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DEFENDANT DEMONSTRATED HE PLED GUILTY WITHOUT BEING INFORMED HE MIGHT BE SUBJECT TO CONFINEMENT UNDER THE SEX OFFENDER MANAGEMENT AND TREATMENT ACT (SOMTA) AFTER COMPLETION OF HIS SENTENCE, HIS MOTION TO SET ASIDE HIS CONVICTION WAS PROPERLY GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined defendant’s motion to vacate his conviction by guilty plea was properly granted. Defendant demonstrated he was not informed of the possibility he would be subject to the Sex Offender Management and Treatment Act (SOMTA) which could result in further confinement pursuant to the Mental Hygiene Law upon the completion of his sentence:

… [T]he defendant, through evidence presented at the hearing, including his testimony, made the factual showing necessary to demonstrate that his plea of guilty was not knowing and voluntary. When the defendant pleaded guilty, he had already been adjudicated a level three predicate sex offender pursuant to the Sex Offender Registration Act … based on a prior conviction. In addition, … the defendant here was made the subject of a SOMTA proceeding. The defendant testified at the hearing that he would not have taken the plea bargain had he known of SOMTA. Under the circumstances of this case, the defendant showed that “the prospect of SOMTA confinement was realistic enough that it reasonably could have caused him, and in fact would have caused him, to reject an otherwise acceptable plea bargain” … . People v Balcerak, 2018 NY Slip Op 03138, Second Dept 5-2-18

​CRIMINAL LAW (VACATE CONVICTION, DEFENDANT DEMONSTRATED HE PLED GUILTY WITHOUT BEING INFORMED HE MIGHT BE SUBJECT TO CONFINEMENT UNDER THE SEX OFFENDER MANAGEMENT AND TREATMENT ACT (SOMTA) AFTER COMPLETION OF HIS SENTENCE, HIS MOTION TO SET ASIDE HIS CONVICTION WAS PROPERLY GRANTED (SECOND DEPT))/MENTAL HYGIENE LAW (VACATE CONVICTION, DEFENDANT DEMONSTRATED HE PLED GUILTY WITHOUT BEING INFORMED HE MIGHT BE SUBJECT TO CONFINEMENT UNDER THE SEX OFFENDER MANAGEMENT AND TREATMENT ACT (SOMTA) AFTER COMPLETION OF HIS SENTENCE, HIS MOTION TO SET ASIDE HIS CONVICTION WAS PROPERLY GRANTED (SECOND DEPT))/VACATE CONVICTION, MOTION TO (DEFENDANT DEMONSTRATED HE PLED GUILTY WITHOUT BEING INFORMED HE MIGHT BE SUBJECT TO CONFINEMENT UNDER THE SEX OFFENDER MANAGEMENT AND TREATMENT ACT (SOMTA) AFTER COMPLETION OF HIS SENTENCE, HIS MOTION TO SET ASIDE HIS CONVICTION WAS PROPERLY GRANTED (SECOND DEPT))/SEX OFFENDER MANAGEMENT AND TREATMENT (SOMTA) (VACATE CONVICTION, DEFENDANT DEMONSTRATED HE PLED GUILTY WITHOUT BEING INFORMED HE MIGHT BE SUBJECT TO CONFINEMENT UNDER THE SEX OFFENDER MANAGEMENT AND TREATMENT ACT (SOMTA) AFTER COMPLETION OF HIS SENTENCE, HIS MOTION TO SET ASIDE HIS CONVICTION WAS PROPERLY GRANTED (SECOND DEPT))

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BY CONCEDING DEFENDANT SUFFERED FROM A DANGEROUS MENTAL CONDITION DEFENSE COUNSEL EFFECTIVELY WAIVED AN INITIAL ‘TRACK’ HEARING PURSUANT TO CPL 330.20, A ‘CRITICAL STAGE’ OF THE PROCEEDINGS AFTER A NOT RESPONSIBLE BY REASON OF MENTAL DISEASE OR DEFECT PLEA, DEFENSE COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE, CPL 330.20 HEARING ORDERED (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Tom, determined defendant did not receive effective assistance of counsel  because counsel, after defendant pled not responsible by reason of mental disease or defect, conceded defendant suffered from a dangerous mental disorder and thereby waived the required “track” hearing pursuant to Criminal Procedure Law (CPL) 330.20 (a “critical stage” of the proceedings):

… [A]fter a court accepts a not responsible plea, it must issue an examination order for the defendant to be examined by two qualified psychiatric examiners … , who must submit to the court a report of their findings and evaluation regarding defendant’s mental condition … .

Critical to this procedure is the requirement that the court conduct an initial hearing within 10 days after receipt of the psychiatric examination reports, in order to classify the defendant as “track one,” “track two,” or “track three” based on the defendant’s mental condition … . …

“The track designation places more dangerous acquittees under the purview of the Criminal Procedure Law, while less dangerous, though still mentally ill, acquittees are committed to the custody of the Commissioner of Mental Health and come under the supervision of the Mental Hygiene Law” … . …

At the initial hearing, the People bear the burden of proving “to the satisfaction of the court,” i.e., by a fair preponderance of the credible evidence, that the defendant has a dangerous mental disorder or is mentally ill … .

The initial hearing under CPL 330.20(6) is “a critical stage” of proceedings at which the defendant is entitled to the effective assistance of counsel … . …

… [C]ounsel rendered ineffective assistance when he conceded at the plea proceeding that defendant was a danger to himself and society, and waived defendant’s right to an initial hearing before reviewing the psychiatric examination reports which had not yet been prepared for the court. Further, at the proceeding that followed the issuance of the reports, counsel simply relied on the psychiatrists’ reports and deferred to the court’s discretion. He did not call any witnesses or seek to cross-examine the psychiatrists who prepared the reports. Nor did counsel consult an expert on defendant’s behalf who might have offered a contrasting opinion. People v Darryl T., 2018 NY Slip Op 02280, First Dept 3-29-18

CRIMINAL LAW (DANGEROUS MENTAL CONDITION, INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE, BY CONCEDING DEFENDANT SUFFERED FROM A DANGEROUS MENTAL CONDITION DEFENSE COUNSEL EFFECTIVELY WAIVED AN INITIAL ‘TRACK’ HEARING PURSUANT TO CPL 330.20, A ‘CRITICAL STAGE’ OF THE PROCEEDINGS AFTER A NOT RESPONSIBLE BY REASON OF MENTAL DISEASE OR DEFECT PLEA, DEFENSE COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE, CPL 330.20 HEARING ORDERED (FIRST DEPT))/INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE (DANGEROUS MENTAL CONDITION, BY CONCEDING DEFENDANT SUFFERED FROM A DANGEROUS MENTAL CONDITION DEFENSE COUNSEL EFFECTIVELY WAIVED AN INITIAL ‘TRACK’ HEARING PURSUANT TO CPL 330.20, A ‘CRITICAL STAGE’ OF THE PROCEEDINGS AFTER A NOT RESPONSIBLE BY REASON OR MENTAL DISEASE OF DEFECT PLEA, DEFENSE COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE, CPL 330.20 HEARING ORDERED (FIRST DEPT))/ATTORNEYS (CRIMINAL LAW, DANGEROUS MENTAL CONDITION, INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE, BY CONCEDING DEFENDANT SUFFERED FROM A DANGEROUS MENTAL CONDITION DEFENSE COUNSEL EFFECTIVELY WAIVED AN INITIAL ‘TRACK’ HEARING PURSUANT TO CPL 330.20, A ‘CRITICAL STAGE’ OF THE PROCEEDINGS AFTER A NOT RESPONSIBLE BY REASON OR MENTAL DISEASE OF DEFECT PLEA, DEFENSE COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE, CPL 330.20 HEARING ORDERED (FIRST DEPT))/DANGEROUS MENTAL CONDITION (CRIMINAL LAW, INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE, BY CONCEDING DEFENDANT SUFFERED FROM A DANGEROUS MENTAL CONDITION DEFENSE COUNSEL EFFECTIVELY WAIVED AN INITIAL ‘TRACK’ HEARING PURSUANT TO CPL 330.20, A ‘CRITICAL STAGE’ OF THE PROCEEDINGS AFTER A NOT RESPONSIBLE BY REASON OF MENTAL DISEASE OR DEFECT PLEA, DEFENSE COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE, CPL 330.20 HEARING ORDERED (FIRST DEPT))/MENTAL HYGIENE LAW (CRIMINAL LAW, DANGEROUS MENTAL CONDITION, INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE, BY CONCEDING DEFENDANT SUFFERED FROM A DANGEROUS MENTAL CONDITION DEFENSE COUNSEL EFFECTIVELY WAIVED AN INITIAL ‘TRACK’ HEARING PURSUANT TO CPL 330.20, A ‘CRITICAL STAGE’ OF THE PROCEEDINGS AFTER A NOT RESPONSIBLE BY REASON OF MENTAL DISEASE OR DEFECT PLEA, DEFENSE COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE, CPL 330.20 HEARING ORDERED (FIRST DEPT))

ATTORNEYS WHO HAD ACCEPTED A RETAINER TO CONTEST THE REMOVAL OF A GUARDIAN WERE NOT REQUIRED TO RETURN THE RETAINER BECAUSE IT WAS PAID FROM THE INCAPACITATED PERSON’S FUNDS, NO PROOF THE ATTORNEYS WERE AWARE OF THE SOURCE OF THE FUNDS, SUPREME COURT REVERSED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, over a two-justice dissent, determined that the attorneys (the appellants), who had accepted a retainer to contest the removal of a guardian (the daughter) for an incapacitated person (Domenica P.), were not required to return the retainer which had been paid from the incapacitated person’s funds. The Second Department determined there was no evidence the attorneys were aware of the source of the funds:

This particular proceeding is substantially different from a Mental Hygiene Law § 81.43 proceeding brought directly against the incapacitated person’s attorney-in-fact … , or directly against someone having a different type of fiduciary and confidential relationship with the incapacitated person … . This turnover proceeding was brought against the law firm retained by the daughter to challenge the Supreme Court’s decision to remove her as guardian of the person of her incapacitated mother, with whom she had been living for some time. In the absence of any indicia that the appellants colluded with the daughter in converting her mother’s funds, or had substantial knowledge that the money used for the retainer was derived from funds belonging to Domenica P., no judgment against them is warranted.

Contrary to the Supreme Court’s determination, the inquiry by the appellants was sufficient. The appellants accepted a check from the daughter’s individual checking account. After the appellants asked the daughter if this was her own money or if it belonged to Domenica P., she told them that the $20,000 came from her own savings. Under these circumstances, the appellants had no reasonable obligation to further investigate, or assess the truthfulness of, their prospective client. What is most revealing is that the appellant law firm rightfully rejected a subsequent check from the daughter drawn on an account held jointly in names of the daughter and Domenica P. Matter of Domenica P., 2018 NY Slip Op 02151, Second Dept 3-28-18

MENTAL HYGIENE LAW (GUARDIANSHIP, ATTORNEYS, ATTORNEYS WHO HAD ACCEPTED A RETAINER TO CONTEST THE REMOVAL OF A GUARDIAN WERE NOT REQUIRED TO RETURN THE RETAINER BECAUSE IT WAS PAID FROM THE INCAPACITATED PERSON’S FUNDS, NO PROOF THE ATTORNEYS WERE AWARE OF THE SOURCE OF THE FUNDS, SUPREME COURT REVERSED (SECOND DEPT))/GUARDIANSHIP (MENTAL HYGIENE LAW, ATTORNEYS WHO HAD ACCEPTED A RETAINER TO CONTEST THE REMOVAL OF A GUARDIAN WERE NOT REQUIRED TO RETURN THE RETAINER BECAUSE IT WAS PAID FROM THE INCAPACITATED PERSON’S FUNDS, NO PROOF THE ATTORNEYS WERE AWARE OF THE SOURCE OF THE FUNDS, SUPREME COURT REVERSED (SECOND DEPT))/ATTORNEYS (MENTAL HYGIENE LAW, RETAINER, ATTORNEYS WHO HAD ACCEPTED A RETAINER TO CONTEST THE REMOVAL OF A GUARDIAN WERE NOT REQUIRED TO RETURN THE RETAINER BECAUSE IT WAS PAID FROM THE INCAPACITATED PERSON’S FUNDS, NO PROOF THE ATTORNEYS WERE AWARE OF THE SOURCE OF THE FUNDS, SUPREME COURT REVERSED (SECOND DEPT))

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A DIAGNOSIS OF PARAPHILIA NOS (NONCONSENT) IS NOT ACCEPTED IN THE PSYCHIATRIC OR PSYCHOLOGICAL COMMUNITIES, EXPERT EVIDENCE ABOUT THE DISORDER SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ADMITTED IN THIS SEX OFFENDER CIVIL COMMITMENT TRIAL (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined that Supreme Court properly found, after a Frye hearing ordered by the Second Department and held after the trial, the diagnosis of paraphilia NOS (nonconsent) is not generally accepted in the psychiatric and psychological communities. The evidence should not have been admitted at the sex offender’s civil commitment trial:

The evidence at the Frye hearing showed that there was no clear definition or criteria for the diagnosis, the diagnosis could not be reliably distinguished from other motivations for rape, the articles offered in support of the diagnosis did not reflect a wide, significant, or well-rounded body of research supporting the validity of the diagnosis, and the diagnosis was repeatedly rejected for inclusion in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (hereinafter DSM) or in the DSM appendix … . Thus, evidence of the paraphilia NOS (nonconsent) diagnosis should not have been admitted at trial. Since the error was not harmless, the matter must be remitted to the Supreme Court, Queens County, for a new trial on the issue of mental abnormality, excluding evidence of the paraphilia NOS (nonconsent) diagnosis, and, if necessary, a new dispositional hearing. Matter of State of New York v Richard S., 2018 NY Slip Op 01072, Second Dept 2-14-18

MENTAL HYGIENE LAW (SEX OFFENDER, CIVIL COMMITMENT, A DIAGNOSIS OF PARAPHIILIA NOS (NONCONSENT) S NOT ACCEPTED IN THE PSYCHIATRIC OR PSYCHOLOGICAL COMMUNITIES, EXPERT EVIDENCE ABOUT THE DISORDER SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ADMITTED IN THIS SEX OFFENDER CIVIL COMMITMENT TRIAL (SECOND DEPT))/SEX OFFENDERS (CIVIL COMMITMENT,  A DIAGNOSIS OF PARAPHILIA NOS (NONCONSENT) IS NOT ACCEPTED IN THE PSYCHIATRIC OR PSYCHOLOGICAL COMMUNITIES, EXPERT EVIDENCE ABOUT THE DISORDER SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ADMITTED IN THIS SEX OFFENDER CIVIL COMMITMENT TRIAL (SECOND DEPT))/CIVIL COMMITMENT (SEX OFFENDERS, MENTAL HYGIENE LAW, A DIAGNOSIS OF PARAPHILIA NOS (NONCONSENT) IS NOT ACCEPTED IN THE PSYCHIATRIC OR PSYCHOLOGICAL COMMUNITIES, EXPERT EVIDENCE ABOUT THE DISORDER SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ADMITTED IN THIS SEX OFFENDER CIVIL COMMITMENT TRIAL (SECOND DEPT))UNSPECIFIED PARAPHILIC DISORDER (MENTAL HYGIENE LAW, SEX OFFENDERS, CIVIL COMMITMENT, A DIAGNOSIS OF PARAPHILIA NOS (NONCONSENT) IS NOT ACCEPTED IN THE PSYCHIATRIC OR PSYCHOLOGICAL COMMUNITIES, EXPERT EVIDENCE ABOUT THE DISORDER SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ADMITTED IN THIS SEX OFFENDER CIVIL COMMITMENT TRIAL (SECOND DEPT))

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A DIAGNOSIS OF UNSPECIFIED PARAPHILIC DISORDER IS NOT ACCEPTED IN THE PSYCHIATRIC OR PSYCHOLOGICAL COMMUNITIES, EXPERT EVIDENCE ABOUT THE DISORDER SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ADMITTED IN THIS SEX OFFENDER CIVIL COMMITMENT TRIAL (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined that the Frye hearing did not demonstrate that diagnosis of unspecified paraphilic disorder has achieved general acceptance in the psychiatric and psychological communities. Therefore the expert evidence on the disorder should not have been admitted at the trial to determine whether appellant sex offender should be subject to civil commitment:

At the Frye hearing, Dr. David Thornton and Dr. Kostas Katsavdakis, who testified for the State, and Dr. Joe Scroppo, who testified on behalf of the appellant, agreed that the forensic use of the diagnosis of unspecified paraphilic disorder, which was added to the latest edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (hereinafter DSM-5) in 2013, was problematic and controversial, since there was no clear definition or criteria for the proposed disorder. Moreover, all of the experts testified that there was no research demonstrating the reliability of the unspecified paraphilic disorder diagnosis after its introduction in the DSM-5 in 2013. Notably, the experts were not aware of any published research, clinical trials, or field studies regarding unspecified paraphilic disorder.

Accordingly, we conclude that the State failed to establish that the diagnosis of unspecified paraphilic disorder has achieved general acceptance in the psychiatric and psychological communities so as to make expert testimony on that diagnosis admissible, and as such, that diagnosis should not have been admitted at the appellant’s trial. Since the admission of this testimony was not harmless, we remit the matter to the Supreme Court, Nassau County, for a new trial on the issue of mental abnormality, excluding evidence of the unspecified paraphilic disorder diagnosis, and, if necessary, a new dispositional hearing. Matter of State of New York v Hilton C., 2018 NY Slip Op 01071, Second Dept 2-14-18

MENTAL HYGIENE LAW (SEX OFFENDER, CIVIL COMMITMENT, A DIAGNOSIS OF UNSPECIFIED PARAPHILIC DISORDER IS NOT ACCEPTED IN THE PSYCHIATRIC OR PSYCHOLOGICAL COMMUNITIES, EXPERT EVIDENCE ABOUT THE DISORDER SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ADMITTED IN THIS SEX OFFENDER CIVIL COMMITMENT TRIAL (SECOND DEPT))/SEX OFFENDERS (CIVIL COMMITMENT,  A DIAGNOSIS OF UNSPECIFIED PARAPHILIC DISORDER IS NOT ACCEPTED IN THE PSYCHIATRIC OR PSYCHOLOGICAL COMMUNITIES, EXPERT EVIDENCE ABOUT THE DISORDER SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ADMITTED IN THIS SEX OFFENDER CIVIL COMMITMENT TRIAL (SECOND DEPT))/CIVIL COMMITMENT (SEX OFFENDERS, MENTAL HYGIENE LAW, A DIAGNOSIS OF UNSPECIFIED PARAPHILIC DISORDER IS NOT ACCEPTED IN THE PSYCHIATRIC OR PSYCHOLOGICAL COMMUNITIES, EXPERT EVIDENCE ABOUT THE DISORDER SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ADMITTED IN THIS SEX OFFENDER CIVIL COMMITMENT TRIAL (SECOND DEPT))UNSPECIFIED PARAPHILIC DISORDER (MENTAL HYGIENE LAW, SEX OFFENDERS, CIVIL COMMITMENT, A DIAGNOSIS OF UNSPECIFIED PARAPHILIC DISORDER IS NOT ACCEPTED IN THE PSYCHIATRIC OR PSYCHOLOGICAL COMMUNITIES, EXPERT EVIDENCE ABOUT THE DISORDER SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ADMITTED IN THIS SEX OFFENDER CIVIL COMMITMENT TRIAL (SECOND DEPT))

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INSUFFICIENT SHOWING THAT SEX OFFENDER’S VIOLATION OF NON-SEXUAL TERMS OF HIS STRICT AND INTENSIVE SUPERVISION AND TREATMENT (SIST) JUSTIFIED A FINDING HE IS UNABLE TO CONTROL SEXUAL MISCONDUCT, COMMITMENT TO LOCKED FACILITY REVERSED (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice DeMoyer, reversing County Court, determined that there was an insufficient showing that respondent sex offender’s non-sexual violations of the terms of his strict and intensive supervision and treatment (SIST) (alcohol abuse) justified a finding he has an inability to control sexual misconduct:

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… [A] Mental Hygiene Law § 10.03 (e) finding of “inability” based on nonsexual SIST violations will satisfy the Michael M. [24 NY3d 649] standard only when such violations bear a close causative relationship to sex offending. Such a relationship is missing here. It is simply not true — as the State claims — that “there is a significant link between respondent’s alcohol use disorder and his sex offenses” or that his sex offending is “fueled by his drug and alcohol use.” A review of the record citations upon which the State relies for those propositions reveals only that respondent was intoxicated during his sex offending decades ago, and that alcohol use “increases his impulsivity and makes [him] more likely to act out.” … [N]o expert has testified that respondent’s substance abuse is “strongly fused” or otherwise inextricably intertwined with his sex offending … . At most, the expert testimony in this case shows that respondent’s alcohol use is colocated with his sex offending (and, for that matter, with every other facet of his life), and that alcohol disinhibits him from resisting the urge to offend sexually. But this testimony is virtually identical to the expert testimony … is inadequate to meet the State’s burden under Michael M. Matter of State of New York v George N., 2018 NY Slip Op 00942, Fourth Dept 2-8-16

MENTAL HYGIENE LAW (INSUFFICIENT SHOWING THAT SEX OFFENDER’S VIOLATION OF NON-SEXUAL TERMS OF HIS STRICT AND INTENSIVE SUPERVISION AND TREATMENT (SIST) JUSTIFIED A FINDING HE IS UNABLE TO CONTROL SEXUAL MISCONDUCT, COMMITMENT TO LOCKED FACILITY REVERSED (FOURTH DEPT))/STRICT AND INTENSIVE SUPERVISION AND TREATMENT (SIST) (MENTAL HYGIENE LAW, INSUFFICIENT SHOWING THAT SEX OFFENDER’S VIOLATION OF NON-SEXUAL TERMS OF HIS STRICT AND INTENSIVE SUPERVISION AND TREATMENT (SIST) JUSTIFIED A FINDING HE IS UNABLE TO CONTROL SEXUAL MISCONDUCT, COMMITMENT TO LOCKED FACILITY REVERSED (FOURTH DEPT))/SEX OFFENDERS (MENTAL HYGIENE LAW, NSUFFICIENT SHOWING THAT SEX OFFENDER’S VIOLATION OF NON-SEXUAL TERMS OF HIS STRICT AND INTENSIVE SUPERVISION AND TREATMENT (SIST) JUSTIFIED A FINDING HE IS UNABLE TO CONTROL SEXUAL MISCONDUCT, COMMITMENT TO LOCKED FACILITY REVERSED (FOURTH DEPT))/CIVIL COMMITMENT (SEX OFFENDERS, MENTAL HYGIENE LAW, INSUFFICIENT SHOWING THAT SEX OFFENDER’S VIOLATION OF NON-SEXUAL TERMS OF HIS STRICT AND INTENSIVE SUPERVISION AND TREATMENT (SIST) JUSTIFIED A FINDING HE IS UNABLE TO CONTROL SEXUAL MISCONDUCT, COMMITMENT TO LOCKED FACILITY REVERSED (FOURTH DEPT))

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PETITIONER, UPSTATE UNIVERSITY HOSPITAL, SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ORDERED TO PAY THE ALLEGED INCAPACITATED PERSON’S (AIP’S) COURT-APPOINTED ATTORNEY’S FEES OR THE COURT EVALUATOR’S FEE IN THIS SUCCESSFUL MENTAL HYGIENE LAW PROCEEDING FOR THE APPOINTMENT OF A GUARDIAN (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined that the court should not have directed the petitioner, Upstate University Hospital, to pay the court-appointed attorney’s fees and the court evaluator’s fees in this proceeding to appoint a guardian for an alleged incapacitated person (AIP). The petition to appoint a guardian was successful and the AIP did not die during the proceedings. The court-appointed attorney should be paid pursuant to the County Law article 18-B, and the court did not have the authority to require petitioner to pay the court evaluator’s fee. The Fourth Department further determined Supreme Court did not abuse its discretion by failing to appoint Mental Hygiene Legal Services to represent the AIP:

Article 81 of the Mental Hygiene Law provides that the court may appoint an attorney to represent the AIP, and that petitioner may be directed to pay for such services where the petition is dismissed or the AIP dies before the proceeding is concluded … . In all cases, “[t]he court shall determine the reasonable compensation for the mental hygiene legal service or any attorney appointed pursuant to” that statute … . Nevertheless, “the statute is silent as to the source of funds for payment of counsel [where, as here,] the AIP is indigent”… . Despite that silence, it is well settled that “the Legislature, by providing for the assignment of counsel for indigents in the Mental Hygiene Law, intended, by necessary implication, to authorize the court to compensate counsel” … , and it is likewise well settled that the court should direct that requests for such compensation should be determined “in accordance with the procedures set forth in County Law article 18-B” … . Thus, the court erred in directing petitioner to pay those fees.

We also agree with the contention of petitioner in appeal No. 3 that the court erred in directing it to pay the fees requested by the court evaluator. Where, as here, a court appoints a court evaluator pursuant to Mental Hygiene Law § 81.09 (a) and then “grants a petition, the court may award a reasonable compensation to a court evaluator, including the mental hygiene legal service, payable by the estate of the allegedly incapacitated person” … . The statute further provides that a court may direct petitioner to pay for the services of a court evaluator only where the court “denies or dismisses a petition,” or the AIP “dies before the determination is made in the petition” … . Therefore, “notwithstanding Supreme Court’s broad discretion to award reasonable fees in Mental Hygiene Law article 81 proceedings . . . , [inasmuch as] petitioner was successful [and the AIP is alive], the court was without authority to ascribe responsibility to petitioner for payment of the court evaluator’s fees” … . Matter of Buttiglieri (Ferrel J.B.), 2018 NY Slip Op 00738, Fourth Dept 2-2-18

MENTAL HYGIENE LAW (PETITIONER, UPSTATE UNIVERSITY HOSPITAL, SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ORDERED TO PAY THE ALLEGED INCAPACITATED PERSON’S (AIP’S) COURT-APPOINTED ATTORNEY’S FEES OR THE COURT EVALUATOR’S FEE IN THIS SUCCESSFUL MENTAL HYGIENE LAW PROCEEDING FOR THE APPOINTMENT OF A GUARDIAN (FOURTH DEPT))/MUNICIPAL LAW (COURT-APPOINTED ATTORNEY’S FEES, MENTAL HYGIENE LAW, PETITIONER, UPSTATE UNIVERSITY HOSPITAL, SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ORDERED TO PAY THE ALLEGED INCAPACITATED PERSON’S (AIP’S) COURT-APPOINTED ATTORNEY’S FEES OR THE COURT EVALUATOR’S FEE IN THIS SUCCESSFUL MENTAL HYGIENE LAW PROCEEDING FOR THE APPOINTMENT OF A GUARDIAN (FOURTH DEPT))/ATTORNEYS (COURT-APPOINTED ATTORNEY’S FEES, MENTAL HYGIENE LAW, PETITIONER, UPSTATE UNIVERSITY HOSPITAL, SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ORDERED TO PAY THE ALLEGED INCAPACITATED PERSON’S (AIP’S) COURT-APPOINTED ATTORNEY’S FEES OR THE COURT EVALUATOR’S FEE IN THIS SUCCESSFUL MENTAL HYGIENE LAW PROCEEDING FOR THE APPOINTMENT OF A GUARDIAN (FOURTH DEPT))/ATTORNEY’S FEES (COURT-APPOINTED ATTORNEY’S FEES, MENTAL HYGIENE LAW, PETITIONER, UPSTATE UNIVERSITY HOSPITAL, SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ORDERED TO PAY THE ALLEGED INCAPACITATED PERSON’S (AIP’S) COURT-APPOINTED ATTORNEY’S FEES OR THE COURT EVALUATOR’S FEE IN THIS SUCCESSFUL MENTAL HYGIENE LAW PROCEEDING FOR THE APPOINTMENT OF A GUARDIAN (FOURTH DEPT))/COURT EVALUATORS (MENTAL HYGIENE LAW, FEES, PETITIONER, UPSTATE UNIVERSITY HOSPITAL, SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ORDERED TO PAY THE ALLEGED INCAPACITATED PERSON’S (AIP’S) COURT-APPOINTED ATTORNEY’S FEES OR THE COURT EVALUATOR’S FEE IN THIS SUCCESSFUL MENTAL HYGIENE LAW PROCEEDING FOR THE APPOINTMENT OF A GUARDIAN (FOURTH DEPT))/GUARDIANSHIP (MENTAL HYGIENE LAW, PETITIONER, UPSTATE UNIVERSITY HOSPITAL, SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ORDERED TO PAY THE ALLEGED INCAPACITATED PERSON’S (AIP’S) COURT-APPOINTED ATTORNEY’S FEES OR THE COURT EVALUATOR’S FEE IN THIS SUCCESSFUL MENTAL HYGIENE LAW PROCEEDING FOR THE APPOINTMENT OF A GUARDIAN (FOURTH DEPT))/ALLEGED INCAPACITATED PERSON (AIP) (MENTAL HYGIENE LAW, PETITIONER, UPSTATE UNIVERSITY HOSPITAL, SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ORDERED TO PAY THE ALLEGED INCAPACITATED PERSON’S (AIP’S) COURT-APPOINTED ATTORNEY’S FEES OR THE COURT EVALUATOR’S FEE IN THIS SUCCESSFUL MENTAL HYGIENE LAW PROCEEDING FOR THE APPOINTMENT OF A GUARDIAN (FOURTH DEPT))

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SEALED LOCAL GOVERNMENT RECORDS PROPERLY UNSEALED FOR CONSIDERATION IN THIS SEX OFFENDER CIVIL COMMITMENT PROCEEDING (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined sealed records were properly unsealed in this sex offender civil commitment hearing:

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The Supreme Court properly granted the State’s motion to unseal the records kept by the Office of the Suffolk County District Attorney and the Suffolk County Police Department regarding the defendant’s 2001 arrest for rape in the first degree. Mental Hygiene Law § 10.08(c) provides, “Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the commissioner, the case review panel and the attorney general shall be entitled to request from any agency, office, department or other entity of the state, and such entity shall be authorized to provide upon request, any and all records and reports relating to the respondent’s commission or alleged commission of a sex offense, the institutional adjustment and any treatment received by such respondent, and any medical, clinical or other information relevant to a determination of whether the respondent is a sex offender requiring civil management.” “The primary goal of the court in interpreting a statute is to determine and implement the Legislature’s intent”… . Given the legislative purpose underlying Mental Hygiene Law § 10.08(c), we have construed this statute to permit authorized parties to obtain records from local government entities in addition to State entities … . Matter of State of New York v David B., 2017 NY Slip Op 08831, Second Dept 12-20-17

 

MENTAL HYGIENE LAW (SEX OFFENDERS, CIVIL COMMITMENT, SEALED LOCAL GOVERNMENT RECORDS PROPERLY UNSEALED FOR CONSIDERATION IN THIS SEX OFFENDER CIVIL COMMITMENT PROCEEDING (SECOND DEPT))/EVIDENCE (MENTAL HYGIENE LAW, SEX OFFENDERS, SEALED LOCAL GOVERNMENT RECORDS PROPERLY UNSEALED FOR CONSIDERATION IN THIS SEX OFFENDER CIVIL COMMITMENT PROCEEDING (SECOND DEPT))/MUNICIPAL LAW (SEALED RECORDS, MENTAL HYGIENE LAW, SEX OFFENDERS,  SEALED LOCAL GOVERNMENT RECORDS PROPERLY UNSEALED FOR CONSIDERATION IN THIS SEX OFFENDER CIVIL COMMITMENT PROCEEDING (SECOND DEPT))/SEALED RECORDS SEX OFFENDERS, CIVIL COMMITMENT, SEALED LOCAL GOVERNMENT RECORDS PROPERLY UNSEALED FOR CONSIDERATION IN THIS SEX OFFENDER CIVIL COMMITMENT PROCEEDING (SECOND DEPT))

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STATE’S EXPERTS SHOULD NOT HAVE RELIED ON HEARSAY EVIDENCE OF CONVICTIONS WHICH WERE VACATED BASED UPON DNA EVIDENCE, NEW MENTAL ABNORMALITY TRIAL ORDERED, SEALED CRIMINAL RECORDS PROPERLY CONSIDERED, FAILURE HOLD PROBABLE CAUSE HEARING AND TRIAL WITHIN STATUTORY TIME FRAMES DID NOT VIOLATE DUE PROCESS (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, in a comprehensive opinion by Justice Sgroi, determined that a detained sex offender, Kerry K, was entitled to a new civil commitment trial on the issue of mental abnormality and, if necessary, a new dispositional hearing. The finding that Kerry K suffered from a mental abnormality was based in part on hearsay about a conviction which had been vacated based upon DNA evidence (after defendant served 11 years in prison). The Second Department further held that the fact that the probable cause hearing and trial did not occur within the statutory time-frames was not a jurisdictional defect or a violation of due process. And the fact that sealed criminal records were relied upon by the state’s experts was deemed proper:

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… [T]he failure to conduct the probable cause hearing and trial within the statutory time frames did not deprive the court of jurisdiction or, under the circumstances, violate Kerry K.’s due process rights. … Mental Hygiene Law § 10.08(c) permits the State to obtain, from local government entities, sealed records relating to an offender’s commission or alleged commission of a sex offense. … [W]e conclude that the court erred in admitting the hearsay basis testimony regarding convictions of which Kerry K. was exonerated … . * * *

The experts’ testimony about the vacated 1982 convictions … did not satisfy the reliability and relevance requirements for admission of hearsay basis evidence. As the Court of Appeals has observed, “unlike adjudications and admissions of guilt, an acquittal cannot provide the basis for reliability” … . Further, “[c]harges that resulted in acquittal are surely more prejudicial than probative on the question of the respondent’s mental abnormality” … . Thus, “acquittal of criminal charges bars admission of those accusations, absent some other basis to substantiate them” … .

In the present case, the information regarding the 1982 convictions was even less reliable and relevant than information concerning charges of which a respondent has merely been acquitted. An acquittal on a particular charge indicates that the People were unable to prove the defendant’s guilt of that charge beyond a reasonable doubt. Here, in contrast, the 1982 convictions were vacated, on consent of the Suffolk County District Attorney’s Office, based on the results of DNA testing conducted by Kerry K.’s and the State’s experts, and Kerry K. later affirmatively proved his innocence by clear and convincing evidence … . Thus, it was error to permit the State’s experts to testify about the 1982 convictions, and this error deprived Kerry K. of due process … . Matter of State of New York v Kerry K., 2017 NY Slip Op 08671, Second Dept 12-13-17

 

MENTAL HYGIENE LAW (SEX OFFENDERS, CIVIL COMMITMENT, STATE’S EXPERTS SHOULD NOT HAVE RELIED ON HEARSAY EVIDENCE OF CONVICTIONS WHICH WERE VACATED BASED UPON DNA EVIDENCE, NEW MENTAL ABNORMALITY TRIAL ORDERED, SEALED CRIMINAL RECORDS PROPERLY CONSIDERED, FAILURE HOLD PROBABLE CAUSE HEARING AND TRIAL WITH STATUTORY TIME FRAMES DID NOT VIOLATE DUE PROCESS (SECOND DEPT))/EVIDENCE (MENTAL HYGIENE LAW, SEX OFFENDERS, CIVIL COMMITMENT, STATE’S EXPERTS SHOULD NOT HAVE RELIED ON HEARSAY EVIDENCE OF CONVICTIONS WHICH WERE VACATED BASED UPON DNA EVIDENCE, NEW MENTAL ABNORMALITY TRIAL ORDERED, SEALED CRIMINAL RECORDS PROPERLY CONSIDERED, FAILURE HOLD PROBABLE CAUSE HEARING AND TRIAL WITH STATUTORY TIME FRAMES DID NOT VIOLATE DUE PROCESS (SECOND DEPT))/SEX OFFENDERS (CIVIL COMMITMENT, STATE’S EXPERTS SHOULD NOT HAVE RELIED ON HEARSAY EVIDENCE OF CONVICTIONS WHICH WERE VACATED BASED UPON DNA EVIDENCE, NEW MENTAL ABNORMALITY TRIAL ORDERED, SEALED CRIMINAL RECORDS PROPERLY CONSIDERED, FAILURE HOLD PROBABLE CAUSE HEARING AND TRIAL WITH STATUTORY TIME FRAMES DID NOT VIOLATE DUE PROCESS (SECOND DEPT))/CIVIL COMMITMENT (SEX OFFENDERS STATE’S EXPERTS SHOULD NOT HAVE RELIED ON HEARSAY EVIDENCE OF CONVICTIONS WHICH WERE VACATED BASED UPON DNA EVIDENCE, NEW MENTAL ABNORMALITY TRIAL ORDERED, SEALED CRIMINAL RECORDS PROPERLY CONSIDERED, FAILURE HOLD PROBABLE CAUSE HEARING AND TRIAL WITH STATUTORY TIME FRAMES DID NOT VIOLATE DUE PROCESS (SECOND DEPT))

,

MENTAL HEALTH LEGAL SERVICE (MHLS) HAS ORGANIZATIONAL STANDING TO BRING AN ARTICLE 78 PROCEEDING TO REQUIRE THE BRONX PSYCHIATRIC CENTER TO PROVIDE A COMPLETE COPY OF A PATIENT’S MEDICAL RECORD PRIOR TO AN INVOLUNTARY RETENTION HEARING, AND, ON THE MERITS, MHLS IS ENTITLED TO SUCH RECORDS (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Renwick, over a two-justice dissenting opinion, determined the Mental Hygiene Legal Service (MHLS) was entitled to a copy of the psychiatric patient’s full medical chart prior to an involuntary-retention hearing under the Mental Hygiene Law. As a preliminary matter, the First Department held MHLS has organizational standing to bring the underlying Article 78 proceeding which was triggered by the Bronx Psychiatric Center’s (BPC’s) refusal to provide the medical record:

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In order to retain a patient involuntarily for more than 60 days, the hospital must obtain a court order so directing, although the patient may remain hospitalized while the application for such an order is pending … . The hospital must show “that the patient is mentally ill and in need of continued, supervised care and treatment, and that the patient poses a substantial threat of physical harm to himself and/or others”… . On the other hand, MHLS has a duty “[t]o provide legal services and assistance to patients or residents and their families related to the admission, retention, and care and treatment of such persons” … . MHLS further has a duty “[t]o initiate and take any legal action deemed necessary to safeguard the right of any patient or resident to protection from abuse or mistreatment” … .

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This Court has found organizational standing under exceptional circumstances involving organizations that were dedicated to protecting a class of individuals who suffered injuries which certain statutes were intended to guard against, and who could not otherwise act in their own interests. …

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We find that MHLS has demonstrated a clear legal right to mandamus relief … . … [W]hen read together, [the] statutory duty and regulatory provisions impose upon BPC a compulsory duty to provide MHLS with a copy of its clients’ complete medical charts before their respective retention hearings under MHL 9.31 and 9.33 are held. Matter of Mental Hygiene Legal Serv. v Daniels, 2017 NY Slip Op 08645, First Dept 12-12-17

 

MENTAL HYGIENE LAW (MENTAL HEALTH LEGAL SERVICE (MHLS) HAS ORGANIZATIONAL STANDING TO BRING AN ARTICLE 78 PROCEEDING TO REQUIRE THE BRONX PSYCHIATRIC CENTER TO PROVIDE A COMPLETE COPY OF A PATIENT’S MEDICAL RECORD PRIOR TO AN INVOLUNTARY RETENTION HEARING, AND, ON THE MERITS, MHLS IS ENTITLED TO SUCH RECORDS (FIRST DEPT))/CIVIL PROCEDURE (ORGANIZATIONAL STANDING, MENTAL HEALTH LEGAL SERVICE (MHLS) HAS ORGANIZATIONAL STANDING TO BRING AN ARTICLE 78 PROCEEDING TO REQUIRE THE BRONX PSYCHIATRIC CENTER TO PROVIDE A COMPLETE COPY OF A PATIENT’S MEDICAL RECORD PRIOR TO AN INVOLUNTARY RETENTION HEARING, AND, ON THE MERITS, MHLS IS ENTITLED TO SUCH RECORDS (FIRST DEPT))/STANDING (CIVIL PROCEDURE, ORGANIZATIONAL STANDING, MENTAL HEALTH LEGAL SERVICE (MHLS) HAS ORGANIZATIONAL STANDING TO BRING AN ARTICLE 78 PROCEEDING TO REQUIRE THE BRONX PSYCHIATRIC CENTER TO PROVIDE A COMPLETE COPY OF A PATIENT’S MEDICAL RECORD PRIOR TO AN INVOLUNTARY RETENTION HEARING, AND, ON THE MERITS, MHLS IS ENTITLED TO SUCH RECORDS (FIRST DEPT))/ORGANIZATIONAL STANDING (MENTAL HEALTH LEGAL SERVICE (MHLS) HAS ORGANIZATIONAL STANDING TO BRING AN ARTICLE 78 PROCEEDING TO REQUIRE THE BRONX PSYCHIATRIC CENTER TO PROVIDE A COM PLETE COPY OF A PATIENT’S MEDICAL RECORD PRIOR TO AN INVOLUNTARY RETENTION HEARING, AND, ON THE MERITS, MHLS IS ENTITLED TO SUCH RECORDS (FIRST DEPT))/MENTAL HEALTH LEGAL SERVICE (INVOLUNTARY RETENTION, MENTAL HEALTH LEGAL SERVICE (MHLS) HAS ORGANIZATIONAL STANDING TO BRING AN ARTICLE 78 PROCEEDING TO REQUIRE THE BRONX PSYCHIATRIC CENTER TO PROVIDE A COMPLETE COPY OF A PATIENT’S MEDICAL RECORD PRIOR TO AN INVOLUNTARY RETENTION HEARING, AND, ON THE MERITS, MHLS IS ENTITLED TO SUCH RECORDS (FIRST DEPT))/PSYCHIATRIC PATIENTS (INVOLUNTARY RETENTION, MENTAL HEALTH LEGAL SERVICE (MHLS) HAS ORGANIZATIONAL STANDING TO BRING AN ARTICLE 78 PROCEEDING TO REQUIRE THE BRONX PSYCHIATRIC CENTER TO PROVIDE A COMPLETE COPY OF A PATIENT’S MEDICAL RECORD PRIOR TO AN INVOLUNTARY RETENTION HEARING, AND, ON THE MERITS, MHLS IS ENTITLED TO SUCH RECORDS (FIRST DEPT))/INVOLUNTARY RETENTION (PSYCHIATRIC PATIENTS, MENTAL HEALTH LEGAL SERVICE (MHLS) HAS ORGANIZATIONAL STANDING TO BRING AN ARTICLE 78 PROCEEDING TO REQUIRE THE BRONX PSYCHIATRIC CENTER TO PROVIDE A COMPLETE COPY OF A PATIENT’S MEDICAL RECORD PRIOR TO AN INVOLUNTARY RETENTION HEARING, AND, ON THE MERITS, MHLS IS ENTITLED TO SUCH RECORDS (FIRST DEPT))

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