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You are here: Home1 / Municipal Law
Municipal Law, Negligence

COUNTY DID NOT DEMONSTRATE THAT IT DID NOT CREATE THE DANGEROUS CONDITION, I.E. SNOW PILED AT AN INTERSECTION, PLAINTIFF ALLEGED THE INTERSECTION COLLISION WAS CAUSED BY THE INABILITY TO SEE BECAUSE OF THE PILE OF SNOW, COUNTY’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT PROPERLY DENIED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined the county was not entitled to summary judgment in this intersection collision case. Plaintiff alleged her field of vision was blocked by snow piled at the intersection. The county demonstrated it did not have written notice of the condition, but did not demonstrate it did not create the condition:

Where ” a municipality has enacted a prior written notice statute, it may not be subjected to liability for injuries caused by an improperly maintained street . . . unless it has received written notice of the defect, or an exception to the written notice requirement applies'”… . As relevant here, an exception to the prior written notice laws exists where the municipality creates the defective condition through an affirmative act of negligence … . Here, the plaintiff alleged that the County affirmatively caused or contributed to the dangerous condition through its snow plowing operations, which caused snow to be piled unreasonably high at the intersection. Therefore, to establish its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, the County was required to demonstrate, prima facie, that it did not receive prior written notice of the alleged dangerous condition and that it did not create the alleged dangerous condition … . Although the County demonstrated, prima facie, that it did not receive prior written notice, the County’s submissions failed to demonstrate, prima facie, that its snow removal operations did not create a dangerous condition … . Manzella v County of Suffolk, 2018 NY Slip Op 05296, Second Dept 7-18-18

NEGLIGENCE (TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS, MUNICIPAL LAW, COUNTY DID NOT DEMONSTRATE THAT IT DID NOT CREATE THE DANGEROUS CONDITION, I.E. SNOW PILED AT AN INTERSECTION, PLAINTIFF ALLEGED THE INTERSECTION COLLISION WAS CAUSED BY THE INABILITY TO SEE BECAUSE OF THE PILE OF SNOW, COUNTY’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT PROPERLY DENIED (SECOND DEPT))/MUNICIPAL LAW (NEGLIGENCE, TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS, COUNTY DID NOT DEMONSTRATE THAT IT DID NOT CREATE THE DANGEROUS CONDITION, I.E. SNOW PILED AT AN INTERSECTION, PLAINTIFF ALLEGED THE INTERSECTION COLLISION WAS CAUSED BY THE INABILITY TO SEE BECAUSE OF THE PILE OF SNOW, COUNTY’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT PROPERLY DENIED (SECOND DEPT))/TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS (NEGLIGENCE, MUNICIPAL LAW,  COUNTY DID NOT DEMONSTRATE THAT IT DID NOT CREATE THE DANGEROUS CONDITION, I.E. SNOW PILED AT AN INTERSECTION, PLAINTIFF ALLEGED THE INTERSECTION COLLISION WAS CAUSED BY THE INABILITY TO SEE BECAUSE OF THE PILE OF SNOW, COUNTY’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT PROPERLY DENIED (SECOND DEPT))

July 18, 2018
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2018-07-18 16:13:312020-02-06 15:30:09COUNTY DID NOT DEMONSTRATE THAT IT DID NOT CREATE THE DANGEROUS CONDITION, I.E. SNOW PILED AT AN INTERSECTION, PLAINTIFF ALLEGED THE INTERSECTION COLLISION WAS CAUSED BY THE INABILITY TO SEE BECAUSE OF THE PILE OF SNOW, COUNTY’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT PROPERLY DENIED (SECOND DEPT).
Civil Procedure, Municipal Law, Negligence

MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL UNLESS PLAINTIFF AGREED TO A REDUCTION IN DAMAGES FOR PRE-IMPACT TERROR AND CONSCIOUS PAIN AND SUFFERING IN THIS TRAFFIC-ACCIDENT WRONGFUL DEATH CASE PROPERLY GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined Supreme Court properly granted defendants’ motion for a new trial (CPLR 4404) in this car-bus-accident wrongful death case if plaintiff did not agree to a reduction of damages for pre-impact terror and conscious pain and suffering:

Here, the evidence at trial established that the decedent made eye contact with the defendant bus operator, William R. Dortch, for approximately one second before the bus collided with the decedent’s vehicle. Under these circumstances, we agree with the Supreme Court’s determinations that the $250,000 award for pre-impact terror deviated materially from what would be reasonable compensation and to grant the branch of the defendants’ cross motion which was for a new trial on the issue of pre-impact terror unless the plaintiff agreed to an award in the principal sum of $50,000 … . …

Here, we agree with the Supreme Court’s determination that the jury award in the principal sum of $1,250,000 deviated materially from what would be reasonable compensation for the decedent’s post-impact conscious pain and suffering. The evidence established that the decedent was able to feel pain following the collision, but that she was able to do so for, at most, 11 to 20 minutes and that, during that time, she was minimally conscious (see id. at 460). Under these circumstances, that branch of the defendants’ motion which was for a new trial on the issue of conscious pain and suffering unless the plaintiff agreed to an award in the principal sum of $400,000 was properly granted … . Vatalaro v County of Suffolk, 2018 NY Slip Op 05352, Second Dept 7-18-18

NEGLIGENCE (TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS, MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL UNLESS PLAINTIFF AGREED TO A REDUCTION IN DAMAGES FOR PRE-IMPACT TERROR AND CONSCIOUS PAIN AND SUFFERING IN THIS TRAFFIC-ACCIDENT WRONGFUL DEATH CASE PROPERLY GRANTED (SECOND DEPT))/CIVIL PROCEDURE (MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL UNLESS PLAINTIFF AGREED TO A REDUCTION IN DAMAGES FOR PRE-IMPACT TERROR AND CONSCIOUS PAIN AND SUFFERING IN THIS TRAFFIC-ACCIDENT WRONGFUL DEATH CASE PROPERLY GRANTED (SECOND DEPT))/CPLR 4404 (MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL UNLESS PLAINTIFF AGREED TO A REDUCTION IN DAMAGES FOR PRE-IMPACT TERROR AND CONSCIOUS PAIN AND SUFFERING IN THIS TRAFFIC-ACCIDENT WRONGFUL DEATH CASE PROPERLY GRANTED (SECOND DEPT))/TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS (MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL UNLESS PLAINTIFF AGREED TO A REDUCTION IN DAMAGES FOR PRE-IMPACT TERROR AND CONSCIOUS PAIN AND SUFFERING IN THIS TRAFFIC-ACCIDENT WRONGFUL DEATH CASE PROPERLY GRANTED (SECOND DEPT))/BUSES (TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS, MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL UNLESS PLAINTIFF AGREED TO A REDUCTION IN DAMAGES FOR PRE-IMPACT TERROR AND CONSCIOUS PAIN AND SUFFERING IN THIS TRAFFIC-ACCIDENT WRONGFUL DEATH CASE PROPERLY GRANTED (SECOND DEPT))/MUNICIPAL LAW (TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS, BUSES, MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL UNLESS PLAINTIFF AGREED TO A REDUCTION IN DAMAGES FOR PRE-IMPACT TERROR AND CONSCIOUS PAIN AND SUFFERING IN THIS TRAFFIC-ACCIDENT WRONGFUL DEATH CASE PROPERLY GRANTED (SECOND DEPT))/WRONGFUL DEATH (DAMAGES, MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL UNLESS PLAINTIFF AGREED TO A REDUCTION IN DAMAGES FOR PRE-IMPACT TERROR AND CONSCIOUS PAIN AND SUFFERING IN THIS TRAFFIC-ACCIDENT WRONGFUL DEATH CASE PROPERLY GRANTED (SECOND DEPT))/DAMAGES (WRONGFUL DEATH, MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL UNLESS PLAINTIFF AGREED TO A REDUCTION IN DAMAGES FOR PRE-IMPACT TERROR AND CONSCIOUS PAIN AND SUFFERING IN THIS TRAFFIC-ACCIDENT WRONGFUL DEATH CASE PROPERLY GRANTED (SECOND DEPT))/PRE-IMPACT TERROR  (WRONGFUL DEATH, MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL UNLESS PLAINTIFF AGREED TO A REDUCTION IN DAMAGES FOR PRE-IMPACT TERROR AND CONSCIOUS PAIN AND SUFFERING IN THIS TRAFFIC-ACCIDENT WRONGFUL DEATH CASE PROPERLY GRANTED (SECOND DEPT))/CONSCIOUS PAIN AND SUFFERING (WRONGFUL DEATH, MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL UNLESS PLAINTIFF AGREED TO A REDUCTION IN DAMAGES FOR PRE-IMPACT TERROR AND CONSCIOUS PAIN AND SUFFERING IN THIS TRAFFIC-ACCIDENT WRONGFUL DEATH CASE PROPERLY GRANTED (SECOND DEPT))

July 18, 2018
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2018-07-18 09:17:472020-02-06 15:30:09MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL UNLESS PLAINTIFF AGREED TO A REDUCTION IN DAMAGES FOR PRE-IMPACT TERROR AND CONSCIOUS PAIN AND SUFFERING IN THIS TRAFFIC-ACCIDENT WRONGFUL DEATH CASE PROPERLY GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).
Eminent Domain, Environmental Law, Municipal Law

CITY DID NOT VIOLATE THE PUBLIC USE DOCTRINE AND COMPLIED WITH THE EMINENT DOMAIN PROCEDURE LAW AND THE STATE ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY REVIEW ACT (SEQRA) IN APPROVING THE TAKING OF LAND FOR A BICYCLE-PEDESTRIAN TRAIL (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, in a comprehensive decision describing the relevant law and procedures, determined the city had complied with the State Environmental Quality Review Act (SEQRA), the Eminent Domain Procedure Law and the prior public use doctrine in determining the taking of a strip of land for a bicycle-pedestrian trial would not have a significant adverse impact on the environment:

… [P]etitioners have failed to demonstrate how the City’s condemnation of the Village’s property would “interfere with or destroy the public use” … . Accordingly, the prior public use doctrine will not prevent the City from condemning the Village’s property. * * *

… [T]he City … performed the steps required in the SEQRA review process and considered areas of potential environmental concern, but failed to provide an adequate written explanation for its negative declaration. Upon realizing its mistake (albeit after receiving communications from petitioners complaining about the negative declaration), and before approving the condemnation of property in relation to the project, the City held a public meeting and formally adopted the supplemental resolution to remedy the defects in the July 2017 negative declaration … . Under the circumstances, remittal to the City for further environmental review or explanation of its determination would be redundant … . …

The City did not abuse its discretion in determining the scope of the proposed taking. Although a municipality cannot use the power of eminent domain to take “‘property not necessary to fulfill [a] public purpose, it is generally accepted that the condemnor has broad discretion in deciding what land is necessary to fulfill that purpose'” … . Matter of Village of Ballston Spa v City of Saratoga Springs, 2018 NY Slip Op 05248, Third Dept 7-12-18

EMINENT DOMAIN (CITY DID NOT VIOLATE THE PUBLIC USE DOCTRINE AND COMPLIED WITH THE EMINENT DOMAIN PROCEDURE LAW AND THE STATE ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY REVIEW ACT (SEQRA) IN APPROVING THE TAKING OF LAND FOR A BICYCLE-PEDESTRIAN TRAIL (THIRD DEPT))/CONDEMNATION (CITY DID NOT VIOLATE THE PUBLIC USE DOCTRINE AND COMPLIED WITH THE EMINENT DOMAIN PROCEDURE LAW AND THE STATE ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY REVIEW ACT (SEQRA) IN APPROVING THE TAKING OF LAND FOR A BICYCLE-PEDESTRIAN TRAIL (THIRD DEPT))/MUNICIPAL LAW (EMINENT DOMAIN, STATE ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY REVIEW ACT, ITY DID NOT VIOLATE THE PUBLIC USE DOCTRINE AND COMPLIED WITH THE EMINENT DOMAIN PROCEDURE LAW AND THE STATE ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY REVIEW ACT (SEQRA) IN APPROVING THE TAKING OF LAND FOR A BICYCLE-PEDESTRIAN TRAIL (THIRD DEPT))/ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (EMINENT DOMAIN, STATE ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY REVIEW ACT, ITY DID NOT VIOLATE THE PUBLIC USE DOCTRINE AND COMPLIED WITH THE EMINENT DOMAIN PROCEDURE LAW AND THE STATE ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY REVIEW ACT (SEQRA) IN APPROVING THE TAKING OF LAND FOR A BICYCLE-PEDESTRIAN TRAIL (THIRD DEPT))/BICYCLES (CITY DID NOT VIOLATE THE PUBLIC USE DOCTRINE AND COMPLIED WITH THE EMINENT DOMAIN PROCEDURE LAW AND THE STATE ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY REVIEW ACT (SEQRA) IN APPROVING THE TAKING OF LAND FOR A BICYCLE-PEDESTRIAN TRAIL (THIRD DEPT))/PEDESTRIANS (CITY DID NOT VIOLATE THE PUBLIC USE DOCTRINE AND COMPLIED WITH THE EMINENT DOMAIN PROCEDURE LAW AND THE STATE ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY REVIEW ACT (SEQRA) IN APPROVING THE TAKING OF LAND FOR A BICYCLE-PEDESTRIAN TRAIL (THIRD DEPT))

July 12, 2018
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2018-07-12 12:46:412020-02-06 01:38:49CITY DID NOT VIOLATE THE PUBLIC USE DOCTRINE AND COMPLIED WITH THE EMINENT DOMAIN PROCEDURE LAW AND THE STATE ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY REVIEW ACT (SEQRA) IN APPROVING THE TAKING OF LAND FOR A BICYCLE-PEDESTRIAN TRAIL (THIRD DEPT).
Constitutional Law, Landlord-Tenant, Municipal Law, Nuisance, Public Nuisance

CITY ORDINANCE PROVISIONS REQUIRING A RENTAL PERMIT AND LIMITING OCCUPANCY OF RENTAL UNITS TO A “FAMILY” AS DEFINED IN THE ORDINANCE ARE NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department determined that municipal code provisions requiring a rental permit and limiting the occupancy of rental units to a “family” as defined in the code were not unconstitutionally vague:

The record therefore reflects that the rental occupancy restriction was enacted to, among other things, serve a legitimate governmental interest in diminishing public nuisances created from the overcrowding of dwelling units occupied by transient residents … . Because the ordinance does not favor certain types of families over others, or restrict the size of unrelated persons living as a functionally equivalent family without also restricting the size of a traditional family, it does not suffer from the same constitutional infirmities as the ordinances in McMinn v Town of Oyster Bay (66 NY2d at 549) or Baer v Town of Brookhaven (73 NY2d 942, 943 [1989]). Moreover, the ordinance here contains objective criteria for rebutting the presumption that four or more persons living together in a single dwelling unit who are unrelated by blood, marriage or legal adoption do not constitute the functional equivalent of a traditional family … , and the occupancy restriction bears a reasonable relationship to the goals sought to be achieved by the ordinance. In light of the foregoing, plaintiffs have not established that the challenged provisions of the ordinance are unconstitutional … . Grodinsky v City of Cortland, 2018 NY Slip Op 05236, Third Dept 7-12-18

MUNICIPAL LAW (LANDLORD-TENANT, CITY ORDINANCE PROVISIONS REQUIRING A RENTAL PERMIT AND LIMITING OCCUPANCY OF RENTAL UNITS TO A “FAMILY” AS DEFINED IN THE ORDINANCE ARE NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL (THIRD DEPT))/LANDLORD-TENANT (MUNICIPAL LAW, CITY ORDINANCE PROVISIONS REQUIRING A RENTAL PERMIT AND LIMITING OCCUPANCY OF RENTAL UNITS TO A “FAMILY” AS DEFINED IN THE ORDINANCE ARE NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL (THIRD DEPT))/CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (MUNICIPAL LAW, LANDLORD-TENANT, CITY ORDINANCE PROVISIONS REQUIRING A RENTAL PERMIT AND LIMITING OCCUPANCY OF RENTAL UNITS TO A “FAMILY” AS DEFINED IN THE ORDINANCE ARE NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL (THIRD DEPT))

July 12, 2018
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2018-07-12 11:39:252020-05-22 09:26:25CITY ORDINANCE PROVISIONS REQUIRING A RENTAL PERMIT AND LIMITING OCCUPANCY OF RENTAL UNITS TO A “FAMILY” AS DEFINED IN THE ORDINANCE ARE NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL (THIRD DEPT).
Municipal Law, Negligence

ALTHOUGH THE NYC ADMINISTRATIVE CODE IMPOSES A DUTY TO KEEP SIDEWALKS SAFE ON ABUTTING PROPERTY OWNERS, IT DOES NOT IMPOSE STRICT LIABILITY, DEFENDANT FAILED TO DEMONSTRATE IT DID NOT CREATE OR HAVE NOTICE OF THE ALLEGED DANGEROUS CONDITION IN THIS SIDEWALK ICE AND SNOW SLIP AND FALL CASE, DEFENDANT’S SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION PROPERLY DENIED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined defendant property owner did not demonstrate that it did not create or have notice of the dangerous condition in this sidewalk snow and ice slip and fall case. The NYC administrative code imposes a duty on abutting property owners to keep sidewalks safe, but it does not impose strict liability:

Administrative Code of the City of New York § 7-210(a) and (b) imposes a duty upon property owners to maintain the sidewalk adjacent to their property, and shifts tort liability to such owners for the failure to maintain the sidewalk in a reasonably safe condition, including the negligent failure to remove snow and ice … . However, Administrative Code of the City of New York § 7-210 does not impose strict liability upon the property owner, and the injured party has the obligation to prove the elements of negligence to demonstrate that an owner is liable… . Thus, to prevail on its summary judgment motion, the defendant was required to establish that it neither created the alleged hazardous condition nor had actual or constructive notice of its existence for a sufficient length of time to discover and remedy it … .

Here, in support of the motion, the defendant submitted, inter alia, the deposition testimony of its custodian, who had no specific recollection as to when it last snowed prior to the incident, what snow and ice removal efforts he undertook prior to the incident, or what the sidewalk at issue looked like within a reasonable time prior to the incident. The custodian’s deposition testimony, along with the defendant’s other submissions, including its expert evidence, were insufficient to demonstrate, prima facie, that the defendant did not create the alleged ice condition through its snow removal efforts or that it did not have actual or constructive notice of the existence of the condition for a sufficient length of time to discover and remedy it … . Muhammad v St. Rose of Limas R.C. Church, 2018 NY Slip Op 05181, Second Dept 7-11-18

​NEGLIGENCE (SLIP AND FALL, MUNICIPAL LAW, ALTHOUGH THE NYC ADMINISTRATIVE CODE IMPOSES A DUTY TO KEEP SIDEWALKS SAFE ON ABUTTING PROPERTY OWNERS, IT DOES NOT IMPOSE STRICT LIABILITY, DEFENDANT FAILED TO DEMONSTRATE IT DID NOT CREATE OR HAVE NOTICE OF THE ALLEGED DANGEROUS CONDITION IN THIS SIDEWALK ICE AND SNOW SLIP AND FALL CASE, DEFENDANT’S SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION PROPERLY DENIED (SECOND DEPT))/MUNICIPAL LAW (SLIP AND FALL, SIDEWALKS, ALTHOUGH THE NYC ADMINISTRATIVE CODE IMPOSES A DUTY TO KEEP SIDEWALKS SAFE ON ABUTTING PROPERTY OWNERS, IT DOES NOT IMPOSE STRICT LIABILITY, DEFENDANT FAILED TO DEMONSTRATE IT DID NOT CREATE OR HAVE NOTICE OF THE ALLEGED DANGEROUS CONDITION IN THIS SIDEWALK ICE AND SNOW SLIP AND FALL CASE, DEFENDANT’S SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION PROPERLY DENIED (SECOND DEPT))/SIDEWALKS (SLIP AND FALL,  ALTHOUGH THE NYC ADMINISTRATIVE CODE IMPOSES A DUTY TO KEEP SIDEWALKS SAFE ON ABUTTING PROPERTY OWNERS, IT DOES NOT IMPOSE STRICT LIABILITY, DEFENDANT FAILED TO DEMONSTRATE IT DID NOT CREATE OR HAVE NOTICE OF THE ALLEGED DANGEROUS CONDITION IN THIS SIDEWALK ICE AND SNOW SLIP AND FALL CASE, DEFENDANT’S SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION PROPERLY DENIED (SECOND DEPT))/SIDEWALKS (SLIP AND FALL, MUNICIPAL LAW, ALTHOUGH THE NYC ADMINISTRATIVE CODE IMPOSES A DUTY TO KEEP SIDEWALKS SAFE ON ABUTTING PROPERTY OWNERS, IT DOES NOT IMPOSE STRICT LIABILITY, DEFENDANT FAILED TO DEMONSTRATE IT DID NOT CREATE OR HAVE NOTICE OF THE ALLEGED DANGEROUS CONDITION IN THIS SIDEWALK ICE AND SNOW SLIP AND FALL CASE, DEFENDANT’S SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION PROPERLY DENIED (SECOND DEPT))

July 11, 2018
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2018-07-11 14:30:552020-02-06 15:30:09ALTHOUGH THE NYC ADMINISTRATIVE CODE IMPOSES A DUTY TO KEEP SIDEWALKS SAFE ON ABUTTING PROPERTY OWNERS, IT DOES NOT IMPOSE STRICT LIABILITY, DEFENDANT FAILED TO DEMONSTRATE IT DID NOT CREATE OR HAVE NOTICE OF THE ALLEGED DANGEROUS CONDITION IN THIS SIDEWALK ICE AND SNOW SLIP AND FALL CASE, DEFENDANT’S SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION PROPERLY DENIED (SECOND DEPT).
Medical Malpractice, Municipal Law, Negligence

LEAVE TO FILE A LATE NOTICE OF CLAIM WAS PROPERLY GRANTED IN THIS CANCER TREATMENT MALPRACTICE ACTION, WHERE THE ALLEGED MALPRACTICE IS APPARENT FROM THE MEDICAL RECORDS, THE RECORDS CONSTITUTE ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE OF THE CLAIM (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined petitioner’s motion seeking leave to file a late notice of claim for medical malpractice against the NYC Health & Hospitals Corporation was properly granted. Plaintiff alleged malpractice in the treatment of a cancerous lesion:

“Where the alleged malpractice is apparent from an independent review of the medical records, those records constitute actual knowledge of the facts constituting the claim'” … . Here, in support of her petition, the petitioner submitted medical records and an affirmation of a physician who reviewed the medical records and concluded, inter alia, that there had been a departure from accepted medical practice. Inasmuch as the medical records show that the hospital failed to confirm that the plaintiff’s tumor had been completely removed, they provided the appellant with actual knowledge of the essential facts constituting the claim … . Furthermore, the petitioner made an initial showing that the appellant would not suffer any prejudice by the delay in serving a notice of claim, and the appellant failed to rebut the petitioner’s showing with particularized indicia of prejudice … . Finally, the lack of a reasonable excuse is not dispositive where there is actual notice and absence of prejudice … . In any event, the petitioner demonstrated that her extensive medical treatment during the time period at issue constitutes a reasonable excuse for the delay … . Matter of Leon v New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 2018 NY Slip Op 05165, Second Dept 7-11-18

MUNICIPAL LAW (NOTICE OF CLAIM, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, LEAVE TO FILE A LATE NOTICE OF CLAIM WAS PROPERLY GRANTED IN THIS CANCER TREATMENT MALPRACTICE ACTION, WHERE THE ALLEGED MALPRACTICE IS APPARENT FROM THE MEDICAL RECORDS, THE RECORDS CONSTITUTE ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE OF THE CLAIM (SECOND DEPT))/NEGLIGENCE (MUNICIPAL LAW, NOTICE OF CLAIM, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, LEAVE TO FILE A LATE NOTICE OF CLAIM WAS PROPERLY GRANTED IN THIS CANCER TREATMENT MALPRACTICE ACTION, WHERE THE ALLEGED MALPRACTICE IS APPARENT FROM THE MEDICAL RECORDS, THE RECORDS CONSTITUTE ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE OF THE CLAIM (SECOND DEPT))/MEDICAL MALPRACTICE (MUNICIPAL LAW, NOTICE OF CLAIM, LEAVE TO FILE A LATE NOTICE OF CLAIM WAS PROPERLY GRANTED IN THIS CANCER TREATMENT MALPRACTICE ACTION, WHERE THE ALLEGED MALPRACTICE IS APPARENT FROM THE MEDICAL RECORDS, THE RECORDS CONSTITUTE ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE OF THE CLAIM (SECOND DEPT))/NOTICE OF CLAIM (MUNICIPAL LAW, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, LEAVE TO FILE A LATE NOTICE OF CLAIM WAS PROPERLY GRANTED IN THIS CANCER TREATMENT MALPRACTICE ACTION, WHERE THE ALLEGED MALPRACTICE IS APPARENT FROM THE MEDICAL RECORDS, THE RECORDS CONSTITUTE ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE OF THE CLAIM (SECOND DEPT))

July 11, 2018
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2018-07-11 13:25:362020-02-06 15:30:09LEAVE TO FILE A LATE NOTICE OF CLAIM WAS PROPERLY GRANTED IN THIS CANCER TREATMENT MALPRACTICE ACTION, WHERE THE ALLEGED MALPRACTICE IS APPARENT FROM THE MEDICAL RECORDS, THE RECORDS CONSTITUTE ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE OF THE CLAIM (SECOND DEPT).
Administrative Law, Environmental Law, Municipal Law

PETITION SEEKING TO ANNUL A NEGATIVE DECLARATION UNDER THE STATE ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY REVIEW ACT (SEQRA) CONCERNING A TRUCK STOP PROJECT PROPERLY DISMISSED FOR FAILURE TO EXHAUST ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES, TOWN PLANNING BOARD DID NOT ACT ARBITRARILY AND CAPRICIOUSLY WHEN IT FAILED TO FOLLOW A LOCAL LAW WHICH CONFLICTED WITH SEQRA (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department determined petitioner did not exhaust administrative remedies before bringing a petition to annul the town’s negative declaration under the State Environmental Quality Review Act (SEQRA) for a truck stop project. The court further found that the town planning board did not act arbitrarily and capriciously when it failed to follow a Local Law (which required an environmental impact statement (EIS)) because the Local Law conflicted with SEQRA and was therefore invalid:

… [W]e conclude that petitioner failed to exhaust its administrative remedies … . The record establishes that the Planning Board, as the lead agency on the project, held a public hearing that petitioner’s counsel attended, but during which he remained silent. Although petitioner made a FOIL request two days after the public hearing, that request did not alert the Planning Board of any specific concerns. …

“A local law that is inconsistent with SEQRA’ must be invalidated” … . “[I]nconsistency has been found where local laws prohibit what would have been permissible under State law or impose prerequisite additional restrictions on rights under State law, so as to inhibit operation of the State’s general laws” … . Here, section 59-3 (A) of the Town Code provided that “Type I actions are likely to have an effect on the environment and will, therefore, require the preparation of an environmental impact statement.” SEQRA, on the other hand, provides that, “[t]he lead agency must determine the significance of any Type I . . . action . . . [and,] [t]o require an EIS for a proposed action, the lead agency must determine that the action may include the potential for at least one significant adverse environmental impact” … . Thus, Chapter 59 is inconsistent with SEQRA because SEQRA permits a negative declaration for Type I actions, whereas Chapter 59 effectively precluded a negative declaration in such actions. Matter of Pilot Travel Ctrs., LLC v Town Bd. of Town of Bath, 2018 NY Slip Op 05082, Fourth Dept 7-6-18

​ENVIRONMENTAL LAW ((PETITION SEEKING TO ANNUL A NEGATIVE DECLARATION UNDER THE STATE ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY REVIEW ACT (SEQRA) CONCERNING A TRUCK STOP PROJECT PROPERLY DISMISSED FOR FAILURE TO EXHAUST ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES, TOWN PLANNING BOARD DID NOT ACT ARBITRARILY AND CAPRICIOUSLY WHEN IT FAILED TO FOLLOW A LOCAL LAW WHICH CONFLICTED WITH SEQRA (FOURTH DEPT)/STATE ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY REVIEW ACT (SEQRA) (PETITION SEEKING TO ANNUL A NEGATIVE DECLARATION UNDER THE STATE ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY REVIEW ACT (SEQRA) CONCERNING A TRUCK STOP PROJECT PROPERLY DISMISSED FOR FAILURE TO EXHAUST ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES, TOWN PLANNING BOARD DID NOT ACT ARBITRARILY AND CAPRICIOUSLY WHEN IT FAILED TO FOLLOW A LOCAL LAW WHICH CONFLICTED WITH SEQRA (FOURTH DEPT))/MUNICIPAL LAW (ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, PETITION SEEKING TO ANNUL A NEGATIVE DECLARATION UNDER THE STATE ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY REVIEW ACT (SEQRA) CONCERNING A TRUCK STOP PROJECT PROPERLY DISMISSED FOR FAILURE TO EXHAUST ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES, TOWN PLANNING BOARD DID NOT ACT ARBITRARILY AND CAPRICIOUSLY WHEN IT FAILED TO FOLLOW A LOCAL LAW WHICH CONFLICTED WITH SEQRA (FOURTH DEPT))/ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, MUNICIPAL LAW, (PETITION SEEKING TO ANNUL A NEGATIVE DECLARATION UNDER THE STATE ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY REVIEW ACT (SEQRA) CONCERNING A TRUCK STOP PROJECT PROPERLY DISMISSED FOR FAILURE TO EXHAUST ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES, TOWN PLANNING BOARD DID NOT ACT ARBITRARILY AND CAPRICIOUSLY WHEN IT FAILED TO FOLLOW A LOCAL LAW WHICH CONFLICTED WITH SEQRA (FOURTH DEPT))

July 6, 2018
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2018-07-06 10:54:252020-01-24 11:32:19PETITION SEEKING TO ANNUL A NEGATIVE DECLARATION UNDER THE STATE ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY REVIEW ACT (SEQRA) CONCERNING A TRUCK STOP PROJECT PROPERLY DISMISSED FOR FAILURE TO EXHAUST ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES, TOWN PLANNING BOARD DID NOT ACT ARBITRARILY AND CAPRICIOUSLY WHEN IT FAILED TO FOLLOW A LOCAL LAW WHICH CONFLICTED WITH SEQRA (FOURTH DEPT).
Arbitration, Civil Procedure, Judges, Municipal Law

COURT EXCEEDED ITS AUTHORITY WHEN IT VACATED AN ARBITRATION AWARD, COURT DID NOT ACQUIRE PERSONAL JURISDICTION OVER A POLICE OFFICER SEEKING MUNICIPAL LAW 207-c BENEFITS BECAUSE THE OFFICER NEVER AUTHORIZED THE UNION ATTORNEY TO REPRESENT HER (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court, over a dissent, determined Supreme Court exceeded its authority when it vacated an arbitration award and the court did not acquire personal jurisdiction over the police officer (Lee) seeking Municipal Law 207-c benefits in another arbitration proceeding handled by a union lawyer:

Lee established that the court failed to acquire personal jurisdiction over her in the proceeding to confirm the arbitration award … because the City never properly served her … . Nor did the court acquire personal jurisdiction over Lee by the unauthorized appearance of the Union’s attorney “on behalf of Katherine Lee.” Contrary to the City’s contention, there is no evidence that Lee expressly or implicitly authorized the Union’s attorney to represent her at any stage of the proceedings. …

We further conclude that the court erred in sua sponte vacating its prior order and judgment, which confirmed the arbitration award … , and directing further arbitration. … A court has authority to “vacate its own judgment for sufficient reason and in the interests of substantial justice” … . That authority, however, is not unlimited… . “A court’s inherent power to exercise control over its judgments is not plenary, and should be resorted to only to relieve a party from judgments taken through [fraud,] mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect” … .

In vacating the order and judgment, … the court “exceeded the narrow bounds within which courts are authorized to alter [arbitration] awards” … . None of the bases in CPLR 7511 (b) or (c) for vacating or modifying an arbitration award applies to the arbitrator’s failure to award the City a specific dollar amount for the value of benefits received by Lee, and the court had no power to disturb the award apart from the grounds set forth in those subdivisions  … . Matter of City of Syracuse (Lee), 2018 NY Slip Op 05077, Third Dept 7-6-18

​ARBITRATION (MUNICIPAL LAW, COURT EXCEEDED ITS AUTHORITY WHEN IT VACATED AN ARBITRATION AWARD, COURT DID NOT ACQUIRE PERSONAL JURISDICTION OVER A POLICE OFFICER SEEKING MUNICIPAL LAW 207-c BENEFITS BECAUSE THE OFFICER NEVER AUTHORIZED THE UNION ATTORNEY TO REPRESENT HER (FOURTH DEPT))/MUNICIPAL LAW (COURT EXCEEDED ITS AUTHORITY WHEN IT VACATED AN ARBITRATION AWARD, COURT DID NOT ACQUIRE PERSONAL JURISDICTION OVER A POLICE OFFICER SEEKING MUNICIPAL LAW 207-c BENEFITS BECAUSE THE OFFICER NEVER AUTHORIZED THE UNION ATTORNEY TO REPRESENT HER (FOURTH DEPT))/ATTORNEYS (MUNICIPAL LAW, COURT EXCEEDED ITS AUTHORITY WHEN IT VACATED AN ARBITRATION AWARD, COURT DID NOT ACQUIRE PERSONAL JURISDICTION OVER A POLICE OFFICER SEEKING MUNICIPAL LAW 207-c BENEFITS BECAUSE THE OFFICER NEVER AUTHORIZED THE UNION ATTORNEY TO REPRESENT HER (FOURTH DEPT))/CIVIL PROCEDURE (ARBITRATION,  COURT EXCEEDED ITS AUTHORITY WHEN IT VACATED AN ARBITRATION AWARD, COURT DID NOT ACQUIRE PERSONAL JURISDICTION OVER A POLICE OFFICER SEEKING MUNICIPAL LAW 207-c BENEFITS BECAUSE THE OFFICER NEVER AUTHORIZED THE UNION ATTORNEY TO REPRESENT HER (FOURTH DEPT))

July 6, 2018
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2018-07-06 09:28:202020-01-26 19:45:02COURT EXCEEDED ITS AUTHORITY WHEN IT VACATED AN ARBITRATION AWARD, COURT DID NOT ACQUIRE PERSONAL JURISDICTION OVER A POLICE OFFICER SEEKING MUNICIPAL LAW 207-c BENEFITS BECAUSE THE OFFICER NEVER AUTHORIZED THE UNION ATTORNEY TO REPRESENT HER (FOURTH DEPT).
Municipal Law, Negligence

ALTHOUGH DEFENDANT HOMEOWNER MAY HAVE REMOVED ICE AND SNOW FROM THE SIDEWALK, THERE WAS NO SHOWING THE REMOVAL EFFORTS EXACERBATED OR CREATED THE DANGEROUS CONDITION IN THIS SLIP AND FALL CASE, HOMEOWNER’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined that the defendant homeowner’s motion for summary judgment in this snow-ice sidewalk slip and fall case should have been granted. Under the NYC Administrative Code the owner of a single-family residential home has no statutory duty to maintain the abutting sidewalk. Although there was evidence defendant removed ice and snow from the sidewalk, there was no showing the snow removal efforts exacerbated or created the dangerous condition:

While there is record evidence that the defendants may have engaged in snow removal efforts prior to the accident, the defendants cannot be held liable for the removal of snow and ice in an incomplete manner … . Since the plaintiff failed to submit evidentiary facts to show that the defendants’ snow removal efforts created or exacerbated an existing hazard, the defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint should have been granted. Wise v Filincieri, 2018 NY Slip Op 05074, Second Dept 7-5-18

​NEGLIGENCE (SLIP AND FALL, ALTHOUGH DEFENDANT HOMEOWNER MAY HAVE REMOVED ICE AND SNOW FROM THE SIDEWALK, THERE WAS NO SHOWING THE REMOVAL EFFORTS EXACERBATED OR CREATED THE DANGEROUS CONDITION IN THIS SLIP AND FALL CASE, HOMEOWNER’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT))/MUNICIPAL LAW (SLIP AND FALL,  ALTHOUGH DEFENDANT HOMEOWNER MAY HAVE REMOVED ICE AND SNOW FROM THE SIDEWALK, THERE WAS NO SHOWING THE REMOVAL EFFORTS EXACERBATED OR CREATED THE DANGEROUS CONDITION IN THIS SLIP AND FALL CASE, HOMEOWNER’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT))/SLIP AND FALL (ALTHOUGH DEFENDANT HOMEOWNER MAY HAVE REMOVED ICE AND SNOW FROM THE SIDEWALK, THERE WAS NO SHOWING THE REMOVAL EFFORTS EXACERBATED OR CREATED THE DANGEROUS CONDITION IN THIS SLIP AND FALL CASE, HOMEOWNER’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT))/SIDEWALKS (SLIP AND FALL, ALTHOUGH DEFENDANT HOMEOWNER MAY HAVE REMOVED ICE AND SNOW FROM THE SIDEWALK, THERE WAS NO SHOWING THE REMOVAL EFFORTS EXACERBATED OR CREATED THE DANGEROUS CONDITION IN THIS SLIP AND FALL CASE, HOMEOWNER’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT))

July 5, 2018
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2018-07-05 12:39:582020-02-06 15:30:10ALTHOUGH DEFENDANT HOMEOWNER MAY HAVE REMOVED ICE AND SNOW FROM THE SIDEWALK, THERE WAS NO SHOWING THE REMOVAL EFFORTS EXACERBATED OR CREATED THE DANGEROUS CONDITION IN THIS SLIP AND FALL CASE, HOMEOWNER’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).
Municipal Law, Negligence

A TREE FELL ON THE CAR IN WHICH PLAINTIFF WAS A PASSENGER, TOWN’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED, TOWN DID NOT DEMONSTRATE IT HAD INSPECTED THE TREE AND DID NOT DEMONSTRATE A LACK OF NOTICE OF THE CONDITION OF THE TREE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the defendant town’s motion for summary judgment in this tree-fall accident should not have been granted. Plaintiff alleged a tree near the roadway fell on the vehicle in which plaintiff was a passenger:

Municipalities have a duty to maintain their roadways in a reasonably safe condition, and this duty extends to trees adjacent to the road which could pose a danger to travelers … . Municipalities also possess a common-law duty to inspect trees adjacent to their roadways … .

Here, the Town did not establish its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law because it failed to demonstrate that it met its duty to inspect and maintain the subject tree, or that it lacked constructive notice of the alleged dangerous condition of the tree … . Schillaci v Town of Islip, 2018 NY Slip Op 05070, Second Dept 7-5-18

​NEGLIGENCE (MUNICIPAL LAW, A TREE FELL ON THE CAR IN WHICH PLAINTIFF WAS A PASSENGER, TOWN’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED, TOWN DID NOT DEMONSTRATE IT HAD INSPECTED THE TREE AND DID NOT DEMONSTRATE A LACK OF NOTICE OF THE CONDITION OF THE TREE (SECOND DEPT))/MUNICIPAL LAW (NEGLIGENCE, TREES, ROADS AND HIGHWAYS, A TREE FELL ON THE CAR IN WHICH PLAINTIFF WAS A PASSENGER, TOWN’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED, TOWN DID NOT DEMONSTRATE IT HAD INSPECTED THE TREE AND DID NOT DEMONSTRATE A LACK OF NOTICE OF THE CONDITION OF THE TREE (SECOND DEPT))/TREES (MUNICIPAL LAW, HIGHWAYS AND ROADS, A TREE FELL ON THE CAR IN WHICH PLAINTIFF WAS A PASSENGER, TOWN’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED, TOWN DID NOT DEMONSTRATE IT HAD INSPECTED THE TREE AND DID NOT DEMONSTRATE A LACK OF NOTICE OF THE CONDITION OF THE TREE (SECOND DEPT))/HIGHWAYS AND ROADS (NEGLIGENCE, MUNICIPAL LAW, TREES, A TREE FELL ON THE CAR IN WHICH PLAINTIFF WAS A PASSENGER, TOWN’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED, TOWN DID NOT DEMONSTRATE IT HAD INSPECTED THE TREE AND DID NOT DEMONSTRATE A LACK OF NOTICE OF THE CONDITION OF THE TREE (SECOND DEPT))

July 5, 2018
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2018-07-05 11:13:552020-02-06 15:30:10A TREE FELL ON THE CAR IN WHICH PLAINTIFF WAS A PASSENGER, TOWN’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED, TOWN DID NOT DEMONSTRATE IT HAD INSPECTED THE TREE AND DID NOT DEMONSTRATE A LACK OF NOTICE OF THE CONDITION OF THE TREE (SECOND DEPT).
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