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QUESTIONS OF FACT ABOUT WHETHER PART PERFORMANCE DEFEATED THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS DEFENSE TO THE ALLEGED ORAL CONTRACT AND WHETHER THE PROPERTY WAS HELD AS A CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST PRECLUDED SUMMARY JUDGMENT; PLAINTIFF ALLEGED HE PROVIDED FUNDS TO DEFENDANT TO PURCHASE PROPERTY WHICH. PURSUANT TO THE ORAL AGREEMENT, WOULD BE TRANSFERRED BY DEFENDANT TO PLAINTIFF (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, affirming the denial of defendant’s summary judgment motion, determined there were question of fact about (1) whether part performance defeated the statute of frauds defense, (2) whether there was a fiduciary relationship between plaintiff and defendant and (3) whether the property was therefore held by defendant as a constructive trust. Plaintiff and defendant were close friends. Plaintiff alleged, pursuant to an oral agreement, he provided funds to defendant for the purchase of property which plaintiff would manage until defendant transferred it to the plaintiff. The defendant alleged there was no such agreement, plaintiff did not provide funds for the purchase of the property and defendant owned the property outright:

… [W]hile the plaintiff’s work in negotiating the purchase of the subject property and in managing it might be susceptible to other explanations, his contribution of approximately $1.5 million toward its purchase, albeit partially in the form of loans from the defendant, would be “unintelligible or at least extraordinary” without reference to the alleged oral agreement … . Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly determined that although the defendant demonstrated, prima facie, that the alleged oral agreement was barred by the statute of frauds, the plaintiff raised a triable issue of fact regarding part performance … . …

The four factors to be considered in ascertaining whether the imposition of a constructive trust is warranted are the existence of a fiduciary or confidential relationship, a promise, a transfer in reliance thereon, and unjust enrichment … . …

… [T]he transaction between the plaintiff and the defendant was not arm’s length but rather took place in the context of a friendship characterized not only by shared interests, cultural affiliations, and personal trust, but also by reliance on one another in business matters, including loans in the hundreds of thousands of dollars. While any single factor might not be sufficient, by itself, to establish a fiduciary relationship … . …

… [T]he terms of the agreement as described by the plaintiff and as evidenced by the parties’ actions are not fatally indefinite. The “doctrine of definiteness” … should not be “applied with a heavy hand” … . …

… [T]he plaintiff’s promise to manage the property and pay its expenses was “a specific, bargained for legal detriment” irrespective of its value to the defendant … . Accordingly, the alleged oral agreement does not fail for lack of consideration. Toobian v Golzad, 2021 NY Slip Op 02185, Second Dept 4-7-21

The trial in this matter was held, plaintiff prevailed, and the Second Department affirmed: Toobian v Golzad, 2021 NY Slip Op 02186, Second Dept 4-7-21

 

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THE 2009 AMENDMENTS TO THE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW ALLOWED LUMP SUM PAYMENTS OF SCHEDULE LOSS OF USE (SLU) AWARDS; CLAIMANT DIED BEFORE THE SLU AWARD WAS MADE; CLAIMANT’S ESTATE IS NOT ENTITLED TO THE LUMP SUM AWARD (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Stein, over a concurring opinion, determined that the 2009 amendments allowing lump sum schedule loss of use (SLU) awards did not entitle claimant’s estate to the lump sum award. The estate was entitled only to the portion of the award that would have been due to the claimant for the period prior to his death:

In December 2014, decedent claimant Norman Youngjohn sustained injuries when he slipped on ice and fell in a parking lot at work while employed by Berry Plastics Corporation. After decedent sought workers’ compensation benefits, a claim was established for injuries to his right shoulder and left elbow, and he was awarded temporary benefits. In September 2016, decedent notified the Workers’ Compensation Board that his injuries had become permanent, and the workers’ compensation insurance carrier (the Carrier) subsequently notified the Board that decedent’s injuries were amenable to a schedule loss of use (SLU) award (see generally Workers’ Compensation Law § 15 [3]). However, in March 2017, before resolution of his claim for permanent partial disability benefits, decedent suffered a fatal heart attack unassociated with his work-related injuries. * * *

The legislature’s 2009 amendments to Workers’ Compensation Law §§ 15 (3) (u) and 25 (1) (b)—which provide that SLU awards may be “payable” in a lump sum upon request of the injured employee …—changed the allowable methods of payment for SLU awards. However, the Estate’s contention that these amendments implicitly provide a claimant’s estate a new entitlement to the value of an SLU award upon a claimant’s death, or otherwise direct that an SLU award “accrues” at that time for purposes of an estate’s recovery—issues that are distinct from the permissible methods of payment for such awards …—cannot be reconciled with the fact that the legislature did not amend Workers’ Compensation Law § 15 (4) (d) when it authorized lump sum payments. An estate’s entitlement to an SLU award upon a claimant’s death remains governed by Workers’ Compensation Law § 15 (4) (d), which was left untouched by the 2009 amendments. Matter of Estate of Youngjohn v Berry Plastics Corp., 2021 NY Slip Op 02017, CtApp 4-1-21

 

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THE ESTATE OF THE MORTGAGOR WAS NOT A NECESSARY PARTY IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION; THE PROPERTY WAS CONVEYED BEFORE HER DEATH AND THE COMPLAINT DOES NOT SEEK A DEFICIENCY JUDGMENT (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the estate of the mortgagor was not a necessary party in the foreclosure proceeding and the complaint should not have been dismissed on that ground:

The estate of the mortgagor was not a necessary party to this action, as it had no interest in the property at the time this action was commenced, inasmuch as the mortgagor conveyed the property that is subject to the mortgage to the defendant prior to her death, and the complaint does not seek a deficiency judgment against her estate … . U.S. Bank N.A. v Apelbaum, 2021 NY Slip Op 02008, Second Dept 3-31-21

 

THE PETITIONER’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT DISMISSING THE OBJECTIONS TO PROBATE ALLEGING LACK OF DUE EXECUTION AND UNDUE INFLUENCE SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Surrogate’s Court, determined the petitioner’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the objections to probate alleging lack of due execution and undue influence should have been granted. The objectants were the children of decedent’s son, who were excluded from any distribution from the estate. With respect to lack of due execution, the court wrote:

“The proponent of a will has the burden of proving that the propounded instrument was duly executed in conformance with the statutory requirements” … . “Where the will is drafted by an attorney and the drafting attorney supervises the will’s execution, there is a presumption of regularity that the will was properly executed in all respects” … . Although the evidence here did not establish that the execution of the will was supervised by an attorney, “a presumption of compliance with the statutory requirements also arises where a propounded will contains an executed attestation clause and a self-proving affidavit” … . Further, “even where the memory of both attesting witnesses is failed or imperfect, a will nevertheless may be admitted to probate” … .

Here, the petitioner established, prima facie, that the 2010 will was duly executed pursuant to EPTL 3-2.1 by submitting a copy of the 2010 will with its executed attestation clause and self-proving affidavit … . At their depositions, both attesting witnesses, who were employees of the drafting attorney’s law office, identified their signatures as witnesses to the 2010 will … . Both attesting witnesses testified as to the office’s general practice for will executions, which met the statutory requirements. In opposition, the objectants failed to raise a triable issue of fact. Matter of Michels, 2021 NY Slip Op 01978, Second Dept 3-31-21

 

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THE INFANCY TOLL OF THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS IN CPLR 208 APPLIES TO A WRONGFUL DEATH ACTION WHERE THE SOLE DISTUBUTEES ARE INFANTS; THE TOLL, HOWEVER, DOES NOT APPLY TO A RELATED ASSAULT AND BATTERY ACTION WHICH IS PERSONAL TO THE DECEDENT (FRIST DEPT).

The First Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Kapnick, determined the infancy toll of the statute of limitations in CPLR 208 applies where the unmarried father of two children dies intestate. The statute of limitations for the ensuing wrongful death action is tolled until the appointment of a guardian of the children’s property. Father was involved in an altercation with a defendant, suffered fatal injuries and died later that day, September 6, 2012. Plaintiffs, the mothers of the two children, were each appointed guardians of the property of their children in 2015. That is when the statute began running on the wrongful death action, rendering the 2016 complaint timely. A wrongful death action directly compensates the distributees, here the children. The assault and battery action, by contrast, is personal to the decedent. Therefore the infancy toll does not apply to the assault and battery cause of action. The First Department explicitly overruled a decision relied upon by the defendants, Ortiz v Hertz Corp., 212 AD2d 374 (1st Dept 1995). (The opinion is comprehensive and can not be fairly summarized here.):

Today we clarify that Ortiz is not good law, because it was based on an incorrect application and interpretation of Hernandez. Therefore, pursuant to the precedent established in Hernandez [78 NY2d 687] … we hold that when the sole distributees of a decedent’s estate are infants, the toll of CPLR 208 applies to a wrongful death claim “until the earliest moment there is a personal representative or potential personal representative who can bring the action whether by appointment of a guardian [of the property of the infant distributee] or majority of [a] distributee, whichever occurs first” … . Machado v Gulf Oil, L.P., 2021 NY Slip Op 01849, First Dept 3-25-21

 

BECAUSE PETITIONER-WIFE DID NOT COMPLY WITH THE RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF THE EPTL, SHE WAS NOT ENTITLED TO HER ELECTIVE SHARE OF HER DECEASED HUSBAND’S DEATH BENEFIT (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined petitioner-wife was not entitled to her elective share of her deceased husband’s death benefit from the New York City Employees’ Retirement System (NYCERS). Her husband’s father was the named beneficiary. Because petitioner did not comply with the relevant provisions of the Estate, Powers and Trusts Law (EPTL), NYCERS was justified in distributing the funds to her husband’s father:

A surviving spouse’s election to take a share of the decedent’s estate “must be made within six months from the date of issuance of letters testamentary or of administration, as the case may be, but in no event later than two years after the date of decedent’s death” (EPTL 5-1.1-A[d][1]). A surviving spouse must file written notice of such election in the Surrogate’s Court that issued the letters testamentary or of administration (see EPTL 5-1.1-A[d][1]).

The provisions of EPTL 5-1.1-A(b) “shall not prevent a corporation or other person from paying or transferring any funds or property to a person otherwise entitled thereto, unless there has been served personally upon such corporation or other person a certified copy of an order enjoining such payment or transfer made by the surrogate’s court having jurisdiction of the decedent’s estate or by another court of competent jurisdiction” (EPTL 5-1.1-A[b][4] …]). EPTL 5-1.1-A(b)(4) further provides that a “corporation or other person paying or transferring any funds or property described in clause (G) of subparagraph one of this paragraph,” which includes death benefits, “to a person otherwise entitled thereto, shall be held harmless and free from any liability for making such payment or transfer, in any action or proceeding which involves such funds or property.”

Here, it is undisputed that the petitioner did not serve NYCERS with an order enjoining it from paying the entirety of the decedent’s death benefit to the named beneficiary, Ghulam. Accordingly, pursuant to EPTL 5-1.1-A(b)(4), NYCERS “shall be held harmless and free from any liability for making such payment” in the instant proceeding. Matter of Baig, 2021 NY Slip Op 01763, Second Dept 3-24-21

 

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IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION, THE JUDGE SHOULD HAVE FIRST DETERMINED WHETHER ANY DISTRIBUTEES OF THE DECEASED MORTGAGORS WERE NECESSARY PARTIES [RPAPL 1311 (1)] AND, IF SO, SUMMON THEM PURSUANT TO CPLR 1001 [b]; THE MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO JOIN NECESSARY PARTIES SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined there were questions of fact whether any distributees of the deceased mortgagors were necessary parties in this foreclosure action. The motion to dismiss for failure to join necessary parties should not have been granted. The court should have determined whether joinder of any parties was required and then summon them pursuant to CPLR 1001 [b]:

Pursuant to RPAPL 1311(1), “necessary defendants” in a mortgage foreclosure action include, among others, “[e]very person having an estate or interest in possession, or otherwise, in the property as tenant in fee, for life, by the curtesy, or for years, and every person entitled to the reversion, remainder, or inheritance of the real property, or of any interest therein or undivided share thereof, after the determination of a particular estate therein.”

“In certain circumstances, the estate of the mortgagor is not a necessary party to a mortgage foreclosure action” … . In particular, “where a mortgagor/property owner dies intestate and the mortgagee does not seek a deficiency judgment, generally a foreclosure action may be commenced directly against the distributees,” in whom title to the real property automatically vests … .

Here, the plaintiff did not seek a deficiency judgment. However, questions of fact existed, which should have been resolved by the Supreme Court, as to whether any distributees of the deceased mortgagors, other than the defendants herein, retained an interest in the property such that they were necessary parties to the foreclosure action. Further, to the extent that there were such necessary parties to the action, dismissal of the complaint was not the proper remedy; rather, the property remedy in such instance is to direct the joinder of those parties (see CPLR 1001[b] … . NRZ Pass-Through Trust IV v Tarantola, 2021 NY Slip Op 01423, Second Dept 3-10-21

 

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THE FORMER SURROGATE, NOW IN PRIVATE PRACTICE, CANNOT REPRESENT A CLIENT IN A CASE WHICH WAS BEFORE HER AS SURROGATE (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing Surrogate’s Court, over a two-justice dissent, determined the former Surrogate, who is now in private practice, cannot represent a client in a proceeding which was before her as Surrogate:

Respondent contends that Surrogate’s Court erred in not granting her motion to disqualify petitioner’s counsel. We agree. Just as a judge may not preside over a case that he or she was previously involved in as an attorney (see Judiciary Law § 14; 22 NYCRR 100.3 [E] [1] [b] [i]), an attorney may not appear for a client in a case that he or she previously presided over as a judge (see Judiciary Law § 17; … see also Rules of Professional Conduct [22 NYCRR 1200.0] rule 1.12 [a]). To that end, Judiciary Law § 17 provides that a “former judge or surrogate shall not act as attorney or counsellor in any action, claim, matter, motion or proceeding, which has been before him [or her] in his [or her] official character.” This prohibition is “absolute” and “establishes a bright-line disqualification rule” … . By our reading, this statute clearly operates to disqualify petitioner’s counsel — who previously presided as the Surrogate over the probate of decedent’s will and the issuance of letters testamentary and letters of trusteeship to respondent — from now representing petitioner in his claims against respondent involving the same estate and the same trust … . To the extent that Surrogate’s Court determined that Rules of Professional Conduct (22 NYCRR 1200.00) rule 1.12 (a) would permit the former Surrogate to represent petitioner in this matter — a finding with which we do not agree — this rule cannot be relied upon to permit a representation agreement that is otherwise precluded by Judiciary Law § 17. Matter of Gordon, 2021 NY Slip Op 01294, Third Dept 3-4-21

 

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A STIPULATION OF SETTLEMENT FOR WHICH A JUDGMENT WAS ENTERED AFTER DECEDENT’S DEATH MAY NOT BE ENTERED IN DECEDENT’S NAME PURSUANT TO CPLR 5016 (d); THEREFORE THE JUDGMENT IS NOT ENTITLED TO PRIORITY IN SETTLING THE ESTATE (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, over a dissent, determined a stipulation of settlement in favor of decedent which was the basis of a judgment entered after decedent’s death cannot, pursuant to CPLR 5016 (d), be entered in his or her own name, and therefore is not entitled to priority in settling the estate:

An “accepted offer to compromise pursuant to [CPLR] 3221” (CPLR 5016 [d]) refers to a precise mechanism, which allows a party against whom a claim is asserted, 10 days before trial, to “serve upon the claimant a written offer to allow judgment to be taken against him [or her] for a sum or property or to the effect therein specified, with costs then accrued. If within [10] days thereafter the claimant serves a written notice that he [or she] accepts the offer, either party may file the summons, complaint and offer, with proof of acceptance, and thereupon the clerk shall enter judgment accordingly” (CPLR 3221). Here, there was no written offer or written acceptance; rather, the stipulation occurred on the record before Supreme Court, and the filing in the Clerk’s Office occurred after petitioner secured the judgment and order from Supreme Court … .

We decline to adopt the broad interpretation of CPLR 5016 (d), as petitioner urges … . The Legislature, in creating CPLR 5016 (d), set forth three distinct situations where a post-mortem judgment may be entered against the decedent in his or her own name, thus bestowing priority to the creditor. None of these three provisions was met here. Matter of Uccellini, 2021 NY Slip Op 01303, Third Dept 3-4-21

 

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THE ESTATE IS NOT A NECESSARY PARTY IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION; THE REFEREE’S FINDINGS WERE BASED UPON UNPRODUCED BUSINESS RECORDS (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the estate was not a necessary party in this foreclosure action and the referee’s finding were based on unproduced business records:

“The rule is that a mortgagor who has made an absolute conveyance of all his [or her] interest in the mortgaged premises, including his [or her] equity of redemption, is not a necessary party to foreclosure, unless a deficiency judgment is sought on his [or her] bond” … . Here, [decedent] conveyed all of the interest in the subject property prior to his death, and prior to the commencement of the instant action. Moreover, the plaintiff moved to amend the complaint to remove any language seeking a deficiency, and the court granted that motion.

However, “the referee’s findings with respect to the total amount due upon the mortgage were not substantially supported by the record inasmuch as the computation was premised upon unproduced business records” … . Federal Natl. Mtge. Assn. v Home & Prop. Works, LLC, 2021 NY Slip Op 01031, Second Dept 2-17-21

 

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