the BB gun … . The jury was free to credit defendant’s theory that he possessed the BB gun but not the Taurus firearm that was also recovered in his vicinity — which was the subject of separate weapon possession counts. Contrary to defendant’s contention, his defense that he never possessed the Taurus firearm was not removed from consideration when the trial court dismissed the charge related to the BB gun, nor did defendant argue in the trial court that the dismissal of the BB gun count impaired his constitutional right to present a defense.

From the dissent:

The trial court abused its discretion when it did not submit the unlawful possession of an air pistol count to the jury and submitted instead only the more serious counts relating to the possession of a handgun. This error allowed the jury to consider highly prejudicial testimony completely irrelevant to the counts submitted, including defendant’s admission of guilt to the possession of the air pistol. So doing, the trial court encouraged reverse jury nullification and provoked confusion in the jury’s deliberative process.  People v Boyd, 2018 NY Slip Op 02120, CtApp 3-27-18

CRIMINAL LAW (MAJORITY DEEMED THE DISMISSAL OF THE BB GUN POSSESSION CHARGE PRIOR TO SUBMITTING THE HANDGUN POSSESSION CHARGE TO THE JURY PROPER, STRONG DISSENT ARGUED THE DEFENDANT’S ADMISSION OF POSSESSION OF THE BB GUN TAINTED THE JURY’S CONSIDERATION OF THE MORE SERIOUS CHARGE (CT APP))/JURIES (CRIMINAL LAW, JURY CONFUSION, (MAJORITY DEEMED THE DISMISSAL OF THE BB GUN POSSESSION CHARGE PRIOR TO SUBMITTING THE HANDGUN POSSESSION CHARGE TO THE JURY PROPER, STRONG DISSENT ARGUED THE DEFENDANT’S ADMISSION OF POSSESSION OF THE BB GUN TAINTED THE JURY’S CONSIDERATION OF THE MORE SERIOUS CHARGE (CT APP))/WEAPON, POSSESSION OF (CRIMINAL LAW, JURY CONFUSION, (MAJORITY DEEMED THE DISMISSAL OF THE BB GUN POSSESSION CHARGE PRIOR TO SUBMITTING THE HANDGUN POSSESSION CHARGE TO THE JURY PROPER, STRONG DISSENT ARGUED THE DEFENDANT’S ADMISSION OF POSSESSION OF THE BB GUN TAINTED THE JURY’S CONSIDERATION OF THE MORE SERIOUS CHARGE (CT APP))/BB GUN (CRIMINAL LAW, JURY CONFUSION, (MAJORITY DEEMED THE DISMISSAL OF THE BB GUN POSSESSION CHARGE PRIOR TO SUBMITTING THE HANDGUN POSSESSION CHARGE TO THE JURY PROPER, STRONG DISSENT ARGUED THE DEFENDANT’S ADMISSION OF POSSESSION OF THE BB GUN TAINTED THE JURY’S CONSIDERATION OF THE MORE SERIOUS CHARGE (CT APP))/HANDGUN (CRIMINAL LAW, JURY CONFUSION, (MAJORITY DEEMED THE DISMISSAL OF THE BB GUN POSSESSION CHARGE PRIOR TO SUBMITTING THE HANDGUN POSSESSION CHARGE TO THE JURY PROPER, STRONG DISSENT ARGUED THE DEFENDANT’S ADMISSION OF POSSESSION OF THE BB GUN TAINTED THE JURY’S CONSIDERATION OF THE MORE SERIOUS CHARGE (CT APP))

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