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Orange County Executive Did Not Have Authority to Terminate County Employees Before County Legislature Eliminated Positions

The Second Department reversed Supreme Court and determined the Orange County Executive did not have the authority to terminate county employees before the legislature acted to removed funding for the positions:

The doctrine of “[l]egislative equivalency requires that a position created by a legislative act can only be abolished by correlative legislative act”…. Pursuant to section 2.02(1) of the Orange County Charter and Orange County Administrative Code, the Orange County Legislature possesses sole authority to “establish or abolish positions of employment and titles thereof.” Here, the County Legislature had not taken any action to abolish the subject positions at the time the County Executive terminated the subject employees’ employment. While the Orange County Charter and Orange County Administrative Code give the County Executive the authority to “supervise, direct and control and administer all departments” (Orange County Charter § 3.02[e]; Administrative Code § 3.02[e]), they do not give the County Executive the authority to terminate the employment of civil service employees without a proper abolition of the positions by the County Legislature in accordance with the doctrine of legislative equivalency…. Further, County Charter § 4.10(a) does not authorize the County Executive to undertake any “remedial action” constituting, inter alia, unilateral modification to the budget and/or abolition of legislatively created positions…. Therefore, under these circumstances, the County Executive did not have the authority to terminate the subject employees’ employment for economic reasons, effective October 29, 2010.   Matter of Civil Serv Empls Assn Inc v County of Orange, 2013 NY Slip Op 04798, 2nd Dept 6-26-13

 

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Ambulance Services Provided by Municipality Constitute a Governmental, Not Proprietary, Function

In a full-fledged opinion by Judge Graffeo, with two concurrences, the majority determined ambulance assistance rendered by first responders is a governmental, not proprietary, function.  The majority also concluded a question of fact had been raised about whether the city owed a “special duty” to the plaintiff, who suffered serious brain damage after going into anaphylactic shock.  Judges Smith and Abdus-Salaam disagreed with the majority and would have found that the ambulance service was a proprietary function.  The Court explained:

When a negligence claim is asserted against a municipality, the first issue for a court to decide is whether the municipal entity was engaged in a proprietary function or acted in a governmental capacity at the time the claim arose. If the municipality’s actions fall in the proprietary realm, it is subject to suit under the ordinary rules of negligence applicable to non-governmental parties…. A government entity performs a purely proprietary role when its “activities essentially substitute for or supplement traditionally private enterprises”…. In contrast, a municipality will be deemed to have been engaged in a governmental function when its acts are “undertaken for the protection and safety of the public pursuant to the general police powers” …. * * *

If it is determined that a municipality was exercising a governmental function, the next inquiry focuses on the extent to which the municipality owed a “special duty” to the injured party. The core principle is that to “‘sustain liability against a municipality, the duty breached must be more than that owed the public generally'”… .  Applewhite, et al, v Accuhealth, Inc, et al, No 86, CtApp 6-25-13

 

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Town Law Applies to Fire District Election

The Second Department explained that the Town Law, not the Election Law, controls in a fire district election.  The Town Law, unlike the Election Law, does not require that a voter whose registration status cannot be immediately verified provide an affidavit he or she is duly registered to vote. The issue was important because the fire commissioner election was won by one vote and the voter whose status could not be immediately verified did not provide an affidavit:

Town Law § 175-a requires voters in fire district elections to be duly registered to vote (see Town Law § 175-a). However, Town Law § 175-a does not require a voter whose voter registration status cannot be immediately verified to provide an affidavit stating that he or she is duly registered to vote. The Election Law, in contrast, does contain such a requirement (see Election Law § 8-302[e][ii]). Specific Election Law provisions, however, do not apply to fire district elections unless the Town Law makes them specifically applicable …. The Town Law does not reference Election Law § 8-302 in its provisions governing fire district elections, and, as such, the affidavit required under that statute was not required here.  Matter of Buechele v Fairview Fire Dist, 2013 NY Slip Op 04603, 2nd Dept, 6-19-13

 

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Liability Criteria Re: Tenant for Slip and Fall on Abutting Public Sidewalk Explained

In dismissing a cause of action in a slip and fall case against a tenant based upon the alleged condition of an abutting public sidewalk (in which a pair of metal doors leading to the basement of the rented premises were set), the Second Department explained the relevant legal principles as follows:

An owner or occupier of land which abuts a public sidewalk owes no duty to maintain the sidewalk in a safe condition…, and liability may not be imposed upon it for injuries sustained as a result of a dangerous condition in the sidewalk, except where the abutting owner or lessee “ either created the condition, voluntarily but negligently made repairs, caused the condition to occur because of some special use, or violated a statute or ordinance placing upon the owner or lessee the obligation to maintain the sidewalk which imposes liability upon that party for injuries caused by a violation of that duty’”…. To recover from a tenant which occupies premises abutting a sidewalk under the theory that the tenant has a special use of the sidewalk, the tenant must be in exclusive possession and control of the alleged special-use area…, and the plaintiff must demonstrate that the special use caused the defective condition which proximately caused his or her injuries….  O’Toole v City of Yonkers, 2013 NY Slip Op 04585, 2nd Dept, 6-19-13

 

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Amendment to Notice of Claim to Add Second Hospital Should Have Been Allowed

In reversing Supreme Court’s denial of petitioner’s application to amend the notice of claim (to add a second hospital) in a wrongful death action against the New York City Health & Hospitals Corporation, the Second Department wrote:

The petitioner’s decedent … was severely beaten on November 10, 2010. He was taken first to Queens Center Hospital and soon thereafter transferred to Elmhurst Hospital for surgery, which took place the same day. The decedent died at Elmhurst Hospital a few days later. The petitioner alleged that the respondents’ employees either did not begin the surgery soon enough or did not perform the surgery correctly. In either event, all of the acts and omissions alleged to have been negligent took place on November 10, 2010. The petitioner’s original notice of claim did not mention Elmhurst Hospital, but the petitioner timely sought leave to amend the notice of claim to, inter alia, add allegations regarding the treatment at Elmhurst Hospital. The Supreme Court denied the relief sought by the petitioner.  All of the conduct alleged to have been negligent took place at the two named hospitals on the same day. Moreover, the respondents’ records noted the decedent’s transfer from Queens Center Hospital to Elmhurst Hospital and detailed all of the treatment rendered that day. The respondents could not have been prejudiced by the proposed amendment of the notice of claim and, under the circumstances, there was no need to treat that amendment as the assertion of a new claim (see General Municipal Law § 50-e[6];…).  Matter of Bingsen Xu v New York City Health & Hosps Corp, 2013 NY 04601, 2nd Dept, 6-19-13

 

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Plaintiff’s Lack of Knowledge About Contract Breaches Did Not Toll Statute of Limitations

The Second Department determined plaintiff’s lack of knowledge about alleged annual breaches of contract by the village for which he served as police commissioner was not the result of fraud and, therefore, the 18-month statute of limitations for each breach was not tolled:

Pursuant to CPLR 9802, “no action shall be maintained against the village upon or arising out of a contract of the village unless the same shall be commenced within eighteen months after the cause of action therefor shall have accrued, nor unless a written verified claim shall have been filed with the village clerk within one year after the cause of action shall have accrued.” Where the claim is for the payment of a sum of money allegedly owed pursuant to a contract, the cause of action accrues when the plaintiff possesses a legal right to demand payment…. Here, as the Village correctly contends, the causes of action alleging breach of contract accrued at the end of each year that the plaintiff allegedly was not paid in accordance with his contract…. Since this action was not commenced until September 28, 2011, the Village established, prima facie, that the action was time-barred to the extent that the plaintiff sought to recover damages accruing prior to March 28, 2010, that is, 18 months prior to the commencement of the action…. In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a question of fact as to whether the statute of limitations had been tolled or was otherwise inapplicable, or whether he actually commenced the action within the applicable limitations periods…. Contrary to the plaintiff’s contention, his lack of knowledge that the several breaches had occurred did not toll the running of the limitations period… Reid v Incorporated Vil of Flora Park, 2013 NY Slip Op 04321, 2nd Dept, 6-12-13

 

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Plaintiffs Should Have Been Allowed to File Late Notice of Claim

The First Department determined plaintiff, who was eleven at the time of the accident, should have been allowed to file an amended notice of claim. The original notice described the wrong address.  At the 50-h hearing the plaintiff identified the correct location after seeing photographs of the incorrect location.  The defendant did not meet its burden of demonstrating prejudice.  Gonzalez v NYC Hous Auth, 2013 NY Slip Op 04287, 1st Dept, 6-11-13

 

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HAIL Act Regulating Taxi Cabs and Livery Vehicles in New York City Does Not Violate Home Rule Section of State Constitution

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Piggot, held that the so-called HAIL Act, which regulates taxi cabs and livery vehicles in New York City, was not an unconstitutional special law in violation of the Home Rule Clause of the New York State Constitution because the statute benefits all New Yorkers, not just New York City residents:

At issue on this appeal is the constitutionality of chapter 602 of the Laws of 2011, as amended by chapter 9 of the Laws of 2012 (“HAIL Act”), which regulates medallion taxicabs (or “yellow cabs”) and livery vehicles, vital parts of New York City’s transportation system. The Act’s stated aim is to address certain mobility deficiencies in the City of New York, namely: the lack of accessible vehicles for residents and non-residents with disabilities; the dearth of available yellow cabs in the four boroughs outside Manhattan (“outer boroughs”), where residents and non-residents must instead rely on livery vehicles; and the sparse availability of yellow cab service outside Manhattan’s central business district. * * *

We conclude that the HAIL Act addresses a matter of substantial State concern. This is not a purely local issue. Millions of people from within and without the State visit the City annually. Some of these visitors are disabled, and will undoubtably benefit from the increase in accessible vehicles in the Manhattan central business district and in the outer boroughs. The Act is for the benefit of all New Yorkers, and not merely those residing within the City. Efficient transportation services in the State’s largest City and international center of commerce is important to the entire State. The Act plainly furthers all of these significant goals. Greater New York Taxi Association v State of New York…, Nos 98, 99, 100, CtApp, 6-6-13

 

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Different Monetary Standards in Wicks Law (Re: Bids for Construction Contracts) for Different Regions of State Did Not Violate Home Rule Section of State Constitution

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Read, determined that the Wicks Law, as amended, did not violate the Home Rule section of the State Constitution.  The Wicks Law “requires public entities seeking bids on construction contracts to obtain ‘separate specification’ for three ‘subdivisions of the work to be performed’—generally, plumbing, electrical and HVAC…”.  Until 2008 the Wicks Law applied to all contracts which exceeded $50,000.  The 2008 amendment raised the contract-amounts and imposed different thresholds for New York City, Nassau, Suffolk and Westchester Counties, and the 54 remaining counties.  The Home Rule section provides: “(b) Subject to the bill of rights of local governments and other applicable provisions of this constitution, the legislature:  . . .  (2) Shall have the power to act in relation to the property, affairs or government of any local government only by general law, or by special law… .”  There was no attempt to comply with the “special law” requirements.  The Court of Appeals determined that the proper test for determining whether the Home Rule section has been complied with is whether the statute relates primarily to a “matter of State concern:”

“The test is . . . that if the subject be in a substantial degree a matter of State concern, the Legislature may act, though intermingled with it are concerns of the locality… .” * * * This principle controls this case. It can hardly be disputed, and plaintiffs here do not dispute, that the manner of bidding on public construction contracts is a matter of substantial State concern. The existence of the Wicks Law itself for the last century, and of much other legislation governing public contracting (e.g., General Municipal Law § 100-a, [requiring competitive bidding]) attests to this. The very amendments of which plaintiffs complain, though they do not treat all counties alike, unquestionably affect the State as a whole.  Empire State Chapter of Associated Builders and Contractors, Inc…v Smith…, No 101, CtApp, 6-6-13

 

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Lane Abutting Properties Was Not Owned by Property-Owners

The Third Department upheld Supreme Court’s determination that the owners of property which abutted a street or lane did not privately own the lane, because no map was referenced in the relevant deeds, and because of the public use of the lane for more than ten years and maintenance of the street by the village:

Fiebelkorn [a leading case] and its progeny stand for the general proposition that “[w]hen an owner of property sells a lot with reference to a map, and the map shows that the lot abuts upon a street, the conveyance presumptively conveys fee ownership to the center of the street on which the lot abuts, subject to the rights of other lot owners and their invitees to use the entire area of the street for highway purposes”….    This general proposition of law is of no aid to plaintiffs, however, in view of the fact that, among other things, plaintiffs’ deeds contain no reference to a map. * * *

Here, plaintiffs argue that the lane cannot be deemed a village street because (a) it does not qualify as a public street by dedication (see Village Law § 6-610), (b) it does not appear on the state Department of Transportation’s inventory of local roads lying within the Village’s jurisdiction, and (c) the  Village  “has  never  maintained”  it.  Plaintiffs’ dedication argument is misplaced because…dedication is not the sole means by which a village street may be created (see Village Law  § 6-626). …  Kingsley v Village of Cooperstown, 515535, 3rd Dept, 6-6-13

 

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