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CONDOMINIUM UNIT OWNERS’ AUTHORIZATION OF THE CONDOMINIUM BOARD TO CHALLENGE THE CONDOMINIUM’S REAL PROPERTY TAX ASSESSMENT REMAINS VALID FOR SUBSEQUENT TAX YEARS UNLESS CANCELED OR RETRACTED, THERE IS NO NEED FOR YEARLY AUTHORIZATIONS (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Fahey, over a two judge dissent, reversing the Appellate Division, determined that a condominium board of managers need only seek one authorization from condominium unit owners to challenge the condominium’s real property tax assessment  The authorization is deemed to remain in effect in subsequent tax years unless canceled or retracted:

This appeal presents the question whether Real Property Law § 339-y (4) requires a condominium board of managers to obtain a separate authorization from each condominium unit owner granting the board authority to proceed on behalf of that owner for each tax year in which the board challenges the condominium’s real property tax assessment. We conclude that section 339-y (4) allows a standing authorization issued by an owner to confer authority upon a board to act on behalf of that owner for the tax year in which that authorization was issued and in all subsequent tax years, unless such authorization is canceled or retracted. Matter of Eastbrooke Condominium v Ainsworth, 2019 NY Slip Op 02384, CtApp 3-28-19

 

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A TAX FORECLOSURE SALE OF THE SERVIENT ESTATE SUBSEQUENT TO THE PLAINTIFFS’ PURCHASE OF TITLE INSURANCE WAS NOT A TITLE DEFECT WHICH ENTITLED THE TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY, AS A MATTER OF LAW, TO DENY PLAINTIFFS’ CLAIM, THE CLAIM STEMMED FROM THE CONSTRUCTION OF A FENCE ACROSS AN EASEMENT ON THE SERVIENT ESTATE WHICH WAS THE ONLY ACCESS TO PLAINTIFFS’ PROPERTY (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined defendant title insurance company should not have been granted summary judgment supporting its denial of plaintiffs’ title insurance claim.  A fence had been constructed across an easement on the servient estate which blocked plaintiffs’ access to their property. Years after the title insurance was purchased and before the fence was constructed, the servient was the subject of a tax foreclosure and sale. The Second Department held that the tax sale was not a title defect which justified, as a matter of law, denial of the claim by the title insurance company:

… [P]laintiffs purchased a policy of title insurance from the defendant Old Republic National Title Insurance Company (hereinafter Old Republic), dated January 17, 2007. The policy specifically insured against losses or damages sustained as a result of the plaintiffs’ “[l]ack of a right of access to and from the land.” The policy excluded from coverage “[d]efects, liens, encumbrances, adverse claims, or other matters . . . attaching or created subsequent to Date of Policy.” …

Contrary to Old Republic’s contention, if the plaintiffs acquired a valid easement appurtenant from [plaintiffs’ predecessors in title] in 2007, such easement would not have been extinguished by the 2013 tax sale … . Thus, Old Republic’s contention that the 2013 tax sale constituted a defect, lien, encumbrance, adverse claim or other matter “attaching or created subsequent to Date of Policy” within the meaning of the relevant policy exclusion is without merit, and cannot serve to establish Old Republic’s prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. Buroker v Phillips, 2019 NY Slip Op 01386, Second Dept 2-27-19

 

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COVENANT TO BUILD A WALKWAY LINKING PARTS OF A RESIDENTIAL COMMUNITY RAN WITH THE LAND AND WAS THEREFORE ENFORCEABLE BY THE HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION AGAINST A SUBSEQUENT PURCHASER OF THE PROPERTY (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined that the plaintiff homeowners association (HOA) was entitled to enforce an agreement made with the prior owners of the residential community to construct a walkway linking the newly constructed area to the existing areas of the community. The walkway covenant was deemed to run with the land:

As stated by the Court of Appeals, “[i]n Neponsit [Neponsit Prop. Owners’ Assn. v Emigrant Indus. Sav. Bank, 278 NY 248] we articulated three conditions . . . that must be met in order for a covenant to run with the land: (1) it must appear that grantor and grantee intended that the covenant should run with the land; (2) it must appear that the covenant is one touching or concerning the land with which it runs; [and] (3) it must appear that there is privity of estate between the promisee or party claiming the benefit of the covenant and the right to enforce it, and the promisor or party who rests under the burden of the covenant” … . …

The contract entered into in 2000, and the 2002 Amendment, as well as the circumstances of the transaction, demonstrate that the grantor and grantee intended that the walkway covenant should run with the land, thus satisfying the first Neponsit condition … . Indeed, the walkway covenant was expressly deemed an “inducement” for the HOA to sell the property … . …

The second Neponsit condition, that the walkway covenant touches and concerns the land, is easily met here, since the walkway covenant requires construction of a walkway linking the property with the Bay Street Landing community, and construction of common amenities. Thus, it “directly affects the uses to which the land may be put and substantially affects its value” … .

The third Neponsit condition is satisfied by the undisputed facts establishing the requisite privity  … . Bay St. Landing Homeowners Assn., Inc. v Meadow Partners, LLC, 2019 NY Slip Op 01384, Second Dept 2-27-19

 

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CITY, AS THE OWNER OF THE MARINA WITH RIPARIAN RIGHTS, WAS ENTITLED TO EJECT DEFENDANTS WHO WERE USING AN INOPERABLE VESSEL AS A HOUSEBOAT DOCKED AT THE MARINA (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined that the city should have been granted summary judgment in this ejectment proceeding. The defendants were using an inoperable vessel as a houseboat docked at a city marina:

To demonstrate entitlement to judgment on a cause of action for ejectment, a plaintiff must establish “(1) it is the owner of an estate in tangible real property, (2) with a present or immediate right to possession thereof, and (3) the defendant is in present possession of the estate” … . “The owner of uplands on a tidal, navigable waterway possesses riparian rights” which include the right to build a pier, dock, or wharf … .

Here, the City established its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law with respect to its first cause of action, for ejectment, by demonstrating that it is the owner of the subject slip … , with a present or immediate right to possession thereof … , and that the defendants are in possession of that property. City of New York v Anton, 2019 NY Slip Op 01389, Second Dept 2-27-19

 

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INSURANCE LAW STATUTE AND RELATED REGULATIONS WHICH PROHIBIT REAL PROPERTY TITLE INSURANCE COMPANIES FROM PROVIDING SPORTS TICKETS, MEALS AND OTHER ENTERTAINMENT TO SOLICIT BUSINESS FROM THOSE WHO USE THEIR SERVICES ARE VALID AND ENFORCEABLE (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Singh, determined that Insurance Law 6409 (d) was not ambiguous and the related regulations promulgated by the Department of Financial Services (DFS), with two exceptions, were valid. The statute and regulations deal with real property title insurance companies and prohibit the companies from soliciting business by providing sports tickets, meals and other entertainment to those who can use their services, including attorneys:

Following the investigation, DFS determined that some practices that resulted in higher premiums and closing costs for consumers, violate Insurance Law § 6409(d). DFS found that “insurers reported meal and entertainment expenses in the following categories: advertising, marketing and promotion, and travel, and other'” (Statement of Maria T. Vullo, Superintendent New York State DFS, Prepared for Delivery at Public Hearing: An Examination of Recent Title Insurance Regulation in New York, January 12, 2018) and expenses reported in the “other” category were “replete with excessive entertainment,” often including “wining and dining . . . of real estate professionals” (id.). For example, one insurer spent approximately $2.5 million to $5.4 million a year, amounting to about 5% to 14% of its charged premiums, on tickets to basketball, baseball, and tennis events for attorneys and other clients in a position to refer business to the insurer (id.). Some insurers paid for their clients to go to bars, strip clubs, and Hooters restaurants (id.). Insurers paid for “expensive designer goods” and “gift cards” for referral sources (id.). One insurer spent about 15% to 30% of premiums on entertainment and gifts for referral sources. Another insurer spent about 50% of its revenue on meals for referral sources. Insurers would report these expenses in the information submitted to DFS to support the premiums they charged (id.).

As a result of its investigation, DFS estimated that, on average, 5.3% of premiums charged statewide violated Insurance Law § 6409(d) from 2008 to 2012. To prevent such practices and to protect consumers from exorbitant costs, DFS promulgated Insurance Regulation 208. Matter of New York State Land Tit. Assn., Inc. v New York State Dept. of Fin. Servs.. 2019 NY Slip Op 00245, First Dept 1-15-19

 

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SUPREME COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE, SUA SPONTE, SEARCHED THE RECORD AND ISSUED A DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ALLOWING PLANTIFFS TO PAVE AN EASEMENT (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined Supreme Court should not have, sua sponte, searched the record and issued a declaratory judgment allowing plaintiffs to pave an easement and further should not have granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment. Plaintiffs have an easement which allows access to their driveway. Plaintiffs alleged the easement needed to be paved because their vehicle would hit bottom crossing it:

A party’s right of passage over an easement carries with it the ” right to maintain it in a reasonable condition for such use’ “… . The right to repair and maintain an easement includes “the right to carry out work as necessary to reasonably permit the passage of vehicles and, in so doing, to not only remove impediments but supply deficiencies in order to construct [or repair] a suitable road’ “… . The right to repair and maintain, however, is “limited to those actions necessary to effectuate the express purpose of [the] easement’ ” … , and thus the work performed must not “materially increase the burden of the servient estate[] or impose new and additional burdens on the servient estate[]” … . Relatedly, the servient landowner has a “corresponding right[] to have the natural condition of the terrain preserved, as nearly as possible’ . . . and to insist that the easement enjoyed shall remain substantially as it was at the time it accrued, regardless of whether benefit or damage will result from a proposed change’ ” … . …

Defendant contends on his appeal that the court erred in searching the record and entering a declaratory judgment in plaintiffs’ favor. We agree. As an initial matter, although plaintiffs did not seek declaratory relief, the court has the authority to “grant any type of relief within its jurisdiction appropriate to the proof whether or not demanded, imposing such terms as may be just” (CPLR 3017 [a]…). We conclude, however, that the declaration was not appropriate given the evidence presented here. Tarsel v Trombino, 2018 NY Slip Op 08779, Fourth Dept 12-21-18

 

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QUESTIONS OF FACT PRECLUDED SUMMARY JUDGMENT WITH RESPECT TO THE ADVERSE POSSESSION ACTION AND THE LACHES DEFENSE, THE ACTION INVOLVED LAND THAT WAS ONCE UNDER WATER CREATED BY THE MOVEMENT OF SAND DURING STORMS DECADES AGO (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, modifying Supreme Court, determined there were questions of fact in this adverse possession case concerning who owned the land and when the adverse possession began. The land in question was once under water and was created by the movement of sand decades ago:

CPLR 212(a) provides that “[a]n action to recover real property or its possession cannot be commenced unless the plaintiff, or his [or her] predecessor in interest, was seized or possessed of the premises within ten years before the commencement of the action.” However, the 10-year limitations period does not begin to run against a record owner of property until the occupiers of the property begin to adversely possess it (see RPAPL 311…).

We disagree with the Supreme Court’s determination that the defendants are entitled to summary judgment dismissing the complaint … on the ground that the action was barred by the statute of limitations. Calculation of the date from which the statute of limitations began to run on the plaintiffs’ causes of action requires a threshold determination as to whether the plaintiffs are the record owners of the disputed land, and secondly, whether, and if so, when, the defendants began to adversely possess the land… . The defendants failed to conclusively establish that the plaintiffs are not the record owners of the disputed land for the purposes of determining a date upon which the statute of limitations began to run … . …

The defendants also failed to establish … that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law on their laches defense. “The essence of the equitable defense of laches is prejudicial delay in the assertion of rights” … . “In order for laches to apply to the failure of an owner of real property to assert his or her interest, it must be shown that [the] plaintiff inexcusably failed to act when [he or] she knew, or should have known, that there was a problem with [his or] her title to the property. In other words, for there to be laches, there must be present elements to create an equitable estoppel'” … .

Here, although the defendants established that the plaintiffs did not commence the action until a lengthy period of time after the alleged avulsive acts had occurred, the defendants failed to eliminate issues of fact as to whether the plaintiffs’ failure to act was excusable, whether the defendants were taking actions to adversely possess the disputed land, and whether and when the plaintiffs should reasonably have become aware of such alleged acts. Strough v Incorporated Vil. of W. Hampton Dunes, 2018 NY Slip Op 08525, Second Dept 12-12-18

 

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CRITERIA FOR INTERPRETING AN EXPRESS EASEMENT AND A PRESCRIPTIVE EASEMENT EXPLAINED, PARTY PROPERLY SANCTIONED FOR COUNSEL’S FILING AN AMENDED COMPLAINT DIFFERENT FROM THE COMPLAINT APPROVED BY THE COURT (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined that neither plaintiff nor defendants were entitled to summary judgment in this dispute over an plaintiff’s ingress and egress easement over defendants’ land. The court explained the criteria for interpretation of an express easement and a prescriptive easement. The court noted that plaintiff was properly sanctioned for her counsel’s conduct in filing an amended complaint which differed from the complaint approved by the court:

,,, [T]he plaintiff moved for summary judgment on the amended complaint, arguing, in effect, that the language of the express easement should be amended to include certain curves in the right of way that were necessary to permit utility and delivery trucks to access the plaintiff’s property. The plaintiff argued that she had obtained a prescriptive easement over the portions of the defendants’ property which underlaid the proposed curves. The defendants cross-moved for summary judgment declaring that the plaintiff was not entitled to an expansion of the easement, by prescription or otherwise. …

“Easements by express grant are construed to give effect to the parties’ intent, as manifested by the language of the grant” … . “The extent of an easement claimed under a grant is generally limited by the language of the grant, as a grantor may create an extensive or a limited easement”… . “Where, as here, an easement provides for the ingress and egress of motor vehicles, it is granted in general terms and the extent of its use includes any reasonable use necessary and convenient for the purpose for which it is created'” … .

“An easement by prescription may be demonstrated by clear and convincing proof of the adverse, open and notorious, continuous, and uninterrupted use of the subject property for the prescriptive period” … . DiDonato v Dyckman, 2018 NY Slip Op 08113, Second Dept 11-28-18

REAL PROPERTY LAW (EASEMENTS, CRITERIA FOR INTERPRETING AN EXPRESS EASEMENT AND A PRESCRIPTIVE EASEMENT EXPLAINED, PARTY PROPERLY SANCTIONED FOR COUNSEL’S FILING AN AMENDED COMPLAINT DIFFERENT FROM THE COMPLAINT APPROVED BY THE COURT (SECOND DEPT))/EXPRESS EASEMENTS ( CRITERIA FOR INTERPRETING AN EXPRESS EASEMENT AND A PRESCRIPTIVE EASEMENT EXPLAINED, PARTY PROPERLY SANCTIONED FOR COUNSEL’S FILING AN AMENDED COMPLAINT DIFFERENT FROM THE COMPLAINT APPROVED BY THE COURT (SECOND DEPT))/PRESCRIPTIVE EASEMENTS (CRITERIA FOR INTERPRETING AN EXPRESS EASEMENT AND A PRESCRIPTIVE EASEMENT EXPLAINED, PARTY PROPERLY SANCTIONED FOR COUNSEL’S FILING AN AMENDED COMPLAINT DIFFERENT FROM THE COMPLAINT APPROVED BY THE COURT (SECOND DEPT))/ATTORNEYS (SANCTIONS, ATTORNEY’S FEES, PARTY PROPERLY SANCTIONED FOR COUNSEL’S FILING AN AMENDED COMPLAINT DIFFERENT FROM THE COMPLAINT APPROVED BY THE COURT (SECOND DEPT))

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DECEDENT DIED INTESTATE, COTENANTS’ INTERESTS IN THE REAL PROPERTY VESTED UPON DEATH, COTENANTS COULD THEREFORE CONVEY THEIR INTERESTS IN THE PROPERTY, SURROGATE’S COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE SET ASIDE DEEDS (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department, reversing Surrogate’s Court, determined deeds executed by decedent’s cotenants should not have been set aside. Because decedent died intestate, the cotenants’ interests in the real property vested upon death and the cotenants could validly convey their interests in the property:

The Surrogate’s Court should not have granted those branches of the petition which sought to set aside the subject deeds and to determine that title to the subject property was vested in the decedent’s estate. When the decedent died intestate, title to the subject property automatically vested in her distributees as tenants in common … . “[W]hen a cotenant who has a partial interest in real property executes a deed that purports to convey full title to the property, the deed is not entirely void; rather, the deed is effective, but only to the extent of conveying the grantor’s interest in the property” … . Matter of Blango, 2018 NY Slip Op 07721, Second Dept 11-14-18

REAL PROPERTY LAW (DECEDENT DIED INTESTATE, COTENANTS’ INTERESTS IN THE REAL PROPERTY VESTED UPON DEATH, COTENANTS COULD THEREFORE CONVEY THEIR INTERESTS IN THE PROPERTY, SURROGATE’S COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE SET ASIDE DEEDS (SECOND DEPT))/TRUSTS AND ESTATES (REAL PROPERTY, COTENANTS, DECEDENT DIED INTESTATE, COTENANTS’ INTERESTS IN THE REAL PROPERTY VESTED UPON DEATH, COTENANTS COULD THEREFORE CONVEY THEIR INTERESTS IN THE PROPERTY, SURROGATE’S COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE SET ASIDE DEEDS (SECOND DEPT))/TENANTS IN COMMON (TRUSTS AND ESTATES, COTENANTS’ INTERESTS IN THE REAL PROPERTY VESTED UPON DEATH, COTENANTS COULD THEREFORE CONVEY THEIR INTERESTS IN THE PROPERTY, SURROGATE’S COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE SET ASIDE DEEDS (SECOND DEPT))/TRUSTS AND ESTATES (REAL PROPERTY LAW, COTENANTS’ INTERESTS IN THE REAL PROPERTY VESTED UPON DEATH, COTENANTS COULD THEREFORE CONVEY THEIR INTERESTS IN THE PROPERTY, SURROGATE’S COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE SET ASIDE DEEDS (SECOND DEPT))/DEEDS (TRUSTS AND ESTATES, TENANTS IN COMMON, COTENANTS’ INTERESTS IN THE REAL PROPERTY VESTED UPON DEATH, COTENANTS COULD THEREFORE CONVEY THEIR INTERESTS IN THE PROPERTY, SURROGATE’S COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE SET ASIDE DEEDS (SECOND DEPT))

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ALTHOUGH THE FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION (FERC) APPROVED THE GAS PIPELINE, THE STATE DID NOT ISSUE A WATER QUALITY CERTIFICATION (WQC) FOR THE PROJECT, THEREFORE THE PIPELINE COMPANY CAN NOT SEEK EASEMENTS OVER PRIVATE LAND PURSUANT TO THE EMINENT DOMAIN PROCEDURE LAW (EDPL) TO INSTALL THE PIPELINE (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice NeMoyer, over a two-justice dissent, considering a matter of first impression, reversing Supreme Court, determined that a gas supply company could not acquire easements over private property by eminent domain for the installation of a pipeline for which the state denied a permit:

In February 2017, the FERC [Federal Energy Regulatory Commission] granted petitioner’s application for a certificate of public convenience and necessity to construct and operate a 97-mile natural gas pipeline from Pennsylvania into western New York. The pipeline’s proposed route travels directly across respondents’ land … . Within the voluminous certificate, the FERC found that petitioner’s “proposed [pipeline] project is consistent with the Certificate Policy Statement,” i.e., the public interest. “Based on this finding and the environmental review for the proposed project,” the FERC further found “that the public convenience and necessity require approval and certification of the project.” …

… [T]he New York State Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC) denied petitioner’s application for a WQC [water quality certification]. The WQC application, held the DEC, “fails to demonstrate compliance with New York State water quality standards.” Petitioner has taken various steps to challenge the WQC denial, including the filing of a petition for judicial review in the Second Circuit pursuant to 15 USC § 717r (d). It appears that those challenges have not yet been finally resolved. It is undisputed, however, that if the WQC denial is ultimately upheld, the pipeline cannot be built … . * * *

… [P]etitioner is trying to expropriate respondents’ land in furtherance of a pipeline project that, as things currently stand, cannot legally be built. Such an effort turns the entire concept of eminent domain on its head. If the State’s WQC denial is finally annulled or withdrawn, then petitioner can file a new vesting petition. But until that time, petitioner cannot commence a vesting proceeding to force a sale without going through the entire EDPL [Eminent Domain Procedure Law] article 2 process. Matter of National Fuel Gas Supply Corp. v Schueckler, 2018 NY Slip Op 07550, Fourth Dept 11-9-18

UTILITIES (GAS PIPELINE INSTALLATION, ALTHOUGH THE FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION (FERC) APPROVED THE GAS PIPELINE, THE STATE DID NOT ISSUE A WATER QUALITY CERTIFICATION (WQC) FOR THE PROJECT, THEREFORE THE PIPELINE COMPANY CAN NOT SEEK EASEMENTS OVER PRIVATE LAND PURSUANT TO THE EMINENT DOMAIN PROCEDURE LAW (EDPL) TO INSTALL THE PIPELINE (FOURTH DEPT))/GAS PIPELINE (EMINENT DOMAIN, ALTHOUGH THE FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION (FERC) APPROVED THE GAS PIPELINE, THE STATE DID NOT ISSUE A WATER QUALITY CERTIFICATION (WQC) FOR THE PROJECT, THEREFORE THE PIPELINE COMPANY CAN NOT SEEK EASEMENTS OVER PRIVATE LAND PURSUANT TO THE EMINENT DOMAIN PROCEDURE LAW (EDPL) TO INSTALL THE PIPELINE (FOURTH DEPT))/REAL PROPERTY LAW (GAS PIPELINE, ALTHOUGH THE FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION (FERC) APPROVED THE GAS PIPELINE, THE STATE DID NOT ISSUE A WATER QUALITY CERTIFICATION (WQC) FOR THE PROJECT, THEREFORE THE PIPELINE COMPANY CAN NOT SEEK EASEMENTS OVER PRIVATE LAND PURSUANT TO THE EMINENT DOMAIN PROCEDURE LAW (EDPL) TO INSTALL THE PIPELINE (FOURTH DEPT))/EMINENT DOMAIN (GAS PIPELINE INSTALLATION, ALTHOUGH THE FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION (FERC) APPROVED THE GAS PIPELINE, THE STATE DID NOT ISSUE A WATER QUALITY CERTIFICATION (WQC) FOR THE PROJECT, THEREFORE THE PIPELINE COMPANY CAN NOT SEEK EASEMENTS OVER PRIVATE LAND PURSUANT TO THE EMINENT DOMAIN PROCEDURE LAW (EDPL) TO INSTALL THE PIPELINE (FOURTH DEPT))/ENVIRONMENTAL LAW  (GAS PIPELINE INSTALLATION, ALTHOUGH THE FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION (FERC) APPROVED THE GAS PIPELINE, THE STATE DID NOT ISSUE A WATER QUALITY CERTIFICATION (WQC) FOR THE PROJECT, THEREFORE THE PIPELINE COMPANY CAN NOT SEEK EASEMENTS OVER PRIVATE LAND PURSUANT TO THE EMINENT DOMAIN PROCEDURE LAW (EDPL) TO INSTALL THE PIPELINE (FOURTH DEPT))/GAS PIPELINE (EMINENT DOMAIN, ALTHOUGH THE FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION (FERC) APPROVED THE GAS PIPELINE, THE STATE DID NOT ISSUE A WATER QUALITY CERTIFICATION (WQC) FOR THE PROJECT, THEREFORE THE PIPELINE COMPANY CAN NOT SEEK EASEMENTS OVER PRIVATE LAND PURSUANT TO THE EMINENT DOMAIN PROCEDURE LAW (EDPL) TO INSTALL THE PIPELINE (FOURTH DEPT))

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