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THE TRAFFIC STOP WAS VALID, BUT THE POLICE OFFICERS SAW NOTHING TO INDICATE A WEAPON WAS IN THE CAR; THE SEARCH OF THE CAR AND SEIZURE OF A WEAPON FROM AN OPEN PURSE IN THE BACK SEAT WAS ILLEGAL (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing defendant’s conviction and dismissing the indictment, determined the police properly stopped the car in which defendant was a passenger but did not have sufficient information to justify a search of the vehicle for a weapon. A weapon was seized from an open purse in the back seat:

The police have authority to order occupants out of a vehicle in the event of a traffic violation … . Absent probable cause, the police are allowed to conduct a limited intrusion into the vehicle only if the totality of the information available supports a reasonable conclusion that there is a substantial likelihood of a weapon within the vehicle that poses an actual and specific threat to the officers’ safety … . … [T]he Court of Appeals has described this exception to the probable cause requirement as “narrow” … .

Furtive movements “suggesting that the defendant was reaching for something that might be a weapon” combined with some other suggestive factor have been determined to meet this standard … . * * *

No such actual and specific danger was shown to exist in this case. …  Defendant hesitated only briefly before rolling the window down and complying with the officer’s demands to show his hands and to step out of the vehicle. Taking a few “moments” to comply with an officer’s orders does not rise to the level of furtive or suspicious activity so as to support a finding of an actual and specific danger to officer safety  … He was frisked outside of the vehicle and found not to possess any weapons. Defendant remained in full view of the officers, his demeanor described as “relaxed”; he made eye contact and did not otherwise appear suspicious. People v Scott, 2023 NY Slip Op 02769, First Dept 5-23-23

Practice Point: There is a narrow exception to the probable cause requirement where police officers suspect a weapon may be in the car during a traffic stop. Here the evidence did not suggest the presence of the weapon. The weapon seized from an open purse in the back seat should have been suppressed.

 

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THE CITY OF OGDENSBURG PROPERLY PASSED A LOCAL LAW REPEALING A PRIOR LOCAL LAW WHICH OPTED OUT OF THE RPTL ARTICLE 11 PROVISIONS FOR DELINQUENT REAL ESTATE TAX COLLECTION; THE COUNTY’S ARGUMENT THAT THE LOCAL LAW UNLAWFULLY SHIFTED THE BURDEN OF TAX COLLECTION TO THE COUNTY AND SCHOOL DISTRICT WAS REJECTED (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Cannataro, determined the Local Law which repealed a prior Local Law in which the City of Ogdensburg opted out of the application of RPTL Article 11 (regarding the collection of delinquent real estate taxes) was not unconstitutional. The county argued repeal of the local law unlawfully shifted the burden of delinquent tax collection to the county and the school district. That argument was rejected:

Inasmuch as the County has no powers with respect to taxation that are not “unambiguously delegated” to it by the legislature or the Constitution … and the legislature has chosen to limit a county’s ability to enter into RPTL 1150 (1) agreements by making such agreement permissive rather than mandatory, it cannot be said that the City impaired the County’s power by doing as the legislature permits it to do under RPTL article 11. Therefore, we conclude that Local Law No. 2 does not violate the statutory and constitutional protections at issue, but effectuates a power the legislature granted to cities wishing to revoke their initial opt-out from article 11. Matter of St. Lawrence County v City of Ogdensburg, 2023 NY Slip Op 02757, CtApp 5-23-23

Practice Point: A city can opt out of the RPTL Article 11 provisions re: delinquent real estate tax collection, and it can later opt back in. Here the county’s argument that the city’s opting back in unlawfully shifted the tax collection burden to the county and school district was rejected.

 

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THE JUDGE’S POLICY OF NOT LETTING MEMBERS OF THE PUBLIC INTO THE COURTROOM DURING TESTIMONY HAD THE UNINTENDED EFFECT OF EXCLUDING MEMBERS OF THE PUBLIC FROM PORTIONS OF THE TRIAL; NEW TRIAL ORDERED (CT APP) ​

The Court of Appeals, reversing the appellate division, determined the procedure imposed by the judge effectively prevented members of the murder victim’s family from attending parts of the trial. Although the judge did not mean to exclude members of the public from the trial, the judge’s policy of not letting members of the public into the courtroom during testimony was improperly implemented and had the unintended result of excluding members of the public. The Court of Appeals, over a two-judge concurrence, ordered a new trial:

The trial judge is in charge of the courtroom and is ultimately responsible for ensuring that any limitation on a defendant’s right to a public trial conforms with constitutional dictates. At defendant’s trial, the judge delegated to court officers the implementation of the judge’s general policy of prohibiting the public from entering or exiting the courtroom while a witness testifies. We agree with the Appellate Division that members of the public were excluded from the courtroom at a time when they should have had access under the terms of the extant policy. But, contrary to the Appellate Division’s conclusion, that error directly resulted from the acts of court officials enforcing the trial judge’s order. Therefore, the court violated defendant’s right to a public trial. People v Muhammad, 2023 NY Slip Op 02756, CtApp 5-23-23

Practice Point: Even if the judge did not intend to exclude members of the public from the trial, the judge’s policy of not allowing anyone to enter the courtroom during testimony had that effect. New trial ordered.

 

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THE JUDGE CLOSED THIS MURDER TRIAL TO THE PUBLIC CITING “INTIMIDATION” BY SPECTATORS AND THE POSTING OF A PHOTO OF THE TRIAL ON INSTAGRAM; THE SPARSE RECORD DID NOT SUPPORT CLOSING THE COURTROOM, NEW TRIAL ORDERED (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, reversing defendant’s conviction and ordering a new trial, determined the record did not support holding the murder trial in a courtroom closed to the public. The judge reacted to spectators deemed “intimidating” and the posting on Instagram of a photo taken in the courtroom with a caption supporting the defendant:

… [T]he People moved to close the courtroom, citing the fact that photographs had been taken in the courtroom and posted on Instagram with the caption “Free Dick Wolf”—which the prosecutor asserted was a reference to one of defendant’s street names. After an off-the-record discussion with counsel, the court noted its concern with the photographs, and added that

“[p]eople in the courtroom have been very intimidating. . . . They intimidated a court reporter already. They stare people down. They’re staring up here. I am closing this courtroom based on the fact that now there are pictures that were taken in this courtroom. And I know that pictures can be taken very [surreptitiously] with a cellphone. You can look like you’re looking at your cellphone when you’re really taking pictures. But clearly pictures were taken in this courtroom by someone who had to have been sitting in this courtroom and pictures were taken outside the court. I’m closing the courtroom.”  * * *

Although the prevention of intimidation by spectators during trial may very well be an “overriding interest” that can support courtroom closure … , it is incumbent on the trial court to ensure that the record adequately justifies its concerns and demonstrates that the identified interest would be jeopardized absent a closure. Where closure is warranted, it must be tailored to address the overriding interest. Here, the court ordered the broadest possible closure, completely excluding all members of the public for the remainder of trial. On this sparse record the closure was disproportionate in relation to the circumstances described. People v Reid, 2023 NY Slip Op 02755, CtApp 5-23-23

Practice Point: Closing the courtroom during a trial is a drastic measure which must be justified on the record. Here the sparse record was deemed insufficient and a new trial was ordered.

 

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“EXEMPT EMPLOYEES” UNDER THE CIVIL SERVICE LAW ARE TERMINABLE AT WILL; A COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT WHICH PURPORTS TO MAKE AN EXEMPT EMPLOYEE TERMINABLE FOR CAUSE IS UNENFORCEABLE (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, reversing the appellate division, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Garcia, determined a so-called “exempt employee (here the secretary to the town planning board) whose qualifications cannot be tested by a Civil Service examination is terminable at will. The collective bargaining agreement (CBA) defined the bargaining unit to include the secretary and permitted the town to terminate only for “just cause.” When the secretary was fired the union filed a grievance and sought arbitration. The Court of Appeals held the secretary. as an “exempt employee”  was terminable at will and arbitration was therefore not available:

Certain civil service positions are classified as “exempt” when the position is of a confidential nature and requires personal qualities that cannot practicably be tested by an examination. Exempt class employees are therefore terminable at will. In this case, the parties entered into a collective bargaining agreement that purports to provide for-cause termination protection to certain exempt class employees. We hold the agreement unenforceable to the extent it grants such protections, and therefore this dispute over an exempt class employee’s termination is not arbitrable. Matter of Teamsters Local 445 v Town of Monroe, 2023 NY Slip Op 02754, CtApp 5-23-23

Practice Point: A so-called “exempt employee” under the Civil Service Law is one whose skills cannot be tested by a Civil Service exam. Exempt employees are terminable at will. A collective bargaining agreement which purports to make exempt employees terminable for cause is unenforceable.

 

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TIER 3 NYC POLICE OFFICERS CANNOT COUNT YEARS OF NON-POLICE SERVICE TOWARD THE 22 YEARS OF POLICE SERVICE REQUIRED FOR RETIREMENT ELIGIBILITY (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Singas, reversing the appellate division, determined tier 3 police officers may not count prior “non-police” service in computing the 22 years of service required for eligibility for retirement benefits:

… [T]ier 3 officers are eligible for retirement after 22 years of service without regard to their age … . The issue before us is whether a tier 3 police officer’s prior non-police service “qualifies to be counted as credited service pursuant to [Retirement and Social Security Law § 513]” … .

… [W]e conclude that the legislature intended tier 3 officers to receive the same service credit as their tier 2 counterparts, but restricted to the credit available prior to July 1, 1976.

Before July 1, 1976, the Administrative Code provided that a tier 2 officer would not be eligible for retirement until he or she “served in the police force for” the then-minimum period of 20 or 25 years … . This language plainly demonstrates that, prior to July 1, 1976, tier 2 officers could count only prior police service toward their retirement eligibility. Accordingly, tier 3 officers may receive retirement credit only for prior police service. Matter of Lynch v City of New York, 2023 NY Slip Op 02753, CtApp 5-23-23

Practice Point: Tier 3 NYC police officers cannot count years of non-police service toward retirement eligibility.

 

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IN THESE TWO CASES, INTRUDERS ENTERED AN APARTMENT BUILDING THROUGH EXTERIOR DOORS WHICH, ALLEGEDLY, WERE UNLOCKED AND MURDERED VICTIMS WHO WERE SPECIFICALLY TARGETED; THE FACT THAT THE VICTIMS WERE TARGETED WAS NOT AN “INTERVENING ACT” WHICH RELIEVED THE LANDLORD OF LIABILITY AS A MATTER OF LAW (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, affirming the Second Department and reversing the First Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Wilson, determined the fact that the murder victims were targeted did not relieve the landlord, here the NYC Housing Authority (NYCHA), of liability for the alleged failure to provide exterior doors with functioning locks:

… [W]hen the issue of proximate cause involves an intervening act, “liability turns on whether the intervening act is a normal or foreseeable consequence of the situation created by the defendant’s negligence” … . It is “[o]nly where ‘the intervening act is extraordinary under the circumstances, not foreseeable in the normal course of events, or independent of or far removed from the defendant’s conduct,’ [that it] may possibly ‘break[ ] the causal nexus’ ” … . But “[a]n intervening act may not serve as a superseding cause, and relieve an actor of responsibility, where the risk of the intervening act occurring is the very same risk which renders the actor negligent” … .

Here, the risk created by the nonfunctioning door locks—that intruders would gain access to the building and harm residents—is exactly the “risk that came to fruition” … . It was not the trial court’s role, on summary judgment, to assess the fact-bound question of whether the intruders … would have persevered in their attacks had the doors been securely locked. This is not to say that the sophistication and planning of an attack is irrelevant to the factfinder’s determination of proximate cause, or even that it could never rise to such a degree that it would sever the proximate causal link as a matter of law … . But neither [scenario here] approaches that level. Scurry v New York City Hous. Auth., 2023 NY Slip Op 02752, CtApp 5-23-23

Practice Point: The fact that the victims were specifically targeted by intruders who entered the apartment buildings through doors alleged to have been unlocked did not relieve the landlord of liability under an “intervening act” theory. The requirement that exterior doors be locked addresses the risk at issue in these cases.

 

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THE EVIDENCE OF PHYSICAL INJURY WAS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE ASSAULT SECOND CONVICTION (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, reversing the appellate division, determined the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction of assault second:

The victim testified that defendant delivered a very hard blow to his face, that he felt pain, and that he experienced bleeding and swelling. Hospital records describe the victim’s pain as “aching” and indicate he was directed to take over-the-counter painkillers. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the People, it was sufficient to establish physical injury for the purposes of Penal Law § 120.05 (3) … . People v Wheeler, 2023 NY Slip Op 02736. CtApp 5-18-23

Practice Point: The Court of Appeals, reversing the appellate division, found the evidence of physical injury sufficient to support the assault second conviction.

 

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THE INDICTMENT COUNT CHARGING AGGRAVATED FAMILY OFFENSE DID NOT SPECIFY WHICH OF THE LISTED OFFENSES WAS THE BASIS OF THE CHARGE, RENDERING THE COUNT JURISDICTIONALLY DEFECTIVE (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Troutman, determined the count of the indictment charging aggravated family offense (Penal Law 240.75) was jurisdictionally defective because it did not specify which of the offenses listed in the statute was the basis of the charge:

A defendant commits the crime of aggravated family offense pursuant to Penal Law § 240.75 when the defendant “commits a misdemeanor defined in subdivision two of this section as a specified offense and [the defendant] has been convicted of one or more specified offenses within the immediately preceding five years” (Penal Law § 240.75 [1]). Subdivision two of the statute contains 54 “specified offense[s],” 36 felonies and 18 misdemeanors … . To qualify as a specified offense, the defendant and the person against whom the offense was committed must be members of the same family or household as defined in CPL 530.11 (1) (see id. § 240.75 [2]) … . Thus, to commit the crime of aggravated family offense, a defendant must have been convicted of one or more of the specified offenses in subdivision two of the statute within the previous five years, the defendant must have currently committed one of the misdemeanor offenses listed in subdivision two, and both offenses must be committed against a member of the same family or household as the defendant.

Defendant contends that the failure to specify the current misdemeanor offense in the count of the indictment charging him with aggravated family offense rendered that count jurisdictionally defective … . We agree. People v Saenger, 2023 NY Slip Op 02735, CtApp 5-18-23

Practice Point: The aggravated family offense count did not specify the current misdemeanor offense on which the count was based, rendering the count jurisdictionally defective.

 

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THE DEFENDANT’S ACTIONS OBSERVED BY THE POLICE OFFICERS IN THIS STREET STOP DID NOT MEET THE “REASONABLE SUSPICION DEFENDANT HAD COMMITTED A CRIME OR WAS IN POSSESSION OF A WEAPON” STANDARD; THE FRISK WAS THEREFORE ILLEGAL AND THE SEIZED DRUGS SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, reversing the Appellate Division and dismissing the indictment, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Wilson, and an extensive concurring opinion by Judge Rivera, determined the police did not have reasonable suspicion defendant had committed a crime or was in possession of a weapon at the time defendant was frisked. The drugs found on defendant’s person should have been suppressed:

Mr. Johnson’s [defendant’s] actions, as observed by Officer Pike, do not meet the minimum standard required to justify a stop and frisk under De Bour. Prior to the frisk, Officer Pike observed Mr. Johnson: (1) move from the driver’s seat to the passenger seat of his parked car; (2) move his upper torso back toward the driver’s seat; (3) pull up his pants and attempt to buckle his belt; and (4) appear nervous while being questioned. These circumstances do not support a reasonable view that Mr. Johnson was armed or that he had committed or was about to commit a crime. These actions “constituted [nothing] other than ‘innocuous behavior,’ sole reliance on which would impermissibly reduce the foundation for [this] intrusion to nothing but ‘whim or caprice’ ” … . People v Johnson, 2023 NY Slip Op 02734, CtApp 5-18-23

Practice Point: Here the Court of Appeals determined the defendant’s actions prior to the stop and frisk did not rise to the “reasonable suspicion” standard. The police observed defendant move to the passenger seat in his parked car, move his upper torso back toward the driver’s seat, pull up his pants and attempt to buckle his belt, and appear nervous when questioned. The stop and frisk was illegal and the seized drugs should have been suppressed.

 

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