You are here: / Workers' Compensation

THE UNAVAILABILIITY OF PARKING FOR WORK REQUIRED THAT CLAIMANT CROSS A DANGEROUS ROAD TO GET TO HIS WORKPLACE; THE INJURIES SUFFERED WHEN CLAIMANT WAS STRUCK BY A VEHICLE WERE THEREFORE COMPENSABLE (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department determined the unavailability of parking for work created a special hazard. Therefore claimant’s being struck by a vehicle while walking to his place of employment resulted in a compensable injury:

… [C]laimant, a food service worker at Montefiore-Nyack Hospital, sustained serious injuries when he was struck by a motor vehicle while walking towards the hospital entrance prior to the start of his work shift. * * *

… [T]he Board could reasonably determine that a special hazard existed due to the unavailability of parking along the eastern side of Route 9W, requiring claimant to, at a certain spot without a crosswalk, cross Route 9W — a dangerous public roadway — to access the loading dock entrance, which, significantly, was not used by the public and regularly used by claimant … . Further, based upon the regular use of the loading dock entrance by claimant and other food service workers, combined with the close proximity of the accident to the loading dock area, there was a close association of the access route with the premises, as far as going and coming are concerned, permitting the conclusion that the accident happened as an incident and risk of employment. Matter of Cadme v FOJP Serv. Corp., 2021 NY Slip Op 04525, Third Dept 7-22-21

 

CLAIMANT, A POLICE OFFICER WHO WORKED AT A VEHICLE CHECKPOINT FOR TRAFFIC TO AND FROM GROUND ZERO AFTER THE WORLD TRADE CENTER WAS DESTROYED, PARTICIPATED IN THE CLEANUP WITHIN THE MEANING OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW SECTION 28; THEREFORE HIS CLAIM (BASED UPON TOXIN-RELATED INJURY) SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED AS UNTIMELY (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing the Workers’ Compensation Board, determined claimant police officer did participate in the cleanup operations at ground zero and his claim should not have been disallowed as untimely pursuant to Workers’ Compensation Law section 28. Claimant worked at a vehicle checkpoint for traffic to and from ground zero and alleged injury from toxins in the environment:

… [C]laimant worked at a vehicle checkpoint and he testified that he was assigned to control traffic at the intersection of West and Canal Streets from January 31, 2002 to February 6, 2002. Claimant further testified that his duties at the checkpoint included stopping traffic and clearing routes for emergency and construction vehicles travelling to and from ground zero. According to claimant, he assisted getting vehicles through the checkpoint, “[w]hether it was construction, whether it was [f]ire department [or] family members.” By providing such assistance, we find that claimant’s activities had a tangible connection to the rescue, recovery and cleanup operations at the WTC [World Trade Center] site … . As such, and in light of the liberal construction afforded this remedial statute, we conclude that the Board’s determination that Workers’ Compensation Law article 8-A does not apply because claimant did not participate in the rescue, recovery and cleanup operations at ground zero is not supported by substantial evidence and, therefore, the claim should not have been disallowed as untimely under Workers’ Compensation Law § 28 … . Matter of Bodisch v New York State Police, 2021 NY Slip Op 03889, Third Dept 6-17-21

 

,

SUPREME COURT HAD JURISDICTION TO ISSUE A DECLARATORY JUDGMENT RE: WHETHER PLAINTIFF PHARMACY COULD SEEK PAYMENT OF PRESCRIPTIONS UNDER THE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW, EVEN THOUGH THE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BOARD (WCB) HAD JURISDICTION OVER THE ISSUES RAISED IN THE COMPLAINT (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined Supreme Court had jurisdiction over a declaratory judgment action, even though the case involved whether plaintiff pharmacy was entitled to payment for prescriptions under the Workers’ Compensation Law, a matter within the jurisdiction of the Workers’ Compensation Board (WCB):

No party accepted responsibility for the payment of the outstanding prescription bills and the plaintiff commenced this action seeking … a judgment declaring that the Workers’ Compensation Law does not prohibit a pharmacy from seeking payment of a prescription bill from the responsible party in a plenary proceeding in a court of appropriate jurisdiction … . * * *

Pursuant to CPLR 3001, the Supreme Court “may render a declaratory judgment having the effect of a final judgment as to the rights and other legal relations of the parties to a justiciable controversy whether or not further relief is or could be claimed. If the court declines to render such a judgment it shall state its grounds.”

The Court of Appeals has ruled that “primary jurisdiction with respect to determinations as to the applicability of the Workers’ Compensation Law has been vested in the Workers’ Compensation Board” [WCB]… . Thus, while the Supreme Court properly determined that the appropriate forum to resolve the issues raised in the complaint is the WCB, the WCB’s jurisdiction is primary and not exclusive. … [S]ince this is a declaratory judgment action, the Supreme Court should have denied the WCB defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction … . 21st Century Pharmacy v American Intl. Group, 2021 NY Slip Op 03820, Second Dept 6-16-21

 

CLAIMANT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GIVEN THE OPPORTUNITY TO CROSS EXAMINE THE CONSULTANTS WHOSE REPORTS WERE THE BASIS FOR THE DENIAL OF CLAIMANT’S REQUEST FOR SURGERY (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing (modifying) the Workers’ Compensation Board, determined claimant should be afforded the opportunity to cross-examine the consultants (Cash and Storrs) whose reports were the basis for the denial of claimant’s request for surgery:

The … request for surgery was not made until after the WCLJ [Workers’ Compensation Law Judge] ordered [the] depositions, but was nevertheless considered by the WCLJ, who upheld the denial even though claimant did not have any opportunity to submit contradictory medical evidence or cross-examine the carrier’s consultants. Matter of Ozoria v Advantage Mgt. Assn., 2021 NY Slip Op 03090, Third Dept 5-13-21

 

,

THE 2009 AMENDMENTS TO THE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW ALLOWED LUMP SUM PAYMENTS OF SCHEDULE LOSS OF USE (SLU) AWARDS; CLAIMANT DIED BEFORE THE SLU AWARD WAS MADE; CLAIMANT’S ESTATE IS NOT ENTITLED TO THE LUMP SUM AWARD (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Stein, over a concurring opinion, determined that the 2009 amendments allowing lump sum schedule loss of use (SLU) awards did not entitle claimant’s estate to the lump sum award. The estate was entitled only to the portion of the award that would have been due to the claimant for the period prior to his death:

In December 2014, decedent claimant Norman Youngjohn sustained injuries when he slipped on ice and fell in a parking lot at work while employed by Berry Plastics Corporation. After decedent sought workers’ compensation benefits, a claim was established for injuries to his right shoulder and left elbow, and he was awarded temporary benefits. In September 2016, decedent notified the Workers’ Compensation Board that his injuries had become permanent, and the workers’ compensation insurance carrier (the Carrier) subsequently notified the Board that decedent’s injuries were amenable to a schedule loss of use (SLU) award (see generally Workers’ Compensation Law § 15 [3]). However, in March 2017, before resolution of his claim for permanent partial disability benefits, decedent suffered a fatal heart attack unassociated with his work-related injuries. * * *

The legislature’s 2009 amendments to Workers’ Compensation Law §§ 15 (3) (u) and 25 (1) (b)—which provide that SLU awards may be “payable” in a lump sum upon request of the injured employee …—changed the allowable methods of payment for SLU awards. However, the Estate’s contention that these amendments implicitly provide a claimant’s estate a new entitlement to the value of an SLU award upon a claimant’s death, or otherwise direct that an SLU award “accrues” at that time for purposes of an estate’s recovery—issues that are distinct from the permissible methods of payment for such awards …—cannot be reconciled with the fact that the legislature did not amend Workers’ Compensation Law § 15 (4) (d) when it authorized lump sum payments. An estate’s entitlement to an SLU award upon a claimant’s death remains governed by Workers’ Compensation Law § 15 (4) (d), which was left untouched by the 2009 amendments. Matter of Estate of Youngjohn v Berry Plastics Corp., 2021 NY Slip Op 02017, CtApp 4-1-21

 

,

AN EMAIL INFORMING PLAINTIFF THAT DEFENDANT LAW FIRM WOULD NOT APPEAL THE RULING OF THE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION APPELLATE PANEL DID NOT UNEQUIVOCALLY TERMINATE THE FIRM’S REPRESENTATION OF PLAINTIFF IN THE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION MATTER (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined an email from the attorney defendants to the plaintiff did not unequivocally terminate the firm’s representation of plaintiff before the Workers’ Compensation Board:

Where, as here, defendants were retained in writing to represent plaintiff in all proceedings before the Workers’ Compensation Board related to his claim, plaintiff made a sufficient showing of a continuing relationship with regard to that proceeding to support his contention of continuous representation … . Defendants’ statement in an email that they would not pursue an appeal to the Third Department after having lost before the Workers’ Compensation appellate panel on the issue of whether plaintiff was an employee, did not “unequivocally” terminate the representation in the workers’ compensation matter, which remained pending following the administrative review … . This is particularly true in light of the terms of the retainer agreement. Schwenger v Weitz, Kleinick & Weitz, LLP, 2021 NY Slip Op 01869, First Dept 3-25-21

 

,

IN THE CONTEXT OF AN INDEMNIFICATION CLAUSE REQUIRED BY THE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW, THE 1ST DEPARTMENT NOTED THAT, UNDER THE COMMON LAW, UNSIGNED DOCUMENTS ARE ENFORCEABLE AS LONG AS THE PARTIES INTENDED TO BE BOUND (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department noted that the written-indemnification-clause requirement in Workers’ Compensation Law section 11 does not require that the document be signed to be enforceable:

Plaintiff was injured while engaged in renovation of an apartment in Park Regis’s cooperative building. The motion court correctly concluded that ASA, plaintiff’s employer, was bound by the provisions of the alteration agreement between Park Regis and the nonparty cooperative shareholder lessees requiring the lessees’ general contractor to indemnify and procure insurance in favor of Park Regis (see Workers’ Compensation Law § 11 …). …

Even if the alteration agreement were not signed by ASA, ASA would still be bound by it, because the record shows that it intended to be bound by it (see Flores v Lower E. Side Serv. Ctr., Inc., 4 NY3d 363, 369 [2005] [“nothing in the language of (Workers’ Compensation Law § 11) or its legislative history (suggests) that, in addition to requiring a written indemnification clause, the Legislature intended to deviate from the common-law rule that written documents can be enforced even if they are not signed”]). ASA’s field supervisor and project manager testified that ASA “signs every alteration agreement[]” before commencing work, that he believed ASA had done so in connection with this project, that he understood ASA to be bound by the terms of the alteration agreement requiring it to procure insurance for and indemnify Park Regis, and that ASA had indeed procured insurance for Park Regis as required by the alteration agreement. Shala v Park Regis Apt. Corp., 2021 NY Slip Op 01870, First Dept 3-25-21

 

,

CARRIER PROPERLY ORDERED TO PAY FOR CLAIMAINT’S PAIN TREATMENT WITH MEDICAL MARIJUANA (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, in a comprehensive opinion by Justice Egan, determined the Workers’ Compensation Board properly issued a variance allowing coverage for medical marijuana for treatment of claimant’s pain. The opinion is too detailed to fairly summarize here. The carrier’s federal conflict preemption and statutory (Public Health Law) exemption arguments were rejected:

“The federal preemption doctrine has its roots in the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, and federal preemption of state laws generally can occur in three ways: where Congress has expressly preempted state law, where Congress has legislated so comprehensively that federal law occupies an entire field of regulation and leaves no room for state law, or where federal law conflicts with state law” … . At issue here is conflict preemption, “which occurs when compliance with both federal and state law is a physical impossibility, or where the state law at issue . . . stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress” … .

* * * [R]equiring the carrier to reimburse claimant … does not serve to subvert, in any way, the principal purposes of the Controlled Substances Act in combating drug abuse and controlling “the legitimate and illegitimate traffic in controlled substances” … , particularly where, as here, claimant was validly prescribed and authorized to use medical marihuana by his pain management specialist to both treat his chronic pain and reduce his reliance on opiates. Matter of Quigley v Village of E. Aurora, 2021 NY Slip Op 01174, Third Dept 2-25-21

 

THE BOARD DEPARTED FROM ITS PRECEDENT WITHOUT EXPLANATION, REVERSED AND REMITTED (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing the Workers’ Compensation Board, determined the Board departed from its precedent without explanation:

… [T]he Board did not follow its precedent in finding that, due to his failure to show labor market attachment, he had no compensable lost time from June 16, 2016 to January 26, 2017. The Board has previously held that findings regarding labor market attachment are limited to the period subsequent to the date when the issue was first raised by the workers’ compensation carrier … . Although the record reflects that the Special Fund first raised labor market attachment during the January 26, 2017 hearing, the Board found no compensable time from June 1, 2016 to November 9, 2018 based upon a lack of proof of labor market attachment. “While the Board is free to alter a course previously set out in its decisions, it must set forth its reasons for doing so, and the Board’s failure to do so renders its decision arbitrary and capricious” …  Inasmuch as the Board did not explain its departure from prior precedent in finding that claimant was not entitled to awards from June 1, 2016 to January 26, 2017, that part of the decision must be reversed and the matter remitted for further proceedings … . Matter of Delk v Orange & Rockland, 2021 NY Slip Op 00604, Second Dept 2-4-21

 

CLAIMANT, A LIVE-IN HOME HEALTH ATTENDANT, WAS INJURED WHEN SHE FELL AFTER PICKING UP MEDICAL RECORDS FROM HER DOCTOR’S OFFICE; THE PURPOSE OF HER VISIT TO THE DOCTOR’S OFFICE WAS NOT PURELY PERSONAL; THEREFORE SHE WAS ENTITLED TO WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BENEFITS (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing the Workers’ Compensation Board, determined that claimant, a 24-hour home health aide, was entitled to Workers’ Compensation benefits even though she was injured when she fell after picking up records from her doctor’s office:

… [I]t is undisputed that it was routine for claimant to escort her client on four- or five-hour walks on days where the client had no scheduled appointments, such as the day of the subject incident. According to claimant, while on such a walk on the day of the incident, she and her client elected to briefly stop at the subject doctor’s office for multiple reasons — to collect medical paperwork pertaining to claimant’s employment and to confirm whether the doctor accepted the client’s insurance prior to scheduling her an appointment. * * *

… [T]here is not substantial evidence that claimant’s actions represented a deviation from employment as conduct specifically prohibited by the employer … . Further, without regard to whether claimant prospectively inquired about the acceptance of her client’s insurance, claimant’s act of briefly stopping while on a routine walk with her client, regardless of where that stop took place, simply cannot be said to be purely personally or wholly unrelated to her work. Moreover, stopping at the subject doctor’s office in order to collect the subject paperwork benefited the employer by allowing claimant to continue to provide round-the-clock care to her client, and to secure the documentation necessary to ensure that such care would not be interrupted in the future. We therefore find that, under the circumstances, claimant’s activity was reasonable, sufficiently work related and, thus, not purely personal, such that the Board’s decision to the contrary is not supported by substantial evidence … . Matter of Sharipova v BNV Home Care Agency, Inc., 2021 NY Slip Op 00605, Third Dept 2-4-21

 

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy