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MOTION TO STRIKE SCHOOL’S ANSWER FOR SPOLIATION OF EVIDENCE PROPERLY DENIED, SCHOOL’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS NEGLIGENT SUPERVISION ACTION PROPERLY GRANTED, PLAINTIFF WAS INJURED BY ANOTHER STUDENT (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined Supreme Court properly granted defendant board of education's motion for summary judgment in this student-on-student assault case. In addition, Supreme Court properly denied plaintiff's motion to strike the answer based upon spoliation of evidence (a video):

The complaint alleges that L.F., an infant, sustained injuries when he was picked up and dropped on his head by a fellow student at Mount Vernon High School. The plaintiff, suing individually and as the parent and natural guardian of L.F., commenced this action against the defendant, Mount Vernon Board of Education, to recover damages for personal injuries, alleging that it failed to provide adequate supervision. * * *

… [A] video recording which captured the incident from a distance could not be located after it had been viewed by the plaintiff, the police, and school administrators. According to the Principal of Mount Vernon High School, he did not know when the video disappeared but he asserted that its disappearance was accidental and a search had been conducted to locate it. Under these circumstances, where the defendant lost the video recording after having provided it for viewing to the plaintiff and others, the plaintiff would still be able to establish her case at trial despite the absence of the video. * * *

The defendant submitted evidence that L.F. and the other student had no previous interaction and that the other student's prior disciplinary record did not include any violent act, thereby establishing that the defendant had no specific knowledge or notice of any prior conduct such that L.F.'s alleged assault … could reasonably have been anticipated … . Francis v Mount Vernon Bd. of Educ., 2018 NY Slip Op 05916, Second Dept 8-29-18

NEGLIGENCE (MOTION TO STRIKE SCHOOL'S ANSWER FOR SPOLIATION OF EVIDENCE PROPERLY DENIED, SCHOOL'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS NEGLIGENT SUPERVISION ACTION PROPERLY GRANTED, PLAINTIFF WAS INJURED BY ANOTHER STUDENT (SECOND DEPT))/EVIDENCE (NEGLIGENCE, SPOLIATION, MOTION TO STRIKE SCHOOL'S ANSWER FOR SPOLIATION OF EVIDENCE PROPERLY DENIED, SCHOOL'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS NEGLIGENT SUPERVISION ACTION PROPERLY GRANTED, PLAINTIFF WAS INJURED BY ANOTHER STUDENT (SECOND DEPT))/NEGLIGENT SUPERVISION (EDUCATION-SCHOOL LAW, MOTION TO STRIKE SCHOOL'S ANSWER FOR SPOLIATION OF EVIDENCE PROPERLY DENIED, SCHOOL'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS NEGLIGENT SUPERVISION ACTION PROPERLY GRANTED, PLAINTIFF WAS INJURED BY ANOTHER STUDENT (SECOND DEPT))/ASSAULT, LIABILITY IN NEGLIGENCE (EDUCATION-SCHOOL LAW, MOTION TO STRIKE SCHOOL'S ANSWER FOR SPOLIATION OF EVIDENCE PROPERLY DENIED, SCHOOL'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS NEGLIGENT SUPERVISION ACTION PROPERLY GRANTED, PLAINTIFF WAS INJURED BY ANOTHER STUDENT (SECOND DEPT))/EDUCATION-SCHOOL LAW (NEGLIGENT SUPERVISION, MOTION TO STRIKE SCHOOL'S ANSWER FOR SPOLIATION OF EVIDENCE PROPERLY DENIED, SCHOOL'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS NEGLIGENT SUPERVISION ACTION PROPERLY GRANTED, PLAINTIFF WAS INJURED BY ANOTHER STUDENT (SECOND DEPT))

NO ONE WITNESSED FOUR-YEAR-OLD’S INJURY, DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT PROPERLY GRANTED, PLAINTIFFS COULD NOT IDENTIFY THE CAUSE OF THE INJURY, INFANT PLAINTIFF SAID SHE WAS INJURED ON AN INFLATABLE SLIDE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined defendant property-owner's motion for summary judgment in the inflatable-slide injury case was properly granted:

The plaintiff's daughter allegedly was injured as she slid down an inflatable slide at a facility owned and operated by the defendant Live, Play and Bounce Corp. (hereinafter the defendant). Although both of her parents were present when the accident allegedly occurred, neither witnessed it. The child, four years old at the time, came to her mother crying, and reporting that she fell and hurt her arm while on a slide. The plaintiff commenced this action to recover damages for personal injuries on behalf of her daughter. …

Based on the deposition testimony of the child's parents, the defendant established its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law dismissing the complaint by demonstrating that the plaintiff was unable to identify the cause of the child's accident … . Harris v Live, Play & Bounce Corp., 2018 NY Slip Op 05918, Second Dept 8-29-18

NEGLIGENCE (NO ONE WITNESSED FOUR-YEAR-OLD'S INJURY, DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT PROPERLY GRANTED, PLAINTIFFS COULD NOT IDENTIFY THE CAUSE OF THE INJURY, INFANT PLAINTIFF SAID SHE WAS INJURED ON AN INFLATABLE SLIDE (SECOND DEPT))/INFLATABLE SLIDE (NEGLIGENCE, NO ONE WITNESSED FOUR-YEAR-OLD'S INJURY, DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT PROPERLY GRANTED, PLAINTIFFS COULD NOT IDENTIFY THE CAUSE OF THE INJURY, INFANT PLAINTIFF SAID SHE WAS INJURED ON AN INFLATABLE SLIDE (SECOND DEPT))

ABUTTING PROPERTY OWNER NOT LIABLE FOR HOLE IN BRICKWORK PUBLIC SIDEWALK IN THIS SLIP AND FALL CASE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined the abutting property-owner's summary judgment motion in this sidewalk slip and fall case was properly granted. There was no statute or ordinance which imposed liability and the defendant demonstrated it did not create the defect and did not cause the defect by a special use. The defendant owned a cafe and had tables near, but not on, the sidewalk:

The plaintiff allegedly sustained injuries when she tripped and fell after stepping into a hole in the brickwork portion of a public sidewalk … .

… [T]he Cafe demonstrated its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by establishing that it did not create the alleged defect in the brickwork, did not cause the alleged defect to occur because of a special use, and did not violate a statute or ordinance that would impose liability for failing to maintain the sidewalk. Moreover, the Cafe demonstrated, prima facie, that the placement of outdoor tables and chairs on the cement portion of the public sidewalk abutting the storefront was not a proximate cause of the plaintiff's alleged injuries … . Finocchiaro v Town of Islip, 2018 NY Slip Op 05915, Second Dept 8-29-18

NEGLIGENCE (ABUTTING PROPERTY OWNER NOT LIABLE FOR HOLE IN BRICKWORK PUBLIC SIDEWALK IN THIS SLIP AND FALL CASE (SECOND DEPT))/SLIP AND FALL (ABUTTING PROPERTY OWNER NOT LIABLE FOR HOLE IN BRICKWORK PUBLIC SIDEWALK IN THIS SLIP AND FALL CASE (SECOND DEPT))

QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER LOCATION OF THE DOORWAY AND THE STAIRWAY PILLAR, WHICH WAS OPEN AND OBVIOUS, WAS AN INHERENTLY DANGEROUS CONDITION, DEFENDANT PROPERTY OWNER’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the defendant property-owner's motion for summary judgment in this slip and fall case should not have been granted. Although the pillar of an exterior stairway (which allegedly caused plaintiff to trip) was open and obvious, there was a question of fact whether the location of the pillar and the exit door created an inherently dangerous condition:

The accident occurred after the injured plaintiff exited the building through a door located next to an opening between the door and the railing. The opening was at the top of the staircase and provided access to the steps descending from the landing. According to the injured plaintiff, the opening was less than two feet wide. When the door was completely open, it blocked the opening leading to the stairs. The injured plaintiff testified at her deposition that she was attempting to reach the opening to access the steps when her left foot hit the pillar of the railing, causing her to fall. * * *

… [t]he defendant failed to establish, prima facie, that it maintained its premises in a reasonably safe condition. Thus, the Supreme Court should have denied the defendant's motion regardless of the sufficiency of the plaintiffs' opposition papers … . Contrary to the defendant's contention, it cannot be said as a matter of law that the metal railing, which was open and obvious, was not inherently dangerous given its location within the accident site … . The defendant also failed to establish, prima facie, that it did not have notice of the alleged dangerous condition … . Dudnik v 1055 Hylan Offs., LLC, 2018 NY Slip Op 05914, Second Dept 8-29-18

NEGLIGENCE (QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER LOCATION OF THE DOORWAY AND THE STAIRWAY PILLAR, WHICH WAS OPEN AND OBVIOUS, WAS AN INHERENTLY DANGEROUS CONDITION, DEFENDANT PROPERTY OWNER'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT))/SLIP AND FALL (QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER LOCATION OF THE DOORWAY AND THE STAIRWAY PILLAR, WHICH WAS OPEN AND OBVIOUS, WAS AN INHERENTLY DANGEROUS CONDITION, DEFENDANT PROPERTY OWNER'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT))

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ALTHOUGH PLAINTIFF TURNED RIGHT INTO DEFENDANT DRIVER’S PATH AT AN INTERSECTION, DEFENDANT DRIVER DID NOT DEMONSTRATE FREEDOM FROM FAULT AND DEFENDANT TOWN DID NOT DEMONSTRATE FOLIAGE OBSTRUCTING A STOP SIGN DID NOT CONTRIBUTE TO THE ACCIDENT, DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendant driver and municipality's motions for summary judgment in this intersection accident case should not have been granted. Apparently plaintiff made a right turn at an intersection into the path of defendant driver, Ayers. According to Ayers, plaintiff did not stop at the stop sign before turning. Plaintiff alleged foliage obscured the stop sign:

The driver defendants failed to eliminate triable issues of fact as to whether Ayers contributed to the happening of the accident. In particular, Ayers testified at his deposition that he was traveling 40 miles per hour as he approached the intersection, and that although nothing obstructed his view of the intersection, he did not see the plaintiff's vehicle until he was one car length from the intersection. Further, Ayers could not say whether he took any evasive action to avoid the collision. Under the circumstances, it cannot be said as a matter of law that Ayers used reasonable care to avoid the accident … ….

Contrary to the Town's contention, there is evidence in the record that the foliage which allegedly obscured the stop sign was located within the right-of-way of a Town road. …

The Town further failed to eliminate triable issues of fact as to whether any such obstruction of the stop sign was a proximate cause of the accident. “Such proximate cause may be found only where it is shown that it was the very [obstruction] of the stop sign . . . which rendered the driver[ ] unaware of the need to stop before proceeding across the intersection'”… . Where the driver “had all the warning, all the notice of danger, that a stop sign would have afforded,” there is no basis for finding that the obstruction of a sign caused the driver “to do anything other than [he or] she would have done had it been present” … .

The Town failed to demonstrate, prima facie, that despite the obstructed stop sign, the plaintiff, who was lost in an unfamiliar area, “had all the warning, all the notice of danger, that a stop sign would have afforded”… . In particular, the Town presented no definitive evidence of either the plaintiff's knowledge of the need to stop at the intersection, or conditions necessitating that she bring her vehicle to a complete stop prior to entering the intersection. Viewing the record evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and resolving all reasonable inferences in her favor … , the Town failed to eliminate issues of fact as to whether the obstruction of the stop sign contributed, to some degree, to the happening of the accident. Rivera v Town of Wappinger, 2018 NY Slip Op 05953, Second Dept 8-29-18

NEGLIGENCE (ALTHOUGH PLAINTIFF TURNED RIGHT INTO DEFENDANT DRIVER'S PATH AT AN INTERSECTION, DEFENDANT DRIVER DID NOT DEMONSTRATE FREEDOM FROM FAULT AND DEFENDANT TOWN DID NOT DEMONSTRATE FOLIAGE OBSTRUCTING A STOP SIGN DID NOT CONTRIBUTE TO THE ACCIDENT, DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT))/TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS (ALTHOUGH PLAINTIFF TURNED RIGHT INTO DEFENDANT DRIVER'S PATH AT AN INTERSECTION, DEFENDANT DRIVER DID NOT DEMONSTRATE FREEDOM FROM FAULT AND DEFENDANT TOWN DID NOT DEMONSTRATE FOLIAGE OBSTRUCTING A STOP SIGN DID NOT CONTRIBUTE TO THE ACCIDENT, DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT))/MUNICIPAL LAW (TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS, ALTHOUGH PLAINTIFF TURNED RIGHT INTO DEFENDANT DRIVER'S PATH AT AN INTERSECTION, DEFENDANT DRIVER DID NOT DEMONSTRATE FREEDOM FROM FAULT AND DEFENDANT TOWN DID NOT DEMONSTRATE FOLIAGE OBSTRUCTING A STOP SIGN DID NOT CONTRIBUTE TO THE ACCIDENT, DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT))

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CITY DEMONSTRATED IT DID NOT HAVE PRIOR WRITTEN NOTICE OF A POTHOLE WHICH PLAINTIFF BICYCLIST RAN OVER, DEFENDANTS’ SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

​The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff bicyclist's suit against the city stemming from injury after running over a pothole should have been dismissed. The defendants established the city did not have prior written notice of the condition:

… [T]he defendants established the City's prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by demonstrating through, inter alia, DOT records, that the City did not have prior written notice of the condition alleged as required by the Administrative Code … and that the City did not affirmatively create the condition … . In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether the City received prior written notice of the alleged condition. Although the plaintiff relied upon a map submitted by the Big Apple Pothole and Sidewalk Protection Corporation which had a straight line, indicating “[r]aised or uneven portion of sidewalk,” in the area where the plaintiff's accident occurred, the map did not give the City prior written notice of the pothole condition alleged by the plaintiff … . The plaintiff also failed to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether the City created the alleged condition through an affirmative act of negligence. Allen v City of New York, 2018 NY Slip Op 05811, Second Dept 8-22-18

NEGLIGENCE (MUNICIPAL LAW, CITY DEMONSTRATED IT DID NOT HAVE PRIOR WRITTEN NOTICE OF A POTHOLE WHICH PLAINTIFF BICYCLIST RAN OVER, DEFENDANTS' SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT))/MUNICIPAL LAW (NEGLIGENCE, CITY DEMONSTRATED IT DID NOT HAVE PRIOR WRITTEN NOTICE OF A POTHOLE WHICH PLAINTIFF BICYCLIST RAN OVER, DEFENDANTS' SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT))/BICYCLISTS (NEGLIGENCE, MUNICIPAL LAW, CITY DEMONSTRATED IT DID NOT HAVE PRIOR WRITTEN NOTICE OF A POTHOLE WHICH PLAINTIFF BICYCLIST RAN OVER, DEFENDANTS' SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT))/POTHOLES (NEGLIGENCE, MUNICIPAL LAW, CITY DEMONSTRATED IT DID NOT HAVE PRIOR WRITTEN NOTICE OF A POTHOLE WHICH PLAINTIFF BICYCLIST RAN OVER, DEFENDANTS' SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT))

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DEFENDANT WHICH BUILT THE SWIMMING POOL, DEFENDANT WHICH INSTALLED THE POOL LINER, AND DEFENDANT OWNERS OF THE POOL, WERE NOT ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS SWIMMING POOL INJURY CASE, PLAINTIFF WAS INJURED WHEN HE DOVE IN AND STRUCK HIS CHIN IN A SHALLOW AREA (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined defendants' motions for summary judgment in this swimming pool injury case was properly denied. Plaintiff was injured when he dove into the pool allegedly unaware of a shallow area near the deep area. The builder of the pool and the installer of the pool liner (the Bertolino defendants), as well as the owners of the pool (the Olsen defendants), were sued.  The Bertolino defendants could be liable based upon their contracts with the owners because it was alleged the pool was negligently designed and constructed by them. There also was a question of fact whether the condition was readily observable (raising the duty to protect or warn on the part of the owners):

With respect to the Bertolino defendants, generally, a contractual obligation of a third party does not give rise to liability in tort to persons not a party to the contract… . An exception exists, however, where the contractor created a dangerous condition or increased the risk of harm to others in its undertaking … . Here, the plaintiff's allegation that the Bertolino defendants negligently designed and constructed the subject pool by incorporating the allegedly dangerous condition falls within this exception … . Moreover, the Bertolino defendants failed to establish, prima facie, that the alleged condition was not dangerous or that it did not unreasonably increase the risk of harm to those diving off the side of the pool, even though, as their expert opined, it was located outside the “diving water envelope,” which the expert described as the “area without constructed intrusions” … . …

As to the Olsen defendants, “[t]he owner of a private residential swimming pool has a duty to maintain the pool in a reasonably safe condition in view of all the circumstances, including the likelihood of injury to others, the seriousness of the injury and the burden of avoiding the risk” … . “What accidents are reasonably foreseeable, and what preventive measures should reasonably be taken, are ordinarily questions of fact” … . However, there is no duty to protect or warn of conditions that are not inherently dangerous and that are readily observable by the reasonable use of one's senses … . Here, the Olsen defendants, who did not deny notice of the allegedly dangerous condition, failed to establish, prima facie, that the condition at issue was not inherently dangerous and that it was readily observable by the reasonable use of one's senses … . Grosse v Olsen, 2018 NY Slip Op 05829. second Dept 8-22-18

NEGLIGENCE (SWIMMING POOL, DEFENDANT WHICH BUILT THE SWIMMING POOL, DEFENDANT WHICH INSTALLED THE POOL LINER, AND DEFENDANT OWNERS OF THE POOL, WERE NOT ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS SWIMMING POOL INJURY CASE, PLAINTIFF WAS INJURED WHEN HE DOVE IN AND STRUCK HIS CHIN IN A SHALLOW AREA (SECOND DEPT))CONTRACT LAW (TORT LIABILITY TO NON-PARTY, SWIMMING POOL, DEFENDANT WHICH BUILT THE SWIMMING POOL, DEFENDANT WHICH INSTALLED THE POOL LINER, AND DEFENDANT OWNERS OF THE POOL, WERE NOT ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS SWIMMING POOL INJURY CASE, PLAINTIFF WAS INJURED WHEN HE DOVE IN AND STRUCK HIS CHIN IN A SHALLOW AREA (SECOND DEPT))/SWIMMING POOLS (NEGLIGENCE, CONTRACT LAW, DEFENDANT WHICH BUILT THE SWIMMING POOL, DEFENDANT WHICH INSTALLED THE POOL LINER, AND DEFENDANT OWNERS OF THE POOL, WERE NOT ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS SWIMMING POOL INJURY CASE, PLAINTIFF WAS INJURED WHEN HE DOVE IN AND STRUCK HIS CHIN IN A SHALLOW AREA (SECOND DEPT))

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ORDER FOLLOWING GRANT OF A MOTION TO REARGUE IS APPEALABLE, APPEAL HEARD EVEN THOUGH A PRIOR APPEAL OF THE ORIGINAL ORDER HAD BEEN ABANDONED INSTEAD OF WITHDRAWN, CITY DEMONSTRATED IT DID NOT HAVE WRITTEN NOTICE OF DEFECT IN BICYCLE LANE, NO SPECIAL USE EXCEPTION TO THE PRIOR WRITTEN NOTICE REQUIREMENT (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined Supreme Court had, in effect, granted plaintiff's motion for reargument of his opposition to the city's motion for summary judgment and therefore the related order was appealable. The Second Department further determined it would hear the appeal, even though plaintiff's prior appeal of the original order had been abandoned rather than withdrawn. Plaintiff, a bicyclist, alleged he had been injured by a defect in the bicycle lane. The city demonstrated it did not have prior written notice of the defect. The Second Department rejected plaintiff's argument that the “special use” exception to the prior written notice requirement applied because the city did not derive a special benefit from the bicycle lanes unrelated to the public use:

“Where, as here, a municipality has enacted a prior written notice law, it may not be subjected to liability for injuries caused by a dangerous roadway condition unless it has received prior written notice of the dangerous condition, or an exception to the prior written notice requirement applies” … . “Where the City establishes that it lacked prior written notice under [Administrative Code of City of NY § 7-201], the burden shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate the applicability of one of two recognized exceptions to the rule—that the municipality affirmatively created the defect through an act of negligence or that a special use resulted in a special benefit to the locality”… . The special use exception is reserved for situations where a municipality derives a special benefit from the property unrelated to the public use … .

It is undisputed that the City demonstrated, prima facie, that it lacked prior written notice of the alleged defect. It is further undisputed that the record contains no evidence that the City created the condition that allegedly caused the plaintiff's accident. The plaintiff contends that this case falls within the special use exception because bicycle lanes provide a special benefit to the City by “enhancing its status” and “attracting residents and tourists.” However, the plaintiff failed to demonstrate that the implementation of bicycle lanes on City roadways bestowed a special benefit upon the City unrelated to the public use or that it constituted a special use of the roadways … . Budoff v City of New York, 2018 NY Slip Op 05817, Second Dept 8-22-18

NEGLIGENCE (ORDER FOLLOWING GRANT OF A MOTION TO REARGUE IS APPEALABLE, APPEAL HEARD EVEN THOUGH A PRIOR APPEAL OF THE ORIGINAL ORDER HAD BEEN ABANDONED INSTEAD OF WITHDRAWN, CITY DEMONSTRATED IT DID NOT HAVE WRITTEN NOTICE OF DEFECT IN BICYCLE LANE, NO SPECIAL USE EXCEPTION TO THE PRIOR WRITTEN NOTICE REQUIREMENT (SECOND DEPT))/MUNICIPAL LAW (NEGLIGENCE, ORDER FOLLOWING GRANT OF A MOTION TO REARGUE IS APPEALABLE, APPEAL HEARD EVEN THOUGH A PRIOR APPEAL OF THE ORIGINAL ORDER HAD BEEN ABANDONED INSTEAD OF WITHDRAWN, CITY DEMONSTRATED IT DID NOT HAVE WRITTEN NOTICE OF DEFECT IN BICYCLE LANE, NO SPECIAL USE EXCEPTION TO THE PRIOR WRITTEN NOTICE REQUIREMENT (SECOND DEPT))/CIVIL PROCEDURE (ORDER FOLLOWING GRANT OF A MOTION TO REARGUE IS APPEALABLE, APPEAL HEARD EVEN THOUGH A PRIOR APPEAL OF THE ORIGINAL ORDER HAD BEEN ABANDONED INSTEAD OF WITHDRAWN, CITY DEMONSTRATED IT DID NOT HAVE WRITTEN NOTICE OF DEFECT IN BICYCLE LANE, NO SPECIAL USE EXCEPTION TO THE PRIOR WRITTEN NOTICE REQUIREMENT (SECOND DEPT))/APPEALS  (ORDER FOLLOWING GRANT OF A MOTION TO REARGUE IS APPEALABLE, APPEAL HEARD EVEN THOUGH A PRIOR APPEAL OF THE ORIGINAL ORDER HAD BEEN ABANDONED INSTEAD OF WITHDRAWN, CITY DEMONSTRATED IT DID NOT HAVE WRITTEN NOTICE OF DEFECT IN BICYCLE LANE, NO SPECIAL USE EXCEPTION TO THE PRIOR WRITTEN NOTICE REQUIREMENT (SECOND DEPT))/SPECIAL USE EXCEPTION (ORDER FOLLOWING GRANT OF A MOTION TO REARGUE IS APPEALABLE, APPEAL HEARD EVEN THOUGH A PRIOR APPEAL OF THE ORIGINAL ORDER HAD BEEN ABANDONED INSTEAD OF WITHDRAWN, CITY DEMONSTRATED IT DID NOT HAVE WRITTEN NOTICE OF DEFECT IN BICYCLE LANE, NO SPECIAL USE EXCEPTION TO THE PRIOR WRITTEN NOTICE REQUIREMENT (SECOND DEPT))

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MOTION TO FILE A LATE NOTICE OF CLAIM IN THIS MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED, CRITERIA FOR LATE NOTICE IN THE COURT OF CLAIMS EXPLAINED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing the Court of Claims, determined claimants' motion to file a late notice of claim in this medical malpractice action should not have been granted:

“Court of Claims Act § 10(6) permits a court, in its discretion, upon consideration of the enumerated factors, to allow a claimant to file a late claim” … . The enumerated factors are whether the delay in filing was excusable, the State of New York had notice of the essential facts constituting the claim, the State had an opportunity to investigate the circumstances underlying the claim, the claim appears to be meritorious, the State is prejudiced, and the claimant has any other available remedy … . “No one factor is deemed controlling, nor is the presence or absence of any one factor determinative” … . …

The claimants failed to demonstrate a reasonable excuse for the delay of more than one year and eight months in seeking leave to file a late claim. …

“Merely having or creating hospital records, without more, does not establish actual knowledge of a potential injury where the records do not evince that the medical staff, by its acts or omissions, inflicted any injury” on the claimants' decedent attributable to malpractice or negligence … . …

The claimants also failed to demonstrate that the defendant had an opportunity to timely investigate the facts underlying the claim, as well as locate and examine witnesses while their memories of the facts were still fresh … . …

In addition, the claimants failed to demonstrate a potentially meritorious cause of action based on their allegations of medical malpractice, since they failed to provide an affidavit of merit from a physician … . Decker v State of New York, 2018 NY Slip Op 05751, Second Dept 8-15-18

COURT OF CLAIMS (MOTION TO FILE A LATE NOTICE OF CLAIM IN THIS MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED, CRITERIA FOR LATE NOTICE IN THE COURT OF CLAIMS EXPLAINED (SECOND DEPT))/NOTICE OF CLAIM (COURT OF CLAIMS, (MOTION TO FILE A LATE NOTICE OF CLAIM IN THIS MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED, CRITERIA FOR LATE NOTICE IN THE COURT OF CLAIMS EXPLAINED (SECOND DEPT))/MEDICAL MALPRACTICE (COURT OF CLAIMS, NOTICE OF CLAIM, MOTION TO FILE A LATE NOTICE OF CLAIM IN THIS MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED, CRITERIA FOR LATE NOTICE IN THE COURT OF CLAIMS EXPLAINED (SECOND DEPT))/NEGLIGENCE (COURT OF CLAIMS, NOTICE OF CLAIM, MOTION TO FILE A LATE NOTICE OF CLAIM IN THIS MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED, CRITERIA FOR LATE NOTICE IN THE COURT OF CLAIMS EXPLAINED (SECOND DEPT))

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ACTIONS AGAINST THE COUNTY STEMMING FROM PLAINTIFF’S EXPOSURE TO ASBESTOS WHILE WORKING ON COUNTY PROPERTY WERE TIME BARRED, INCLUDING AN ACTION ALLEGING FRAUDULENT CONCEALMENT OF THE PRESENCE OF ASBESTOS (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined plaintiff's actions stemming from exposure to asbestos, including an action against the county alleging fraudulent concealment of the presence of asbestos where plaintiff worked, were time barred:

Generally, an action to recover damages for personal injuries caused by the latent effects of exposure to any substance or combination of substances must be commenced within three years of the date of discovery of the injury by the plaintiff or from the date when, through the exercise of reasonable diligence, such injury should have been discovered by the plaintiff, whichever is earlier (see CPLR 214-c[2] …). “For purposes of CPLR 214-c, discovery occurs when, based upon an objective level of awareness of the dangers and consequences of the particular substance, the injured party discovers the primary condition on which the claim is based'” … . Where, as here, a claim is asserted against a municipality, the statute of limitations as to the claim against the municipality is 1 year and 90 days and is measured from the date of discovery of the injury or from the date when, through the exercise of reasonable diligence, the injury should have been discovered, whichever is earlier … . O'Brien v County of Nassau, 2018 NY Slip Op 05774, Second Dept 8-15-18

TOXIC TORTS (ASBESTOS, ACTIONS AGAINST THE COUNTY STEMMING FROM PLAINTIFF'S EXPOSURE TO ASBESTOS WHILE WORKING ON COUNTY PROPERTY WERE TIME BARRED, INCLUDING AN ACTION ALLEGING FRAUDULENT CONCEALMENT OF THE PRESENCE OF ASBESTOS (SECOND DEPT))/ASBESTOS (ACTIONS AGAINST THE COUNTY STEMMING FROM PLAINTIFF'S EXPOSURE TO ASBESTOS WHILE WORKING ON COUNTY PROPERTY WERE TIME BARRED, INCLUDING AN ACTION ALLEGING FRAUDULENT CONCEALMENT OF THE PRESENCE OF ASBESTOS (SECOND DEPT))/MUNICIPAL LAW (TOXIC TORTS, ACTIONS AGAINST THE COUNTY STEMMING FROM PLAINTIFF'S EXPOSURE TO ASBESTOS WHILE WORKING ON COUNTY PROPERTY WERE TIME BARRED, INCLUDING AN ACTION ALLEGING FRAUDULENT CONCEALMENT OF THE PRESENCE OF ASBESTOS (SECOND DEPT))/CIVIL PROCEDURE (STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS, TOXIC TORTS, ACTIONS AGAINST THE COUNTY STEMMING FROM PLAINTIFF'S EXPOSURE TO ASBESTOS WHILE WORKING ON COUNTY PROPERTY WERE TIME BARRED, INCLUDING AN ACTION ALLEGING FRAUDULENT CONCEALMENT OF THE PRESENCE OF ASBESTOS (SECOND DEPT))/(STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS, TOXIC TORTS, ACTIONS AGAINST THE COUNTY STEMMING FROM PLAINTIFF'S EXPOSURE TO ASBESTOS WHILE WORKING ON COUNTY PROPERTY WERE TIME BARRED, INCLUDING AN ACTION ALLEGING FRAUDULENT CONCEALMENT OF THE PRESENCE OF ASBESTOS (SECOND DEPT))/FRAUD (ASBESTOS, ACTIONS AGAINST THE COUNTY STEMMING FROM PLAINTIFF'S EXPOSURE TO ASBESTOS WHILE WORKING ON COUNTY PROPERTY WERE TIME BARRED, INCLUDING AN ACTION ALLEGING FRAUDULENT CONCEALMENT OF THE PRESENCE OF ASBESTOS (SECOND DEPT))

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