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PLAINTIFF WAS STANDING ON AN A-FRAME LADDER WHEN AN ELECTRICAL EXPLOSION CAUSED HIM AND THE LADDER TO FALL TO THE GROUND; THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE THE LADDER WAS DEFECTIVE; BECAUSE PLAINTIFF DID NOT PRESENT ANY EVIDENCE THAT A SAFETY DEVICE WOULD HAVE PREVENTED THE FALL, HE WAS NOT ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Rodriguez, determined plaintiff in this ladder-fall case was not entitled to summary judgment on his Labor Law 240(1) cause of action. Plaintiff was standing on an A-frame ladder when a wire fed in by another worker struck and electric panel causing an explosion. Plaintiff and the ladder fell to the floor. The evidence did not demonstrate the ladder was defective. And plaintiff did not present any evidence that additional safety devices would have prevented the ladder from falling over:

Nazario applies … . … [T]here the plaintiff was not entitled to summary judgment due to the presence of several triable issues of fact (see Nazario, 28 NY3d at 1055). The record … lacked evidence concerning whether the plaintiff “should have been provided with additional safety devices and [whether] the failure to do so was a contributing cause of the accident” … . Summary judgment was appropriately denied, … even though the plaintiff “hung onto the ladder” and the ladder “fell to the ground” with the plaintiff “because it was not secured to something stable” … . As in Nazario, plaintiff here failed to submit any evidence—whether by his own testimony or through an expert opinion—addressing gravity-related safety devices or precautions that might have prevented his fall … . Arias v Brooks Holdings Corp., 2026 NY Slip Op 01841, First Dept 3-26-26

Practice Point: If a plaintiff in a ladder-fall case presents no evidence the ladder itself was defective, summary judgment on the Labor Law 240 (1) cause of action will not be granted unless the plaintiff presents evidence that an additional safety device (which was not provided) would have prevented the fall.

 

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PLAINTIFF WAS A CO-PILOT OF A HELICOPTER USED TO PROVIDE AN AERIAL PLATFORM FOR WORK ON POWER LINES; THE HELICOPTER STRUCK A POWER LINE AND PLAINTIFF JUMPED FROM THE HELICOPTER FROM A HEIGHT OF 75 FEET; THE LABOR LAW 240(1) AND 241(6) STRICT LIABILITY CAUSES OF ACTION WERE PREEMPTED BY THE FEDERAL AVIATION ACT (FAA); THE LABOR LAW 200 AND NEGLIGENCE CAUSES OF ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED; RATHER THE FEDERAL STANDARD OF CARE SHOULD BE APPLIED TO THOSE CAUSES OF ACTION (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Ford, determined the Labor Law 240(1) and 241(6) six causes of action were preempted by the Federal Aviation Act (FAA) but the negligence and Labor Law 200 causes of action should not have been dismissed because the federal standard of care can be applied to them. Plaintiff was the co-pilot of a helicopter which was being used to provide an aerial platform for work on power lines. The helicopter struck a power line and plaintiff jumped out of the helicopter from a height of 75 feet:

Under the federal rules, “[t]he pilot in command of an aircraft is directly responsible for, and is the final authority as to, the operation of that aircraft” (14 CFR 91.3[a] …). Various federal courts have held that the pilot thereby has the “sole responsibility to determine whether it is safe or unsafe to undertake the proposed flight” … . * * *

Additionally, under the federal rules, “[n]o person may operate an aircraft in a careless or reckless manner so as to endanger the life or property of another” (14 CFR 91.13[a]). This rule is “[c]entral” to the FAA’s overarching standard of care …. Common-law negligence cases require a more stringent standard of care, “that of a reasonable person under the same or similar circumstances” … . Labor Law § 200 codifies the common-law negligence standard … , while Labor Law §§ 240(1) and 241(6) “subject contractors and owners to absolute strict liability” … . The standards of care underlying the four sources of liability alleged by the plaintiff—i.e., liability for common-law negligence and under Labor Law §§ 200, 240(1), and 241(6)—thereby conflict with, and are preempted by, the federal recklessness standard. …

Where applicable, the effect of preemption of a state standard of care is not to preclude recovery or “to deprive Plaintiffs of their state remedies, but rather, to substitute a federal standard of care for New York’s reasonably-prudent-person standard” … . Fabia v Power Auth. of the State of N.Y., 2026 NY Slip Op 01489, Second Dept 3-18-26

Practice Point: Here, although the Federal Aviation Act (FAA) preempted the strict liability Labor Law 240(1) and 241(6) causes of action in this helicopter-accident case, the negligence and Labor Law 200 causes of action should not have been dismissed because the federal standard of care can be applied to them.

Practice Point: Consult this opinion for an in-depth analysis of the issues raised by preemption of state Labor Law and negligence claims stemming from a helicopter accident by the Federal Aviation Act (FAA).

 

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PLAINTIFF ATTEMPTED TO MOVE A SCAFFOLD WHILE STANDING ON IT AND IT FELL OVER; PLAINTIFF WAS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE LABOR LAW 240(1) AND 241(6) CAUSES OF ACTION (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined plaintiff was entitled to summary judgment on the Labor Law 240(1) cause of action. Plaintiff was standing on a Baker scaffold, attempting to move it, when it toppled over. The scaffold did not have safety railings and plaintiff was not provided with any safety equipment.. Plaintiff’s comparative negligence is irrelevant for a Labor Law 240(1) action:

The plaintiff’s assigned work on the project required him to stand on top of a Baker scaffold. As the plaintiff was attempting to move the scaffold while standing on the platform of the scaffold, the scaffold toppled over and the plaintiff fell five to six feet to the floor below. * * *

… [T]he plaintiff met his prima facie burden of demonstrating a violation of Labor Law § 240(1) and that this violation was a proximate cause of his injuries by submitting a transcript of his deposition testimony in which he testified that he fell from a scaffold that did not have any safety railings and that he was not provided with any safety devices to keep him from falling … . In opposition, the defendants failed to raise a triable issue of fact. Since the plaintiff established a violation of Labor Law § 240(1) and that the violation was a proximate cause of his fall, his comparative negligence, if any, is not a defense to the cause of action alleging a violation of that statute … . * * *

… [T]he court should have granted that branch of the plaintiff’s motion which was for summary judgment on the issue of liability on so much of the cause of action alleging a violation of Labor Law § 241(6) as was predicated on a violation of 12 NYCRR 23-5.18(b), as the plaintiff established, prima facie, that the manually propelled scaffold lacked safety railings … . Bustamante v BSD 370 Lexington, L.L.C., 2026 NY Slip Op 01180, Second Dept 3-4-26

Practice Point: This decision illustrates the irrelevance of comparative negligence for a Labor Law 240(1) cause of action.​

 

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PLAINTIFF WAS STRUCK BY A STEEL BAR WHICH FELL DURING AN ATTEMPT TO HOIST IT WITH EXCAVATING EQUIPMENT; PLAINTIFF WAS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE LABOR LAW 240(1) CAUSE OF ACTION; PLAINTIFF DID NOT NEED TO DEMONSTRATE THE EXACT CAUSE FOR THE BAR’S FALLING, NOR DID HE NEED TO SPECIFY THE EQUIPMENT WHICH SHOULD HAVE BEEN USED (FIRST DEPT). ​

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff was entitled to summary judgment on the Labor Law 240(1) cause of action. Plaintiff was struck by a steel bar which apparently fell over as it was about to be hoisted by an excavation machine. Plaintiff did not need to demonstrate the exact circumstances under which the bar fell, nor did he need to specify the type of equipment which should have been used to hoist the bar:

Plaintiff was injured as he and his coworkers were making bases for cement columns by using a drilling/excavation machine to remove steel bars that had been drilled into the ground. Plaintiff testified that when removing the bars, a fabric sling was tied to the top of the bar, a hook was placed into the sling, and the drilling/excavation machine lifted the bar away. As the last bar was being removed, it fell and hit plaintiff. According to plaintiff’s testimony, the bar was standing vertically on the drilling machine and was not secured before the machine moved it.

Supreme Court should have granted plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment on liability on their Labor Law § 240(1) claim. Plaintiffs demonstrated prima facie entitlement to summary judgment on this claim by submitting evidence establishing that the steel bar was not secured while the excavation/drilling machine was hoisting it out of the ground … . Even though plaintiff testified that he did not see the precise moment that the bar began to fall and was unsure whether a sling was attached to the bar at the time of the accident, he was not obliged to show the exact circumstances under which the object fell … . Furthermore, because the equipment used to hoist the steel bar failed to prevent it from falling, plaintiffs were also not obliged to specify the type of safety device that defendants should have provided … . Valarezo v HP Jamsta Hous. Dev. Fund Co. Inc., 2026 NY Slip Op 01148, First Dept 2-26-26

Practice Point: To be entitled to summary judgment on a Labor Law 240(1) falling-object cause of action, plaintiff need not demonstrate the precise circumstances which caused the object to fall.

 

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PLAINTIFF WAS HIT BY A FALLING CHISEL WHILE SITTING UNDER A SIDEWALK BRIDGE AT THE WORKSITE TAKING A BREAK; THE CHISEL SHOULD HAVE BEEN SECURED AND THE SCAFFOLDING ABOVE PLAINTIFF WAS INADEQUATE TO PROTECT HIM FROM A FALLING OBJECT; PLAINTIFF WAS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE LABOR LAW 240(1) CAUSE OF ACTION (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff in this falling-object case was entitled to summary judgment on his Labor Law 240(1) cause of action. Plaintiff was sitting underneath a sidewalk bridge on the jobsite, taking a break, when he was struck by a chisel. The chisel should have been secured and the scaffolding above plaintiff had gaps and therefore failed to provide adequate protection. Plaintiff did not have to prove where the chisel came from:

… “[I]njuries sustained while a worker was on site, although . . . on a break, come within the protections of Labor Law § 240(1)” … .

Plaintiff established that the chisel “required securing for the purposes of the undertaking” and that the scaffolding “proved inadequate” to protect him … . It is irrelevant that plaintiff did not know where the chisel fell from, or what caused it to fall, or hear anything fall, as “plaintiff is not required to show exactly how the [object] fell” … . Any alleged inconsistency concerning the location of the accident is immaterial … . Similarly, it does not matter where the chisel struck plaintiff’s body, as it is undisputed that it struck him. … [P]laintiff alleges without contradiction that the scaffolding was defective … , including the existence of gaps between the scaffolding planks. Contreras v City of New York, 2026 NY Slip Op 00612, First Dept 2-10-26

Practice Point: In a Labor Law 240(1) falling-object case, a plaintiff need not prove where the object came from.

 

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THE A-FRAME LADDER PLAINTIFF WAS USING WHEN HE FELL WAS DEFECTIVE AND LABOR LAW 240(1) APPLIED ON THAT GROUND ALONE; EVEN IF THE LADDER HAD NOT BEEN DEFECTIVE, LABOR LAW 240(1) WOULD STILL APPLY BECAUSE THE LADDER WOBBLED AFTER PLAINTIFF RECEIVED AN ELECTRIC SHOCK; THERE IS NO EXCEPTION TO THE APPLICABILITY OF LABOR LAW 240(1) WHERE A LADDER-FALL IS PRECEDED BY AN ELECTRIC SHOCK (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Mendez, determined plaintiff was entitled to summary judgment on the Labor Law 240(1) cause of action in this ladder-fall case. Plaintiff was standing on an A-frame ladder when he he was shocked by a live electric wire and fell. At the time he was shocked, he felt the ladder wobble. That evidence was sufficient for summary judgment. There is no exception under Labor Law 240(1) for a fall which follows an electric shock:

… [T]he statute applies here because the ladder was defective. Plaintiff’s deposition testimony and the photographs provided clearly demonstrate that the ladder, which was the only one available for the work plaintiff was required to perform, had two bent and curved crossbeams and worn rubber feet. The general contractor’s corporate safety manager confirmed that the ladder was defective when he stated at his deposition that if he had observed a ladder with the damage depicted in the photographs, he would have replaced the ladder and taken it out of service.

Even if the ladder had been stable, this would have been no impediment to a claim under section 240 … . Plaintiff submitted evidence that the ladder was an inadequate safety device because it failed to provide adequate protection against the gravity-related risk inherent in the work he was performing. Plaintiff testified that when he removed his hand from the wires that shocked him, the ladder immediately “moved, wobbled and shifted,” establishing that it failed to adequately support and protect him from the gravity-related risk … . Szczesiak v Ery Tenant LLC, 2026 NY Slip Op 00600, First Dept 2-5-26

Practice Point: Plaintiff fell from a ladder which wobbled after he received an electric shock. The fact that the ladder wobbled was proof it was not an adequate safety device. The electric shock was not relevant to the applicability of Labor Law 240(1).​

 

PLAINTIFF TRIPPED AND FELL OUTSIDE, NOT IN A “PASSAGEWAY” WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE INDUSTRIAL CODE; THE LABOR LAW 241(6) CAUSE OF ACTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined the Labor Law 241(6) cause of action should have been dismissed because plaintiff tripped and fell outside and not in a “passageway” within the meaning of Industrial Code 23-1.7(e)(1):

… [T]he Labor Law § 241(6) claim insofar as it was predicated on Industrial Code § 23-1.7(e)(1), as the accident occurred outdoors and therefore did not take place in a “passageway” within the meaning of the Industrial Code provision (see Quigley v Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 168 AD3d 65, 67-68 [1st Dept 2018] [holding that a “passageway” under § 23-1.7(e)(1) pertains to “an interior or internal way of passage inside a building”]). Lacruise v Memorial Sloan-Kettering Cancer Ctr., 2026 NY Slip Op 00424, First Dept 1-29-26

Practice Point: At least in the First Department, the Industrial Code reference to  “passageway” means an interior passage inside a building, not a walkway outside.

 

PLAINTIFF WAS INJURED WHILE STANDING ON INSTALLED REBAR WHICH WOBBLED AS A CO-WORKER HANDED HIM A PIECE OF REBAR; HE DROPPED THE REBAR BUT GRABBED IT BEFORE IT FELL ANY FURTHER, INJURING HIS SHOULDER; INJURY WHILE ATTEMPTING TO PREVENT AN OBJECT FROM FALLING IS COVERED BY LABOR LAW 240(1) (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff was entitled to summary judgment on his Labor Law 240(1) cause of action. Plaintiff dropped a piece of rebar while standing on installed rebar which wobbled. The rebar fell about one foot before he grabbed it to keep it from falling further, injuring his shoulder. Injury from attempting to prevent an object from falling is covered by Labor Law 240(1):

Contrary to defendants’ assertion otherwise, they are not entitled to summary judgment on the grounds that plaintiff did not fall and was not struck by a falling object … . On the contrary, liability under the statute may be imposed where, as here, a plaintiff can establish that their injury was caused by an attempt to catch something or prevent something from falling further … . The record establishes that plaintiff was injured in the act of trying to catch a falling piece of rebar, and that his injury may have been prevented had defendants supplied a proper hoist to safely transfer the rebar… . According to the evidence submitted, although a crane was sometimes used to transfer heavy rebar at the job site, no crane was available at the time.

… [D]efendants failed to establish that that the previously installed rebar, which was the sole platform available for plaintiff to stand on while his coworkers passed him the rebar from above, was stable and safe for plaintiff to be working on at an elevated height … . Alonzo v RP1185 LLC, 2026 NY Slip Op 00306, First Dept 1-27-26

Practice Point: Injury when attempting to prevent an object from falling is covered by Labor Law 240(1).​

 

PLAINTIFF WAS INJURED WHEN A DRILL FELL FROM A CO-WORKER WHO WAS STANDING ON AN A-FRAME LADDER; THE DRILL SHOULD HAVE BEEN TETHERED TO THE CO-WORKER’S PERSON; PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE LABOR LAW 240(1) CAUSE OF ACTION (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff in this Labor Law 240(1) action was entitled to summary judgment in this falling object case. Plaintiff was struck by a drill which fell from a co-worker standing on an A-frame ladder. The drill should have been tethered to the co-worker’s person:

… [T[he coworker’s elevated work atop the A-frame ladder, warranted overhead protection or tethering of the tools to the coworker’s person to safeguard other workers from falling objects … . Elmaz v CNY Constr. LLC, 2026 NY Slip Op 00313, First Dept 1-27-26

Practice Point: Labor Law 240(1) requires protection against falling objects. Here a tool used by a co-worker who was standing on an A-frame ladder fell and struck plaintiff. Plaintiff was entitled to summary judgment because the tool should have been tethered to the co-worker’s person.

 

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A TREE IS NOT A “BUILDING OR STRUCTURE” WITHIN THE MEANING OF LABOR LAW 240 (1); THEREFORE PLAINTIFF’S INJURY, INCURRED WHILE CUTTING A LIMB OFF A TREE, WAS NOT COVERED BY THE LABOR LAW (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined that plaintiff’s injury while he was cutting a tree was not covered by Labor Law 240 (1). Plaintiff, a county parks department employee, argued that the tree cutting and removal was part of a larger construction project, i.e., setting up a holiday light show:

“Labor Law § 240(1) imposes upon owners and general contractors, and their agents, a nondelegable duty to provide safety devices necessary to protect workers from risks inherent in elevated work sites” … . The statute “applies where an employee is engaged ‘in the erection, demolition, repairing, altering, painting, cleaning or pointing of a building or structure'” … . “[T]ree cutting and removal, in and of themselves, are not activities subject to Labor Law § 240(1). Those activities are generally excluded from statutory protection because a tree is not a building or structure, as contemplated by the statute but, rather, ‘a product of nature'” … .

Here, the defendant established its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law dismissing the cause of action alleging a violation of Labor Law § 240(1) by submitting evidence demonstrating that, at the time of his accident, the plaintiff was engaged in tree cutting and removal, which “constituted routine maintenance outside of a construction or renovation context” … . In support of its motion, the defendant submitted, inter alia, transcripts of the deposition testimony of James Leonard, the director of general maintenance for the Department, and Russell Argila, a senior maintenance mechanic in the general maintenance department. Leonard testified that, on the date of the accident, the plaintiff and his coworkers were engaged in “thinning out, pruning trees, dead branches along . . . [a] hillside,” and that the tree the plaintiff was cutting at the time of his accident was part of that work. Argila testified that the tree crew, of which the plaintiff was a member, was “coming up there to clean it up, to do their normal tree work,” and denied that the purpose of the tree work was to prepare for the installation of the [light show]. Peterkin v Westchester Parks Found., Inc., 2026 NY Slip Op 00268, Second Dept 1-21-26

Practice Point: Here tree cutting and removal was deemed “routine maintenance” which was not covered by Labor Law 240 (1) because a tree is not a “building of structure.”

 

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