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TO BE ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS TRAFFIC ACCIDENT CASE THE TOWN DEFENDANTS NEEDED TO DEMONSTRATE EITHER THAT THEY WERE NOT NEGLIGENT OR THAT THEIR NEGLIGENCE WAS NOT A PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE ACCIDENT; BY FOCUSING ONLY ON PROXIMATE CAUSE, THE TOWN DEFENDANTS EFFECTIVELY ASSUMED THEY WERE NEGLIGENT; THE EVIDENCE THE DRIVER OF THE TOWN DUMP TRUCK WAS TRAVELING TOO FAST FOR THE CONDITIONS PRECLUDED SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THE TOWN’S FAVOR (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the town defendants’ motion for summary judgment in this traffic accident case should not have been granted. The town’s dump truck collied with a car which failed to yield the right–of-way at an intersection, veered into plaintiff’s decedent’s lane and collided with plaintiff’s decedent’s car. The town focused its argument on proximate cause, contending that the car which failed to yield the right-of-way was the sole proximate cause of the accident. But, to be entitled to summary judgment in this context, the defendant must demonstrate it was not negligent. By focusing on proximate case, the town defendants “must assume, arguendo, that they were negligent:”

The Town defendants’ submissions established that LaRocca, who was driving a dump truck containing 10 tons of asphalt, did not adhere to an advisory traffic sign recommending that speed be reduced to 35 miles per hour prior to entering the intersection and further established that the tree line limited his view of cross traffic at the intersection. If a trier of fact were to determine that LaRocca’s speed was unreasonable under the existing conditions, the trier of fact could also conclude that LaRocca’s own unreasonable speed was what deprived him of sufficient time to avoid the collision … . * * *

By focusing on “sole proximate cause” in this common-law negligence action, the Town defendants overlook the fact that their burden on their motion was to establish “as a matter of law that [they were] not negligent or that, even if [they were] negligent, [their] negligence was not a proximate cause of the accident” … . In other words, when moving for summary judgment in the negligence context and addressing only the issue of proximate cause, the Town defendants must effectively assume, arguendo, that they were negligent … . Inasmuch as the Town defendants did not do that here, we need not address their proximate cause argument. Gates v Simpson, 2025 NY Slip Op 04313, Fourth Dept 7-25-24

Practice Point: A defendant in a traffic accident case is entitled to summary judgment (1) if defendant was not negligent; or (2) even if defendant was negligent, defendant was not a proximate cause of the accident. In making a motion for summary judgment, if a defendant does not address defendant’s own negligence and focuses only on proximate cause, the defendant is “assuming” defendant was negligent.

 

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DEFENDANT’S VEHICLE WAS STRUCK BY A VEHICLE WHICH WAS BEING CHASED BY POLICE AND WHICH FAILED TO OBEY A STOP SIGN; DEFENDANT WAS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT; TWO-JUSTICE DISSENT (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court, over a two-justice dissent, determined defendant was entitled to summary judgment in this intersection traffic accident case. Plaintiff was a passenger in a Honda which was being chased by police. Defendant, whose car was struck by the Honda when the driver of the Honda failed to obey a stop sign, could justifiably assume the driver of the Honda would obey the stop sign. The dissent argued there was a question of fact whether defendant breached the duty to see what should be seen:

We respectfully disagree with our dissenting colleagues that defendant failed to meet his initial burden of establishing that he was free of comparative fault. … [Defendant testified] the collision occurred “instantly” after he first saw the car. * * * … [P]laintiff testified that he “blacked out” in the accident and did not know how it was caused. He was not even sure that the accident occurred at an intersection. All he could remember was the Honda proceeding straight with the police behind them and that he was “a little shaken up because [he had] never been in a high speed [chase].” That was “all [he could] remember, and [then] it was just boom.” Another occupant of the Honda testified that, as the Honda approached the intersection, “[i]t tried to stop, but . . . [they] were going a little too fast” and slid into the intersection. Defendant therefore established that the Honda never stopped at the stop sign before proceeding into the intersection and colliding with defendant’s vehicle. Inasmuch as the evidence submitted by defendant established that he had, at most, “only seconds to react” to the Honda that failed to yield the right-of-way, he established as a matter of law that he was not comparatively negligent … . Brown v City of Buffalo, 2025 NY Slip Op 03902, Fourth Dept 6-27-25

Practice Point: Here defendant’s vehicle was struck by a vehicle which was being chased by police and which did not obey a stop sign. The complaint against defendant, brought by a passenger in the vehicle which ran the stop sign, should have been dismissed. A two-justice dissent argued there was a question of fact whether defendant breached the duty of a driver to see what could be seen.

 

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PLAINTIFF’S DECEDENT WAS KILLED WHEN DEFENDANT DRIVER, WHO WAS BEING CHASED BY THE POLICE DEFENDANTS, COLLIDED WITH PLAINTIFF’S DECEDENT’S VEHICLE; THE DEFENSE VERDICT IN THE “RECKLESS DISREGARD” ACTION AGAINST THE POLICE WAS REVERSED BECAUSE OF THE OMISSION OF RELEVANT EVIDENCE AND THE ADMISSION OF PREJUDICIAL EVIDENCE; NEW TRIAL ORDERED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing the defense verdict and ordering a new trial in this “reckless disregard” action against the Nassau County Police Department stemming from a fatal traffic accident during a police chase, determined several evidentiary errors deprived plaintiff’s decedent of a fair trial. The vehicle which the police were chasing, driven by defendant Daley, collided with plaintiff’s decedent’s vehicle:

Supreme Court erred in declining to admit the Nassau County Police Department Rules and Regulations (hereinafter the rules) into evidence. An officer’s alleged violation of internal guidelines, although not dispositive, may be some evidence of whether an officer acted with reckless disregard … . The court compounded this error when it charged the jury pursuant to PJI 2:79A, specifically charging the jury that it may consider the rules when determining whether the police officers acted with reckless disregard for the safety of others. To the extent necessary, the rules could have been admitted with a limiting instruction that they may considered only as some evidence of recklessness, along with other factors … .

Further, the Supreme Court erred in admitting the full decision from a Dunaway/Huntley/Mapp hearing in the defendant driver’s criminal proceeding, as its subject matter was collateral and merely served to bolster the testimony of the police officers … and was therefore prejudicial. The court also erred in entirely precluding cross-examination of Detective Peter Ellison with respect to prior bad acts. Under the circumstances of this case, these errors were not harmless (see CPLR 2002), as the evidence related directly to issues to be determined by the jury … , i.e., the officers’ credibility, the nature of the police stop, and the question of when the officers activated their emergency lights. Yun v Daley, 2025 NY Slip Op 03224, Second Dept 5-28-25

Practice Point: In the “reckless disregard” action against the police stemming from a high-speed chase, the police department rules should have been admitted in evidence because a violation of the rules is some evidence of negligence.

Practice Point: Here the defendant driver who collided with plaintiff’s decedent during the police chase was charged criminally. It was prejudicial error to allow a decision in the criminal matter in evidence in this “reckless disregard” action against the police. It was also error to preclude the cross-examination of a detective about prior bad acts.

 

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HERE PLAINTIFF HAD THE RIGHT-OF-WAY ENTERING AN INTERSECTION AND DEFENDANT FAILED TO YIELD; PLAINTIFFS WERE ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON LIABILITY AND DISMISSAL OF DEFENDANTS’ COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiffs in this intersection-accident case was entitled to summary judgment on liability and dismissal of defendants’ comparative negligence affirmative defense:

“‘A driver who enters an intersection against a red traffic light in violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1110(a) is negligent as a matter of law'” … . “A driver who has the right-of-way is entitled to anticipate that other drivers will obey traffic laws that require them to yield” … . Moreover, “a driver with the right-of-way who has only seconds to react to a vehicle which has failed to yield cannot be comparatively negligent for failing to avoid the collision” … .

“[T]he issue of a plaintiff’s comparative negligence may be decided in the context of a summary judgment motion where the plaintiff moves for summary judgment dismissing a defendant’s affirmative defense alleging comparative negligence” … . Here, the plaintiffs established their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law dismissing the defendants’ affirmative defense alleging comparative negligence by demonstrating that the plaintiff driver entered the intersection with a green traffic light and had the right-of-way and that Mendez’s conduct was the sole proximate cause of the accident … . In opposition, the defendants failed to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether the plaintiff driver was comparatively negligent in causing the accident … . Ederi v Mendez, 2025 NY Slip Op 03041, Second Dept 5-21-25

Practice Point: A driver with the right-of-way who has only seconds to react to a vehicle which has failed to yield is not comparatively negligent and is entitled to summary judgment dismissing the comparative negligence affirmative defense.

 

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PLAINTIFF’S TRANSLATED AFFIDAVIT WAS NOT ACCOMPANIED BY THE TRANSLATOR’S AFFIDAVIT AND WAS THEREFORE INADMISSIBLE; THE ROADWAY WHERE THE COLLISION OCCURRED WAS NOT DIVIDED INTO TWO OR MORE CLEARLY MARKED LANES; THEREFORE THE “UNSAFE LANE CHANGE” STATUTE (VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW 1128(A)) DID NOT APPLY (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined summary judgment should not have been awarded to plaintiff in this traffic accident case. Plaintiff submitted his affidavit which had been translated but did not submit an affidavit from the translator attesting to the translator’s qualifications and the accuracy of plaintiff’s affidavit. In addition, the roadway where the accident occurred was not divided into two or more clearly marked lanes. Therefore the unsafe-lane-change provision of the Vehicle and Traffic Law did not apply to the facts:

In support of his motion for summary judgment, plaintiff submitted his translated affidavit and dashcam footage from defendants’ vehicle. He argued that defendant driver made an unsafe lane change in violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1128(a), which provides that “[w]henever any roadway has been divided into two or more clearly marked lanes for traffic . . . [a] vehicle shall be driven as nearly as practicable entirely within a single lane and shall not be moved from such lane until the driver has first ascertained that such movement can be made with safety.”

Plaintiff failed to demonstrate his entitlement to summary judgment. His affidavit, which was not accompanied by an affidavit from a translator attesting to the translator’s qualifications and the accuracy of the affidavit, does not comply with CPLR 2101(b) and is therefore inadmissible … . Even if the affidavit could be considered, the dashcam video does not “conclusively establish” that defendant driver violated Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1128(a) or eliminate issues of fact as to how the accident occurred … .

The dashcam video shows that Zerega Avenue was not divided into lanes in the southbound direction, and that neither vehicle was driving within a “clearly marked” lane of traffic when plaintiff’s vehicle drove up on the right side of defendants’ tractor-trailer. Moreover, the dashcam footage does not establish that defendant driver caused the accident by moving into plaintiff’s lane of traffic when it was not safe to do so. Richards v Walls, 2025 NY Slip Op 02889, First Dept 5-13-25

Practice Point: Where an affidavit submitted to support a summary judgment motion has been translated, it is not admissible unless it is accompanied by the translator’s affidavit attesting the the translator’s qualifications and the accuracy of the translation.

Practice Point: The unsafe-lane-change statute, Vehicle and Traffic Law 1128(a), does not apply unless there are two or more clearly marked lanes of travel.

 

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AT THE TIME OF THE COLLISION, THE SHERIFF’S DEPUTY WAS ENGAGED IN AN EMERGENCY OPERATION AND DID NOT ACT WITH RECKLESS DISREGARD FOR THE SAFETY OF OTHERS; TWO-JUSTICE DISSENT (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, affirming Supreme Court, over a two-justice dissent, determined the police vehicle (driven by Deputy Fong) which collided with plaintiff’s vehicle was engaged in an emergency operation and was not being operated in reckless disregard for the safety of others. The dissenters argued there was a question of fact on the “reckless disregard” issue:​

… [I]t is undisputed that the reckless disregard standard of care applies because Fong was driving an emergency vehicle and was engaged in an emergency operation at the time she proceeded through the red traffic signal (see Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1104 [b] [2]). In addition, defendants established that Fong’s conduct did not rise to a level of reckless disregard for the safety of others. Defendants’ submissions established, in particular, that Fong took several precautions before proceeding into the intersection against the red traffic signal, including bringing her vehicle to a complete stop, looking in all directions, activating her emergency lights, and proceeding slowly into the intersection … . Granath v Monroe County, 2025 NY Slip Op 02521, Fourth Dept 4-25-25

 

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ALTHOUGH THE VEHICLE OWNER, HERE A CAR DEALERSHIP, IS USUALLY VICARIOUSLY LIABLE FOR AN ACCIDENT CAUSED BY A DRIVER OPERATING THE VEHICLE WITH THE OWNER’S PERMISSION, HERE THERE IS A QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER THE DRIVER, WHO WAS TEST DRIVING THE VEHICLE, EXCEEDED THE SCOPE OF THE PERMISSION (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined summary judgment against the owner of the vehicle in this traffic accident case should not have been granted. Although summary judgment against the driver, Patel, was properly granted, there was a question of fact whether the driver had exceeded the scope of the permission granted by the owner, Paragon, a car dealership. There was evidence the sales rep told Patel he could drive around the block and return in five or ten minutes. Patel had taken the car on the expressway and called the dealership 35 minutes after leaving to say he had accident:

“Vehicle and Traffic Law § 388(1) provides that, with the exception of bona fide commercial lessors of motor vehicles, which are exempt from vicarious liability under federal law, the owner of a motor vehicle is liable for the negligence of one who operates the vehicle with the owner’s express or implied consent” … . “The strong presumption of permissive use afforded by Vehicle and Traffic Law § 388, can only be rebutted by substantial evidence sufficient to show that the driver of the vehicle was not operating the vehicle with the owner’s consent” … . “An owner may place limitations on a driver’s permission to use a vehicle, such as granting consent to drive only to a particular area or for a specific purpose, and use outside the scope of permission negates the owner’s liability under the statute” … . “Thus, an owner may avoid liability under the statute if the driver exceeded the time, place[,] and purpose of the use permitted by the owner” … . Madrigal v Paragon Motors of Woodside, Inc., 2025 NY Slip Op 01620, Second Dept 3-19-25

Practice Point: The owner of a vehicle may impose limits on the permissive use of the vehicle by another. If the driver exceeds the scope of the permission to use the vehicle, the owner may not be vicariously liable under Vehicle and Traffic Law section 388.

 

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DEFENDANT’S GUILTY PLEA WAS NOT VOLUNTARY BECAUSE HE WAS NOT INFORMED OF THE MANDATORY FINES FOR THE VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW OFFENSES; AN EXCEPTION TO THE PRESERVATION REQUIREMENT APPLIED; AN APPEAL WAIVER DOES NOT PRECLUDE ARGUING THE PLEA WAS INVOLUNTARY (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, reversing the Appellate Division, determined defendant’s guilty plea was not voluntary because he was not informed of the mandatory fines for the Vehicle and Traffic Law offenses. Although the error was not preserved, the “no actual or practical ability to object” preservation exception was invoked: An appeal waiver does not preclude the defendant from arguing the plea was involuntary:

An exception to the preservation requirement exists where, as here, a defendant had “no actual or practical ability to object” prior to the imposition of the fines by the sentencing court … . Further, a valid appeal waiver does not preclude a defendant from challenging a plea as involuntary, where the court fails to advise a defendant of a component of their sentence before it is imposed … .

Supreme Court erred in failing to inform defendant at the time of his plea that the sentences for two of the offenses to which he was pleading guilty included mandatory fines (see Vehicle and Traffic Law § 511 [3] [b]; Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1193 [1] [a]) The failure to “ensure that . . . defendant, before pleading guilty, ha[d] a full understanding of what the plea connotes and its consequences” … , requires vacatur of the plea. People v Padilla-Zuniga, 2025 NY Slip Op 01563, CtApp 3-18-25

Practice Point: The failure to inform the defendant of mandatory fines renders the guilty plea involuntary.

Practice Point: Here the “no actual or practical ability to object” exception to the preservation requirement applied.

Practice Point: An appeal waiver does not preclude the argument that the plea was involuntarily entered.

 

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THE OFFICER’S TESTIMONY HE COULD NOT SEE INSIDE THE CAR FROM A DISTANCE OF 10 TO 15 FEET PROVIDED PROBABLE CAUSE TO STOP THE CAR FOR A “TINTED WINDOWS” VIOLATION; THE DISSENT ARGUED IT WAS DARK AT THE TIME OF THE STOP AND THE OFFICER DID NOT LINK HIS INABILITY TO SEE INSIDE THE CAR TO THE TINTED WINDOWS AS OPPOSED TO THE AMBIENT DARKNESS (FOURTH DEPT). ​

The Fourth Department, affirming County Court, over a dissent, determined the officer’s testimony he could not see the driver’s face from a distance of 10 to 15 feet demonstrated probable cause of a “tinted window” violation which supported the vehicle stop. The dissent argued the officer’s testimony was insufficient to demonstrate probable cause because it was dark at the time of the stop and the officer did not link his inability to see inside the car to the tinted windows, as opposed to the ambient darkness:

Here, the officer who initiated the stop testified at the suppression hearing that he looked directly at the driver’s side window of the vehicle defendant was operating, that he did so from a distance of no more than 10 to 15 feet, and that he was “unable to see the driver of the vehicle” through the window. We conclude that the officer’s testimony contained sufficient facts to establish that he reasonably believed that the windows were excessively tinted in violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 375 (12-a) (b) (2) … .

From the dissent:

The officer who attempted to initiate the stop of defendant’s vehicle testified that he believed any level of tint on the front driver’s side window or the front passenger window would be illegal and that the actual tint on the vehicle’s windows was never tested with a tint meter. He further testified that he initially observed the vehicle when it was dark outside and that he was unable to see the driver inside the vehicle. At no point did the officer testify that it was the window tint, as opposed to the ambient darkness, that prevented him from seeing the driver. The officer’s failure to link the allegedly excessive tint with his inability to see into the vehicle distinguishes this case from those cited by the majority, in which the arresting officer “testified at the suppression hearing that he could tell the window tints were too dark because he could not see into the [vehicle]” … or “specifically testified that the driver’s side windows were ‘so dark that [he] was unable to actually see the operator of the vehicle as the vehicle was going by’ ” … . Because the officer’s testimony here failed to link his conclusory belief that the windows were excessively tinted with an objective fact in support of that belief, I conclude that the People failed to meet their burden … . People v Hall, 2025 NY Slip Op 01457, Fourth Dept 3-14-25

Practice Point: Consult this decision for some insight into the proof required for a valid “tinted-windows-violation” traffic stop.

 

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IN THE CONTEXT OF DRIVING WITH A SUSPENDED LICENSE, THE COURT OF APPEALS EXPLAINED THE CRITERIA FOR A VALID MISDEMEANOR COMPLAINT, VERSUS A MISDEMEANOR INFORMATION (CT APP). ​

The Court of Appeals, affirming the convictions by guilty pleas to misdemeanor complaints, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Troutman, determined the factual allegations in the complaints were sufficient. The defendants were charged with driving with a suspended license and argued the complaints did not demonstrate reasonable cause to believe they knew they their licenses had been suspended:

The misdemeanor complaints here satisfy the reasonable cause standard. The complaints “state[d] the time, date and location of the[ ] events,” and otherwise “provide[d] [defendants] with enough information” of how defendants committed the crime “to put [them] on notice of the crime” and “to prevent defendant[s] from facing double jeopardy on the same charges” … . Defendants knew from the complaints what they were accused of doing and where, when, and how they allegedly did it. Based on the complaints’ allegations, defendants could assess what defenses were available to them, such as contending that they never knew their licenses were suspended, that they were never served with a summons, or that the summonses didn’t warn them that their licenses would be suspended if they failed to respond.

… [D]efendants contend that the complaints failed to provide reasonable cause because they did not specifically allege that defendants personally received the summonses. * * * … [T]he numerous summonses issued to each defendant are sufficient to convince a person of ordinary intelligence, judgment, and experience that it is reasonably likely defendants received at least one of them. …

… [D]efendants’ consent to prosecution by misdemeanor complaint relieved the People of their obligation under a misdemeanor information to proffer “[n]on-hearsay allegations establishing every element of each charge” … . Although that obligation—known as “the prima facie case requirement”—applies to an information, “[a] misdemeanor complaint, in comparison, need only set forth facts that establish reasonable cause to believe that the defendant committed the charged offense” … .

Nor were the complaints deficient simply because they did not explain how the officers knew about suspension warnings appearing on traffic summonses or about those suspensions occurring automatically (by computer) within four weeks of a defendant’s failure to answer those summonses. We do not require complaints to contain such “formulaic recitation” … . Moreover, at this stage, the officers’ statements about summonses “appear[] reliable” … , inasmuch as the law tasks officers with delivering traffic summonses to alleged violators … . People v Willis, 2025 NY Slip Op 01405. CtApp 3-13-25

Practice Point: Consult this decision for an explanation of the criteria for a valid misdemeanor complaint, versus a misdemeanor information.

 

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