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HERE IN THIS MED MAL ACTION, THE COVID-RELATED IMMUNITY CODIFIED IN THE EMERGENCY OR DISASTER TREATMENT PROTECTION ACT (EDTPA) WARRANTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT DISMISSING THE CAUSES OF ACTION STEMMING FROM THE TREATMENT OF PLAINTIFF BY DEFENDANT PHYSICIAN IN APRIL 2020, BUT NOT THE CAUSE OF ACTION STEMMING FROM THE TREATMENT OF PLAINTIFF BY DEFENDANT PHYSICIAN IN MARCH 2020, BEFORE HIS OFFICE WAS CLOSED PURSUANT TO THE COVID EMERGENCY DECLARATION (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined (1) the repeal of the Emergency or Disaster Treatment Protection Act (EDTPA) does not apply retroactively, and (2), the EDTPA did not provide COVID-related immunity for defendants’ treatment of plaintiff in March, 2020, but did provide immunity for defendants’ treatment of plaintiff in April, 2020:

On March 16, 2020, the plaintiff sought treatment for nausea, constipation, and vomiting from the defendant Joseph Tromba and was examined at Tromba’s medical office at the defendant Long Island Gastroenterology, P.C. On March 23, 2020, the medical office was closed pursuant to the emergency declaration in New York State during the COVID-19 pandemic, but Tromba spoke to the plaintiff on the telephone on April 1, April 3, and April 6, 2020. On April 6, 2020, the plaintiff presented to a hospital and underwent emergency surgery for a bowel obstruction. * * *

“[T]he EDTPA  … provided … that a health care facility ‘shall have immunity from any liability, civil or criminal, for any harm or damages alleged to have been sustained as a result of an act or omission in the course of arranging for or providing health care services’ [if] the services were arranged for or provided pursuant to a COVID-19 emergency rule or otherwise in accordance with applicable law, the act or omission was impacted by decisions or activities that were in response to or as a result of the COVID-19 outbreak and in support of the State’s directives, and the services were arranged or provided in good faith” … .

… [T]he defendants’ submissions in support of their motion for summary judgment failed to establish … that the treatment of the plaintiff on March 16, 2020, was impacted by the defendants’ decisions or activities that were in response to or as a result of the COVID-19 outbreak and in support of the State’s directives.  * * *

[Defendants established] the three requirements for immunity were satisfied with respect to their treatment of the plaintiff on April 1, April 3, and April 6, 2020 … . Tromba testified at his deposition that from March 23, 2020, through May 2020, his office was closed pursuant to the emergency declaration and he was “dealing with” his patients “as well as [he could] without seeing them physically.” Regarding the plaintiff specifically, Tromba testified that he could not see her in his office due to the COVID-19 pandemic and her reticence to leave the house. He also testified that he wanted the plaintiff to go for an X-ray in order to see the quantity of stool in her bowel. However, due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the only place that the plaintiff could obtain an X-ray was an emergency room. The plaintiff testified at her deposition, among other things, that she did not want to go for an X-ray because she had COPD, her husband had emphysema, and it “was in the middle of COVID.” Although she also testified that she would have gone for an X-ray if she thought it would have helped her, she nevertheless testified that this “was when COVID was going on” and she “didn’t even know where [she] could get an X-ray at that point.” This testimony was sufficient to establish, prima facie, that the plaintiff’s treatment on April 1, April 3, and April 6, 2020, was impacted by decisions or activities that were in response to or as a result of the COVID-19 outbreak and in support of the State’s directives … . Sapienza v Tromba, 2025 NY Slip Op 04672, Second Dept 8-13-25

Practice Point: Consult this decision for an example of how the COVID-related immunity codified in the Emergency or Disaster Treatment Protection Act (EDTPA) can be applied in a medical malpractice action.

 

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PLAINTIFF SLIPPED AND FELL ON SNOW FIVE HOURS AFTER THE “EXTRAORDINARY SNOWSTORM” HAD ENDED; THE STORM-IN-PROGRESS RULE APPLIED AND DEFENDANT TRANSIT AUTHORITY WAS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the defendant transit authority’s motion for summary judgment in this slip and fall case should have been granted pursuant to the “storm in progress” rule. :Plaintiff slipped an fell on an uncovered staircase at a subway station. The fall happened five hours after the end of “an extraordinary snowstorm:”

Under the storm in progress rule, a property owner will not be held liable for accidents caused by accumulation of snow unless “an adequate period of time has passed following the cessation of the storm to allow the owner an opportunity to ameliorate the hazards caused by the storm” … . “[T]he question of whether a reasonable time has elapsed may be decided as a matter of law by the court, based upon the circumstances of the case” … .

Here, the defendant made a prima facie showing of its entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by submitting an affidavit of a meteorologist, with attached certified climatological data, which demonstrated that at the time of the plaintiff’s accident, less than five hours had passed since the end of an extraordinary snowstorm … . In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact … . Harris v New York City Tr. Auth., 2025 NY Slip Op 04635, Second Dept 8-13-25

Practice Point: The storm in progress rule applies for a period of time after the precipitation stops. Here the rule was applied to a slip and fall which occurred five hours after an “extraordinary snowstorm.”

 

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PLAINTIFFS ALLEGED A TEENAGER WHO COMMITTED RACIALLY-MOTIVATED MASS MURDER WAS ADDICTED TO SOCIAL MEDIA CONTENT PRESENTING THE VIEW THAT WHITES ARE BEING REPLACED BY NON-WHITES; PLAINTIFFS ALLEGED THE SOCIAL MEDIA PLATFORMS WERE DEFECTIVELY DESIGNED TO BE ADDICTIVE; OVER A TWO-JUSTICE DISSENT, THE DEFENDANT SOCIAL MEDIA PLATFORMS WERE DEEMED IMMUNE FROM SUIT BASED UPON THIRD-PARTY CONTENT PURSUANT TO SECTION 230 OF THE COMMUNICATIONS DECENCY ACT (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Lindley, over a two-justice dissent, determined the actions against social media platforms alleging the platforms are defectively designed to be “addictive” such that a teenager’s addiction to racist content led him to commit a racially-motivated mass shooting, should have been dismissed:

These consolidated appeals arise from four separate actions commenced in response to the mass shooting on May 14, 2022 at a grocery store in a predominately Black neighborhood in Buffalo. The shooter, a teenager from the Southern Tier of New York, spent months planning the attack and was motivated by the Great Replacement Theory, which posits that white populations in Western countries are being deliberately replaced by non-white immigrants and people of color. After driving more than 200 miles from his home to Buffalo, the shooter arrived at the store and opened fire on Black individuals in the parking lot and inside the store with a Bushmaster XM-15 semiautomatic rifle, killing 10 people and wounding three others. * * *

The social media defendants moved to dismiss the complaints against them for failure to state a cause of action (see CPLR 3211 [a] [7]), contending, inter alia, that they are immune from liability under section 230 of the Communications Decency Act (section 230) (see 47 USC § 230 [c] [1], [2]) and the First Amendment of the Federal Constitution, applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. * * *

… [I]t is undisputed that the social media defendants qualify as providers of interactive computer services. The dispositive question is whether plaintiffs seek to hold the social media defendants liable as publishers or speakers of information provided by other content providers. Based on our reading of the complaints, we conclude that plaintiffs seek to hold the social media defendants liable as publishers of third-party content. We further conclude that the content-recommendation algorithms used by some of the social media defendants do not deprive those defendants of their status as publishers of third-party content. It follows that plaintiffs’ tort causes of action against the social media defendants are barred by section 230. Patterson v Meta Platforms, Inc., 2025 NY Slip Op 04385, Fourth Dept 7-25-25

Practice Point: Consult this opinion for an in-depth discussion of whether social medial platforms can be liable for the actions of persons who become addicted to and are motivated to act by third-party social-media content. Here plaintiffs unsuccessfully argued that social media platforms are defectively designed using algorithms which foster addiction.

 

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PLAINTIFF IN THIS MED MAL ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN PRECLUDED FROM PRESENTING EVIDENCE DECEDENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GIVEN A BLOOD TRANSFUSION ON THE GROUND THE ISSUE WAS NOT PLED AND PLAINTIFF’S REQUEST FOR A MISSING WITNESS JURY INSTRUCTION WHEN THE DEFENSE INDICATED IT WAS NOT GOING TO CALL THREE DEFENDANTS SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED; DEFENSE VERDICT REVERSED AND NEW TRIAL ORDERED (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, ordering a new trial in this medical malpractice action after a defense verdict, determined plaintiff’s should not have been precluded from presenting evidence that decedent should have received a blood transfusion in the emergency room on the ground the issue had not been pled and the judge should have given the missing witness jury instruction after the defense indicated it was not going call three defendants:

… [P]laintiff from the outset alleged that the ED [emergency department] defendants failed to act upon complaints, signs, symptoms, and diagnostic testing, and such allegations were neither new nor would have been a surprise to the ED defendants because they had responded during summary judgment motion practice to the allegation that they should have acted upon the drop in hemoglobin and hematocrit levels. …

… [T]he court abused its discretion in failing to give a missing witness charge for defendants Patel, Chan, and Alexander. A trier of fact in a civil proceeding may draw the strongest inference that the opposing evidence permits against a party who fails to testify … . This type of instruction, which is commonly referred to as a missing witness charge, “derives from the commonsense notion that the nonproduction of evidence that would naturally have been produced by an honest and therefore fearless claimant permits the inference that its tenor is unfavorable to the party’s cause” … . In seeking use of this charge, “[t]he burden, in the first instance, is upon the party seeking the charge to promptly notify the court that there is an uncalled witness believed to be knowledgeable about a material issue pending in the case, that such witness can be expected to testify favorably to the opposing party and that such party has failed to call [the witness] to testify” … . Once the foregoing is established, the burden shifts to the party opposing the charge “to account for the witness'[s] absence or otherwise demonstrate that the charge would not be appropriate” … . The opposing party’s burden can be met by demonstrating, inter alia, that “the testimony would be cumulative to other evidence” … . Heinrich v Serens, 2025 NY Slip Op 04318, Fourth Dept 7-25-25

Practice Point: Consult this decision for insight into when the court should give the missing witness jury instruction. Here in the med mal case the defense notification that it was not going to call three defendants as witnesses justified plaintiff’s request for the instruction. Under the facts, the request should have been granted.​

 

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TO BE ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS TRAFFIC ACCIDENT CASE THE TOWN DEFENDANTS NEEDED TO DEMONSTRATE EITHER THAT THEY WERE NOT NEGLIGENT OR THAT THEIR NEGLIGENCE WAS NOT A PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE ACCIDENT; BY FOCUSING ONLY ON PROXIMATE CAUSE, THE TOWN DEFENDANTS EFFECTIVELY ASSUMED THEY WERE NEGLIGENT; THE EVIDENCE THE DRIVER OF THE TOWN DUMP TRUCK WAS TRAVELING TOO FAST FOR THE CONDITIONS PRECLUDED SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THE TOWN’S FAVOR (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the town defendants’ motion for summary judgment in this traffic accident case should not have been granted. The town’s dump truck collied with a car which failed to yield the right–of-way at an intersection, veered into plaintiff’s decedent’s lane and collided with plaintiff’s decedent’s car. The town focused its argument on proximate cause, contending that the car which failed to yield the right-of-way was the sole proximate cause of the accident. But, to be entitled to summary judgment in this context, the defendant must demonstrate it was not negligent. By focusing on proximate case, the town defendants “must assume, arguendo, that they were negligent:”

The Town defendants’ submissions established that LaRocca, who was driving a dump truck containing 10 tons of asphalt, did not adhere to an advisory traffic sign recommending that speed be reduced to 35 miles per hour prior to entering the intersection and further established that the tree line limited his view of cross traffic at the intersection. If a trier of fact were to determine that LaRocca’s speed was unreasonable under the existing conditions, the trier of fact could also conclude that LaRocca’s own unreasonable speed was what deprived him of sufficient time to avoid the collision … . * * *

By focusing on “sole proximate cause” in this common-law negligence action, the Town defendants overlook the fact that their burden on their motion was to establish “as a matter of law that [they were] not negligent or that, even if [they were] negligent, [their] negligence was not a proximate cause of the accident” … . In other words, when moving for summary judgment in the negligence context and addressing only the issue of proximate cause, the Town defendants must effectively assume, arguendo, that they were negligent … . Inasmuch as the Town defendants did not do that here, we need not address their proximate cause argument. Gates v Simpson, 2025 NY Slip Op 04313, Fourth Dept 7-25-24

Practice Point: A defendant in a traffic accident case is entitled to summary judgment (1) if defendant was not negligent; or (2) even if defendant was negligent, defendant was not a proximate cause of the accident. In making a motion for summary judgment, if a defendant does not address defendant’s own negligence and focuses only on proximate cause, the defendant is “assuming” defendant was negligent.

 

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PLAINTIFF, A DEVELOPMENTALLY DISABLED STUDENT, WAS KNOCKED OVER BY ANOTHER STUDENT; THE DEFENDANT SCHOOL HAS A DUTY TO PROPERLY SUPERVISE ITS STUDENTS; QUESTIONS OF FACT PRECLUDED SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF DEFENDANT SCHOOL (THE YOUNG ADULT INSTITUTE, INC.) (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined there were questions of fact precluding summary judgment in favor of defendant in this negligent supervision case. Plaintiff, a developmentally disable adult and a member of defendant Young Adult Institute, Inc. (YAI) was knocked over in a parking lot by a fellow student:

Programs such as YAI that provide services to developmentally disabled adults have a duty to adequately supervise such students in their care, “and are liable for foreseeable injuries proximately related to the absence of adequate supervision” … . “‘[I]n determining whether the duty to provide adequate supervision has been breached in the context of injuries caused by the acts of fellow students, it must be established that school authorities had sufficiently specific knowledge or notice of the dangerous conduct which caused injury; that is, that the third-party acts could reasonably have been anticipated'” … . “‘Even if a breach of the duty of supervision is established, it must [also] be demonstrated that such negligence was a proximate cause of the injuries sustained'” … . “‘The test for causation is whether under all the circumstances the chain of events that followed the negligent act or omission was a normal or foreseeable consequence of the situation created by the school’s negligence'” … . Sclafani v Young Adult Inst., Inc., 2025 NY Slip Op 04266, Second Dept 7-23-25

Practice Point: ​A provider of services to developmentally disabled adults has a duty to adequately supervise its students. Here there were questions of fact about whether supervision was adequate. Plaintiff student was knocked over by another student in a parking lot.

 

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PLAINTIFF TRIPPED OVER AN EMPTY MILK CRATE ON A CARPETED FLOOR; THE CONDITION WAS DEEMED “OPEN AND OBVIOUS” AS A MATTER OF LAW ENTITLING DEFENDANTS TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendants were entitled to summary judgment in this slip and fall case on the ground the empty milk crate plaintiff tripped over was an “open and obvious” condition:

The accident occurred in the morning, during one of the plaintiff’s usual daytime shifts. As the plaintiff was walking in a hallway with carpeting she described as “reddish, green-ish . . . earth colors,” she tripped on an empty, black milk crate. By all accounts, the milk crate was an ordinary milk crate and it was not attached to the floor in any way … . * * *

… [T]he hotel defendants established … the empty milk crate was open and obvious, as it was readily observable by those employing the reasonable use of their senses, and was not inherently dangerous under all the existing circumstances … . Raspberry v Best W. JFK Airport Hotel, 2025 NY Slip Op 04264, Second Dept 7-23-25

Practice Point: This decision presents a rare example of a condition which caused a trip and fall, i.e. an empty milk crate on a carpeted floor, deemed “open and obvious” as a matter of law.​

 

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IN A SLIP AND FALL, PROOF OF GENERAL CLEANING PRACTICES DOES NOT DEMONSTRATE A LACK OF CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE OF THE ALLEGED DANGEROUS CONDITION; ONLY PROOF THE AREA WAS INSPECTED OR CLEANED CLOSE IN TIME TO THE FALL WILL SUFFICE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendants in this slip and fall case did not demonstrate a lack of constructive notice of the dangerous condition and therefore were not entitled to summary judgment:

… [T]he evidence submitted by the defendants in support of their motion failed to demonstrate, prima facie, that they lacked constructive notice of the allegedly dangerous condition that caused the plaintiff to fall. The defendants’ property manager provided information only as to the building’s general cleaning and inspection practices, and the defendants did not proffer any evidence demonstrating when the staircase was last cleaned or inspected before the plaintiff slipped and fell … . Johnson v 2525-2537 Realty, LLC, 2025 NY Slip Op 04239, Second Dept 7-23-25

Practice Point: In a slip and fall, a lack of constructive notice of the alleged dangerous condition cannot be proved by evidence of general cleaning practices. There must be evidence the area was cleaned or inspected close in time to the fall.

 

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IN A MED MAL ACTION, AN EXPERT’S AFFIRMATION WHICH IS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD WILL BE DEEMED “CONCLUSORY” AND WILL NOT SUPPORT SUMMARY JUDGMENT (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendants’ motion for summary judgment in this medical malpractice case should not have been granted because the expert affirmation submitted is support of the motion was “conclusory and not supported by the record:”

… [D]efendants failed to establish their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against them. The defendants submitted, inter alia, the affirmation of an expert, whose opinions regarding the defendants’ alleged failure to diagnose the plaintiff’s aortic dissection after receipt of certain X-ray results and blood test results were conclusory and unsupported by the record … . That expert’s opinion regarding proximate cause was also conclusory and insufficient to meet the defendants’ burden as the parties moving for summary judgment … . In v Maimonides Med. Ctr., 2025 NY Slip Op 04238, Second Dept 7-23-25

Practice Point: In a med mal case. an expert affirmation which is not supported by the record will be deemed “conclusory” and insufficient to support summary judgment.

 

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HERE PLAINTIFF SUBMITTED A SUPPLEMENTAL BILL OF PARTICULARS, NOT AN AMENDED BILL OF PARTICULARS, MORE THAN 30 DAYS BEFORE TRIAL; DEFENDANTS SHOULD HAVE ACCEPTED IT; LEAVE OF COURT WAS NOT REQUIRED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court in this slip and fall case, determined plaintiff was entitled to compel defendants to accept a second supplemental bill of particulars after plaintiff had surgery on her injured shoulder:

“Pursuant to CPLR 3043(b), a plaintiff in a personal injury action may serve a supplemental bill of particulars containing ‘continuing special damages and disabilities,’ without leave of the court at any time, but not less than 30 days prior to trial, if it alleges ‘no new cause of action’ or claims no ‘new injury'” (… quoting CPLR 3043[b]). Here, contrary to the defendants’ contention, the plaintiff sought to allege continuing consequences of the injuries suffered to her left shoulder and described in the original bill of particulars, rather than new and unrelated injuries … . Since the contested bill of particulars is a supplemental bill of particulars, rather than an amended bill of particulars, and was served more than 30 days prior to trial, leave of court was not required … . Miller v Great Vegetable Farm, Inc., 2025 NY Slip Op 04170, Second Dept 7-16-25

Practice Point: Here plaintiff documented the results of surgery on her injured shoulder in a supplemental bill of particulars. Because the document addressed injuries already alleged to have been caused by the slip and fall, and not new injuries, the document was a supplemental bill of particulars, not an amended bill of particulars. As long as a supplemental bill of particulars is served more than 30 days before trial, leave of court is not required and defendant must accept it.

 

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