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PLAINTIFF DID NOT RAISE A QUESTION OF FACT ABOUT THE GAS COMPANY’S LIABILITY FOR A GAS EXPLOSION TRIGGERED BY A TREE UPROOTED DURING A HURRICANE, GAS COMPANY’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the defendant gas company's (appellant's) motion for summary judgment in this negligence action should have been granted. During a hurricane a tree in plaintiff's neighbor's yard uprooted and disturbed a gas line, causing the neighbor's home to explode. Plaintiff allegedly was injured by debris from the explosion. The Second Department held that plaintiff had not raised a question of fact about whether the gas line was negligently maintained or whether the dangerous condition was created by the gas company:

… [T]he appellant established, prima facie, that it was not negligent in the installation of the subject gas service line … . The appellant submitted evidence that the tree that uprooted was not present in 1936 when the gas service line was installed. This evidence included the deposition testimony of a former senior administrator for the appellant's predecessor, who testified that the presence of a tree would have rendered it impossible to install the line where it was placed in 1936. The appellant also submitted an affidavit of an arborist, who opined that the subject tree was a mature tree planted after the construction of the community was completed in 1938, based on the fact that nearly every other house on the subject block had alternating plantings of similar sized trees, thereby demonstrating that the trees were intentionally planted as part of the development of the community. …

Further, the appellant established, prima facie, that it was not negligent in maintaining the gas service line. The appellants' experts noted that the appellant complied with applicable regulations (see 49 CFR 192.723; 16 NYCRR 255.723) by performing a walking survey of the property on which the tree was located to detect leaks on July 28, 2010, within the three-year period prior to the explosion. The appellant submitted evidence demonstrating that no leaks were detected during that walking survey… . Deitrick v Long Is. Power Auth., 2018 NY Slip Op 06079, Second Dept 9-19-18

NEGLIGENCE (PLAINTIFF DID NOT RAISE A QUESTION OF FACT ABOUT THE GAS COMPANY'S LIABILITY FOR A GAS EXPLOSION TRIGGERED BY A TREE UPROOTED DURING A HURRICANE, GAS COMPANY'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT))/UTILITIES (GAS EXPLOSION, PLAINTIFF DID NOT RAISE A QUESTION OF FACT ABOUT THE GAS COMPANY'S LIABILITY FOR A GAS EXPLOSION TRIGGERED BY A TREE UPROOTED DURING A HURRICANE, GAS COMPANY'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT))/GAS (UTILITIES, NEGLIGENCE, PLAINTIFF DID NOT RAISE A QUESTION OF FACT ABOUT THE GAS COMPANY'S LIABILITY FOR A GAS EXPLOSION TRIGGERED BY A TREE UPROOTED DURING A HURRICANE, GAS COMPANY'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT))

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QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER THE INADEQUATE HEIGHT OF A GUARDRAIL ALONG THE STAIRWELL WAS THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF PLANTIFF’S FALL, HEIGHT WAS BELOW THAT MANDATED BY THE NATIONAL FIRE PROTECTION ASSOCIATION (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department determined defendant's motion for summary judgment in this slip and fall case was properly denied. The plaintiff presented evidence that the proximate cause of his stairway fall over the guardrail was the inadequate height of the guardrail:

… [P]laintiff raised an issue of fact by submitting an affidavit by an expert engineer who averred that the stairwell violated National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) No. 101. NFPA No. 101, which was listed in the “Generally Accepted Standards Applicable to the State Building Construction Code” in effect at the time of the hotel's construction, advocated the construction of a 42-inch-high guardrail along the stairwell. The record shows that the existing guardrail was no more than 32 inches high. A violation of NFPA No. 101, which was “applicable by reference in the [State] Building Construction Code – not incorporation – would constitute some evidence of negligence and may establish a standard of care” … . …

Defendants failed to establish prima facie that they did not have constructive notice of a dangerous or defective condition. They argue that the stairwell complied with applicable building codes and that they never received any violations regarding the stairwell. However, their claimed compliance with applicable building codes is not dispositive of whether they breached their common-law duty of care … . Moreover, the existence of a guardrail less than 42 inches high, although not in violation of a particular mandatory code, was obvious and had existed for a sufficient time for defendants to discover and remedy it. Contrary to defendants' argument, plaintiff's inability to identify the cause of his slip or trip on the stairs, which made him lose his balance and go over the rail, is not fatal to his claims, given the evidence supporting his contention that the proximate cause of his … injuries was the lack of a 42-inch guardrail. In any event, there can be more than one proximate cause of an accident. Sussman v MK LCP Rye LLC, 2018 NY Slip Op 06143, First Dept 9-19-18

NEGLIGENCE (SLIP AND FALL, QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER THE INADEQUATE HEIGHT OF A GUARDRAIL ALONG THE STAIRWELL WAS THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF PLANTIFF'S FALL, HEIGHT WAS BELOW THAT MANDATED BY THE NATIONAL FIRE PROTECTION ASSOCIATION (FIRST DEPT))/EVIDENCE (NEGLIGENCE, SLIP AND FALL, STAIRWELL, QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER THE INADEQUATE HEIGHT OF A GUARDRAIL ALONG THE STAIRWELL WAS THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF PLANTIFF'S FALL, HEIGHT WAS BELOW THAT MANDATED BY THE NATIONAL FIRE PROTECTION ASSOCIATION (FIRST DEPT))/SLIP AND FALL ( STAIRWELL, QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER THE INADEQUATE HEIGHT OF A GUARDRAIL ALONG THE STAIRWELL WAS THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF PLANTIFF'S FALL, HEIGHT WAS BELOW THAT MANDATED BY THE NATIONAL FIRE PROTECTION ASSOCIATION (FIRST DEPT))GUARDRAILS (STAIRWELL, SLIP AND FALL, QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER THE INADEQUATE HEIGHT OF A GUARDRAIL ALONG THE STAIRWELL WAS THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF PLANTIFF'S FALL, HEIGHT WAS BELOW THAT MANDATED BY THE NATIONAL FIRE PROTECTION ASSOCIATION (FIRST DEPT))

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HEARSAY IN POLICE REPORT ABOUT THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE TRAFFIC ACCIDENT WAS INADMISSIBLE, DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT)

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined there was a question of fact about whether defendant's (RB Juice's] truck was a proximate cause of the vehicle accident which injured plaintiff. Although the police report indicated the truck was not a proximate cause, the officer did not witness the collision and therefore the officer's conclusions were inadmissible hearsay:

There can be more than one proximate cause of an accident … , and “[g]enerally, it is for the trier of fact to determine the issue of proximate cause” … .

Here, RB Juice failed to establish, prima facie, that its truck was not a proximate cause of the accident. In support of the motion, RB Juice submitted the deposition testimony of the plaintiff, her husband, its employees, and the responding police officer, as well as a copy of the police accident report prepared by the responding police officer. The evidence submitted by RB Juice revealed the existence of triable issues of fact as what its box truck was doing at the time of the accident and how the accident occurred … . With respect to the deposition testimony of the responding police officer, who did not witness the accident, about the section of the police accident report in which he identified “passing or lane usage improper” by the plaintiff as a contributing factor to the happening of the accident, and attributed no contributing factors to the operation of the box truck, such testimony and the related section of the police accident report constituted inadmissible hearsay. Since the source of the information contained in this section of the police accident report was not identified, it could not be established whether the source of the information had a duty to make the statement or whether some other hearsay exception applied … . Further, that information bore directly on the ultimate issue to be decided by the factfinder … . Ardanuy v RB Juice, LLC, 2018 NY Slip Op 06074, Second Dept 9-19-18

NEGLIGENCE (TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS, HEARSAY IN POLICE REPORT ABOUT THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE TRAFFIC ACCIDENT WAS INADMISSIBLE, DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT))/EVIDENCE (NEGLIGENCE, POLICE REPORT, HEARSAY IN POLICE REPORT ABOUT THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE TRAFFIC ACCIDENT WAS INADMISSIBLE, DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT))/HEARSAY (NEGLIGENCE, POLICE REPORT, HEARSAY IN POLICE REPORT ABOUT THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE TRAFFIC ACCIDENT WAS INADMISSIBLE, DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT))/POLICE REPORTS (HEARSAY, (TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS, HEARSAY IN POLICE REPORT ABOUT THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE TRAFFIC ACCIDENT WAS INADMISSIBLE, DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT))/TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS  (NEGLIGENCE, POLICE REPORT, HEARSAY IN POLICE REPORT ABOUT THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE TRAFFIC ACCIDENT WAS INADMISSIBLE, DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT))/PROXIMATE CAUSE  (TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS, HEARSAY IN POLICE REPORT ABOUT THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE TRAFFIC ACCIDENT WAS INADMISSIBLE, DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT))

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ABUTTING PROPERTY OWNERS AND CITY NOT LIABLE FOR A LAMP POST BASE IN THE SIDEWALK OVER WHICH PLAINTIFF ALLEGEDLY TRIPPED, THERE WAS, HOWEVER, A QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER CON ED INSTALLED THE BASE AND WAS THEREFORE LIABLE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined the abutting property owners (Lomangino and Joro) and the city were entitled to summary judgment in this sidewalk slip and fall case. The raised concrete with bolts coming out of it, over which plaintiff allegedly tripped, was the base of a lamp post which was never replaced. The object was not part of the sidewalk, so the property owners were not required to maintain it. The city did not have written notice of the defect, so it was not liable. Con Ed, however, was not entitled to summary judgment because it submitted Lomangino's deposition in which he testified Con Ed had installed the object:

Lomangino and Joro established, prima facie, that the defect upon which the plaintiff tripped was not part of the sidewalk within the meaning of Administrative Code of the City of New York § 7-210… . Lomangino and Joro also established that Lomangino did not create the allegedly dangerous condition, that the condition was not the result of his negligent repair, and that Lomangino did not make any special use of the subject area … . …

The plaintiff also contends that the Supreme Court erred in granting that branch of the City defendants' motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against them because (1) the prior written notice law is inapplicable, and (2) there are triable issues of fact as to whether the City defendants created the defective condition by knocking down the former lamppost during snowplow operations in the winter of 1998. “Administrative Code of the City of New York § 7-201(c) limits the City's duty of care over municipal streets and sidewalks by imposing liability only for those defects or hazardous conditions which its officials have been actually notified exist at a specified location”… . Contrary to the plaintiff's contention, the prior written notice rule includes “any encumbrances” or “attachments” to the sidewalk (Administrative Code § 7-201[c][2]), and thus encompasses the lamppost foundation at issue here … . Madonia v City of New York, 2018 NY Slip Op 06088, Second Dept 9-19-18

NEGLIGENCE (ABUTTING PROPERTY OWNERS AND CITY NOT LIABLE FOR A LAMP POST BASE IN THE SIDEWALK OVER WHICH PLAINTIFF ALLEGEDLY TRIPPED, THERE WAS, HOWEVER, A QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER CON ED INSTALLED THE BASE AND WAS THEREFORE LIABLE (SECOND DEPT))/SLIP AND FALL (ABUTTING PROPERTY OWNERS AND CITY NOT LIABLE FOR A LAMP POST BASE IN THE SIDEWALK OVER WHICH PLAINTIFF ALLEGEDLY TRIPPED, THERE WAS, HOWEVER, A QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER CON ED INSTALLED THE BASE AND WAS THEREFORE LIABLE (SECOND DEPT))/SIDEWALKS (SLIP AND FALL, ABUTTING PROPERTY OWNERS AND CITY NOT LIABLE FOR A LAMP POST BASE IN THE SIDEWALK OVER WHICH PLAINTIFF ALLEGEDLY TRIPPED, THERE WAS, HOWEVER, A QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER CON ED INSTALLED THE BASE AND WAS THEREFORE LIABLE (SECOND DEPT))/MUNICIPAL LAW (SIDEWALKS, SLIP AND FALL, ABUTTING PROPERTY OWNERS AND CITY NOT LIABLE FOR A LAMP POST BASE IN THE SIDEWALK OVER WHICH PLAINTIFF ALLEGEDLY TRIPPED, THERE WAS, HOWEVER, A QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER CON ED INSTALLED THE BASE AND WAS THEREFORE LIABLE (SECOND DEPT))/UTILITIES (SLIP AND FALL, SIDEWALKS, ABUTTING PROPERTY OWNERS AND CITY NOT LIABLE FOR A LAMP POST BASE IN THE SIDEWALK OVER WHICH PLAINTIFF ALLEGEDLY TRIPPED, THERE WAS, HOWEVER, A QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER CON ED INSTALLED THE BASE AND WAS THEREFORE LIABLE (SECOND DEPT))

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TOWN DID NOT OWE A DUTY TO PLAINTIFF WHO WAS STRUCK BY A CAR CROSSING A STREET AFTER ATTENDING A TOWN FIREWORKS DISPLAY (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined defendant town did not owe a duty to plaintiff who was struck by a car when crossing a county road after attending a town fireworks display:

On the evening of July 17, 2012, the infant plaintiffs attended a concert and fireworks show held by the Town of Oyster Bay in a Town park. The infant plaintiffs allegedly were injured when they were struck by a car while crossing Merrick Road in the Town, at a site where there was neither a crosswalk nor any traffic control devices. The infant plaintiffs and their father commenced this action to recover damages for the personal injuries sustained by the infant plaintiffs and for loss of services on behalf of their father, against, among others, the Town. …

“In any negligence action, the threshold issue before the court is whether the defendant owed a legally recognized duty to the plaintiff” … . “The existence and scope of an alleged tortfeasor’s duty is, in the first instance, a legal question for determination by the courts” …  Under the particular circumstances of this case, the Town established, prima facie, that it owed no duty to the infant plaintiffs once they left Town property and decided to cross Merrick Road, which is owned by the County … . Janas v Town of Oyster Bay, 2018 NY Slip Op 06086, Second Dept 9-19-18

NEGLIGENCE (TOWN DID NOT OWE A DUTY TO PLAINTIFF WHO WAS STRUCK BY A CAR CROSSING A STREET AFTER ATTENDING A TOWN FIREWORKS DISPLAY (SECOND DEPT))/MUNICIPAL LAW (TOWN DID NOT OWE A DUTY TO PLAINTIFF WHO WAS STRUCK BY A CAR CROSSING A STREET AFTER ATTENDING A TOWN FIREWORKS DISPLAY (SECOND DEPT))/TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS (TOWN DID NOT OWE A DUTY TO PLAINTIFF WHO WAS STRUCK BY A CAR CROSSING A STREET AFTER ATTENDING A TOWN FIREWORKS DISPLAY (SECOND DEPT))/PEDESTRIANS  (TOWN DID NOT OWE A DUTY TO PLAINTIFF WHO WAS STRUCK BY A CAR CROSSING A STREET AFTER ATTENDING A TOWN FIREWORKS DISPLAY (SECOND DEPT))

PLAINTIFF, A TRAFFIC ENFORCEMENT OFFICER, WAS WALKING IN THE STREET WHEN DEFENDANT STRUCK HIM AFTER TAKING HIS EYES OFF THE ROAD, PLAINTIFF DID NOT HAVE TO DEMONSTRATE FREEDOM FROM COMPARATIVE FAULT, PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined that plaintiff's motion for summary judgment in the pedestrian-vehicle accident case should have been granted. Plaintiff, a New York City Police Department traffic enforcement agent, was walking in the road when he was struck by defendant's vehicle. Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment should have been granted because plaintiff did not have demonstrate freedom from comparative fault:

On April 3, 2018, the Court of Appeals decided Rodriguez v City of New York (31 NY3d 312, 324-325), and held that “[t]o be entitled to partial summary judgment a plaintiff does not bear the double burden of establishing a prima facie case of defendant's liability and the absence of his or her own comparative fault” … . Reviewing the record in the context of this recent decision, we conclude that the plaintiff established his prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law on the issue of liability by the submission of deposition testimony which demonstrated that as the defendant driver was operating the vehicle, he took his eyes off the road and struck the plaintiff and a parked vehicle. The testimony further demonstrated that the defendant driver did not see the plaintiff prior to impact. Outar v Sumner, 2018 NY Slip Op 06103, Second Dept 9-19-18

NEGLIGENCE (PLAINTIFF, A TRAFFIC ENFORCEMENT OFFICER, WAS WALKING IN THE STREET WHEN DEFENDANT STRUCK HIM AFTER TAKING HIS EYES OFF THE ROAD, PLAINTIFF DID NOT HAVE TO DEMONSTRATE FREEDOM FROM COMPARATIVE FAULT, PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT))/TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS (PLAINTIFF, A TRAFFIC ENFORCEMENT OFFICER, WAS WALKING IN THE STREET WHEN DEFENDANT STRUCK HIM AFTER TAKING HIS EYES OFF THE ROAD, PLAINTIFF DID NOT HAVE TO DEMONSTRATE FREEDOM FROM COMPARATIVE FAULT, PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT))/PEDESTRIANS (TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS, PLAINTIFF, A TRAFFIC ENFORCEMENT OFFICER, WAS WALKING IN THE STREET WHEN DEFENDANT STRUCK HIM AFTER TAKING HIS EYES OFF THE ROAD, PLAINTIFF DID NOT HAVE TO DEMONSTRATE FREEDOM FROM COMPARATIVE FAULT, PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT))/COMPARATIVE FAULT (TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS, PEDESTRIANS, PLAINTIFF, A TRAFFIC ENFORCEMENT OFFICER, WAS WALKING IN THE STREET WHEN DEFENDANT STRUCK HIM AFTER TAKING HIS EYES OFF THE ROAD, PLAINTIFF DID NOT HAVE TO DEMONSTRATE FREEDOM FROM COMPARATIVE FAULT, PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT))

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SIDEWALK DEFECT WAS NOT TRIVIAL AS A MATTER OF LAW, TRIVIALITY IS NOT A QUESTION OF DIMENSIONS ALONE, DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS SLIP AND FALL CASE PROPERLY DENIED (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department determined that Supreme Court properly denied the defendants' motion for summary judgment in this sidewalk trip and fall case. There was a question of fact, raised by the plaintiff's expert, whether the defect was trivial as a matter of law:

… [P]laintiff submitted an affidavit from an expert engineer who … found that the sidewalk flags had a vertical height differential of over one half inch. … [P]laintiff's expert opined that this differential and the dimension of the opening at the expansion joint created a “trap-like hazardous condition and [was] a known cause of trip and fall accidents.” The expert further opined that the condition of the sidewalk had been in a noticeable state of disrepair for at least one year prior to plaintiff's fall, and therefore, defendants should have been aware of the unsafe condition.

The motion court properly rejected defendants' argument that the sidewalk defect was trivial as a matter of law and denied defendants' motion for summary judgment, finding issues of fact. The Court of Appeals has held “that there is no “minimal dimension test” or per se rule that a defect must be of a certain minimum height or depth in order to be actionable' . . . and therefore [] granting summary judgment to a defendant based exclusively on the dimensions[s] of the . . . defect is unacceptable'”… . Thus, a finding of triviality, as a matter of law, must “be based on all the specific facts and circumstances of the case, not size alone” … . For this reason, the Court of Appeals has noted that “whether a dangerous or defective condition exists on the property of another so as to create liability . . . is generally a question of fact for the jury” … .

Here, the crux of defendants' triviality argument is that the defect was physically insignificant. However, as already noted, case law prohibits us from basing a finding of triviality on size alone. Indeed, before the burden can shift to the plaintiff, defendants “must make a prima facie showing that the defect is, under the circumstances, physically insignificant and that the characteristics of the defect or the surrounding circumstances do not increase the risks it poses” … .  Suarez v Emerald 115 Mosholu LLC, 2018 NY Slip Op 06059, First Dept 9-13-18

NEGLIGENCE (SIDEWALK DEFECT WAS NOT TRIVIAL AS A MATTER OF LAW, TRIVIALITY IS NOT A QUESTION OF DIMENSIONS ALONE, DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS SLIP AND FALL CASE PROPERLY DENIED (FIRST DEPT))/SLIP AND FALL (SIDEWALK DEFECT WAS NOT TRIVIAL AS A MATTER OF LAW, TRIVIALITY IS NOT A QUESTION OF DIMENSIONS ALONE, DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS SLIP AND FALL CASE PROPERLY DENIED (FIRST DEPT))/TRIVIAL DEFECT (SLIP AND FALL, SIDEWALK DEFECT WAS NOT TRIVIAL AS A MATTER OF LAW, TRIVIALITY IS NOT A QUESTION OF DIMENSIONS ALONE, DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS SLIP AND FALL CASE PROPERLY DENIED (FIRST DEPT))/SIDEWALKS (SLIP AND FALL, SIDEWALK DEFECT WAS NOT TRIVIAL AS A MATTER OF LAW, TRIVIALITY IS NOT A QUESTION OF DIMENSIONS ALONE, DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS SLIP AND FALL CASE PROPERLY DENIED (FIRST DEPT))

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FAILURE TO WARN WAS NOT A SUBSTANTIAL CAUSE OF THE INJURIES AND DEATHS IN THIS PRODUCTS LIABILITY ACTION, DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined that the manufacturer of a transformer base was entitled to summary judgment in this failure to warn action. Plaintiffs decedent fell asleep at the wheel, “drove up an embankment, struck a tree, rolled back down the embankment, and ran over a transformer base, which ruptured the gas tank of his vehicle, causing a fire. The decedent was unable to extricate himself and his two infant children from the vehicle, and they all died. “

The plaintiff alleged that when a pole is attached to the transformer base, the transformer base is designed so that it will break away from its concrete base when it is struck by a vehicle in order to minimize damage to the vehicle. The plaintiff alleged that when the pole was removed from the subject transformer base prior to the accident, the transformer base lost this “breakaway” feature. The plaintiff alleged that the manufacturer of the transformer base and all other entities in the supply chain had a duty to warn the DOT that the transformer base would lose its breakaway capability if it was not attached to a pole. * * *

To recover on a strict products liability cause of action based on inadequate warnings, a plaintiff must prove causation, i.e., that if adequate warnings had been provided, the product would not have been misused… . In other words, “[f]or there to be recovery for damages stemming from a product defective because of the inadequacy or absence of warnings, the failure to warn must have been a substantial cause of the events which produced the injury” … . “Generally, it is for the trier of fact to determine the issue of proximate cause”… . “However, the issue of proximate cause may be decided as a matter of law where only one conclusion may be drawn from the established facts” … . …

The transformer base at issue in this case was located beyond the clear zone, which is defined as “an area without fixed objects that is adjacent to a highway and intended to provide safe passage and a recovery area for vehicles that veer off the roadway” … . [Defendants] demonstrated that, as per DOT policy, light poles located beyond the clear zone were not required to have breakaway transformer bases and that the loss of the breakaway feature would not have affected the DOT's decision to remove the light pole from the subject transformer base prior to the accident. Accordingly, [defendants] established, prima facie, that the failure to warn of the loss of the breakaway feature was not a substantial cause of the events which produced the injuries alleged here … . Reece v J.D. Posillico, Inc., 2018 NY Slip Op 06048, Second Dept 9-12-18

PRODUCTS LIABILITY (FAILURE TO WARN WAS NOT A SUBSTANTIAL CAUSE OF THE INJURIES AND DEATHS IN THIS PRODUCTS LIABILITY ACTION, DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT))/FAILURE TO WARN (PRODUCTS LIABILITY, FAILURE TO WARN WAS NOT A SUBSTANTIAL CAUSE OF THE INJURIES AND DEATHS IN THIS PRODUCTS LIABILITY ACTION, DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT))/WARN, FAILURE TO (PRODUCTS LIABILITY, FAILURE TO WARN WAS NOT A SUBSTANTIAL CAUSE OF THE INJURIES AND DEATHS IN THIS PRODUCTS LIABILITY ACTION, DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT))/TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS (PRODUCTS LIABILITY, FAILURE TO WARN WAS NOT A SUBSTANTIAL CAUSE OF THE INJURIES AND DEATHS IN THIS PRODUCTS LIABILITY ACTION, DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT))/HIGHWAYS AND ROADS  (PRODUCTS LIABILITY, FAILURE TO WARN WAS NOT A SUBSTANTIAL CAUSE OF THE INJURIES AND DEATHS IN THIS PRODUCTS LIABILITY ACTION, DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT))

EVIDENCE NOT SUFFICIENT TO DEMONSTRATE SIDEWALK DEFECT WAS TRIVIAL, DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS SLIP AND FALL CASE PROPERLY DENIED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined the owners of property abutting the sidewalk where plaintiff fell did not present sufficient evidence to warrant summary judgment in this slip and fall case. The defendant-owners (Millers) argued the defect was trivial:

“A defendant seeking dismissal of a complaint on the basis that the alleged defect is trivial must make a prima facie showing that the defect is, under the circumstances, physically insignificant and that the characteristics of the defect or the surrounding circumstances do not increase the risks it poses” … . In determining whether a defect is trivial, the court must examine all of the facts presented, including the “width, depth, elevation, irregularity and appearance of the defect along with the time, place, and circumstance of the injury” … .

The Millers failed to establish their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law on the ground that the alleged defective condition was trivial as a matter of law … . In support of their motion, the Millers submitted conflicting evidence as to the dimensions of the alleged defective condition, including the plaintiff's testimony at a hearing pursuant to General Municipal Law § 50-h and measurements taken by the Millers' investigator. Further, “it is impossible to ascertain from the photographs submitted in support of the motion whether the alleged defective condition was trivial as a matter of law” … . Coriat v Miller, 2018 NY Slip Op 05998, Second Dept 9-12-18

NEGLIGENCE (EVIDENCE NOT SUFFICIENT TO DEMONSTRATE SIDEWALK DEFECT WAS TRIVIAL, DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS SLIP AND FALL CASE PROPERLY DENIED (SECOND DEPT))/SLIP AND FALL  (EVIDENCE NOT SUFFICIENT TO DEMONSTRATE SIDEWALK DEFECT WAS TRIVIAL, DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS SLIP AND FALL CASE PROPERLY DENIED (SECOND DEPT))/SIDEWALKS (SLIP AND FALL, EVIDENCE NOT SUFFICIENT TO DEMONSTRATE SIDEWALK DEFECT WAS TRIVIAL, DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS SLIP AND FALL CASE PROPERLY DENIED (SECOND DEPT))

PLAINTIFF INJURED WHEN, AFTER CONSUMING ALCOHOL, HE DOVE INTO A SHALLOW PART OF DEFENDANT’S POOL, DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT PROPERLY GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined defendant property owner's motion for summary judgment was properly granted in this swimming pool injury case:

After consuming alcohol, the plaintiff ran out of the defendant's house and dove headfirst into the defendants' pool, striking his forehead on the bottom of the pool. The plaintiff commenced this action against the defendants to recover damages for personal injuries, alleging that the defendants were negligent in, among other things, the ownership, operation, and maintenance of their pool. The defendants moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, and the plaintiff opposed the motion. The Supreme Court granted the defendants' motion and dismissed the complaint.

The defendants established their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by demonstrating that the plaintiff's act of diving headfirst into the defendants' shallow pool was the sole proximate cause of his injuries … . In support of their motion, the defendants submitted, inter alia, the plaintiff's deposition transcript, in which he testified that he swam in the subject pool once or twice prior to the accident, and that he was aware of the depth of the pool … . Carroll v Montalvo, 2018 NY Slip Op 05997, Second Dept 9-12-18

NEGLIGENCE (PLAINTIFF INJURED WHEN, AFTER CONSUMING ALCOHOL, HE DOVE INTO AN SHALLOW PART OF DEFENDANT'S POOL, DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT PROPERLY GRANTED (SECOND DEPT))/SWIMMING POOLS (NEGLIGENCE, (PLAINTIFF INJURED WHEN, AFTER CONSUMING ALCOHOL, HE DOVE INTO AN SHALLOW PART OF DEFENDANT'S POOL, DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT PROPERLY GRANTED (SECOND DEPT))

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