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NYC TAXI AND LIMOUSINE COMMISSION’S RULES RE: HYBRID AND WHEELCHAIR ACCESSIBLE TAXICABS AND LIVERY VEHICLES UPHELD.

The First Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Kahn too detailed to be summarized here, upheld the validity of the New York City Taxi and Limousine Commission’s (TLC’s) “Accessibility Rules” which aim to increase the number of hybrid and wheel-chair-accessible taxicabs and livery vehicles:

In keeping with [the] legislative intent, the TLC promulgated sections 51-03, 58-50 and the other aspects of the Accessibility Rules. In those rules, the TLC established a precondition for commencement of the program that encouraged the development of a vehicle that is both compliant with [Administrative Code] § 19-533 [re: hybrid vehicles] and accessible, consistent with its twin statutory mandates of promoting cleaner air and serving disabled passengers. Recognizing that such a vehicle might not be developed, however, the TLC included language in this rule limiting the time period in which this precondition remained in effect to no later than January 1, 2016, 20 months after the Accessibility Rules were promulgated. In doing so, the TLC rationally promulgated rules providing for a reasonable period of time for the development of an accessible hybrid electric vehicle while ensuring that, at minimum, the TLC’s mandate to increase the number of accessible taxicabs would be fulfilled. Matter of Clair v City of New York, 2016 NY Slip Op 06768, 1st Dept 10-13-16

MUNICIPAL LAW (NYC TAXI AND LIMOUSINE COMMISSION’S RULES RE: HYBRID AND WHEELCHAIR ACCESSIBLE TAXICABS AND LIVERY VEHICLES UPHELD)/TAXIS (NYC TAXI AND LIMOUSINE COMMISSION’S RULES RE: HYBRID AND WHEELCHAIR ACCESSIBLE TAXICABS AND LIVERY VEHICLES UPHELD)/DISABILITIES, PERSONS WITH (NYC TAXI AND LIMOUSINE COMMISSION’S RULES RE: HYBRID AND WHEELCHAIR ACCESSIBLE TAXICABS AND LIVERY VEHICLES UPHELD)/HYBRID VEHICLES (NYC TAXI AND LIMOUSINE COMMISSION’S RULES RE: HYBRID AND WHEELCHAIR ACCESSIBLE TAXICABS AND LIVERY VEHICLES UPHELD)

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ABUTTING PROPERTY OWNER NOT LIABLE IN NEGLIGENCE FOR INJURY TO POLICE OFFICER DUE TO THE CONDITION OF THE SIDEWALK; HOWEVER PROPERTY OWNER MAY BE LIABLE UNDER GENERAL MUNICIPAL LAW 205-e BASED UPON CODE VIOLATIONS RE: SIDEWALK MAINTENANCE.

The Second Department determined the common law negligence cause of action brought by a police officer against the owner of property abutting the sidewalk where the officer allegedly slipped and fell, was properly dismissed. The applicable village and town codes did not make an abutting landowner liable in tort to someone injured on the sidewalk. However, the police officer’s action under General Municipal Law 205-e properly survived summary judgment. A property owner’s violation of a code provision requiring maintenance of the sidewalk was a proper basis for an action under General Municipal Law 205-e:

… [ t]he Supreme Court properly denied that branch of the defendant’s motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the second cause of action, which seeks to recover damages pursuant to General Municipal Law § 205-e. “A police officer seeking to recover under General Municipal Law § 205-e must identify a statute or ordinance with which the defendant failed to comply and must, in addition, set forth facts from which it may be inferred that the defendant’s negligence directly or indirectly caused harm to him or her” … . As a prerequisite to recovery pursuant to a General Municipal Law § 205-e cause of action, a police officer must demonstrate injury resulting from negligent noncompliance with a requirement found in a well-developed body of law and regulation that imposes clear legal duties … .

* * * Section 302.3 of the 2007 Property Maintenance Code of New York State (see 19 NYCRR 1226.1) has been found by this Court to be a proper predicate for recovery under General Municipal Law § 205-e … .

Further, § 181-11 of the Town Code and § 250-27 of the Village Code are well-developed bodies of law that impose clear duties upon every property owner to keep his or her sidewalk in good and safe repair. Lewis v Palazzolo, 2016 NY Slip Op 06686, 2nd Dept 10-12-16

 

NEGLIGENCE (ABUTTING PROPERTY OWNER NOT LIABLE IN NEGLIGENCE FOR INJURY TO POLICE OFFICER DUE TO THE CONDITION OF THE SIDEWALK; HOWEVER PROPERTY OWNER MAY BE LIABLE UNDER GENERAL MUNICIPAL LAW 205-e BASED UPON CODE VIOLATIONS RE: SIDEWALK MAINTENANCE)/MUNICIPAL LAW (ABUTTING PROPERTY OWNER NOT LIABLE IN NEGLIGENCE FOR INJURY TO POLICE OFFICER DUE TO THE CONDITION OF THE SIDEWALK; HOWEVER PROPERTY OWNER MAY BE LIABLE UNDER GENERAL MUNICIPAL LAW 205-e BASED UPON CODE VIOLATIONS RE: SIDEWALK MAINTENANCE)/SLIP AND FALL (POLICE OFFICERS, (ABUTTING PROPERTY OWNER NOT LIABLE IN NEGLIGENCE FOR INJURY TO POLICE OFFICER DUE TO THE CONDITION OF THE SIDEWALK; HOWEVER PROPERTY OWNER MAY BE LIABLE UNDER GENERAL MUNICIPAL LAW 205-e BASED UPON CODE VIOLATIONS RE: SIDEWALK MAINTENANCE)/SIDEWALKS (POLICE OFFICERS, (ABUTTING PROPERTY OWNER NOT LIABLE IN NEGLIGENCE FOR INJURY TO POLICE OFFICER DUE TO THE CONDITION OF THE SIDEWALK; HOWEVER PROPERTY OWNER MAY BE LIABLE UNDER GENERAL MUNICIPAL LAW 205-e BASED UPON CODE VIOLATIONS RE: SIDEWALK MAINTENANCE)/POLICE OFFICERS (SLIP AND FALL, ABUTTING PROPERTY OWNER NOT LIABLE IN NEGLIGENCE FOR INJURY TO POLICE OFFICER DUE TO THE CONDITION OF THE SIDEWALK; HOWEVER PROPERTY OWNER MAY BE LIABLE UNDER GENERAL MUNICIPAL LAW 205-e BASED UPON CODE VIOLATIONS RE: SIDEWALK MAINTENANCE)

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DOCTRINE OF EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL APPLIED TO DENY NYC TRANSIT AUTHORITY’S MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO SERVE A NOTICE OF CLAIM; THE NOTICE HAD BEEN TIMELY SERVED ON THE METROPOLITAN TRANSIT AUTHORITY AND A 50-h HEARING HAD BEEN HELD.

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the doctrine of equitable estoppel should have been applied to deny the NYC Transit Authority’s (NYCTA’s) motion to dismiss for failure to timely serve a notice of claim. The notice of claim had been timely served on the Metropolitan Transit Authority (MTA) and a 50-h hearing had been held:

Although the MTA and NYCTA share an affiliation, they are separate entities … . Thus, service of a notice of claim upon the MTA does not satisfy the condition precedent of serving a notice of claim upon the NYCTA … . However, a municipal corporation may be equitably estopped from asserting lack of notice of claim when it has wrongfully or negligently engaged in conduct that misled or discouraged a party from serving a timely notice of claim or making a timely application for leave to serve a late notice of claim, and when that conduct was justifiably relied upon by that party … . “By applying the doctrine of equitable estoppel to notice of claim situations, the courts may insure that statutes like section 50-e of the General Municipal Law, do not become a trap to catch the unwary or the ignorant'” … .  Konner v New York City Tr. Auth., 2016 NY Slip Op 06683, 2nd Dept 10-12-16

MUNICIPAL LAW (DOCTRINE OF EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL APPLIED TO DENY NYC TRANSIT AUTHORITY’S MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO SERVE A NOTICE OF CLAIM; THE NOTICE HAD BEEN TIMELY SERVED ON THE METROPOLITAN TRANSIT AUTHORITY AND A 50-h HEARING HAD BEEN HELD)/NEGLIGENCE (MUNICIPLA LAW, NOTICE OF CLAIM, DOCTRINE OF EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL APPLIED TO DENY NYC TRANSIT AUTHORITY’S MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO SERVE A NOTICE OF CLAIM; THE NOTICE HAD BEEN TIMELY SERVED ON THE METROPOLITAN TRANSIT AUTHORITY AND A 50-h HEARING HAD BEEN HELD)/CIVIL PROCEDURE (EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL, DOCTRINE OF EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL APPLIED TO DENY NYC TRANSIT AUTHORITY’S MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO SERVE A NOTICE OF CLAIM; THE NOTICE HAD BEEN TIMELY SERVED ON THE METROPOLITAN TRANSIT AUTHORITY AND A 50-h HEARING HAD BEEN HELD)/NOTICE OF CLAIM (DOCTRINE OF EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL APPLIED TO DENY NYC TRANSIT AUTHORITY’S MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO SERVE A NOTICE OF CLAIM; THE NOTICE HAD BEEN TIMELY SERVED ON THE METROPOLITAN TRANSIT AUTHORITY AND A 50-h HEARING HAD BEEN HELD)/EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL (MUNICIPAL LAW, NOTICE OF CLAIM, DOCTRINE OF EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL APPLIED TO DENY NYC TRANSIT AUTHORITY’S MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO SERVE A NOTICE OF CLAIM; THE NOTICE HAD BEEN TIMELY SERVED ON THE METROPOLITAN TRANSIT AUTHORITY AND A 50-h HEARING HAD BEEN HELD)

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VILLAGE FAILED TO DEMONSTRATE MELTING AND FREEZING OF A PILE OF SNOW DID NOT CREATE THE HAZARD, SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED.

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined summary judgment in favor of the defendant village should not have been granted in this sidewalk slip and fall case.  Although the village demonstrated it did not have written notice of snow and ice on the sidewalk, it did not demonstrate its practice of piling snow did not create the hazard:

While the mere failure to remove all snow or ice from a sidewalk is an act of omission, rather than an affirmative act of negligence … , a municipality’s act in piling snow as part of its snow removal efforts, which snow pile then melts and refreezes to create a dangerous icy condition, constitutes an affirmative act excepting the dangerous condition from the prior written notice requirement … . The defendant’s evidence demonstrated that the temperature rose and remained above freezing for an extended period of time on the day before the plaintiff’s accident, after the defendant created the snow piles. On the day of the plaintiff’s accident, however, the temperature dropped to below freezing. While the defendant submitted an affidavit of an employee who stated that he applied sand and salt to the area of the sidewalk where the plaintiff fell sometime between 7:30 a.m. and 4:00 p.m. on the day of plaintiff’s accident, the plaintiff testified at his hearing held pursuant to General Municipal Law § 50-h that there was no sand or salt on the sidewalk at the time of his fall. Evidence submitted by the defendant also indicates that the ice upon which the plaintiff fell was located on a portion of the sidewalk that sloped down from the snow piles. Larenas v Incorporated Vil. of Garden City, 2016 NY Slip Op 06684, 2nd Dept 10-12-16

MUNICIPAL LAW (NEGLIGENCE,VILLAGE FAILED TO DEMONSTRATE MELTING AND FREEZING OF A PILE OF SNOW DID NOT CREATE THE HAZARD, SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED)/NEGLIGENCE (MUNICIPAL LAW, VILLAGE FAILED TO DEMONSTRATE MELTING AND FREEZING OF A PILE OF SNOW DID NOT CREATE THE HAZARD, SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED)/SLIP AND FALL (MUNICIPAL LAW, VILLAGE FAILED TO DEMONSTRATE MELTING AND FREEZING OF A PILE OF SNOW DID NOT CREATE THE HAZARD, SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED)/SIDEWALKS (MUNICIPAL LAW, VILLAGE FAILED TO DEMONSTRATE MELTING AND FREEZING OF A PILE OF SNOW DID NOT CREATE THE HAZARD, SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED)

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APPLICATION TO FILE LATE NOTICE OF CLAIM SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED. NO SHOWING OF DEFENDANT’S TIMELY AWARENESS OF THE INJURIES.

The Fourth Department determined claimant’s application for leave to file a late notice of claim should not have been granted. Apparently plaintiff’s daughter was injured by a student from defendant school district who was subject to an order of protection requiring the student to stay away from the school attended by claimant’s daughter. Although claimant demonstrated defendant had timely knowledge of the order of protection but not demonstrate the defendant had timely knowledge of any injuries resulting from the violation of the order:

 

Supreme Court abused its discretion in granting claimant’s application for leave to serve a late notice of claim pursuant to General Municipal Law § 50-e (5) approximately one year after the incident in which her daughter was injured occurred. “It is well settled that key factors for the court to consider in determining an application for leave to serve a late notice of claim are whether the claimant has demonstrated a reasonable excuse for the delay, whether the municipality acquired actual knowledge of the essential facts constituting the claim within 90 days of its accrual or within a reasonable time thereafter, and whether the delay would substantially prejudice the municipality in maintaining a defense on the merits” … . “While the presence or absence of any single factor is not determinative, one factor that should be accorded great weight is whether the [municipality] received actual knowledge of the facts constituting the claim in a timely manner” … . It is well established that “[k]nowledge of the injuries or damages claimed . .. , rather than mere notice of the underlying occurrence, is necessary to establish actual knowledge of the essential facts of the claim within the meaning of General Municipal Law § 50-e (5)” … , and the claimant has the burden of demonstrating that the respondent had actual timely knowledge … . Matter of Turlington v Brockport Cent. Sch. Dist., 2016 NY Slip Op 06572, 4th Dept 10-7-16

EDUCATION-SCHOOL LAW (APPLICATION TO FILE LATE NOTICE OF CLAIM SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED. NO SHOWING OF DEFENDANT’S TIMELY AWARENESS OF THE INJURIES)/MUNICIPAL LAW (APPLICATION TO FILE LATE NOTICE OF CLAIM SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED. NO SHOWING OF DEFENDANT’S TIMELY AWARENESS OF THE INJURIES)/NOTICE OF CLAIM (APPLICATION TO FILE LATE NOTICE OF CLAIM SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED. NO SHOWING OF DEFENDANT’S TIMELY AWARENESS OF THE INJURIES)

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NYC DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH EXCEEDED ITS REGULATORY AUTHORITY WITH RESPECT TO MANDATING INFLUENZA VACCINATIONS FOR CERTAIN PRE-SCHOOL PROGRAMS.

The First Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Richter, determined the New York City Department of Health exceeded the scope of its regulatory authority when it adopted regulations mandating influenza vaccinations for children attending certain child care, pre-kindergarten and kindergarten programs. The regulations allowed programs to opt-out of the vaccination requirement by paying a fine. The opt-out provision was deemed unrelated to public health, and therefore beyond the Department of Health’s regulatory authority:

… [W]e conclude that by adopting the challenged amendments, the Board of Health “cross[ed] the line into legislative territory” … . [T]he Board of Health did not merely balance costs and benefits, but instead improperly made value judgments by creating a regulatory scheme with exceptions not grounded in promoting public health. … [T]he challenged amendments do not prohibit a child who was not vaccinated against the flu from attending child care or school, but provide only that the facility “may” refuse entry to the unvaccinated child … . Instead, the provider or school can, in effect, opt-out of the vaccination requirement and allow an unvaccinated child to attend, upon payment of a monetary fine … .

This opt-out provision stands in stark contrast to section 2164(7)(a) of the State’s Public Health Law, which, logically, forbids children from remaining in school without proof of the immunizations required under that statute. The challenged amendments, on the other hand, allow a child care provider or school to make an economic choice to pay a fine rather than expel a student and lose a year’s worth of tuition. Creating a policy whereby unvaccinated children are allowed to stay in child care or school flies in the face of respondents’ claim that the challenged amendments are meant to promote the public health by reducing transmission of the flu virus. Not surprisingly, respondents are unable to point to any health-related reason supporting the opt-out provision. Garcia v New York City Dept. of Health & Mental Hygiene, 2016 NY Slip Op 06559, 1st Dept 10-6-16

MUNICIPAL LAW (NYC DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH EXCEEDED ITS REGULATORY AUTHORITY WITH RESPECT TO MANDATING INFLUENZA VACCINATIONS FOR CERTAIN PRE-SCHOOL PROGRAMS)/ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (NYC DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH EXCEEDED ITS REGULATORY AUTHORITY WITH RESPECT TO MANDATING INFLUENZA VACCINATIONS FOR CERTAIN PRE-SCHOOL PROGRAMS)/INFLUENZA VACCINATIONS (NYC DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH EXCEEDED ITS REGULATORY AUTHORITY WITH RESPECT TO MANDATING INFLUENZA VACCINATIONS FOR CERTAIN PRE-SCHOOL PROGRAMS)

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CITY HOUSING AUTHORITY OUTREACH WORKER WAS AN EMPLOYEE ENTITLED TO UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE BENEFITS.

The Third Department determined an outreach worker/field supervisor who, pursuant to a grant, worked for the Niagara Falls Housing Authority was an employee entitled to unemployment insurance benefits:

Prior to being hired, claimant filled out an application and was required to submit a résumé, after which he was interviewed by a panel, which included two officials from the Housing Authority, that determined to hire him … . Upon being hired, claimant was required to attend training … . The rate of pay for claimant, who was required to work 35 hours per week, was not subject to negotiation … , and claimant was required to fill out and submit weekly time sheets that would have to be approved and signed by his supervisor before receiving remuneration from the Housing Authority … . While claimant did not receive benefits, he was reimbursed for expenses related to the costs of a cell phone, gas, tolls, food and office supplies … , and the Housing Authority also provided claimant with office space to use in one of its buildings. While performing his duties as an outreach worker, claimant was required to wear a jacket or shirt, as well as a hat, identifying him as part of the SNUG [violence reduction] program … and was required to maintain a certain number of clients and to meet with those clients. Claimant was also not allowed to subcontract his work or employ a substitute to perform his work … , and his work in the community was reviewed periodically and subject to oversight by his supervisors … . Matter of Cole (Niagara Falls Hous. Auth.–Commissioner of Labor), 2016 NY Slip Op 06281, 3rd Dept 9-29-16

UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE (CITY HOUSING AUTHORITY OUTREACH WORKER WAS AN EMPLOYEE ENTITLED TO UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE BENEFITS)

FAILURE TO STRICTLY COMPLY WITH SIGNATURE REQUIREMENTS IN THE VILLAGE LAW REQUIRED INVALIDATION OF REFERENDUM PETITION.

The Second Department determined failure to strictly comply with the signature requirements in the Village Law invalidated a referendum concerning the elimination of paid fireman positions:

Village Law § 9-902(8) states: “Petition shall be made upon white paper containing the signatures of qualified electors of the village. The sheets of such a petition shall be numbered consecutively beginning with number one at the foot of each sheet. Such petition must set forth in every instance the correct date of signing, the full name of the signer, his present residence, the ward if any and the village election district if any. A signer need not himself fill in the date, residence, ward, or election district” … . The respondents/defendants do not dispute that their referendum petitions failed to set forth the village election district for all but 5 of the 4,254 signatories. * * *

The Court of Appeals has held that, “[w]hile substantial compliance is acceptable as to details of form, there must be strict compliance with statutory commands as to matters of prescribed content” … . Here, the prescribed content includes the village election district, which is a matter of substance, not form … . Matter of Pilla v Karnsomtob, 2016 NY Slip Op 06142, 2nd Dept 9-26-16

 

MUNICIPAL LAW (FAILURE TO STRICTLY COMPLY WITH SIGNATURE REQUIREMENTS IN THE VILLAGE LAW REQUIRED INVALIDATION OF REFERENDUM PETITION)/VILLAGE LAW (FAILURE TO STRICTLY COMPLY WITH SIGNATURE REQUIREMENTS IN THE VILLAGE LAW REQUIRED INVALIDATION OF REFERENDUM PETITION)/REFERENDUM (FAILURE TO STRICTLY COMPLY WITH SIGNATURE REQUIREMENTS IN THE VILLAGE LAW REQUIRED INVALIDATION OF REFERENDUM PETITION)/PETITIONS (REFERENDUM, VILLAGE LAW, FAILURE TO STRICTLY COMPLY WITH SIGNATURE REQUIREMENTS IN THE VILLAGE LAW REQUIRED INVALIDATION OF REFERENDUM PETITION)

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SCRAP METAL SALES OPERATION WAS NOT A TRANSFER STATION WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE COUNTY SOLID WASTE LAW.

The Second Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Cohen, determined a scrap metal seller was not operating a “transfer station” within the meaning of the Westchester County Solid Waste Law. Therefore, certain fines and license fees related to the operation of a transfer station should not have been imposed by the county. The Second Department noted that, in reviewing an Article 78 proceeding, as long as the underlying statute does not require expertise to interpret, the reviewing court has the power to determine the meaning of the controlling statute. Here the plain meaning of the statute would not support defining the scrap metal sales operation as a transfer station:

The petitioner, Universal Metal & Ore, Inc. (hereinafter Universal), is an international metal trading company founded in 1951, which maintains a facility in Mount Vernon. Essentially, Universal is in the business of purchasing scrap metal, and reselling it at a profit to other companies. The primary issue raised on appeal is whether Universal’s Mount Vernon facility, where Universal accepts deliveries of scrap metal from independent dealers and stores it pending transport, may be considered a solid waste “transfer station” under the Westchester County Solid Waste and Recyclables Collection Licensing Law (hereinafter the Solid Waste Law). … [W]e conclude that Universal’s facility is not a transfer station as defined by the Solid Waste Law, and that there was thus no rational basis for the Westchester County Solid Waste Commission’s determination to fine Universal for operating a transfer station without a license. Matter of Universal Metal & Ore, Inc. v Westchester County Solid Waste Commn., 2016 NY Slip Op 06091, 2nd Dept 9-21-16

MUNICIPAL LAW (SCRAP METAL SALES OPERATION WAS NOT A TRANSFER STATION WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE COUNTY SOLID WASTE LAW)/ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (SOLID WASTE LAW, SCRAP METAL SALES OPERATION WAS NOT A TRANSFER STATION WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE COUNTY SOLID WASTE LAW)/SOLID WASTE LAW (SCRAP METAL SALES OPERATION WAS NOT A TRANSFER STATION WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE COUNTY SOLID WASTE LAW)/SCRAP METAL (SCRAP METAL SALES OPERATION WAS NOT A TRANSFER STATION WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE COUNTY SOLID WASTE LAW)

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EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS UNDER STATE AND CITY HUMAN RIGHTS LAW SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED AS UNTIMELY.

The First Department determined plaintiff stated causes of action for employment discrimination and retaliation under both the state and city (NYC) Human Rights Law. The court noted that claims after 2011 were time-barred under the state law, but claims going back to 2007 were timely under the city law, which allows otherwise time-barred claims which are part of a continuing course of conduct:

… [P]laintiff’s claims under the New York State HRL for failure to promote after May 23, 2011 are timely and should not have been dismissed, as plaintiff alleged sufficient facts to meet his pleading burden for purposes of this motion to dismiss … . Plaintiff’s claims for failure to promote under the City HRL were also improperly dismissed because plaintiff has adequately alleged “a single continuing pattern of unlawful conduct [starting from his first promotion rejection in 2007] extending into the [limitations] period immediately preceding the filing of the complaint” … , which permits consideration under the City HRL of all actions relevant to that claim, including those that would otherwise be time-barred … . Moreover, while, as plaintiff concedes, the continuing violations doctrine only applies to his claims of failure to promote under the City HRL … , even under the State HRL, he “is not precluded from using the prior acts as background evidence in support of a timely claim'” … . St. Jean Jeudy v City of New York, 2016 NY Slip Op 06045, 1st Dept 9-15-16

EMPLOYMENT LAW (EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS UNDER STATE AND CITY HUMAN RIGHTS LAW SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED AS UNTIMELY)/HUMAN RIGHTS LAW (EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS UNDER STATE AND CITY HUMAN RIGHTS LAW SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED AS UNTIMELY)/DISCRIMINATION (EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS UNDER STATE AND CITY HUMAN RIGHTS LAW SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED AS UNTIMELY)/

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