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CAUSES OF ACTION AGAINST ABUTTING PROPERTY OWNERS AND COUNTY ALLEGING OBSTRUCTION OF SIGHT AT AN INTERSECTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED.

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court in this traffic accident case, determined the causes of action against abutting property owners (the Herlichs) and the county alleging obstruction of sight at an intersection should not have been dismissed:

“A homeowner has no duty under the common law to prevent vegetation from creating a visual obstruction to users of a public roadway, but a duty to such users may be created by statute or ordinance” … . “[W]here a specific regulatory provision . . . imposes upon property owners a duty to prevent vegetation from visually obstructing the roadway, proof of noncompliance with the regulatory provision may give rise to tort liability for any damages proximately caused thereby” … . Here, the Herlich defendants failed to establish their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, as they failed to demonstrate that the hedge on their property did not constitute a visual obstruction in violation of Code of the Town of Oyster Bay chapter 246 § 246-4.4.4, and Code of the Village of Massapequa Park chapter 298, article I, § … . …

“It has long been established that a governmental body, be it the State, a county or a municipality, is under a nondelegable duty to maintain its roads and highways in a reasonably safe condition, and that liability will flow for injuries resulting from a breach of the duty” … . Here, the County, which concedes that the section of Park Boulevard where the accident occurred was within its jurisdiction, failed to demonstrate, prima facie, that Park Boulevard was maintained in a reasonably safe condition with unobstructed sight lines. Dutka v Odierno, 2016 NY Slip Op 08196, 2nd Dept 12-7-16

 

NEGLIGENCE (CAUSES OF ACTION AGAINST ABUTTING PROPERTY OWNERS AND COUNTY ALLEGING OBSTRUCTION OF SIGHT AT AN INTERSECTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED)/TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS (CAUSES OF ACTION AGAINST ABUTTING PROPERTY OWNERS AND COUNTY ALLEGING OBSTRUCTION OF SIGHT AT AN INTERSECTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED)/OBSTRUCTION OF SIGHT (TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS, CAUSES OF ACTION AGAINST ABUTTING PROPERTY OWNERS AND COUNTY ALLEGING OBSTRUCTION OF SIGHT AT AN INTERSECTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED)/HIGHWAYS AND ROADS (CAUSES OF ACTION AGAINST ABUTTING PROPERTY OWNERS AND COUNTY ALLEGING OBSTRUCTION OF SIGHT AT AN INTERSECTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED)/INTERSECTIONS (CAUSES OF ACTION AGAINST ABUTTING PROPERTY OWNERS AND COUNTY ALLEGING OBSTRUCTION OF SIGHT AT AN INTERSECTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED)

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NOTICE OF CLAIM REQUIRED FOR WRONGFUL TERMINATION SUIT AGAINST A COUNTY, EVEN THOUGH A NOTICE OF CLAIM WOULD NOT BE REQUIRED FOR A SIMILAR SUIT AGAINST A CITY.

The Third Department determined plaintiff’s wrongful termination suit against the county was properly dismissed for failure to file a notice of claim. The court noted that the notice of claim requirement for suits against cities is more narrow and applies only to tort cases. The notice of claim requirements for suits against counties are not limited to tort actions:

County Law § 52 (1) broadly provides that “[a]ny claim . . . against a county for damage [or] injury . . . and any other claim for damages arising at law or in equity, alleged to have been caused . . . by or because of any misfeasance, omission of duty, negligence or wrongful act on the part of the county, its officers, agents, servants or employees, must be made and served in compliance with [General Municipal Law § 50-e]” … . Here, plaintiff’s complaint sought damages for wrongful termination and, thus, pursuant to County Law § 52 (1), General Municipal Law § 50-e (1) (a) required service of a notice of claim within 90 days after the claim for retaliatory termination arose. It is undisputed that plaintiff failed to serve a notice of claim, entitling defendant to dismissal of the complaint … .

Plaintiff’s reliance on appellate decisions involving complaints asserting a Civil Service Law § 75-b or similar claims against cities, in which the courts have ruled that the filing of a notice of claim is not required … , is misplaced. The cases cited by plaintiff involve claims against cities to which the more narrow notice of claim provisions of General Municipal Law §§ 50-e and 50-i apply, limiting the requirement for notices of claim to “tort” claims (General Municipal Law § 50-e [1] [a]) or claims for “personal injury, wrongful death or damage to real or personal property” (General Municipal Law § 50-i [1]). Sager v County of Sullivan, 2016 NY Slip Op 08152, 3rd Dept 12-1-16

 

EMPLOYMENT LAW (NOTICE OF CLAIM REQUIRED FOR WRONGFUL TERMINATION SUIT AGAINST A COUNTY, EVEN THOUGH A NOTICE OF CLAIM WOULD NOT BE REQUIRED FOR A SIMILAR SUIT AGAINST A CITY)/MUNICIPAL LAW (NOTICE OF CLAIM REQUIRED FOR WRONGFUL TERMINATION SUIT AGAINST A COUNTY, EVEN THOUGH A NOTICE OF CLAIM WOULD NOT BE REQUIRED FOR A SIMILAR SUIT AGAINST A CITY)/WRONGFUL TERMINATION (NOTICE OF CLAIM REQUIRED FOR WRONGFUL TERMINATION SUIT AGAINST A COUNTY, EVEN THOUGH A NOTICE OF CLAIM WOULD NOT BE REQUIRED FOR A SIMILAR SUIT AGAINST A CITY)/COUNTIES (WRONGFUL TERMINATION, NOTICE OF CLAIM REQUIRED FOR WRONGFUL TERMINATION SUIT AGAINST A COUNTY, EVEN THOUGH A NOTICE OF CLAIM WOULD NOT BE REQUIRED FOR A SIMILAR SUIT AGAINST A CITY)

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FIRE REKINDLED AFTER FIRE DEPARTMENT PERSONNEL ASSURED PLAINTIFFS THE FIRE WAS OUT, NEGLIGENCE CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST THE CITY SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED, QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER THERE WAS A SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CITY AND PLAINTIFFS.

The Third Department determined the action against the city alleging negligence resulting in the destruction of plaintiffs’ property by fire should not have been dismissed. Fire department personnel told the plaintiffs the fire had been extinguished and that it was safe to reenter. However the fire rekindled. The Third Department held that there was a “special relationship” between the city and the plaintiffs stemming from the assurances the fire was out:

To establish a special relationship, plaintiffs were required to show: “(1) an assumption by the municipality, through promises or actions, of an affirmative duty to act on behalf of the party who was injured; (2) knowledge on the part of the municipality’s agents that inaction could lead to harm; (3) some form of direct contact between the municipality’s agents and the injured party; and (4) that party’s justifiable reliance on the municipality’s affirmative undertaking” … .

Construing the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiffs and providing them the benefit of every favorable inference …, we conclude that plaintiffs raised a triable issue of fact as to whether a special relationship existed. With regard to the first element, there is no dispute that defendants’ agents dispatched the Department to plaintiffs’ residence in response to their 911 call for assistance and that the responding crew thereafter assumed control over the ongoing fire. Even if the Department’s actions in that regard simply constituted the performance of a duty owed to the public generally … , we are of the view that, by making affirmative representations to plaintiffs that the fire had been fully extinguished and that it was safe to reenter the home, the Department assumed an affirmative duty to plaintiffs … . As for the second and third elements, knowledge on the part of the Department that inaction could result in harm can be reasonably inferred from the circumstances … , and the Department’s employees undisputedly had direct contact with plaintiffs. With respect to the final element, plaintiffs allege that they relied upon the Department’s assurances that the fire was completely extinguished in choosing to leave their home unattended for the evening. Trimble v City of Albany, 2016 NY Slip Op 07912, 3rd Dept 11-23-16

 

MUNICIPAL LAW (FIRE REKINDLED AFTER FIRE DEPARTMENT PERSONNEL ASSURED PLAINTIFFS THE FIRE WAS OUT, NEGLIGENCE CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST THE CITY SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED, QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER THERE WAS A SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CITY AND PLAINTIFFS)/NEGLIGENCE (MUNICIPAL LAW, FIRE REKINDLED AFTER FIRE DEPARTMENT PERSONNEL ASSURED PLAINTIFFS THE FIRE WAS OUT, NEGLIGENCE CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST THE CITY SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED, QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER THERE WAS A SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CITY AND PLAINTIFFS)/IMMUNITY (MUNICIPAL LAW, FIRE REKINDLED AFTER FIRE DEPARTMENT PERSONNEL ASSURED PLAINTIFFS THE FIRE WAS OUT, NEGLIGENCE CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST THE CITY SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED, QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER THERE WAS A SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CITY AND PLAINTIFFS)/FIRE (MUNICIPAL LAW, NEGLIGENCE, FIRE REKINDLED AFTER FIRE DEPARTMENT PERSONNEL ASSURED PLAINTIFFS THE FIRE WAS OUT, NEGLIGENCE CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST THE CITY SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED, QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER THERE WAS A SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CITY AND PLAINTIFFS)

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CAUSE OF ACTION ALLEGING NEGLIGENT FAILURE TO INSTALL A GUARDRAIL SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED.

The Third Department determined plaintiff’s action alleging defective design and construction of a highway should not have been dismissed. Plaintiff’s car slid on ice and snow and went off the road. Plaintiff alleged a guardrail should have been installed. The court noted that the written notice requirement did not apply to the guardrail allegation:

A municipality has a nondelegable duty to the public to construct and maintain its roads in a reasonably safe condition, and this duty extends to furnishing and maintaining adequate barriers or guardrails where appropriate … . To that end, a municipality is under no obligation to upgrade its roads that complied with design standards when they were built merely because the standards were subsequently upgraded … .

We conclude that defendant failed to establish that the design of the road comported with the applicable standards at the time that County Road 113 was constructed. County Road 113, over which defendant admitted ownership, was constructed in the late 1940s. Defendant’s engineering expert did not identify what standards were in effect at the time that County Road 113 was designed or constructed … . Rather, defendant’s expert cited to the Department of Transportation Highway Design Manual in concluding that there was little justification for the placement of a guardrail at the location of [the] accident. This manual, however, was published in the 1970s and, therefore, does not apply to County Road 113. Fu v County of Wash., 2016 NY Slip Op 07910, 3rd Dept 11-23-16

 

MUNICIPAL LAW (CAUSE OF ACTION ALLEGING NEGLIGENT FAILURE TO INSTALL A GUARDRAIL SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED)/NEGLIGENCE (MUNICIPAL LAW, HIGHWAYS, CAUSE OF ACTION ALLEGING NEGLIGENT FAILURE TO INSTALL A GUARDRAIL SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED)/HIGHWAYS (MUNICIPAL LAW, HIGHWAYS, CAUSE OF ACTION ALLEGING NEGLIGENT FAILURE TO INSTALL A GUARDRAIL SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED)/GUARDRAILS (MUNICIPAL LAW, HIGHWAYS, CAUSE OF ACTION ALLEGING NEGLIGENT FAILURE TO INSTALL A GUARDRAIL SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED)

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QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER COUNTY NEGLIGENT IN FAILING TO REVIEW INMATE’S PAST RECORD OF VIOLENT BEHAVIOR, INMATE ASSAULTED PLAINTIFF.

The Third Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined there was question of fact whether the county defendants were negligent in failing to determine whether an inmate was violent. Plaintiff was assaulted by the inmate and alleged the county should have reviewed the inmate’s past record of violent behavior:

“Having assumed physical custody of inmates, who cannot protect and defend themselves in the same way as those at liberty can, the [s]tate [or its political subdivisions] owe[] a duty of care to safeguard inmates, even from attacks by fellow inmates” … . This duty of care does not render the custodial entity “an insurer of inmate safety[,] and negligence cannot be inferred merely because an incident occurred” … . The duty owed is instead “limited to providing reasonable care to protect inmates from risks of harm that are reasonably foreseeable, i.e., those that [the custodial entity or its agents] knew or should have known” … . * * *

Correction Law § 500-b (7) (a) states that the reviewing officer “shall exercise good judgment and discretion and shall take all reasonable steps to ensure that the assignment of persons to facility housing units” advances the safety and security of all inmates and that of the facility in general. The statute enumerates a number of factors to consider in that analysis, but an inmate’s history of assaultive behavior or his or her prior prison disciplinary history are not among them … . The statute further lacks a specific requirement that the reviewing officer obtain all records pertaining to an inmate, instead directing a review of whatever “relevant and known” records are “accessible and available” (Correction Law § 500-b [7] [c] [3]). The statute accordingly creates a “possibility of exceptions . . . significant enough to justify a case-by-case determination of negligence without the automatic imposition of negligence under the negligence per se doctrine,” although a failure to obtain specific records could well constitute evidence of negligence in a given case … . Wassmann v County of Ulster, 2016 NY Slip Op 07907, 3rd Dept 11-23-16

 

MUNICIPAL LAW (INMATES, QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER COUNTY NEGLIGENT IN FAILING TO REVIEW INMATE’S PAST RECORD OF VIOLENT BEHAVIOR, INMATE ASSAULTED PLAINTIFF)/NEGLIGENCE (MUNICIPAL LAW, INMATES, QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER COUNTY NEGLIGENT IN FAILING TO REVIEW INMATE’S PAST RECORD OF VIOLENT BEHAVIOR, INMATE ASSAULTED PLAINTIFF)/INMATES (MUNICIPAL LAW, NEGLIGENCE, QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER COUNTY NEGLIGENT IN FAILING TO REVIEW INMATE’S PAST RECORD OF VIOLENT BEHAVIOR, INMATE ASSAULTED PLAINTIFF)/ASSAULT  (MUNICIPAL LAW, NEGLIGENCE, QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER COUNTY NEGLIGENT IN FAILING TO REVIEW INMATE’S PAST RECORD OF VIOLENT BEHAVIOR, INMATE ASSAULTED PLAINTIFF)

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CAUSE OF ACTION ALLEGING NEGLIGENT MAINTENANCE OF A SEWER SYSTEM SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED.

The Third Department determined an action alleging negligent maintenance of a sewer system should not have been dismissed. The court noted that the written notice requirement (a common prerequisite for municipal liability) applies to defects in roads and sidewalks, etc. and does not apply to subsurface structures:

It is settled that a municipality is under a continuing duty to maintain and repair its sewage and water systems … , and this duty is independent of the duty not to create a dangerous or defective condition … . “[T]he breach of this ongoing duty is the ‘event’ that forms the basis for the claim” for purposes of General Municipal Law § 50-i … . Thus, defendant’s negligence, if any, in failing to maintain or repair its water and/or sewage system constitutes a continuing wrong that gives rise to a new cause of action for each injury that occurred … . Plaintiff’s recoverable damages, however, are limited “‘to those caused by the alleged unlawful acts sustained within 90 days preceding the date of filing of the notice of claim'” … . 461 Broadway, LLC v Village of Monticello, 2016 NY Slip Op 07905, 3rd Dept 11-23-16

MUNICIPAL LAW (CAUSE OF ACTION ALLEGING NEGLIGENT MAINTENANCE OF A SEWER SYSTEM SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED)/NEGLIGENCE (CAUSE OF ACTION ALLEGING NEGLIGENT MAINTENANCE OF A SEWER SYSTEM SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED)/SEWER SYSTEMS (CAUSE OF ACTION ALLEGING NEGLIGENT MAINTENANCE OF A SEWER SYSTEM SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED)

IN AWARDING A COUNTY CONTRACT TO A PRIVATE BUS COMPANY, THE COUNTY’S DEVIATION FROM A FORMULA DESCRIBED IN ITS REQUEST FOR PROPOSALS WAS ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS.

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Fahey, reversing Supreme Court, over a two-judge dissent, determined that defendant county was required to use the formula outlined in its request for proposals (RFP) when evaluating bids for county contracts (here involving use of private bus services). The county included one formula in the RFP and used a different formula in awarding the contract:

Here, the County deviated from the criteria specified in its RFP when it evaluated the proposals received pursuant to its request. The emphatic language used in the RFP's paradigm of a percentage to points ratio — stating that if a 10% cost difference exists between the lowest offeror and the next lowest, then the latter “will have 2 points deducted from the maximum score of 20” — makes clear that the “example” was meant to explain that a percentage to points ratio is one in which a one percent cost difference translates to one percent of the total number of points allocated to cost. Instead, the County used a 2-point deduction for every 4% difference in price. Applying this new formula, a one percent cost difference corresponded to 2.5%, rather than one percent, of the number of points assigned to cost.

The County abandoned the cost formula it had promised to apply and instead created a new formula that disfavored ACME. This was arbitrary and capricious … . Matter of ACME Bus Corp. v Orange County, 2016 NY Slip Op 07835, CtApp 11-22-16

MUNICIPAL LAW (IN AWARDING A COUNTY CONTRACT TO A PRIVATE BUS COMPANY, THE COUNTY'S DEVIATION FROM A FORMULA DESCRIBED IN ITS REQUEST FOR PROPOSALS WAS ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS)

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IN A CITY WHICH DOES NOT PROVIDE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BENEFITS FOR ITS POLICE OFFICERS, AN OFFICER RECEIVING BENEFITS PURSUANT TO GENERAL MUNICIPAL LAW 207-c IS NOT BARRED FROM SUING FOR GENERAL MUNICIPAL LAW 205-e BENEFITS.

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Stein, over a dissent, reversing the Appellate Division, determined a police officer who receives benefits under General Municipal Law 207-c is not barred from suing for benefits under General Municipal Law 205-e in a city which does not provide workers’ compensation benefits. The officer her alleged asbestos-related injury caused by the building which housed the police station:

“In addition to any other right of action or recovery under any other provision of law,” section 205-e permits police officers to bring tort claims for injuries sustained “while in the discharge or performance at any time or place of any duty imposed by . . . superior officers” where such injuries occur “directly or indirectly as a result of any neglect, omission, willful or culpable negligence of any person or persons in failing to comply with the requirements of any of the statutes, ordinances, rules, orders and requirements of the federal, state, county, village, town or city governments” (General Municipal Law § 205-e [1]). Separately, section 207-c “provides for the payment of the full amount of regular salary or wages,” along with payment for medical treatment and hospital care, “to a police officer or other covered municipal employee who is injured ‘in the performance of his [or her] duties’ or is taken ill ‘as a result of the performance of [such] duties'” * * *

… [W]e reject the City’s argument, also adopted by the dissent, that General Municipal Law § 207-c benefits can be equated to workers’ compensation benefits for purposes of interpreting the proviso contained in General Municipal Law § 205-e [FN2]. The language of section 205-e prohibits only recipients of workers’ compensation benefits from commencing suit against their employers; it does not, by its terms, bar the commencement of suits by recipients of section 207-c benefits — which we have repeatedly recognized to be separate and distinct from workers’ compensation benefits. In fact, section 205-e states that the right contained therein is “[i]n addition to any other right of action or recovery under any other provision of law” (General Municipal Law § 205-e [1]). Matter of Diegelman v City of Buffalo, 2016 NY Slip Op 07817, CtApp 11-21-16

 

MUNICIPAL LAW (IN A CITY WHICH DOES NOT PROVIDE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BENEFITS FOR ITS POLICE OFFICERS, AN OFFICER RECEIVING BENEFITS PURSUANT TO GENERAL MUNICIPAL LAW 207-c IS NOT BARRED FROM SUING FOR GENERAL MUNICIPAL LAW 205-e BENEFITS)/POLICE OFFICERS (IN A CITY WHICH DOES NOT PROVIDE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BENEFITS FOR ITS POLICE OFFICERS, AN OFFICER RECEIVING BENEFITS PURSUANT TO GENERAL MUNICIPAL LAW 207-c IS NOT BARRED FROM SUING FOR GENERAL MUNICIPAL LAW 205-e BENEFITS)/GENERAL MUNICIPAL LAW IN A CITY WHICH DOES NOT PROVIDE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BENEFITS FOR ITS POLICE OFFICERS, AN OFFICER RECEIVING BENEFITS PURSUANT TO GENERAL MUNICIPAL LAW 207-c IS NOT BARRED FROM SUING FOR GENERAL MUNICIPAL LAW 205-e BENEFITS)/WORKERS COMPENSATION LAW (IN A CITY WHICH DOES NOT PROVIDE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BENEFITS FOR ITS POLICE OFFICERS, AN OFFICER RECEIVING BENEFITS PURSUANT TO GENERAL MUNICIPAL LAW 207-c IS NOT BARRED FROM SUING FOR GENERAL MUNICIPAL LAW 205-e BENEFITS)

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SYRACUSE NOISE ORDINANCE PROHIBITING MUSIC LOUD ENOUGH TO BE HEARD 50 FEET FROM A PERSON’S CAR IS NOT UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VAGUE.

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Garcia, determined the Syracuse Noise Ordinance was not unconstitutionally vague and therefore defendant was properly stopped in his vehicle based upon a violation of the ordinance:

Syracuse Noise Ordinance section 40-16 (b) is sufficiently definite to put a person on notice that playing music which can be heard over 50 feet from such person’s car on a public road, in a manner that would annoy or disturb “a reasonable person of normal sensibilities” is forbidden conduct and the objective standard affords police sufficiently “clear standards [for] enforcement” … . People v Stephens, 2016 NY Slip Op 07819, CtApp 11-21-16

CRIMINAL LAW (SYRACUSE NOISE ORDINANCE PROHIBITING MUSIC LOUD ENOUGH TO BE HEARD 50 FEET FROM A PERSON’S CAR IS NOT UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VAGUE)/NOISE ORDINANCE (SYRACUSE NOISE ORDINANCE PROHIBITING MUSIC LOUD ENOUGH TO BE HEARD 50 FEET FROM A PERSON’S CAR IS NOT UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VAGUE)/MUNICIPAL LAW (SYRACUSE NOISE ORDINANCE PROHIBITING MUSIC LOUD ENOUGH TO BE HEARD 50 FEET FROM A PERSON’S CAR IS NOT UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VAGUE)/STREET STOPS (SYRACUSE NOISE ORDINANCE PROHIBITING MUSIC LOUD ENOUGH TO BE HEARD 50 FEET FROM A PERSON’S CAR IS NOT UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VAGUE)

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RECKLESS DISREGARD STANDARD APPLIED TO COLLISION BETWEEN BICYCLE AND POLICE CAR, EVEN THOUGH THE OFFICER WAS NOT IN PURSUIT.

The Fourth Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined that the “reckless disregard” standard applied to the defendant police officer’s driving and dismissed plaintiff bicyclist’s complaint. Apparently, the officer was moving his car into an intersection, trying to get the attention of another driver to whom he wished to speak. Plaintiff bicyclist, who had the green light, collided with the officer’s car:

… [W]e note that there is no dispute that defendant officer was operating an “authorized emergency vehicle” (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 101). We reject plaintiff’s contention that, in determining whether defendant officer’s operation of the police vehicle qualifies as an “emergency operation” within the meaning of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 114-b, we should adopt the definition of “pursuit” contained in the operations manual of defendant City of Syracuse Police Department … . Likewise, it is irrelevant whether defendant officer believed he was involved in an emergency operation … . Contrary to plaintiff’s further contentions, we conclude that defendant officer’s actions constituted an “emergency operation” as contemplated by Vehicle and Traffic Law § 114-b … ; the applicable standard of liability is reckless disregard for the safety of others rather than ordinary negligence (see § 1104 [e]…); and defendants established as a matter of law that defendant officer’s conduct did not constitute the type of recklessness necessary for liability to attach … . Lacey v City of Syracuse, 2016 NY Slip Op 07794, 4th Dept 11-18-16

MUNICIPAL LAW (POLICE OFFICERS, RECKLESS DISREGARD STANDARD APPLIED TO COLLISION BETWEEN BICYCLE AND POLICE CAR, EVEN THOUGH THE OFFICER WAS NOT IN PURSUIT)/NEGLIGENCE (POLICE OFFICERS, RECKLESS DISREGARD STANDARD APPLIED TO COLLISION BETWEEN BICYCLE AND POLICE CAR, EVEN THOUGH THE OFFICER WAS NOT IN PURSUIT)/EMERGENCY VEHICLES (POLICE OFFICERS, RECKLESS DISREGARD STANDARD APPLIED TO COLLISION BETWEEN BICYCLE AND POLICE CAR, EVEN THOUGH THE OFFICER WAS NOT IN PURSUIT)/POLICE OFFICERS (RECKLESS DISREGARD STANDARD APPLIED TO COLLISION BETWEEN BICYCLE AND POLICE CAR, EVEN THOUGH THE OFFICER WAS NOT IN PURSUIT)

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