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DEFENDANT’S WAIVER OF HIS RIGHT TO COUNSEL WAS INVALID BECAUSE DEFENDANT WAS NOT AWARE OF HIS SENTENCING EXPOSURE AND THE JUDGE DID NOT CONDUCT A SEARCHING INQURY; THE EVIDENCE OF CRIMINAL MISCHIEF AND AUTO STRIPPING WAS LEGALLY INSUFFICIENT AND THE CONVICTIONS WERE AGAINST THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing defendant’s conviction, determined the waiver of defendant’s right to counsel was invalid and the evidence of criminal mischief and auto stripping was legally insufficient, and the convictions were against the weight of the evidence:

Defendant’s waiver of his right to counsel was invalid, because the record “does not sufficiently demonstrate that defendant was aware of his actual sentencing exposure” … . “The critical consideration is defendant’s knowledge at the point in time when he first waived his right to counsel”; the court’s subsequent warnings about sentencing “were incapable of retrospectively ‘curing’ the . . . court’s error” … . Moreover, the court “improperly granted defendant’s request to proceed pro se without first conducting a searching inquiry regarding defendant’s mental capacity to waive counsel” … , in light of his history of mental illness, as well as his statement, in response to the court’s reference to the “tremendous pitfalls of representing yourself,” that “[n]one of that has been explained,” even after the court had warned him of a number of such risks.

Defendant’s conviction of third-degree criminal mischief as to one of the vehicles he damaged (count four), and his conviction of first-degree auto stripping, were unsupported by legally sufficient evidence (a claim we review in the interest of justice), and were also against the weight of the evidence … . The People failed to establish that particular charge of criminal mischief because the evidence did not show that “the reasonable cost of repairing the damaged property” … . Such costs “may not be established by hearsay”… . The People relied on a nonexpert witness who was not the owner of the vehicle and did not pay for the repairs, but testified that he looked at a receipt and that the repair costs were $600 … , and the People do not invoke any exception to the hearsay rule. In the absence of admissible evidence as to the repair costs for that vehicle, the People also failed to establish that the aggregate damage to all the vehicles exceeded $3,000, the minimum value for first-degree auto stripping … . People v Jackson, 2021 NY Slip Op 03288, First Dept 5-25-21

 

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THE JUDGE SHOULD NOT HAVE, SUA SPONTE, DISMISSED THE COMPLAINT BECAUSE PLAINTIFF MISSED A STATUS CONFERENCE; THE SUA SPONTE ORDER IS NOT APPEALABLE; PLAINTIFF CORRECTLY MOVED TO VACATE THE ORDER AND APPEALED THE DENIAL (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the judge should not have, sua sponte, dismissed the complaint because plaintiff missed a status conference. The First Department noted that the sua sponte dismissal order was not appealable as of right. Therefore plaintiff correcting moved to vacate the order and then appealed the denial of that order:

Contrary to defendant Hudson’s argument, the status conference order sua sponte dismissing the complaint was not appealable as of right (CPLR 5701[a][2] …). Plaintiff followed proper procedure by “apply[ing] to vacate the order and then appeal[ing] from the denial of that motion so that a suitable record [could] be made and counsel afforded the opportunity to be heard on the issues” … .

The court improvidently exercised its discretion in imposing the extreme penalty of dismissal without giving plaintiff notice that such a sanction might be imminent … . Further, the sanction of dismissal was not warranted, and would not have been warranted even upon a motion on notice, based on plaintiff’s noncompliance with one order … . MJC Elec., Inc v Hudson Meridian Constr. Group, LLC, 2021 NY Slip Op 03258, First Dept 5-20-21

 

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A GENERAL RELEASE AND WAIVER WHICH IS CONTRADICTED BY ACTIONS WHICH POST-DATE THE DOCUMENT CANNOT BE CONSTRUED AS A RELEASE; THE JUDGE DID NOT HAVE THE POWER, SUA SPONTE, PURSUANT TO CPLR 5019, TO VACATE THE COURT’S OWN ORDER (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined (1) actions which post-date a release and waiver which conflict with the terms of the release and waiver indicate the document can not be construed as a release, and (2) the judge did not have the authority, sua sponte, to vacate the court’s own order:

“‘Where a waiver form purports to acknowledge that no further payments are owed, but the parties’ conduct indicates otherwise, the instrument will not be construed as a release'” … . …

The Supreme Court erred in, sua sponte, vacating the December 2016 order. “‘Pursuant to CPLR 5019(a), a trial court has the discretion to correct an order or judgment which contains a mistake, defect, or irregularity not affecting a substantial right of a party, or is inconsistent with the decision upon which it is based. However, a trial court has no revisory or appellate jurisdiction, sua sponte, to vacate its own order or judgment'” … . Additionally, “[p]ursuant to CPLR 5015(a), a court may relieve a party from an order or judgment, but only ‘on motion of [an] interested person’ and ‘with such notice as the court may direct” … .

Here, to the extent that the Supreme Court was acting pursuant to CPLR 5019(a), the court erred, since that statute cannot be used by courts to vacate prior orders or judgments or “reconsider[ ] the merits of summary judgment” … . United Airconditioning Corp. v Axis Piping, Inc.2021 NY Slip Op 03210, Second Dept 5-19-21

 

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MANDAMUS PETITION TO COMPEL JUDGES TO ISSUE A WRITTEN ORDER DECIDING PETITIONER’S MOTION TO REARGUE HIS MOTION TO VACATE HIS CONVICTION GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, granted the petition to compel judges to issue a written order denying petitioner’s motion to reargue a motion to vacate his conviction:

Under the circumstances of this case, the petitioner demonstrated a clear legal right to a written order determining his motion for leave to reargue his prior motion pursuant to CPL 440.10, in the action entitled People v Cruz … and mandamus properly lies to compel the respondents to issue that written order, as well as an order determining the petitioner’s motion to reargue the “bench decision” … . Matter of Cruz v D’Emic, 2021 NY Slip Op 03175, Second Dept 5-19-21

 

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FAMILY COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE FOUND NEW YORK DID NOT HAVE JURISDICTION OVER THIS CUSTODY DISPUTE WITHOUT HOLDING A HEARING PURSUANT TO THE UNIFORM CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION AND ENFORCEMENT ACT TO DETERMINE WHETHER NEW YORK OR YEMEN WAS THE CHILDREN’S HOME STATE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Family Court, determined Family Court should not have found New York did not have jurisdiction over this custody dispute without holding a hearing pursuant to the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA). The issue is whether New York or Yemen was the children’s home state:

Pursuant to Domestic Relations Law § 70, “[w]here a minor child is residing within this state, either parent may apply to the supreme court for a writ of habeas corpus to have such minor child brought before such court; and on the return thereof, the court, on due consideration, may award . . . custody of such child to either parent.” Here, since the children reside outside of this State, reference must necessarily be made to the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (Domestic Relations Law art 5-A; hereinafter UCCJEA), which provides, inter alia, that “a court of this state has jurisdiction to make an initial child custody determination only if: (a) this state is the home state of the child on the date of the commencement of the proceeding, or was the home state of the child within six months before the commencement of the proceeding and the child is absent from this state but a parent or person acting as a parent continues to live in this state” (Domestic Relations Law § 76[1][a] …). The UCCJEA defines “home state” as “the state in which a child lived with a parent . . . for at least six consecutive months immediately before the commencement of a child custody proceeding” (Domestic Relations Law § 75-a[7]).

Here, the Family Court was required to hold a hearing as to the issue of whether New York or Yemen was the children’s home state, as there are disputed issues of fact regarding the circumstances under which the parties moved with the children from New York to Yemen … . Matter of Kassim v Al-Maliki, 2021 NY Slip Op 02800, Second Dept 5-5-21

 

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FAMILY COURT, UPON REMITTAL AFTER A PRIOR REVERSAL ON APPEAL, DID NOT MAKE A SUFFICIENT RECORD FOR REVIEW OF ITS ORDER RE: FATHER’S PARENTAL ACCESS (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Family Court, determined Family Court, upon remittal after a prior reversal, did not create a sufficient record to allow review of its order re: father’s parental access schedule:

“In determining custody and [parental access] issues, the most important factor to be considered is the best interests of the child” … . “Generally, [parental access] should be determined after a full evidentiary hearing to determine the best interests of the child” … .

“A trial court must state in its decision ‘the facts it deems essential’ to its determination” … . “Effective appellate review, especially in proceedings involving child custody determinations, ‘requires that appropriate factual findings be made by the trial court—the court best able to measure the credibility of the witnesses'” … . Under the circumstances of this case, the record is not sufficient for this Court to conduct an intelligent review of the evidence.

Furthermore, the children are of such an age and maturity that information regarding their preferences is necessary to create a sufficient record to determine their best interests … . Matter of Georgiou-Ely v Ely, 021 NY Slip Op 02796, Second Dept 5-5-21

 

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THE JUDGE’S MAINTENANCE AWARD MAY NOT HAVE BEEN PROPERLY BASED UPON THE FACTORS ENUMERATED IN DOMESTIC RELATIONS LAW 236; MATTER REMITTED (FOURTH DEPT). ​

The Fourth Department, vacating the maintenance award and remitting for recalculation, determined Supreme Court did not set forth the factors for the maintenance calculation as required by Domestic Relations Law 236:

Defendant husband appeals from a judgment of divorce that, inter alia, directed him to pay plaintiff wife $750 a week in maintenance for a period of 17 years. On appeal, he contends that Supreme Court erred in awarding maintenance for a period of time in excess of the recommendation set forth in the advisory schedule in Domestic Relations Law § 236 (B) (6) (f) (1) without adequately demonstrating its reliance on the relevant statutory factors enumerated in section 236 (B) (6) (e) (see § 236 [B] [6] [f] [2]). We agree and further conclude that the court erred in awarding plaintiff maintenance without sufficiently setting forth the relevant factors enumerated in section 236 (B) (6) (e) that it relied on in reaching its determination. Although the court need not specifically cite the factors enumerated in that section, its analysis must show that it at least considered the relevant factors in making its determination … . The determination must also “reflect[] an appropriate balancing of [the wife’s] needs and [the husband’s] ability to pay” … .

… [T]he court stated that it awarded plaintiff $750 per week—an amount deviating from the statutory guidelines—for a duration in excess of the statutory guidelines based on the length of the marriage, the parties’ disproportionate earning capacities, and defendant’s tax debt. However, although the statutory guidelines use the length of the marriage to calculate the duration of the maintenance award … , the length of the parties’ marriage is not a factor enumerated in section 236 (B) (6) (e). Further, the court did not state what factors it considered, in addition to actual earnings, in determining the parties’ earning capacities … . Moreover, the court did not determine whether defendant’s substantial tax debt would impede his ability to pay plaintiff’s maintenance award … . Thus, the court failed to show that it considered any of the factors enumerated in section 236 (B) (6) (e) (1) in making its determination of both the amount and duration of the maintenance award. Gutierrez v Gutierrez, 2021 NY Slip Op 02662, Fourth Dept 4-30-21

 

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SUPREME COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE, SUA SPONTE, DETERMINED DEFENDANT IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION WAIVED DISMISSAL FOR FAILURE TO TIMELY MOVE FOR A DEFAULT JUDGMENT BECAUSE THE ISSUE WAS DISPOSITIVE AND NEVER LITIGATED; THE BANK’S FAILURE TO TIMELY MOVE FOR A DEFAULT JUDGMENT PURSUANT TO CPLR 3215 (C) REQUIRED DISMISSAL OF THE BANK’S ACTION (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff-bank’s failure to move for a default judgment within one year required dismissal of the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3215 (c). The court noted that Supreme Court should not have, sua sponte, held defendant waived dismissal pursuant to CPLR 3215 (c) because the issue had never been litigated:

Although the Supreme Court keenly observed that the defendants had filed a notice of appearance in the first action in October 2014, it should not have, sua sponte, determined that such notice of appearance constituted a waiver of their right to seek dismissal of the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3215(c), as the parties never litigated the issue of waiver. Since that branch of the defendants’ cross motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3215(c) to dismiss the complaint had “‘dispositive import'” … , the court should have notified the parties of the waiver issue and afforded them an opportunity to be heard prior to determining the cross motion on a ground neither side argued. …

“The language of CPLR 3215(c) is not, in the first instance, discretionary, but mandatory, inasmuch as courts ‘shall’ dismiss claims (CPLR 3215[c]) for which default judgments are not sought within the requisite one-year period, as those claims are then deemed abandoned” … . “‘Failure to take proceedings for entry of judgment may be excused, however, upon a showing of sufficient cause,’ which requires the plaintiff to ‘demonstrate that it had a reasonable excuse for the delay in taking proceedings for entry of a default judgment and that it has a potentially meritorious action'” … . Wells Fargo Bank v Aucapina, 2021 NY Slip Op 02561, Second Dept 4-28-21

 

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DEFENDANT’S PLEA ALLOCUTION NEGATED AN ELEMENT OF THE OFFENSE; PRESERVATION OF THE ERROR NOT REQUIRED BECAUSE THE JUDGE FAILED TO INQUIRE FURTHER AT THE TIME OF THE ALLOCUTION (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, vacating defendant’s guilty plea, determined the plea allocution negated the intent-to-sell element of criminal possession of a controlled substance. Preservation of the error for appeal was not required because the judge did not make a sufficient inquiry at the time of the allocution:

As charged here, criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree requires “knowingly and unlawfully” possessing “a narcotic drug with intent to sell it” (Penal Law § 220.16[1]). The defendant denied during his plea allocution that he intended to sell the drugs he possessed. This is “that rare case . . . where the defendant’s recitation of the facts underlying the crime pleaded to clearly casts significant doubt upon the defendant’s guilt or otherwise calls into question the voluntariness of the plea” … . …

“[W]here a defendant’s factual recitation negates an essential element of the crime pleaded to, the court may not accept the plea without making further inquiry to ensure that defendant understands the nature of the charge and that the plea is intelligently entered” … . When a defendant makes remarks during the plea allocution that cast significant doubt on his guilt concerning an element of the crime, the court has a duty to conduct further inquiry to ensure that the plea was knowingly and voluntarily made … . Where, as here, the court fails in its duty to inquire further, a defendant may raise a claim regarding the validity of the plea even without having moved to withdraw the plea … . People v Gause, 2021 NY Slip Op 02543, Second Dept 4-28-21

 

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THE JUDGE’S LAW CLERK, A FORMER ASS’T DA, DISCUSSED DEFENDANT’S SENTENCING WITH THE JUDGE; THE JUDGE SHOULD HAVE RECUSED HIMSELF FROM THE SENTENCING, SENTENCE VACATED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, vacating defendant’s sentence, determined the sentencing judge should have recused himself because his law clerk, a former assistant DA, was not screened from the case:

… [A]fter the verdict was rendered, but prior to sentencing, the trial justice hired as his law clerk a former Queens County Assistant District Attorney who had been involved in the investigation and the early stages of the defendant’s prosecution. “‘[A] law clerk is probably the one participant in the judicial process whose duties and responsibilities are most intimately connected with the judge’s own exercise of the judicial function'” … .

Under the circumstances of this case, due process principles did not require recusal, as there was no indication that the trial justice had a direct, personal, substantial, or pecuniary interest in the case … . However, since the law clerk was not screened from working on this case and, according to the trial justice, actually discussed the sentencing of the defendant with the justice, the justice should have recused himself “‘in a special effort to maintain the appearance of impartiality'” … . People v Hymes, 2021 NY Slip Op 02412, Second Dept 4-21-21

 

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