You are here: / Labor Law-Construction Law

ALTHOUGH THE HOMEOWNER HIRED CONTRACTORS TO REPAIR HER HOME AND VISITED THE PROPERTY AS THE WORK WAS BEING DONE SHE DID NOT DIRECT OR SUPERVISE THE WORK AND THEREFORE WAS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT DISMISSING THE LABOR LAW 240(1), 241(6) AND 200 CAUSES OF ACTION (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined defendant homeowner’s (Hanson’s) motion for summary judgment in this Labor Law 240(1), 241(6) and 200 action was properly granted, in part because the homeowner’s exemption from Labor Law liability applied. The facts that the homeowner hired several contractors to repair her home and visited the property while work was being done did not subject her to liability:

Hannon established … that she was the owner of a single-family home and that she did not direct or control the work performed by the plaintiff or his employer… . While Hannon testified at her deposition that she visited the property several times per week to “[p]ick up the mail, check on progress, say hello,” her deposition testimony, along with that of the plaintiff, established that she never directed the work … . …[T]he fact that Hannon hired separate contractors to perform different aspects of the work on her property does not render her “a general contractor, responsible for supervising the entire construction project and enforcing safety standards” … .

… Supreme Court properly granted that branch of Hannon’s motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the Labor Law § 200 and common-law negligence causes of action insofar as asserted against her. Hannon established, prima facie, that she did not have the authority to supervise or control the method or manner in which the plaintiff’s work was performed … . Navarra v Hannon, 2021 NY Slip Op 04611, Second Dept 8-4-21

 

PLAINTIFF’S FALL FROM A LADDER OCCURRED DURING ROUTINE MAINTENANCE AND THEREFORE WAS NOT ACTIONABLE PURSUANT TO LABOR LAW 240 (1) (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined plaintiff’s Labor Law 240 (1) cause of action was properly dismissed because plaintiff was engaged in routine maintenance at the time of his fall from a ladder:

“Generally, courts have held that work constitutes routine maintenance where the work involves ‘replacing components that require replacement in the course of normal wear and tear'”  … .

… [T]he defendants established … that the replacement of the condenser fan motor, which, according to the deposition testimony of the injured plaintiff’s employer, weighed approximately 1½ pounds and was the kind of part that required replacement “all the time,” constituted routine maintenance and not repairing, or any of the other enumerated activities under Labor Law § 240(1) … . “The work here involved replacing [a] component[ ] that require[s] replacement in the course of normal wear and tear” … . Stockton v H&E Biffer Enters. No. 2, LLC, 2021 NY Slip Op 04568, Second Dept 7-28-21

 

BECAUSE PLAINTIFF WAS FOLLOWING THE DIRECTIONS OF HIS FOREMAN WHEN INJURED BY AN IMPROPERLY HOISTED LOAD, HE COULD NOT BE THE SOLE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF HIS INJURIES (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the plaintiff in this Labor Law 240 (1) and 241 (6) action could not be the sole proximate cause of his injuries because he was following the directions of his foreman when struck by an improperly hoisted load:

Plaintiff Samuel Hayek demonstrated prima facie entitlement to summary judgment on his Labor Law § 240(1) claim, where the undisputed evidence showed that he was injured when struck by an improperly hoisted or inadequately secured load of L-shaped steel rebar weighing between 2000 and 3000 pounds, while doing construction work at defendant Metropolitan Transportation Authority’s Eastside Access project … .

In opposition, defendants failed to raise a triable issue as to the statutory violation and whether plaintiff was the sole proximate cause of his injury. Given the undisputed evidence that plaintiff was following the directions of his foreman at the time of his injury, plaintiff cannot be the sole proximate cause of his injuries … . Hayek v Metropolitan Transp. Auth., 2021 NY Slip Op 04103, First Dept 6-29-21

 

PLAINTIFF WAS PROPERLY AWARDED SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON HIS LABOR LAW 240 (1) CAUSE OF ACTION STEMMING FROM A FALL FROM A SIDEWALK BRIDGE PLAINTIFF WAS DISMANTLING; ALTHOUGH PLAINTIFF WAS SUPPLIED WITH A HARNESS, THERE WAS NO PLACE TO ATTACH THE SAFETY LINE (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department determined plaintiff was properly awarded summary judgment on his Labor Law 240 (1) cause of action based on his fall from a sidewalk bridge he was dismantling. Although plaintiff had a harness, there was no place to attach the safety line:

Plaintiff testified that he was wearing a harness but that the sidewalk bridge did not have a lifeline to which he could attach the safety line, which was seven to nine feet long. The task at hand involved his breaking down the structure’s components and carrying them to the end of the sidewalk bridge run, which covered nearly a city block. The expert stated that if plaintiff’s movement was limited to nine feet with his lanyard attached to the sidewalk bridge, he could still have performed his job “as described.” However, he failed to explain further or indicate where on the bridge a tie-off would have been either practicable or safe, given the maximum range of the harness line. Gomez v Trinity Ctr. LLC, 2021 NY Slip Op 03810, First Dept 6-15-21

 

PLAINTIFF WAS STANDING AT THE TOP OF A LADDER WHEN IT WOBBLED AND HE FELL; COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE IS NOT A DEFENSE TO A LABOR LAW 240 (1) ACTION; PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff was entitled to summary judgment on his Labor Law 240 (1) cause of action, Plaintiff was standing at the top of a ladder when it wobbled and he fell:

Plaintiff established prima facie entitlement to summary judgment on the Labor Law § 240(1) claim through his testimony that while installing a cover on a sprinkler in a ceiling, he fell to the ground and sustained injury when the unsecured ladder on which he was standing with one foot on the ladder’s top, and the other foot one rung below began to wobble and he lost his equilibrium … . …

… [T]here is no requirement that plaintiff identify exactly what caused the ladder to move, or his fall … . While defendants argue that different versions as to why the ladder wobbled preclude summary judgment, under any of the scenarios, plaintiff is entitled to partial summary judgment because he was not supplied with adequate protection under the statute, which was the proximate cause of the accident … .

Given plaintiff’s undisputed testimony, any alleged misuse by him constitutes at most comparative negligence, which is not a defense to a Labor Law § 240(1) claim … . Hoxhaj v West 30th HL LLC, 2021 NY Slip Op 03811, First Dept 6-15-21

 

,

COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE IS A DEFENSE TO A LABOR LAW 241 (6) CAUSE OF ACTION (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department noted that comparative negligence is a defense to a Labor Law 241 (6) cause of action. Here plaintiff alleged he slipped and fell on ice and snow in a parking lot which functioned as a passageway and Supreme Court granted plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment. The Fourth Department found defendant had raised a question of fact about whether it had discharged its duty to keep the passageway clear by salting it and sent the matter back for a trial:

… [G]iven the need for a trial on liability and, if necessary, a new trial on damages, we note our agreement with defendant that the court erred in granting plaintiff’s request to preclude defendant from introducing at the prior damages trial any evidence of plaintiff’s comparative fault with respect to the Labor Law § 241 (6) cause of action. The court determined that defendant was precluded from offering evidence of plaintiff’s comparative fault at trial because that issue had been decided when the court granted plaintiff’s motion. Contrary to the court’s determination, however, consideration of comparative fault is still required even “[w]hen a defendant’s liability is established as a matter of law before trial” because the jury must still “determine whether the plaintiff was negligent and whether such negligence was a substantial factor” in causing his or her injuries … , “comparative negligence remains a cognizable affirmative defense to a section 241 (6) cause of action” … . Baum v Javen Constr. Co., Inc., 2021 NY Slip Op 03678, Fourth Dept 6-11-21

 

,

LABOR LAW 240 (1) AND 200 CAUSES OF ACTION MAY BE PLED IN THE ALTERNATIVE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined the Labor Law 200 cause of action should not have been dismissed on the ground that it duplicated the Labor Law 240 (1) cause of action. Those causes of action may be pled in the alternative:

… [T]he Supreme Court erred in granting those branches of the School District’s motion which were for summary judgment dismissing the Labor Law § 200 and common-law negligence causes of action asserted against it on the ground that those causes of action were duplicative of the Labor Law § 240(1) cause of action, as the plaintiffs may assert alternative Labor Law causes of action … . Cain v Ameresco, Inc., 2021 NY Slip Op 03572, Second Dept 6-9-21

 

PLAINTIFF WAS INJURED ATTEMPTING TO HOLD BACK A HAND TRUCK WITH A 500 POUND LOAD AS HE WAS DESCENDING STAIRS; IT WAS POSSIBLE TO LOWER THE LOAD USING RIGGING IN AN ELEVATOR SHAFTWAY BUT PLAINTIFF WAS DIRECTED TO USE THE STAIRS; PLAINTIFF WAS PROPERLY AWARDED SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON HIS LABOR LAW 240 (1) CAUSE OF ACTION (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department determined plaintiff was properly awarded summary judgment on his Labor Law 240 (1) cause of action. Plaintiff was injured trying to keep a hand truck from descending stairs too fast with a 500 pound load. The load could have been lowered with rigging equipment in an elevator shaftway but was directed to use the stairs:

Plaintiff was not provided with any hoisting equipment to use on the staircase and defendants had previously refused Dunwell’s [plaintiff’s employer’s] requests to bring equipment through the building’s lobby and down the shaftway of the lobby elevator, which was already outfitted with rigging equipment. Instead, defendants instructed Dunwell to bring their materials through the courtyard behind the building and down an exterior staircase to the basement. Plaintiff testified that he was holding the hand truck by the handles at the top, while his coworkers held it from the bottom to control its descent, and as the hand truck was going down the first step, one of the coworkers, a helper, “kind of let off the pressure” on his side of the hand truck, causing the hand truck to go down the first step “very fast,” which “jerked” plaintiff and caused him to slip on some dirt, gravel, or debris on the step. Plaintiff testified further that at that point he attempted to hold back the weight of the steel bedplate and stop the load’s descent. Plaintiff “yelled out a little bit” and the three workers rested for approximately 30 seconds, before continuing the descent down the stairs. All three workers rested at the bottom of the stairs before moving the bedplate into the building. During this break, plaintiff told his coworkers “I pulled my shoulder out and my back is killing me.” Agli v 21 E. 90 Apts. Corp., 2021 NY Slip Op 03540, First Dept 6-8-21

 

PLAINTIFF INJURED HIS BACK WHEN HE LIFTED A HEAVY PIECE OF LUMBER TO ALLOW THE BLADES OF A FORKLIFT TO MOVE UNDER THE LUMBER; THERE WERE QUESTIONS OF FACT WHETHER LABOR LAW 240 (1) WAS APPLICABLE (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment on his Labor Law 240 (1) cause of action should not have been granted (but did not explain why). Plaintiff injured his back when he lifted a heavy object to allow the blades of a forklift to be moved under it:

There are issues of fact as to “whether plaintiff’s injuries were the direct consequence of a failure to provide adequate protection against a risk arising from a physically significant elevation differential” … .

It appears that plaintiff was placed in a position that required him to lift an extremely heavy piece of lumber without any safety devices such as those listed in Labor Law § 240(1) in order to get the assistance of a forklift. We note, in this regard, that any action on plaintiff’s part in lifting the beam goes to the issue of comparative negligence, which is not a defense to a Labor Law § 240(1) claim, because the statute imposes absolute liability once a violation is shown … . Moreover, plaintiff was under no duty to demand an alternate safety device on his own because “[t]o place that burden on employees would effectively eviscerate the protections that the legislature put in place” … . “Indeed, workers would be placed in a nearly impossible position if they were required to demand adequate safety devices from their employers or the owners of buildings on which they work” … . Greene v Raynors Lane Prop. LLC, 2021 NY Slip Op 03114, First Dept 5-13-21

 

THERE WAS A QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER PLAINTIFF WAS ENGAGED IN REPAIR AS OPPOSED TO ROUTINE MAINTENANCE OF THE AIR CONDITIONER WHEN HE WAS INJURED; THEREFORE DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DIMSISS THE LABOR LAW 240(1) CAUSE OF ACTION WAS PROPERLY DENIED; HOWEVER THE LABOR LAW 241(6) CAUSE OF ACTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMIISED BECAUSE PLAINTIFF WAS NOT INVOLVED IN CONSTRUCTION (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court determined defendant’s (Chase’s) motion for summary judgment on the Labor Law 240(1) cause of action was properly denied but Chase’s motion for summary judgment on the Labor Law 241(6) cause of action should have been granted. There was a question of fact whether plaintiff was engaged in routine maintenance repair of the air conditioner. But plaintiff was not involved in construction of the building, so Labor Law 241 (6) did not apply:

Chase’s own evidentiary submissions, including the injured plaintiff’s deposition testimony, raised triable issues of fact as to whether the injured plaintiff was engaged in repairs or routine maintenance at the time the accident occurred. Although it is undisputed that an outside party was to perform the ultimate repair to the defective division plate, the injured plaintiff testified at his deposition that his supervisor instructed him to perform a temporary repair to the division plate in order to make the air conditioning unit function. Thus, there is a triable issue of fact as to whether the injured plaintiff’s activity constituted a repair of the unit within the scope of Labor Law § 240(1) … . …

“Although the applicability of Labor Law § 241(6) is not limited to building sites, the work in which the plaintiff was engaged must have affected the structural integrity of the building or structure or have been an integral part of the construction of a building or structure” … . Cantalupo v Arco Plumbing & Heating, Inc., 2021 NY Slip Op 02783, Second Dept 5-5-21

 

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy