Municipal Law – Page 105 – New York Appellate Digest

COUNTY HAD AUTHORITY TO IMPOSE A WAGE FREEZE TO ADDRESS A FINANCIAL CRISIS.

MUNICIPAL LAW, EMPLOYMENT LAW.

The Second Department, interpreting the Public Authorities Law, determined Nassau County had the authority to impose a wage freeze on county employees to address a financial crisis:

… [W]e find that, contrary to the … petitioners’ contention, the Supreme Court correctly determined that NIFA [Nassau County Interim Finance Authority] was authorized under the NIFA Act to impose the subject wage freezes (see Public Authorities Law § 3669[3]). Public Authorities Law § 3669(3) expressly provides for NIFA’s authority to declare a control period by enacting a resolution finding a fiscal crisis, and upon such finding, order that all increases in salary or wages of county employees be suspended. Control periods may be declared “at any time” (Public Authorities Law § 3669[1]). Matter of Carver v Nassau County Interim Fin. Auth., 2016 NY Slip Op 05995, 2nd Dept 9-14-16

MUNICIPAL LAW (COUNTY HAD AUTHORITY TO IMPOSE A WAGE FREEZE TO ADDRESS A FINANCIAL CRISIS)/EMPLOYMENT LAW (MUNICIPAL LAW, COUNTY HAD AUTHORITY TO IMPOSE A WAGE FREEZE TO ADDRESS A FINANCIAL CRISIS)/WAGE FREEZE (COUNTY HAD AUTHORITY TO IMPOSE A WAGE FREEZE TO ADDRESS A FINANCIAL CRISIS)

September 14, 2016

Civil Rights Law, Municipal Law, Negligence

PORTION OF DETECTIVE’S INTERNAL AFFAIRS FILE DISCOVERABLE; DEPOSITION OF ADDITIONAL EMERGENCY MEDICAL TECHNICIANS SHOULD HAVE BEEN ALLOWED.

In an action against a detective and emergency medical technicians (EMT’s) alleging negligence during an emergency response, the Second Department determined a portion of the detective’s “internal affairs” file was discoverable as “material and necessary” and the deposition of two additional EMT’s should have been allowed because sufficient information about the response to the accident had not been provided by the EMT’s who had been deposed:

Contrary to the Supreme Court’s determination, we find that two of the Internal Affairs records must be disclosed because they are relevant and material: (1) a recording or recordings of emergency dispatch calls referred to as “Seventh Precinct Band (Disc #1)” and (2) a “Fire, Rescue, and Emergency Services (FRES)” recording. Accordingly, the court should have granted that branch of the plaintiffs’ motion which was to compel the disclosure of those two records (see Civil Rights Law § 50-a…). * * *

Supreme Court should have granted that branch of the plaintiffs’ motion which was to compel the depositions of the EMTs or EMT aides who were present at the accident scene. In the first instance, a municipality has the right to determine which of its officers or employees with knowledge of the facts may appear for a deposition … . Similarly, “[a] corporate entity has the right to designate, in the first instance, the employee who shall be examined” … . In order to demonstrate that additional depositions are necessary, the movant must show “(1) that the representatives already deposed had insufficient knowledge, or were otherwise inadequate, and (2) there is a substantial likelihood that the persons sought for depositions possess information which is material and necessary to the prosecution of the case” … .

Here, only two EMTs who responded to the accident scene have been deposed thus far, and one of those EMTs is the … officer who allegedly failed to provide necessary first aid to the decedent. The testimony of these two emergency responders did not provide sufficient information regarding the actions taken by the various EMTs and ambulance workers who responded to the accident, and it is likely that other on-scene EMTs may possess relevant and material information. Under these circumstances, the plaintiffs are entitled to depose the other members of the ambulance company who were present at the accident scene … . Cea v Zimmerman, 2016 NY Slip Op 05968, 2nd Dept 9-14-16

MUNICIPAL LAW (PORTION OF DETECTIVE’S INTERNAL AFFAIRS FILE DISCOVERABLE; DEPOSITION OF ADDITIONAL EMERGENCY MEDICAL TECHNICIANS SHOULD HAVE BEEN ALLOWED)/CIVIL RIGHTS LAW (POLICE OFFICERS, PORTION OF DETECTIVE’S INTERNAL AFFAIRS FILE DISCOVERABLE)/POLICE OFFICERS (POLICE OFFICERS, PORTION OF DETECTIVE’S INTERNAL AFFAIRS FILE DISCOVERABLE)/CIVIL PROCEDURE (NEGLIGENCE, DEPOSITION OF ADDITIONAL EMERGENCY MEDICAL TECHNICIANS SHOULD HAVE BEEN ALLOWED)/NEGLIGENCE (NEGLIGENCE, PORTION OF DETECTIVE’S INTERNAL AFFAIRS FILE DISCOVERABLE; DEPOSITION OF ADDITIONAL EMERGENCY MEDICAL TECHNICIANS SHOULD HAVE BEEN ALLOWED)

September 14, 2016

Education-School Law, Municipal Law

CERTAIN CAUSES OF ACTION IN COMPLAINTS ALLEGING THE STATE HAS FAILED TO ADEQUATELY FUND NEW YORK CITY PUBLIC SCHOOLS ADEQUATELY PLED; MUNICIPALITY (CITY OF YONKERS), HOWEVER, DID NOT HAVE STANDING TO SUE.

The First Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Tom, determined plaintiffs (parents of students, among others) had sufficiently pled certain causes of action based upon the state’s alleged failure to adequately fund New York City public schools. The complex discussion cannot be summarized here. With respect to a municipality’s (here, the City of Yonkers’) lack of standing standing to sue the state in this context, the court explained:

The City of Yonkers maintains that it has capacity to sue …, asserting that the educational funding cuts have deprived it of a proprietary interest in the Foundation Aid monies calculated to be apportioned to it by formula pursuant to the 2007 Budget and Reform Act. This argument is unpersuasive. Contrary to Yonkers’s contention, the proprietary interest exception does not apply where a municipality has “a mere hope or expectancy” of receiving funds … , but instead “relate[s] to funds or property of a municipal corporation in its possession or to which it had a right to immediate possession” … . The Foundation Aid monies provided for under the 2007 Budget and Reform Act (codified in Education Law § 3602) are the product of a complex formula that turns on the application of numerous variables, including things like a school district’s “daily attendance figures” … . Sums allocated pursuant to the formula therefore vary from year to year. Moreover, any sums provided for by Foundation Aid must themselves be the subject of a separate budgetary appropriation; absent such appropriation, they do not exist (see State Finance Law §§ 4[1]; 40[2][a]). Thus, the Foundation Aid formula does not create any “specific sum of money” that would “create[] a proprietary interest” in any school district … . Aristy-Farer v State of New York, 2016 NY Slip Op 05960, 1st Dept 9-8-16

EDUCATION-SCHOOL LAW (CERTAIN CAUSES OF ACTION IN COMPLAINTS ALLEGING THE STATE HAS FAILED TO ADEQUATELY FUND NEW YORK CITY PUBLIC SCHOOLS ADEQUATELY PLED; MUNICIPALITY (CITY OF YONKERS), HOWEVER, DID NOT HAVE STANDING TO SUE)/MUNICIPAL LAW (CERTAIN CAUSES OF ACTION IN COMPLAINTS ALLEGING THE STATE HAS FAILED TO ADEQUATELY FUND NEW YORK CITY PUBLIC SCHOOLS ADEQUATELY PLED; MUNICIPALITY (CITY OF YONKERS), HOWEVER, DID NOT HAVE STANDING TO SUE)

September 8, 2016

Municipal Law

USE OF ROADWAY BY PEDESTRIANS AND BICYCLISTS MAY SUFFICE TO SHOW A ROADWAY, NOT USED BY VEHICLES, HAS NOT BEEN ABANDONED WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE HIGHWAY LAW.

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined there was a question of whether a roadway had been abandoned under Highway Law 205. The court noted that the lack of use by vehicles does not necessarily render a roadway abandoned. Use by pedestrians and bicyclists may suffice. The plaintiff demonstrated such recreational use. The town raised a question of fact whether the roadway had been abandoned with proof portions of the roadway were impassable:

Once a highway exists, it is presumed to continue until the contrary is demonstrated … . “It will be deemed abandoned, however, if it is not traveled or used as a public highway for six years” … . To show use as a highway, there must be evidence that travel proceeds, in forms reasonably normal, along the lines of an existing street … . Automobile use is not determinative in assessing whether a road has been abandoned … . Indeed, evidence of frequent recreational activity may be sufficient to preclude a finding of abandonment … . Dandomar Co., LLC v Town of Pleasant Val. Town Bd., 2016 NY Slip Op 05905, 2nd Dept 8-31-16

MUNICIPAL LAW (USE OF ROADWAY BY PEDESTRIANS AND BICYCLISTS MAY SUFFICE TO SHOW A ROADWAY, NOT USED BY VEHICLES, HAS NOT BEEN ABANDONED WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE HIGHWAY LAW)/HIGHWAY LAW (USE OF ROADWAY BY PEDESTRIANS AND BICYCLISTS MAY SUFFICE TO SHOW A ROADWAY, NOT USED BY VEHICLES, HAS NOT BEEN ABANDONED WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE HIGHWAY LAW)/ABANDONMENT (HIGHWAY LAW, USE OF ROADWAY BY PEDESTRIANS AND BICYCLISTS MAY SUFFICE TO SHOW A ROADWAY, NOT USED BY VEHICLES, HAS NOT BEEN ABANDONED WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE HIGHWAY LAW)

August 31, 2016

Appeals, Immunity, Municipal Law

WAIVER OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY ARGUMENT COULD BE CONSIDERED ON APPEAL EVEN THOUGH NOT RAISED BELOW, CRITERIA EXPLAINED.

The First Department determined the Port Authority of NY & NJ did not waive sovereign immunity, despite several contract provisions requiring several steps to resolve disputes prior to resorting to suit. Because the notice of claim and the subsequent filing of a complaint were not timely pursuant to Unconsolidated Law 7107, the complaint was properly dismissed. The court noted that, although the waiver of sovereignty argument was not raised below, the appellate court could consider the argument (which was rejected). With respect to the powers of the appellate court in this context, the court explained:

… [W]here a party does not allege new facts, but merely raises a legal argument that appeared upon the face of the record, we are free to consider the argument “[s]o long as the issue is determinative and the record on appeal is sufficient to permit our review” … . The waiver argument presents this very circumstance, and therefore, we consider [the] waiver argument on this appeal. W&W Steel, LLC v Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 2016 NY Slip Op 05900, 1st Dept 8-25-16

(MUNICIPAL LAW (WAIVER OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY ARGUMENT COULD BE CONSIDERED ON APPEAL EVEN THOUGH NOT RAISED BELOW, CRITERIA EXPLAINED)APPEALS (WAIVER OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY ARGUMENT COULD BE CONSIDERED ON APPEAL EVEN THOUGH NOT RAISED BELOW, CRITERIA EXPLAINED)/IMMUNITY (MUNICIPAL LAW, WAIVER OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY ARGUMENT COULD BE CONSIDERED ON APPEAL EVEN THOUGH NOT RAISED BELOW, CRITERIA EXPLAINED)

August 25, 2016

Landlord-Tenant, Municipal Law, Negligence

LESSEE AND CITY NOT LIABLE FOR HOLE IN SIDEWALK; DEFECT WAS NOT IN THE CURB CUT OR PEDESTRIAN RAMP FOR WHICH THE ABUTTING PROPERTY OWNER WOULD NOT BE RESPONSIBLE.

The Second Department determined the lessee of property abutting a sidewalk and the city (NYC) were entitled to summary judgment in this slip and fall case. The city argued it did not have prior written notice of the hole in the sidewalk. The lessee, El Fuerte, argued it did not create the dangerous condition, did not violate any statute or ordinance, and the lease imposed no duty to repair the sidewalk. With regard to the liability of the abutting property owner, the court noted that, although a curb cut and pedestrian ramp leading from a sidewalk to the street are not the responsibility of the abutting property owner, the defect here was not in the curb cut or ramp:

… [A] lessee of property which abuts a public sidewalk owes no duty to maintain the sidewalk in a safe condition, and liability may not be imposed upon it for injuries sustained as a result of a dangerous condition in the sidewalk, except where the abutting lessee either created the condition, voluntarily but negligently made repairs, caused the condition to occur because of some special use, or violated a statute or ordinance placing upon the lessee the obligation to maintain the sidewalk which imposes liability upon the lessee for injuries caused by a violation of that duty … . * * * … [A] provision of a lease which obligates a tenant to repair a sidewalk does not impose on the tenant a duty to a third party, such as the plaintiff. Martin v Rizzatti, 2016 NY Slip Op 05797, 2nd Dept 8-17-16

NEGLIGENCE (LESSEE AND CITY NOT LIABLE FOR HOLE IN SIDEWALK; DEFECT WAS NOT IN THE CURB CUT OR PEDESTRIAN RAMP FOR WHICH THE ABUTTING PROPERTY OWNER WOULD NOT BE RESPONSIBLE)/MUNICIPAL LAW (SIDEWALK SLIP AND FALL, LESSEE AND CITY NOT LIABLE FOR HOLE IN SIDEWALK; DEFECT WAS NOT IN THE CURB CUT OR PEDESTRIAN RAMP FOR WHICH THE ABUTTING PROPERTY OWNER WOULD NOT BE RESPONSIBLE)/LANDLORD-TENANT (LESSEE AND CITY NOT LIABLE FOR HOLE IN SIDEWALK; DEFECT WAS NOT IN THE CURB CUT OR PEDESTRIAN RAMP FOR WHICH THE ABUTTING PROPERTY OWNER WOULD NOT BE RESPONSIBLE)/SIDEWALKS (LESSEE AND CITY NOT LIABLE FOR HOLE IN SIDEWALK; DEFECT WAS NOT IN THE CURB CUT OR PEDESTRIAN RAMP FOR WHICH THE ABUTTING PROPERTY OWNER WOULD NOT BE RESPONSIBLE)/SLIP AND FALL (LESSEE AND CITY NOT LIABLE FOR HOLE IN SIDEWALK; DEFECT WAS NOT IN THE CURB CUT OR PEDESTRIAN RAMP FOR WHICH THE ABUTTING PROPERTY OWNER WOULD NOT BE RESPONSIBLE)

August 17, 2016

Immunity, Municipal Law, Negligence

INVESTIGATION OF CHILD ABUSE IS A DISCRETIONARY ACT, CITY CAN NOT BE SUED FOR NEGLIGENT INVESTIGATION; NEW YORK DOES NOT RECOGNIZE A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR NEGLIGENT INVESTIGATION.

The Second Department determined the City of New York was immune from a suit alleging the negligent investigation of child abuse, leading to the child’s death two years later. The court also noted that New York does not recognize a cause of action for negligent investigation or prosecution:

… [T]he defendants contended and established that they engaged in discretionary conduct in investigating the report of abuse in 2003, and thus cannot be held liable for the manner in which the investigation was performed under the doctrine of governmental immunity … . A government’s performance of a governmental function, when discretionary in nature, cannot result in liability .. . Discretionary acts “involve the exercise of reasoned judgment which could typically produce different acceptable results” … . The defendants demonstrated that the subject investigation consisted of a series of discretionary acts … , and that this was not a situation in which no discretion or judgment was exercised. In any event, the defendants also demonstrated their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by establishing that New York does not recognize a cause of action sounding in negligent investigation or negligent prosecution … . Hines v City of New York, 2016 NY Slip Op 05794, 2nd Dept 8-17-16

NEGLIGENCE (INVESTIGATION OF CHILD ABUSE IS A DISCRETIONAY ACT, CITY CAN NOT BE SUED FOR NEGLIGENT INVESTIGATION; NEW YORK DOES NOT RECOGNIZE A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR NEGLIGENT INVESTIGATION)/MUNICIPAL LAW (INVESTIGATION OF CHILD ABUSE IS A DISCRETIONAY ACT, CITY CAN NOT BE SUED FOR NEGLIGENT INVESTIGATION; NEW YORK DOES NOT RECOGNIZE A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR NEGLIGENT INVESTIGATION)/GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY (INVESTIGATION OF CHILD ABUSE IS A DISCRETIONAY ACT, CITY CAN NOT BE SUED FOR NEGLIGENT INVESTIGATION; NEW YORK DOES NOT RECOGNIZE A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR NEGLIGENT INVESTIGATION)/CHILD ABUSE (INVESTIGATION OF CHILD ABUSE IS A DISCRETIONAY ACT, CITY CAN NOT BE SUED FOR NEGLIGENT INVESTIGATION; NEW YORK DOES NOT RECOGNIZE A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR NEGLIGENT INVESTIGATION)/NEGLIGENT INVESTIGATION OF CHILD ABUSE (INVESTIGATION OF CHILD ABUSE IS A DISCRETIONAY ACT, CITY CAN NOT BE SUED FOR NEGLIGENT INVESTIGATION; NEW YORK DOES NOT RECOGNIZE A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR NEGLIGENT INVESTIGATION)

August 17, 2016

Municipal Law, Negligence

PETITIONER SHOULD HAVE BEEN ALLOWED TO FILE A LATE NOTICE OF CLAIM IN RESPONSE TO THE CITY’S RAISING AN AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE IN A RELATED FEDERAL ACTION.

The First Department, over an extensive two-justice dissent, determined the petitioners’ motion for leave to file a late notice of claim against the city should have been granted. Petitioner was using a bicycle provided by New York City’s Citi Bike program when he struck a wheel stop and flipped over, injuring his head. In a federal diversity action stemming from the same incident, the city asserted an affirmative defense based upon petitioner’s failure to wear a helmet. Petitioner, in the federal action, was allowed thereafter to assert a negligence claim against the city based upon the city’s failure to rent helmets. Petitioner, in the state action, then sought both to amend the notice of claim and to file a late notice of claim to reflect the helmet allegation, as well as a negligent design allegation (re: placement of the wheel stop). The motion to amend was rejected by the First Department but the motion to file a late notice (General Municipal Law 50-3 (5)) was granted:

Here, to the extent that the allegations concerning the design of the station differ between the original notice of claim and the proposed amended notice of claim, the City unquestionably had actual notice of the claims in the latter document, based on the original notice of claim. Further, it was not prejudiced by petitioner’s amplification of the claims in the proposed amended notice, since the alleged defect was not transitory in nature … . * * *

We note that petitioner’s failure to use a helmet is akin to a plaintiff’s failure to use a seatbelt in a motor vehicle case. It is well settled that any such failure does not go to comparative liability but rather to how damages, if any, should be assessed … . Further, the City bears the burden of proving that some or all of petitioner’s injuries would not have been received had he used a helmet … . Accordingly, petitioners had no reason to make a claim concerning the lack of helmets until the City raised the issue. Additionally, * * * the City cannot claim to be prejudiced where it chose to inject a mitigation defense into the federal action, and petitioners are merely trying to ensure that their notice of claim supports their effort to rebut that defense … . Matter of Corwin v City of New York, 2016 NY Slip Op 05663, 1st Dept 7-28-16

MUNICIPAL LAW (PETITIONER SHOULD HAVE BEEN ALLOWED TO FILE A LATE NOTICE OF CLAIM IN RESPONSE TO THE CITY’S RAISING OF AN AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE IN A RELATED FEDERAL ACTION)/NEGLIGENCE (MUNICIPAL LAW, PETITIONER SHOULD HAVE BEEN ALLOWED TO FILE A LATE NOTICE OF CLAIM IN RESPONSE TO THE CITY’S RAISING OF AN AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE IN A RELATED FEDERAL ACTION)/NOTICE OF CLAIM (ALTHOUGH THE NOTICE COULD NOT BE AMENDED, A LATE NOTICE ASSERTING A NEW THEORY SHOULD HAVE BEEN ALLOWED)/BICYCLISTS (FAILURE TO WEAR A HELMET GOES TO COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE)/HELMETS (BICYCLISTS, FAILURE TO WEAR A HELMET GOES TO COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE)

July 28, 2016

Immunity, Municipal Law, Negligence

NO SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP WITH PLAINTIFF’S DECEDENT, CITY IMMUNE FROM SUIT.

The Second Department determined the City emergency response personnel did not enter into a special relationship with plaintiff’s decedent based upon the 911 operator’s assurance an ambulance was on its way. There was some confusion about where plaintiff’s decedent was located which resulted is some delay in the arrival of help:

Here, the defendant demonstrated its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law dismissing the complaint by establishing that no special relationship existed between it and the decedent … . The defendant demonstrated, prima facie, that the firefighters did not assume an affirmative duty to act on the decedent’s behalf, and, in opposition, the plaintiffs failed to raise a triable issue of fact … . Moreover, even assuming that the 911 operator’s assurance that an ambulance was on its way constituted an assumption by the defendant of an affirmative duty to act on behalf of the decedent, the defendant demonstrated, prima facie, that the decedent and the plaintiffs did not rely to their detriment on that assurance. In opposition, the plaintiffs failed to raise a triable issue of fact. The record does not show that the plaintiffs were lulled by any assurance made by the 911 operator into a false sense of security that caused them “to forego other available avenues of protection” … . Holloway v City of New York, 2016 NY Slip Op 05627, 2nd Dept 7-27-16

MUNICIPAL LAW (NO SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP WITH PLAINTIFF’S DECEDENT, CITY IMMUNE FROM SUIT)/ GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY (NO SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP WITH PLAINTIFF’S DECEDENT, CITY IMMUNE FROM SUIT)/NEGLIGENCE (GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY, (NO SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP WITH PLAINTIFF’S DECEDENT, CITY IMMUNE FROM SUIT)

July 27, 2016

Landlord-Tenant, Municipal Law

HOUSING AUTHORITY VIOLATED ITS OWN RULES AND EFFECTIVELY PREVENTED PETITIONER FROM MEETING THE PREREQUISITES FOR A HEARING ON HER REMAINING FAMILY MEMBER GRIEVANCE.

The First Department, over an extensive dissent, determined the New York City Housing Authority (NYCHA) effectively made it impossible for the petitioner to meet the prerequisites for a hearing (paying use and occupancy arrears) on her “remaining family member” grievance. The case was therefore remitted for a hearing on the grievance:

The NYCHA Management Manual requires that a remaining family member grievant must remain current in use and occupancy to pursue the grievance (NYCHA Management Manual, ch 1, subd XII[D][2][b]). This Court has upheld that requirement (Matter of Garcia v Franco, 248 AD2d 263, 265 [1st Dept 1998], lv denied 92 NY2d 813 [1998]). However, in this case, NYCHA’s application of that rule to petitioner, and its resulting dismissal of her remaining family member grievance, was arbitrary and capricious. NYCHA failed and refused to recalculate use and occupancy based on petitioner’s income, notwithstanding that the NYCHA Management Manual requires that it do so, during the pendency of a remaining family member grievance, in order for it to determine use and occupancy as the lower of the tenant of record’s rent or the rent rate based on the income of the remaining occupant (Manual, at ch 1, subd XII[D][2][b])[FN1]. NYCHA also failed and refused to provide petitioner with information and documents necessary for her to apply for funds to pay the arrears in use and occupancy. As a result, it was impossible for petitioner to meet the condition precedent to a hearing. Matter of Figueroa v New York City Hous. Auth., 2016 NY Slip Op 05619, 1st Dept 7-21-16

MUNICIPAL LAW (HOUSING AUTHORITY VIOLATED ITS OWN RULES AND EFFECTIVELY PREVENTED PETITIONER FROM MEETING THE PREREQUISITES FOR A HEARING ON HER REMAINING FAMILY MEMBER GRIEVANCE)/LANDLORD-TENANT (NEW YORK CITY HOUSING AUTHORITY, HOUSING AUTHORITY VIOLATED ITS OWN RULES AND EFFECTIVELY PREVENTED PETITIONER FROM MEETING THE PREREQUISITES FOR A HEARING ON HER REMAINING FAMILY MEMBER GRIEVANCE)/NEW YORK CITY HOUSING AUTHORITY (HOUSING AUTHORITY VIOLATED ITS OWN RULES AND EFFECTIVELY PREVENTED PETITIONER FROM MEETING THE PREREQUISITES FOR A HEARING ON HER REMAINING FAMILY MEMBER GRIEVANCE)

July 20, 2016