You are here: / Toxic Torts
, ,

ALTHOUGH THE DAMAGES WERE DEEMED EXCESSIVE, PLAINTIFFS’ MULTI-MILLION DOLLAR VERDICT IN THE ASBESTOS MESOTHELIOMA ACTION WAS SUPPORTED BY THE EXPERT EVIDENCE OF CAUSATION (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, although finding some of the damage amounts excessive, determined, over a dissent, the plaintiffs’ multi-million-dollar verdict in this asbestos exposure case was supported by the evidence. The case hinged on expert evidence that the extent of the exposure was sufficient to cause the resulting illness. The dissent argued the expert evidence did not meet the criteria imposed by the Court of Appeals:

In this asbestos case, Marlena Robaey [(]plaintiff), who died after the trial of this action, testified that, working with her husband and co-plaintiff, she had been regularly exposed to visible dust from scraping and grinding engine gaskets over a period of years, from cleaning the family garage after each gasket change, and from taking her and her husband’s dusty clothes into their laundry room to clean. [Defendant] Federal-Mogul’s corporate representatives, as well as the various experts called by defendants at trial, testified that the gaskets contained anywhere from 50% to 85% asbestos, and plaintiffs’ experts testified that dust from these products, if visible, necessarily exceeded current permissible levels and contained sufficient levels of asbestos to cause plaintiff’s peritoneal mesothelioma. * * *

… [T]he experts did not merely testify as to only an increased risk. Dr. Schwartz testified that the visible dust from the gaskets at issue, which were conceded by defendants’ expert to contain between 50% and 85% asbestos, 80% being “standard,” necessarily contained several thousand times the “safe” amount of asbestos, and thus was causative of plaintiff’s disease … .

From the dissent:

It should be borne in mind that the decedent’s relevant alleged exposure to asbestos from Fel-Pro products was restricted to helping her husband remove gaskets from his cars “once or twice . . . in a month” over a period of 12 year. It should also be remembered that only about half of the gaskets involved were [defendant’s] products, that not all of the [defendant’s] gaskets contained asbestos, and that any asbestos that the gaskets did contain was of the less hazardous chrysotile variety.  Matter of New York City Asbestos Litig. v Air & Liquid Sys. Corp., 2020 NY Slip Op 04437, First Dept 8-5-20

 

, , , ,

MOTIONS FOR LEAVE TO FILE LATE NOTICES OF CLAIM IN THIS “POLLUTION ESCAPING FROM A LANDFILL” CASE SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED; THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS HAD BEEN TOLLED BY THE FILING OF A FEDERAL CLASS ACTION SUIT; ALTHOUGH THERE WAS NO ADEQUATE EXCUSE, THE RESPONDENT WAS AWARE OF THE CLAIMS AND COULD NOT DEMONSTRATE PREJUDICE FROM THE DELAY (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the motions for leave to file late notices of claim in these actions stemming from pollution escaping from a landfill should have been granted. Although leave to file a late notice of claim can not be granted after the statute of limitations has run, here the statute of limitations was tolled by the filing of a federal class action suit:

Although more than one year and ninety days had elapsed between the November 2016 accrual date alleged in claimants’ proposed notices of claim and their application for leave to serve late notices of claim, we agree with claimants that the filing of the federal class action in March 2017, in which claimants are putative class members, tolled the statute of limitations … . …

… [T]he court abused its discretion in denying their application insofar as it sought leave to serve late notices of claim on respondent … . “In determining whether to grant such [relief], the court must consider, inter alia, whether the claimant[s have] shown a reasonable excuse for the delay, whether the [respondent] had actual knowledge of the facts surrounding the claim within 90 days of its accrual, and whether the delay would cause substantial prejudice to the [respondent]” … . Although claimants failed to establish a reasonable excuse for the delay, “[t]he failure to offer an excuse for the delay is not fatal where . . . actual notice was had and there is no compelling showing of prejudice to [respondent]” … .

… [B]ecause respondent knew that its Site was upgraded to a Class 2 site in 2015 and because similarly situated individuals served timely notices of claim on respondent alleging “substantively identical” exposure to the Site’s pollutants and resulting damages … , we conclude that claimants established that respondent received the requisite actual timely knowledge of the claims claimants now assert. We further conclude that claimants met their initial burden of establishing that respondent would not be substantially prejudiced by the delay inasmuch as respondent has been investigating similar claims since early 2017 … and that, in opposition, respondent failed to make a “particularized showing” of substantial prejudice caused by the late notice … . Matter of Bingham v Town of Wheatfield, 2020 NY Slip Op 04241, Fourth Dept 7-24-20

 

, , ,

PLAINTIFFS WERE ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT FINDING DEFENDANT-LANDLORD VIOLATED NYC LOCAL LAW NO. 1 BY FAILING TO TAKE REASONABLE MEASURES TO ADDRESS THE HAZARDOUS LEAD-PAINT CONDITION IN PLAINTIFFS’ APARTMENT; HOWEVER DEFENDANTS RAISED A QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER DEFENDANTS’ NEGLIGENCE WAS THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE CHILD’S INJURIES (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Moulton, determined plaintiffs demonstrated defendants violated Local Law No. 1 of the City of New York in failing to take reasonable measures to address the hazardous lead-based paint condition in plaintiffs’ apartment. However defendants’ medical expert raised a question of fact whether defendants’ negligence was the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s child’ (S.T.’s) injuries:

Under Local Law 1 defendants’ liability is not predicated on their observations of peeling paint or whether they are informed of it. Defendants’ liability does not depend on the mother demonstrating that she credibly complained about each and every instance or location of peeling paint. Even assuming that the mother never complained about the paint condition, defendants are charged with notice of the hazardous lead-based paint condition under Local Law 1 from the time that defendants were aware that S.T. moved into apartment. Moreover, Local Law 1 imposes on landlords “a specific duty to ameliorate hazardous levels of lead-based paint” … . Defendants cannot avoid liability by attempting to shift their statutory obligation to the mother by questioning her memory or her credibility, or for failing to inform them when the paint began to peel. Shifting the burden to the mother is inconsistent with the purpose of Local Law 1 which “is unquestionably intended to protect a definite class of persons [plaintiffs] from a particular hazard they are incapable of avoiding themselves” … . S.T. v 1727-29 LLC, 2020 NY Slip Op 03630, First Deptp 6-25-20

 

, , , ,

DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS ASBESTOS-INJURY CASE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED, PROPER BURDEN OF PROOF EXPLAINED (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the defendant’s motion for summary judgment in this asbestos -injury case should not have been granted and, alternatively, even if the motion were properly granted, leave to renew should have been granted based on additional evidence:

In connection with a motion for summary judgment in an action based on exposure to asbestos, defendant has the initial burden of showing “unequivocally” that its product could not have contributed to the causation of decedent’s asbestos-related injury … .

Defendant Burnham failed to sustain its initial burden of demonstrating that its products could not have contributed to decedent’s mesothelioma. Decedent’s testimony identified defendant as the manufacturer of greenhouses in which he worked and cited three possible sources of asbestos: transite benches in the greenhouses, window glazing and the greenhouse boiler. Burnham provided no evidence demonstrating that its products could not have been the source of the asbestos that caused decedent’s illness. It only pointed to gaps in plaintiffs’ proof, which was insufficient to meet its burden … . Even if the burden had shifted, plaintiffs’ evidence in opposition raised an issue of fact as to whether Burnham had sold, distributed, and recommended asbestos-containing products such as those used in plaintiffs’ family’s gardening business. While hearsay, that evidence could be considered by the court since it was not the sole basis of the opposition … .

Alternatively, even if the summary judgment motion had been properly granted, the court should have granted leave to renew in the interests of fairness and justice since plaintiffs presented an affidavit of decedent’s estranged brother, which supplied crucial evidence linking decedent’s illness to Burnham’s products. Fischer v American Biltrite, Inc., 2020 NY Slip Op 03277, First Dept 6-11-20

 

, , ,

THE ISSUES ADDRESSED IN THIS COMPREHENSIVE ASBESTOS-MESOTHELIOMA OPINION INCLUDE: GENERAL CAUSATION; SPECIFIC CAUSATION; WHETHER THE CLOSING PREJUDICED THE JURY; AND THE APPORTIONMENT OF DAMAGES (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, in a comprehensive opinion by Justice Gische, over a dissent, determined there was sufficient evidence of causation to raise a jury question in this asbestos-mesothelioma action. The issues addressed included: (1) general causation; (2) specific causation; (3) whether plaintiff’s counsel’s closing required a new trial; and (4) the apportionment of damages. The opinion is far too detailed and comprehensive to fairly summarize here:

The Court of Appeals recognized that precise information and exact details are not always available in toxic tort cases and they may not be necessary so long as there is “evidence from which a reasonable person could conclude” that the defendant’s offending substance “has probably caused” the kind of harm of which the plaintiff complains … . * * *

After each sides’ attorney highlighted the weaknesses in the other sides’ expert’s scientific evidence and authorities, it then became the province of the jury to weigh the evidence and decide which opinion was more credible … . There is no legal basis to disturb the jury’s findings and verdict in favor of plaintiff … . * * *

There is no basis, in this record, for a finding that the weight of the evidence presented at trial preponderated in favor of finding no specific causation. * * *

Plaintiff’s counsel’s summation comments were isolated remarks during a very lengthy summation. They were not pervasive, egregious or an obdurate pattern of remarks that inflamed the jury into believing that the focus of plaintiff’s exposure to asbestos contaminated talc was other than airborne particulants that she had breathed in for many years … . * * *

Issues raised by plaintiff on its cross appeal regarding the court’s calculation of offsets for payments made by the settling defendants … do have merit. General Obligations Law § 15-108 requires that a judgment be adjusted by subtracting the greater of other tortfeasors’ equitable share of the damages or the amount actually paid by them. Nemeth v Brenntag N. Am., 2020 NY Slip Op 02261, First Dept 4-9-20

 

,

DEFENDANT, WHO CO-OWNED THE PROPERTY FOR A TWO-YEAR PERIOD, DEMONSTRATED HE DID NOT HAVE ACTUAL OR CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE OF THE HAZARDOUS LEAD PAINT CONDITION (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendant’s motion for summary judgment in this lead-paint exposure case should have been granted. Defendant was a co-owner of the subject property but he was able to demonstrate his connection to the property was such that he did not have actual or constructive notice of the hazardous lead paint condition:

… [D]efendant owned the subject property, as a tenant in common, with his father during the period of plaintiffs’ tenancy from 1992 to 1994. In support of his motions, defendant submitted his affidavit, wherein he averred, among other things, that he was a co-owner of the property “on paper only,” that his father handled all day-to-day maintenance of the property, and that defendant never entered plaintiffs’ apartments or hired anyone to make repairs thereto during plaintiffs’ tenancy. Defendant further averred that he did not have a key to the apartments and that he never spoke to or received complaints from plaintiffs or plaintiffs’ mother. Defendant’s submissions also established that he had no knowledge of inspections for or the existence of lead paint at the property during plaintiffs’ tenancy and that he was unaware that the property was constructed at a time before lead paint was banned, that paint was peeling at the property, that lead paint posed a danger to young children, and that young children lived on the property.

Regardless of whether defendant’s father had actual or constructive notice through his own involvement with the property, that notice cannot be imputed to defendant absent evidence of defendant’s own actual or constructive notice … . McDowell v Maldovan, 2020 NY Slip Op 01748, Fourth Dept 3-13-20

 

, , , ,

FOUR CLASSES PROPERLY CERTIFIED TO BRING CLASS ACTION SUITS BASED UPON THE CONTAMINATION OF AIR, WATER, REAL PROPERTY AND PEOPLE WITH TOXIC CHEMICALS (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Lynch, determined that Supreme Court properly certified four classes bring class action suits against a manufacturer alleging the contamination of water, air, real property and people with toxic chemicals, PFOA and PFOS:

Plaintiffs, residents of the Town, commenced this action as a proposed class action, alleging that defendant’s use and improper disposal of PFOA and PFOS caused personal injury and property damage. In their complaint, plaintiffs proposed four classes: (1) a public water property damage class; (2) a private well water property damage class; (3) a private well nuisance class; and (4) a PFOA invasion injury class. Generally, the putative class members were individuals who owned or leased property in the Town or who ingested contaminated municipal or well water or inhaled PFOA or PFOS particulates in the Town and had demonstrable evidence of elevated levels of the chemical in their blood system. * * *

We agree with Supreme Court’s determination that, in addition to those questions common to the property classes, the answers to certain additional common questions will be applicable to all members of the invasion injury class, for example: (1) whether medical monitoring is an available remedy; (2) the extent of the health hazard presented by exposure to PFOA; and (3) whether the members of the class are at significant increased risk for disease based on the excess accumulation of PFOA in their bodies. Although defendant contends that there are myriad factual questions that are not common to the class, we do not agree that those predominate. Importantly, this is not a case where there is an issue of fact regarding exposure — rather, each class member must establish exposure and accumulation through blood work … . Burdick v Tonoga, Inc., 2019 NY Slip Op 08461, Third Dept 11-21-19

 

, , , ,

ACTION AGAINST GAS COMPANY FOR CONTAMINATION OF REAL PROPERTY ACCRUED WHEN INJURY SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISCOVERED AND WAS TIME BARRED; ACTION FOR NUISANCE RELATING TO REMEDIATION EFFORTS, HOWEVER, IS SUBJECT TO A DIFFERENT STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS PROVISION AND WAS NOT TIME-BARRED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined the causes of action against a gas company to recover damages for contamination of real property were time-barred, but the nuisance actions stemming from remediation efforts were not time-barred:

“Generally, an action to recover damages for personal injury or injury to property must be commenced within three years of the injury” … . “[T]he three year period within which an action to recover damages for personal injury or injury to property caused by the latent effects of exposure to any substance or combination of substances,” however, “shall be computed from the date of discovery of the injury by the plaintiff or from the date when through the exercise of reasonable diligence such injury should have been discovered by the plaintiff, whichever is earlier” (CPLR 214-c[2] …). “For purposes of CPLR 214-c, discovery occurs when, based upon an objective level of awareness of the dangers and consequences of the particular substance, the injured party discovers the primary condition on which the claim is based'” … .  …

… [T]he defendants here demonstrated that they undertook extensive efforts beginning in 1999 to inform and engage with property owners potentially affected by the contamination and remediation by conducting, among other things, door-to-door canvassing, direct mailings of newsletters and fact sheets, numerous public meetings, and highly visible and disruptive remediation work. The defendants also inspected the subject property twice in 2005 to determine whether certain remediation work between those inspections caused any damage, and mailed the results of their inspections to the plaintiff in 2006. … The defendants … established, prima facie, that the plaintiff should have discovered, through the exercise of reasonable diligence, the primary condition upon which its exposure-related claims were based prior to January 22, 2007 … . …

We disagree, however, with the Supreme Court’s determination that the causes of action to recover damages for public and private nuisance allegedly arising from the defendants’ remediation work were time-barred … . These causes of action are subject to the limitations period in CPLR 214(4) rather than CPLR 214-c(2) because they do not seek “to recover damages for personal injury or injury to property caused by the latent effects of exposure” … .  Here, the papers submitted in support of the defendants’ motion demonstrated that there was no dispute that the defendants conducted remediation work in close proximity to the subject property shortly after new tenants signed a lease to occupy the space in 2008 … . Onder Realty, Inc. v Keyspan Corp., 2019 NY Slip Op 07406, Second Dept 10-16-19

 

, , , ,

CLAIMANTS DID NOT ALLEGE WHEN THE ALLEGED INJURIES RELATED TO TOXIC CONTAMINATION WERE INCURRED, CLAIMS PROPERLY DISMISSED AS JURISDICTIONALLY DEFECTIVE (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department determined the action alleging negligence and inverse condemnation stemming from toxic contamination of the vicinity of a defunct factory was properly dismissed because the allegations did not specify when the alleged injuries occurred:

The State of New York is sovereign and has consented to be sued only in strict accordance with the requirements of the Court of Claims Act (see Court of Claims Act § 8 …). Among those requirements is the claimant’s duty to allege “the time when [the] claim arose” … . The requirements of section 11 (b) are jurisdictional in nature … , and the failure to satisfy them mandates dismissal of the claim without regard to whether the State was prejudiced … or had access to the requisite information from its own records … . As the Court of Appeals has explained, the State is not required “to ferret out or assemble information that section 11 (b) obligates the claimant to allege” … . …

Here, although claimants adequately specified when defendant’s negligent acts allegedly occurred, they failed to supply any dates or ranges of dates regarding their alleged injuries, such as when they were exposed to toxins, when they developed symptoms, when they sought treatment, or when they were diagnosed with an illness. Instead, claimants alleged only the dates of their residence in Geneva and the dates when news of the contamination became public. Claimants’ allegations are insufficient to enable defendant to adequately investigate the claims in order to ascertain its liability, if any. Given claimants’ failure to provide any dates regarding their alleged injuries, defendant could not realistically differentiate between those injuries attributable to toxic exposure and those injuries attributable to other causes. We therefore conclude that claimants failed to adequately plead when the claims arose for purposes of Court of Claims Act § 11 (b). Consequently, the court properly dismissed the claims as jurisdictionally defective … . Matter of Geneva Foundry Litig., 2019 NY Slip Op 05271, Fourth Dept 6-28-19

 

, , ,

DEFENDANT DID NOT DEMONSTRATE AS A MATTER OF LAW THAT COKE OVENS USED IN THE MANUFACTURE OF STEEL WERE NOT PRODUCTS TRIGGERING THE DUTY TO WARN OF THE HAZARDS OF BREATHING EMISSIONS FROM THE OVENS, DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Stein, over a two-judge dissent, reversing the Appellate Division, determined the defendant (Wilputte), which sold coke ovens for steel production, did not demonstrate, as a matter of law, the ovens were not “products” triggering the duty to warn. Therefore defendant’s motion for summary judgment should not have been granted (by the Appellate Division). Plaintiff’s decedent worked on top of the coke ovens and alleged breathing the toxic substances caused lung cancer. Plaintiffs alleged defendant had a duty to warn plaintiff’s decedent to use a respirator when working on the ovens. The Appellate Division had determined the coke ovens, housed in so-called “batteries,” were akin to buildings and construction of the buildings was a service, not a product:

… [D]efendant has not met its burden in showing that the coke ovens at issue are not products as a matter of law. Regardless of the alterations Bethlehem [the steel manufacturer] may have made to the scale and specifications of the battery at large, the ovens themselves served one function: the production of coke. This process was standard across all variations of coke ovens that Wilputte sold, ultimately placing the hazardous thing at issue squarely within the category of products to which liability has attached in the failure-to-warn context. …

… Wilputte was responsible for placing the ovens into the stream of commerce and that it derived financial benefit from its role in the production process. Indeed, by the time decedent began working for Bethlehem, Wilputte had sold hundreds of coke ovens to plants … . Wilputte also marketed its ovens with informational brochures showing the completed ovens and their functionality, indicating that Wilputte, not Bethlehem, was the commercial source of the product. … Although the ovens were largely assembled and completed on-site, that merely speaks to the logistical realties of the market of which Wilputte had a considerable share. …

… [T]he record supports Supreme Court’s conclusion that Wilputte was in the best position to assess the safety of the coke ovens because of its superior knowledge regarding the ovens’ intended functionality … . “A major determinant of the existence of a duty to warn” is an assessment of “whether the manufacturer is in a superior position to know of and warn against those hazards” inherent to its product … . Matter of Eighth Jud. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 2019 NY Slip Op 04640, CtApp 6-11-19

 

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy