You are here: / Negligence
,

SCHOOL’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT PROPERLY DENIED IN THIS NEGLIGENT SUPERVISION ACTION BROUGHT BY INJURED STUDENT.

The Second Department determined the defendant school’s motion for summary judgment in this negligent supervision action was properly denied. The complaint alleged plaintiff’s fall was caused by students jumping up and down on a bridge:

… [T]he defendant, in support of its motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, failed to submit evidence sufficient to establish, prima facie, that it properly supervised the infant plaintiff or that its alleged negligent supervision was not a proximate cause of his injuries .. . J.M. v North Babylon Union Free Sch. Dist., 2016 NY Slip Op 08847, 2nd Dept 12-28-16

NEGLIGENCE (SCHOOL’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT PROPERLY DENIED IN THIS NEGLIGENT SUPERVISION ACTION BROUGHT BY INJURED STUDENT)/EDUCATION-SHOOL LAW (SCHOOL’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT PROPERLY DENIED IN THIS NEGLIGENT SUPERVISION ACTION BROUGHT BY INJURED STUDENT)

,

DESPITE THE EXPRESS EXCLUSION OF LIABILITY TO THIRD PARTIES IN THE CONTRACT BETWEEN DEFENDANT SECURITY COMPANY AND DEFENDANT THEATER, THE COMPLAINT ALLEGED A COMMON-LAW DUTY OWED BY THE SECURITY COMPANY TO PLAINTIFF, THE SECURITY COMPANY ALLEGEDLY DIRECTED PLAINTIFF TO RESTRAIN A NONPARTY WHO THEN ASSAULTED AND INJURED PLAINTIFF.

The Second Department determined defendant Arrow Security, a company under contract with defendant theater, Paramount, to provide security for patrons, was not entitled to a dismissal of the complaint. Plaintiff, an employee of Paramount, alleged he was instructed by Arrow to restrain a person, John Doe, who was in the rear alley of the theater premises. Plaintiff alleged he was beaten and injured by John Doe. The contract between Arrow and Paramount specifically stated the contract did not create a duty owed to third parties. However, the court concluded the complaint stated a claim for common-law negligence because it was alleged Arrow directed plaintiff to restrain John Doe:

… Arrow failed to conclusively establish that it owed no common-law duty to the plaintiff. To the contrary, the allegations in the complaint, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff … , set forth a cognizable legal theory under which Arrow could be found to have assumed a duty of care to the plaintiff by calling for and instructing him to investigate, restrain, and/or detain the intoxicated John Doe … . A duty of care may be assumed where a “defendant’s conduct placed plaintiff in a more vulnerable position than plaintiff would have been in had defendant done nothing” … , or where a defendant’s conduct “enhanced the risk that plaintiff faced, created a new risk or induced plaintiff to forego some opportunity to avoid risk” … . Garda v Paramount Theatre, LLC, 2016 NY Slip Op 08841, 2nd Dept 12-28-16

NEGLIGENCE (DESPITE THE EXPRESS EXCLUSION OF LIABILITY TO THIRD PARTIES IN THE CONTRACT BETWEEN DEFENDANT SECURITY COMPANY AND DEFENDANT THEATER, THE COMPLAINT ALLEGED A COMMON-LAW DUTY OWED BY THE SECURITY COMPANY TO PLAINTIFF, THE COMPLAINT ALLEGED THE SECURITY COMPANY DIRECTED PLAINTIFF TO RESTRAIN A NONPARTY WHO THEN ASSAULTED AND INJURED PLAINTIFF)/CONTRACT, TORT LIABILITY STEMMING FROM (DESPITE THE EXPRESS EXCLUSION OF LIABILITY TO THIRD PARTIES IN THE CONTRACT BETWEEN DEFENDANT SECURITY COMPANY AND DEFENDANT THEATER, THE COMPLAINT ALLEGED A COMMON-LAW DUTY OWED BY THE SECURITY COMPANY TO PLAINTIFF, THE COMPLAINT ALLEGED THE SECURITY COMPANY DIRECTED PLAINTIFF TO RESTRAIN A NONPARTY WHO THEN ASSAULTED AND INJURED PLAINTIFF)/ASSAULT (NEGLIGENCE, DESPITE THE EXPRESS EXCLUSION OF LIABILITY TO THIRD PARTIES IN THE CONTRACT BETWEEN DEFENDANT SECURITY COMPANY AND DEFENDANT THEATER, THE COMPLAINT ALLEGED A COMMON-LAW DUTY OWED BY THE SECURITY COMPANY TO PLAINTIFF, THE COMPLAINT ALLEGED THE SECURITY COMPANY DIRECTED PLAINTIFF TO RESTRAIN A NONPARTY WHO THEN ASSAULTED AND INJURED PLAINTIFF)/DUTY (NEGLIGENCE, DESPITE THE EXPRESS EXCLUSION OF LIABILITY TO THIRD PARTIES IN THE CONTRACT BETWEEN DEFENDANT SECURITY COMPANY AND DEFENDANT THEATER, THE COMPLAINT ALLEGED A COMMON-LAW DUTY OWED BY THE SECURITY COMPANY TO PLAINTIFF, THE COMPLAINT ALLEGED THE SECURITY COMPANY DIRECTED PLAINTIFF TO RESTRAIN A NONPARTY WHO THEN ASSAULTED AND INJURED PLAINTIFF)

DEFENDANT PROPERTY OWNER’S ACKNOWLEDGED AWARENESS OF THE SIDEWALK DEFECT IN THIS TRIP AND FALL CASE PRECLUDED SUMMARY JUDGMENT.

The Second Department determined the defendant abutting property owner’s motion for summary judgment in this sidewalk trip and fall action was properly denied. The court clearly explained the relationship between the applicable administrative code provision and the abutting property owners’ responsibility for maintaining a safe sidewalk. The plaintiff tripped over a raised sidewalk flag. The defendant’s own motion papers demonstrated he was aware of the defect for four years:

Section 7-210 of the Administrative Code of the City of New York (hereinafter the Administrative Code) imposes tort liability upon certain owners of real property, including the appellant, for injuries proximately caused by the failure of such owners to maintain the sidewalks abutting their property in a reasonably safe condition … . Section 7-210 of the Administrative Code does not, however, impose strict liability upon landowners for injuries arising from allegedly dangerous conditions on a sidewalk abutting their property … . Rather, the injured party has the obligation to prove the elements of negligence to demonstrate that the landowner is liable under this section of the Administrative Code … . Specifically, the injured party must establish (1) the existence of a duty on the landowner’s part as to the injured party, (2) a breach of this duty, and (3) a resulting injury to the injured party … . In support of a motion for summary judgment dismissing a cause of action pursuant to section 7-210 of the Administrative Code, the landowner has the initial burden of demonstrating, prima facie, that it neither created the hazardous condition nor had actual or constructive notice of its existence for a sufficient length of time to discover and remedy it … . Nisimova v City of New York, 2016 NY Slip Op 08875, 2nd Dept 12-28-16

NEGLIGENCE (DEFENDANT PROPERTY OWNER’S ACKNOWLEDGED AWARENESS OF THE SIDEWALK DEFECT IN THIS TRIP AND FALL CASE PRECLUDED SUMMARY JUDGMENT)/SIDEWALKS (DEFENDANT PROPERTY OWNER’S ACKNOWLEDGED AWARENESS OF THE SIDEWALK DEFECT IN THIS TRIP AND FALL CASE PRECLUDED SUMMARY JUDGMENT)/SLIP AND FALL (SIDEWALKS, (DEFENDANT PROPERTY OWNER’S ACKNOWLEDGED AWARENESS OF THE SIDEWALK DEFECT IN THIS TRIP AND FALL CASE PRECLUDED SUMMARY JUDGMENT)

ALTHOUGH PLAINTIFF HAD THE RIGHT OF WAY AND ALLEGED DEFENDANT FAILED TO STOP AT A STOP SIGN, SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS PROPERLY DENIED, PLAINTIFF DID NOT DEMONSTRATE FREEDOM FROM COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE.

The Second Department determined plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment in this vehicle-collision case was properly denied. Plaintiff had the right of way and alleged defendant did not stop at a stop sign. However, plaintiff did not demonstrate she was free from comparative fault:

… [T]he only evidence in admissible form submitted by the plaintiff in support of her motion was her own affidavit, in which she briefly alleged that the defendant driver had failed to stop at the stop sign governing traffic on Batchelder Street and yield to traffic on Avenue U. The plaintiff’s affidavit did not set forth other relevant circumstances, including the rate of speed at which she was traveling, where her vehicle was positioned when she allegedly observed the defendant driver fail to stop at the stop sign, and where her vehicle was positioned when the collision occurred. Accordingly, the plaintiff’s affidavit was insufficient to establish, prima facie, that the defendant driver’s alleged negligence was the sole proximate cause of the accident, and that she was free from comparative fault … . Kanfer v Wong, 2016 NY Slip Op 08851, 2nd Dept 12-28-16

NEGLIGENCE (ALTHOUGH PLAINTIFF HAD THE RIGHT OF WAY AND ALLEGED DEFENDANT FAILED TO STOP AT A STOP SIGN, SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS PROPERLY DENIED, PLAINTIFF DID NOT DEMONSTRATE FREEDOM FROM COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE)/COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE (VEHICLE COLLISION, ALTHOUGH PLAINTIFF HAD THE RIGHT OF WAY AND ALLEGED DEFENDANT FAILED TO STOP AT A STOP SIGN, SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS PROPERLY DENIED, PLAINTIFF DID NOT DEMONSTRATE FREEDOM FROM COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE)/ACCIDENTS, VEHICLE (ALTHOUGH PLAINTIFF HAD THE RIGHT OF WAY AND ALLEGED DEFENDANT FAILED TO STOP AT A STOP SIGN, SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS PROPERLY DENIED, PLAINTIFF DID NOT DEMONSTRATE FREEDOM FROM COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE)/SUMMARY JUDGMENT (VEHICLE ACCIDENTS, ALTHOUGH PLAINTIFF HAD THE RIGHT OF WAY AND ALLEGED DEFENDANT FAILED TO STOP AT A STOP SIGN, SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS PROPERLY DENIED, PLAINTIFF DID NOT DEMONSTRATE FREEDOM FROM COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE)

,

ALTHOUGH THE HOSPITAL WAS NOT LIABLE IN ORDINARY NEGLIGENCE FOR RELEASING PLAINTIFF AND NOT ENSURING A SAFE RETURN HOME, THE COMPLAINT STATED A CAUSE OF ACTION IN MEDICAL MALPRACTICE.

The Fourth Department, over a dissent, determined the motion to dismiss the medical malpractice cause of action was properly denied. The negligence cause of action against the hospital stemming from the same facts had previously been dismissed. Plaintiff was released from the hospital and found two hours later, disoriented and frost-bitten. The hospital, in the negligence cause of action, was found to have no duty to prevent plaintiff from leaving the hospital against medical advice and no duty to ensure plaintiff’s safe return home. However, allegations that the assessment plaintiff’s medical and mental status and the discharge of plaintiff from the hospital were not in accordance with good and accepted medical practice stated a cause of action in medical malpractice:

Although “no rigid analytical line separates the two” … , we have long recognized the distinction between an ordinary negligence cause of action against a hospital and/or a physician … and a medical malpractice cause of action against a hospital and/or a physician … . We note that there is no prohibition against simultaneously pleading both an ordinary negligence cause of action and one sounding in medical malpractice … . It is simply beyond cavil “that an action for personal injuries may be maintained, in the proper case, on the dual theories of medical malpractice or simple negligence where a person is under the care and control of a medical practitioner or a medical facility” … . Moreover, in a proper case, both theories may be presented to the jury … .

Here, the medical malpractice cause of action alleges, inter alia, that defendant did not properly assess plaintiff’s medical and mental status and rendered medical care that was not in accordance with good and accepted medical practice, and that the discharge of plaintiff was not in accordance with good and accepted medical practices. Ingutti v Rochester Gen. Hosp., 2016 NY Slip Op 08615, 4th Dept 12-23-16

NEGLIGENCE (MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, ALTHOUGH THE HOSPITAL WAS NOT LIABLE IN ORDINARY NEGLIGENCE FOR RELEASING PLAINTIFF AND NOT ENSURING A SAFE RETURN HOME, THE COMPLAINT STATED A CAUSE OF ACTION IN MEDICAL MALPRACTICE)/MEDICAL MALPRACTICE (ALTHOUGH THE HOSPITAL WAS NOT LIABLE IN ORDINARY NEGLIGENCE FOR RELEASING PLAINTIFF AND NOT ENSURING A SAFE RETURN HOME, THE COMPLAINT STATED A CAUSE OF ACTION IN MEDICAL MALPRACTICE)

GOLFER ASSUMED THE RISK OF LOSING CONTROL OF HER GOLF CART ON A WET SLOPE.

The Fourth Department determined plaintiff had assumed the risk of losing control of her golf cart on a steep slope:

… [D]efendants established on the motion that plaintiff was an experienced golfer who had played that hole and driven that cart path several times previously. Apart from her familiarity with the steep topography of the hole, plaintiff was aware that it had rained the night before and that the course was still wet that morning. She had driven her golf cart on that cart path just moments before her accident, and further had observed the leaves and berries on the cart path as she began down the cart path. It is common knowledge that leaves and other natural litter may be present on a golf course and that such litter may become slick when it is wet … . For those reasons, we conclude that plaintiff was aware of the risk posed by the cart path and assumed it … . Kirby v Drumlins, Inc., 2016 NY Slip Op 08709, 4th Dept 12-23-16

NEGLIGENCE (GOLFER ASSUMED THE RISK OF LOSING CONTROL OF HER GOLF CART ON A WET SLOPE)/GOLF CARTS (GOLFER ASSUMED THE RISK OF LOSING CONTROL OF HER GOLF CART ON A WET SLOPE)/ASSUMPTION OF THE RISK (GOLFER ASSUMED THE RISK OF LOSING CONTROL OF HER GOLF CART ON A WET SLOPE)

INJURY FROM DIVING INTO THE SHALLOW END OF A POOL NOT ACTIONABLE.

The Fourth Department determined plaintiff’s injury from diving into the shallow end of a pool was not actionable:

It is well established that “[s]ummary judgment is an appropriate remedy in swimming pool injury cases when from his general knowledge of pools, his observations prior to the accident, and plain common sense’ . . . , the plaintiff should have known that, if he dove into the pool, the area into which he dove contained shallow water and, thus, posed a danger of injury” … . In light of that standard, we conclude that defendant met her burden on the motion, and that plaintiff failed to raise an issue of fact … . The record establishes that plaintiff lived on the same street as defendant, swam in the subject pool multiple times prior to the accident, was aware that striking the bottom of a pool was a risk when diving into the shallow end of the pool, and acknowledged that he knew the depth dimensions of defendant’s pool, i.e., where the shallow end started and ended. Under those circumstances, we conclude that plaintiff’s reckless conduct was the sole proximate cause of his injuries … . Furthermore, even assuming, arguendo, that defendant was negligent in failing to provide a “safety float line separating the shallow and deep end of [her] pool, [we conclude that] even the most liberal interpretation of the record eliminates any cause of this accident other than the reckless conduct of plaintiff” … . Brady v Domino, 2016 NY Slip Op 08687, 4th Dept 12-23-16

NEGLIGENCE (INJURY FROM DIVING INTO THE SHALLOW END OF A POOL NOT ACTIONABLE)/SWIMMING POOLS (INJURY FROM DIVING INTO THE SHALLOW END OF A POOL NOT ACTIONABLE)/DIVING (INJURY FROM DIVING INTO THE SHALLOW END OF A POOL NOT ACTIONABLE)/SOLE PROXIMATE CAUSE (INJURY FROM DIVING INTO THE SHALLOW END OF A POOL NOT ACTIONABLE)

, ,

PLAINTIFF NEED NOT ELIMINATE ALL OTHER POSSIBLE CAUSES OF INJURY TO MAKE OUT A PRIMA FACIE CASE OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, MOTION FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED.

The Third Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Peters, determined certain causes of action in this medical malpractice suit should have been allowed to go to the jury. Defendant’s motion for a directed verdict should not have been granted. Most of the opinion is fact-generated and cannot be summarized here. The law surrounding a directed verdict in this context, including the applicability of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, was explained. A plaintiff is not required to eliminate all other possible causes of injury to make out a prima facie case:

A directed verdict is only appropriate “when, viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the nonmoving part[y] and affording such part[y] the benefit of every inference, there is no rational process by which a jury could find in favor of the nonmovant[]” … . “[A] plaintiff asserting a medical malpractice claim must demonstrate that the doctor deviated from acceptable medical practice, and that such deviation was a proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injury” … . “[T]o establish proximate causation, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant’s deviation from the standard of care was a substantial factor in bringing about the injury” … . A plaintiff in a medical malpractice action may also rely on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur … , which “permits the jury to infer negligence and causation sufficient to establish a prima facie case based on circumstantial evidence” … . “Notably, a plaintiff is not required to eliminate all other possible causes of the injury in order to establish a prima facie case” of medical malpractice … . * * *

“Whether or not res ipsa loquitur was applicable here, plaintiff presented sufficient evidence of negligence to go to the jury” on two of her three theories of liability … . Upon the evidence submitted, Supreme Court properly rejected plaintiff’s first theory of liability as a matter of law at the close of plaintiff’s proof, yet provided no explanation for dismissing the entire complaint, and we can perceive none under the circumstances of this case given the existence of two viable and independent theories of liability that were supported by sufficient trial proof … . Majid v Cheon-Lee, 2016 NY Slip Op 08572, 3rd Dept 12-22-16

 

NEGLIGENCE (PLAINTIFF NEED NOT ELIMINATE ALL OTHER POSSIBLE CAUSES OF INJURY TO MAKE OUT A PRIMA FACIE CASE OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, MOTION FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED)/MEDICAL MALPRACTICE (PLAINTIFF NEED NOT ELIMINATE ALL OTHER POSSIBLE CAUSES OF INJURY TO MAKE OUT A PRIMA FACIE CASE OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, MOTION FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED)/CIVIL PROCEDURE (DIRECTED VERDICT, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, PLAINTIFF NEED NOT ELIMINATE ALL OTHER POSSIBLE CAUSES OF INJURY TO MAKE OUT A PRIMA FACIE CASE OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, MOTION FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED)/DIRECTED VERDICT (MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, PLAINTIFF NEED NOT ELIMINATE ALL OTHER POSSIBLE CAUSES OF INJURY TO MAKE OUT A PRIMA FACIE CASE OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, MOTION FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED)

,

QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER ALLOWING A CALF TO ESCAPE FROM A FARM WAS A PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE DEATH OF A MOTORIST WHO STOPPED TO HELP THE CALF AND WAS STRUCK.

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Stein, reversing the appellate division, determined the proximate cause of the accident presented a jury question. Defendants own a farm from which a calf, born that day, escaped. Plaintiff’s decedent saw the calf in the roadway, stopped her car and got out to help the calf. She was then struck by a vehicle and killed. The appellate division held that the escaped calf created a condition for the accident, but was not a proximate cause of the accident. The Court of Appeals reviewed the case law addressing when an intervening act severs the causal connection and held that, under these facts, proximate cause presented a jury question:

The very same risk that rendered negligent the Farm’s alleged failure to restrain or retrieve its farm animal — namely, that the wandering calf would enter a roadway and cause a collision — was, in fact, the risk that came to fruition … . That the Farm could not predict the exact manner in which the calf would cause injury to a motorist does not preclude liability because the general risk and character of injuries was foreseeable … . … Thus, we cannot say, as a matter of law, that the Farm’s negligence merely furnished the occasion for the collision or that the accident resulting in decedent’s death did not flow from the Farm’s negligent conduct in permitting its calf to stray.

A factfinder could reasonably conclude that decedent’s actions in exiting her vehicle and entering the roadway were an entirely “‘normal or foreseeable consequence of the situation created by the defendant’s negligence'” … . In Hastings v Sauve, we held that a property owner may be liable under ordinary principles of tort law when he or she, through negligent acts or omissions, allows a farm animal — specifically, a domestic animal as defined in Agriculture and Markets Law § 108 (7) — to stray from the property on which the animal is kept (see 21 NY3d at 125-126). …  Thus, a jury could reasonably conclude that it is foreseeable that a motorist who encounters such an animal on a rural roadway would attempt to remove the animal from the thoroughfare. Such conduct cannot, as a matter of law, be considered so “extraordinary under the circumstances, not foreseeable in the normal course of events, or independent of or far removed from the defendant’s conduct,” that it breaks the chain of causation … . Hain v Jamison, 2016 NY Slip Op 08583, CtApp 12-22-16

NEGLIGENCE (QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER ALLOWING A CALF TO ESCAPE FROM A FARM WAS A PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE DEATH OF A MOTORIST WHO STOPPED TO HELP THE CALF AND WAS STRUCK)/ANIMAL LAW (QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER ALLOWING A CALF TO ESCAPE FROM A FARM WAS A PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE DEATH OF A MOTORIST WHO STOPPED TO HELP THE CALF AND WAS STRUCK)/PROXIMATE CAUSE (QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER ALLOWING A CALF TO ESCAPE FROM A FARM WAS A PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE DEATH OF A MOTORIST WHO STOPPED TO HELP THE CALF AND WAS STRUCK)/INTERVENING CAUSE (QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER ALLOWING A CALF TO ESCAPE FROM A FARM WAS A PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE DEATH OF A MOTORIST WHO STOPPED TO HELP THE CALF AND WAS STRUCK)/CONDITION VERSUS PROXIMATE CAUSE (QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER ALLOWING A CALF TO ESCAPE FROM A FARM WAS A PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE DEATH OF A MOTORIST WHO STOPPED TO HELP THE CALF AND WAS STRUCK)/FORESEEABILITY (QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER ALLOWING A CALF TO ESCAPE FROM A FARM WAS A PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE DEATH OF A MOTORIST WHO STOPPED TO HELP THE CALF AND WAS STRUCK)

,

MOTHER CAN NOT RECOVER FOR EMOTIONAL DISTRESS CAUSED BY IN UTERO INJURY WHEN THE BABY IS BORN ALIVE.

The Second Department determined mother could not recover for emotional distress based upon alleged in utero medical malpractice when the baby is born alive. Here the baby was born alive but not conscious and died eight days later:

When an infant who is injured by medical malpractice while in utero survives the pregnancy, the infant may seek damages for his or her injuries … . If the pregnant mother suffers an independent injury as a result of malpractice, she may commence suit to recover for her own personal injuries … . If the malpractice causes a stillbirth or miscarriage, the mother can recover for emotional injuries even without showing that she suffered an independent physical injury … . However, where, as here, the alleged medical malpractice causes in utero injury to a fetus that is born alive, the mother cannot recover damages for emotional harm … . Ward v Safajou, 2016 NY Slip Op 08394, 2nd Dept 12-14-16

NEGLIGENCE (MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, MOTHER CAN NOT RECOVER FOR EMOTIONAL DISTRESS CAUSED BY IN UTERO INJURY WHEN THE BABY IS BORN ALIVE)/MEDICAL MALPRACTICE (MOTHER CAN NOT RECOVER FOR EMOTIONAL DISTRESS CAUSED BY IN UTERO INJURY WHEN THE BABY IS BORN ALIVE)/IN UTERO INJURY (MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, MOTHER CAN NOT RECOVER FOR EMOTIONAL DISTRESS CAUSED BY IN UTERO INJURY WHEN THE BABY IS BORN ALIVE)/EMOTIONAL DISTRESS (MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, MOTHER CAN NOT RECOVER FOR EMOTIONAL DISTRESS CAUSED BY IN UTERO INJURY WHEN THE BABY IS BORN ALIVE)

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy