You are here: / Workers' Compensation
,

THE EVIDENCE DID NOT SUPPORT THE FINDING CLAIMANT’S INJURY WAS WORK-RELATED (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing the Workers’ Compensation Board, determined the evidence that claimant suffered a meniscus tear at work was insufficient:

“The Board is empowered to determine the factual issue of whether a causal relationship exists based upon the record, and its determination will not be disturbed when supported by substantial evidence” … . Although the medical opinion evidence relied upon by the Board to demonstrate the existence of a causal relationship does not need to be expressed with absolute or reasonable medical certainty, “it must signify a probability of the underlying cause that is supported by a rational basis and not be based upon a general expression of possibility” … . …

Bruce Greene, claimant’s treating orthopedic surgeon, testified that it was difficult to determine when the meniscus tear occurred. He further testified that there is “a strong possibility [that] there was an acute or chronic tear of [the] meniscus” and that it is “very reasonable that something could have happened at work that exacerbated a chronic [condition].” The Board, finding that the medical testimony expressing that it was “highly possible” that the injury was causally related to work, falls short of the reasonable probability that is required to establish a causal relationship between claimant’s employment and his injury. Matter of Johnson v Borg Warner, Inc., 2020 NY Slip Op 04897, Third Dept 9-3-20

 

ALTHOUGH THERE WAS NO SCHEDULE LOSS OF USE (SLU) AWARD FOR THE PRIOR (2003) INJURY, THE AMOUNT OF THE AWARD FOR THE CURRENT (2015) INJURY MUST BE REDUCED BY THE LOSS OF USE ATTRIBUTED TO THE PRIOR INJURY (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing the Workers’ Compensation Board, determined the schedule loss of use (SLU) award should have been apportioned between the effects of a prior (2003) injury for which claimant was not compensated and the current (2015) injury to the same body member. The prior injury would have been compensable but for the finding the injury was caused by an injury at work:

In August 2015, claimant sustained another injury to his right shoulder while at work, and his ensuing claim was established for injury to the right shoulder. Ultimately, a WCLJ found that claimant had a 50% SLU of the right arm that was causally related to the 2015 accident. The WCLJ [Workers’ Compensation Law Judge] rejected the carrier’s assertion that there should be apportionment between the 2015 claim and the 2003 noncompensable injury, stating that the carrier had successfully argued at the time of the 2003 claim that one of claimant’s consultants was not credible and that there was no SLU for the 2003 injury and that it would be contradictory to now reduce claimant’s award based on that consultant’s prior SLU opinion. …

It is standard practice to apportion an SLU award involving two compensable injuries to the same body member and thus hold each carrier responsible for only that portion of the overall loss of use attributable to the injury covered by them ). That same principle is applicable to an SLU case involving a prior, noncompensable injury when the prior injury was disabling “in a compensation sense” before the occurrence of the subsequent injury. Because an SLU award “is not given for an injury sustained, but[, rather,] for the residual permanent physical and functional impairments” to the subject body member … , the question is whether there is documented prior “loss of use, function or range of motion of the body member in question” … . In other words, “apportionment may be applicable in an SLU case if the medical evidence establishes that the claimant’s prior injury [to the same body member] — had it been compensable — would have resulted in an SLU finding” … . Matter of St. Aubin v Office of Children & Family Servs., 2020 NY Slip Op 03706, Third Dept 7-2-20

 

CLAIMANT ENTITLED TO A SCHEDULE LOSS OF USE (SLU) AWARD DESPITE RETURNING TO WORK AT PREINJURY WAGES (SECOND DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing the Workers’ Compensation Board, determined claimant was entitled to a schedule loss of use (SLU) award even though claimant returned to work at preinjury wages:

For the reasons set forth in Matter of Arias v City of New York (182 AD3d 170 [2020]), we find that the Board’s disregard of Matter of Taher v Yiota Taxi, Inc. (162 AD3d 1288 [2018] …) was in error and, therefore, reverse. As this Court has recently held, “where a claimant who has sustained both schedule and nonschedule permanent injuries in the same work-related accident has returned to work at preinjury wages and, thus, receives no award based on his or her nonschedule permanent partial disability classification, he or she is entitled to an SLU award” … . As there was a finding of permanency as to claimant’s neck injury and he has returned to work at preinjury wages, he is entitled to an SLU award for the remaining injuries … . Matter of Cruz v Suffolk County Police Dept., 2020 NY Slip Op 03713, Second Dept 7-2-20

Similar issues and result: Matter of Cosides v Town of Oyster Bay Sanitation, 2020 NY Slip Op 03710, Third Dept 7-2-20

 

, ,

PERSONAL INJURY ACTION BY MOTHER OF A 14-YEAR-OLD KILLED WHEN WORKING ILLEGALLY ON DEFENDANT FARM PROPERLY DISMISSED; THE RECOVERY UNDER THE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW WAS THE EXCLUSIVE REMEDY BECAUSE THE INTENTIONAL-TORT EXCEPTION DID NOT APPLY; THE ACTION WAS PRECLUDED BY THE RES JUDICATA DOCTRINE; IN ADDITION THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE DEFENDANTS ACTED WILLFULLY OR INTENTIONALLY (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department determined the personal injury action brought by decedent’s mother was properly dismissed because the recovery pursuant to the Workers’ Compensation Law was the exclusive remedy. Plaintiff’s decedent, 14-years-old, was killed operating a skid steer while illegally employed by defendant’s (Park’s) farm. Although plaintiffs recovered Workers’ Compensation benefits, plaintiffs argued an exception to the exclusive-remedy restriction for intentional torts applied. The Third Department held the exclusive-remedy restriction applied and there was no evidence of willful or intentional conduct on the part of the defendants:

Inasmuch as the [Workers’ Compensation] Board had already “determined that [decedent’s] injuries were suffered accidentally and in the course of employment” for the Farm, the claim that the Farm or its employees are liable “for an intentional tort based on the same event is barred by the exclusive remedy and finality provisions of the Workers’ Compensation Law, and by principles of res judicata” … . Even if the Board’s decision did not have preclusive effect, however, Supreme Court properly rejected the contention that Park engaged in “deliberate acts . . . to injure [decedent] or to have him injured” so as to bring this case within an exception to the exclusivity provisions of the Workers’ Compensation Law … . The record reflects that decedent used the skid steer without anyone’s knowledge and that, following the investigation into decedent’s death, Park pleaded guilty to willful failure to pay unemployment insurance contributions (see Labor Law § 633), endangering the welfare of a child (see Penal Law § 260.10) and prohibited employment of a minor (see Labor Law § 133). It could be inferred from those facts that Park was negligent in failing to supervise decedent, or even reckless in exposing decedent to dangerous work that his age left him unsuited for, but not that Park acted out of a “willful intent to harm” decedent, as required … . Smith v Park, 2020 NY Slip Op 03583, Third Dept 6-25-20

 

FAILURE TO SPECIFY WHEN THE OBJECTION TO BE REVIEWED WAS MADE IN ANSWER TO QUESTION 15 OF THE APPLICATION JUSTIFIED THE BOARD’S REFUSING TO REVIEW IT, DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE DATE OF THE RELEVANT HEARING WAS INDICATED ELSEWHERE IN THE APPLICATION (SECOND DEPT).

The Third Department determined the Workers’ Compensation Board properly refused the employer’s application for review because the application did not indicate when the objection to be reviewed was made. The application indicated the objection was made at the hearing, but there were several hearings. The fact that the date of the hearing in question was indicated elsewhere in the application did affect the validity of the Board’s ruling:

The pertinent regulation, as well as the instructions in effect at the time that the employer filed its application for review, unambiguously required the employer to “specify the objection or exception that was interposed to the ruling [of the Workers’ Compensation Law Judge], and when the objection or exception was interposed” … . In response to question number 15 on the application for Board review, the employer set forth the specific objection but, in answering when such objection was interposed, indicated “at the hearing on the record.” As noted by the Board, because there were multiple hearings held in this matter, we cannot say that the Board abused its discretion in deeming the employer’s response to question number 15 to be incomplete based upon its failure to specify when such objection was interposed in order to satisfy the temporal element of the regulation …. Further, the fact that the date of the hearing at which the objection or exception was allegedly interposed appeared elsewhere on the application did not obviate the requirement for the employer to provide a complete response to question number 15, as the Board was not required to deduce when the employer’s objection or exception was interposed … . Matter of Rzeznik v Town of Warwick, 2020 NY Slip Op 02702, Second Dept 5-7-20

 

, ,

THE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BOARD MADE SEVERAL DECISIONS BUT REMITTED THE MATTER TO THE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW JUDGE FOR ADDITIONAL RULINGS; THE ORDER APPEALED FROM THEREFORE WAS NONFINAL; APPEAL DISMISSED (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department determined the decision by the Workers’ Compensation Board was nonfinal and therefore the appeal could not be considered:

In reviewing these various decisions, the Board found, among other things, that claimant was entitled to awards from April 14, 1997 to September 1, 2011 at the previously established temporary partial disability rate of 66.6% and that claimant had reached maximum medical improvement, but remitted the case to the WCLJ [Workers’ Compensation Law Judge] for a determination of issues related to claimant’s alleged violation of Workers’ Compensation Law § 114-a, permanency and loss of wage-earning capacity … . …

This appeal must be dismissed. “We will not conduct a piecemeal review of the issues presented in a nonfinal decision in workers’ compensation cases that will be reviewable upon an appeal of the Board’s final decision” … . “Board decisions which neither decide all substantive issues nor involve a threshold legal issue are not appealable” … . As none of the arguments raised on this appeal address potentially dispositive threshold legal questions, and “the nonfinal decision may be reviewed upon an appeal from the Board’s final determination, this appeal must be dismissed” … . Matter of Navarro v General Motors, 2020 NY Slip Op 02504, Third Dept 4-30-20

 

CLAIMANT, IN HIS APPLICATION FOR BOARD REVIEW, DID NOT SPECIFY WHEN THE OBJECTION SUBJECT TO BOARD REVIEW WAS MADE; THEREFORE THE BOARD PROPERLY DENIED REVIEW OF THE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW JUDGE’S DECISION (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department determined the Workers’ Compensation Board properly rejected claimant’s application for review because the question “when” the objection subject to review was made was not answered:

When claimant filed his application for Board review in September 2018, both the relevant version of form RB-89 and the corresponding instructions then in effect required an appellant to “specify the objection or exception that was interposed to the [WCLJ’s] [Workers’ Compensation Law Judge’s] ruling, and when the objection or exception was interposed” (12 NYCRR 300.13 [b] [2] [ii] …) In response to question number 15, claimant identified his objection to the WCLJ’s ruling; however, the Board found that claimant’s response was incomplete because there were multiple hearings held in this case, and claimant’s response to question number 15 failed to indicate when the objection or exception was interposed. Inasmuch as the regulation and instructions both expressly required claimant to “specify . . . when the objection or exception was interposed” … , we cannot say that the Board abused its discretion in deeming claimant’s response to question number 15 to be incomplete … . Matter of Martinez v New York Produce, 2020 NY Slip Op 02519, Third Dept 4-30-20

Similar issue and result in Matter of Turcios v NBI Green, LLC, 2020 NY Slip Op 02518, Third Dept 4-30-20

 

CLAIMANT’S INJURIES DID NOT ARISE OUT OF HIS EMPLOYMENT; CLAIMANT WAS STRUCK BY A CAR CROSSING THE STREET IN FRONT OF HIS PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department determined claimant’s injury did not arise out of his employment and he was not entitled to workers’ compensation benefits. Claimant was struck by a car in front of his place of employment:

Generally, “accidents that occur outside of work hours and in public areas away from the workplace are not compensable” … . Where an accident occurs near a claimant’s place of employment, as is the case here, “there develops a gray area where the risks of street travel merge with the risks attendant with employment and where the mere fact that the accident took place on a public road or sidewalk may not ipso facto negate the right to compensation” … . …

At the time of the accident, claimant had arrived more than one hour early for his shift, had not yet reported to work and had not been approved for overtime. Further, although the public road and parking area used by claimant when he was injured was located in front of his workplace, they were open to and used by the public “and there was no showing that [they were] otherwise controlled by the employer, that workers were encouraged to use [them] or that [they] existed solely to provide access to the workplace” … . Thus, the risk of getting hit by a car while crossing the public road was unrelated to claimant’s employment and merely constituted a danger that ” existed to any passerby traveling along the street in that location” … . Moreover, notwithstanding claimant’s assertion that his choice to drive to work and his general parking location was known to his supervisor and reduced his commute so that he could be well rested for work, “[t]here is no evidence that the method or route [he] chose served any business purpose, or that the employer benefitted from that route” … . Matter of Johnson (New York City Tr. Auth.), 2020 NY Slip Op 02521, Third Dept 4-30-20

 

CLAIMANT, WHO WAS ON THE JOB OUT-OF-TOWN, WAS INJURED IN A TRAFFIC ACCIDENT WHILE DRIVING FROM HIS HOTEL TO WHERE THE EMPLOYEES PICKED UP THEIR TRUCKS; CLAIMANT WAS ENTITLED TO WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BENEFITS UNDER THE TRAVELING EMPLOYEE EXCEPTION (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department determined claimant was entitled to workers’ compensation benefits for injuries stemming from a traffic accident on his way to the site where the employees pickup up their bucket trucks for tree-trimming work. Claimant was working about five or six hours from his home and his employer was paying a portion of his hotel costs. The traffic accident occurred when claimant was driving from the hotel to where the trucks were kept:

Under the traveling employee exception, “injuries to a traveling employee may be compensable even if the employee at the time of the accident was not engaged in the duties of his [or her] employment,” provided that the employee is engaged in a reasonable activity … . We are not persuaded by the carrier’s contention that the Board erred in applying this exception. The Board observed that claimant was working in an area about a 5½-to 6-hour drive from home. Although the employer’s supervisor testified that claimant was not required to stay at the hotel, he agreed that it would not have been practical for claimant to commute from home. All of claimant’s coworkers, including the general foreman, stayed at the hotel. Under these circumstances, the Board determined that claimant’s status as an employee continued throughout his stay away from home. As claimant was engaged in a reasonable activity at the time of the accident, the record provides substantial evidence for the Board’s conclusion that claimant’s injuries arose out of and in the course of his employment … . Matter of Wright v Nelson Tree Serv., 2020 NY Slip Op 02312, Third Dept 4-20-20

 

PLAINTIFF ENTITLED TO WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BENEFITS FOR INJURIES CAUSED BY A CO-EMPLOYEE’S INTENTIONAL TORT (ASSAULT) (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department determined plaintiff was entitled to workers’ compensation benefits for injuries from an intentional tort (assault) by an employee:

Plaintiff alleged that he was injured when, as he was attempting to sit down, defendant, his coworker, pulled his chair out from under him, causing him to fall to the ground. After plaintiff’s accident, the Workers’ Compensation Board determined that he was entitled to benefits for a work-related injury.

An employee’s rights to Workers’ Compensation benefits is the employee’s exclusive remedy against his employer or coemployee for injuries sustained during his employment (see Workers’ Compensation Law §§ 11, 29[6]) … ). The Workers’ Compensation Law, however, does not prevent an employee from recovering for intentional torts, such as an assault … .

Here, the motion court properly denied defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the claim for assault. There are issues of fact as to whether defendant’s conduct placed plaintiff in “imminent apprehension of harmful contact” … . Donnelly v Christian. 2020 NY Slip Op 02279, First Dept 4-16-20

 

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy