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TO, SUA SPONTE, DECIDE BRANCHES OF A MOTION AND CROSS-MOTION ON A GROUND NOT RAISED BY THE PARTIES DEPRIVED PLAIINTIFF OF THE OPPORTUNITY TO REFUTE THE JUDGE’S DETERMINATION (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court in this foreclosure action, determined the judge should not have decided branches of a motion and cross-motion on a ground not raised by the parties, i.e. “in the interest of justice” on the ground the action was commenced “when foreclosures were stayed due to [the[ Covid-19 pandemic:”

“The lack of notice and opportunity to be heard implicates the fundamental issue of fairness that is the cornerstone of due process” … . As the plaintiff correctly contends, the Supreme Court improperly determined the subject branches of the parties’ motion and cross-motion on the ground that the action was commenced when “foreclosures were stayed due to [the] Covid-19 pandemic.” Sino [defendant] did not argue in support of the cross-motion that the plaintiff improperly commenced the action during any COVID-19-related stay or that it was prejudiced because the action was commenced during any COVID-19-related stay. Thus, the plaintiff was prejudiced, since it was “never afforded the opportunity to present evidence refuting the court’s sua sponte determination” … . Accordingly, the court should not have determined the subject branches of the motion and cross-motion on a ground that was never raised by the parties … . Austin 26 Dental Group, PLLC v Sino Northeast Metals (U.S.A.), Inc., 2024 NY Slip Op 04187, Second Dept 8-14-24

Practice Point: Judges cannot decide motions on a ground not raised by the parties.

 

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HERE TWO DISSENTERS ARGUED THE JUDGE DID NOT MAKE THE REQUIRED FINDINGS THAT THE PROSECUTOR’S RACE-NEUTRAL REASONS FOR PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES WERE NON-PRETEXTUAL (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, over a two-justice dissent, determined County Court properly denied Batson challenges to the prosecutor’s peremptory challenges:

From the dissent:

Although trial courts are permitted to implicitly determine that the race-neutral explanations offered by the prosecutor are not pretextual … , we find that the language utilized by County Court cannot be construed as making an implicit determination. County Court did not state that it believed the race-neutral reasons offered by the prosecutor; instead, the court indicated that it “believe[d] there’s a race-neutral reason . . . which would permit a . . . peremptory challenge by the People, not subject to Batson.” This language demonstrates that the court only considered whether the People had proffered a race-neutral reason and not whether the race-neutral reason was pretextual as required under the third step of the Batson inquiry, despite defendant’s arguments to this effect … . People v Morgan, 2024 NY Slip Op 04165, Third Dept 8-8-24

Practice Point: As part of a Batson juror challenge, the judge must determine whether the race-neutral reasons for a peremptory challenge are genuine (non-pretextual). Here two dissenters argued the judge did not make that determination.​

 

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THE JUDGE SHOULD HAVE DECLARED A MISTRIAL AFTER THE JURY’S REPEATED COMMUNICATIONS EXPLAINING THEY COULD NOT REACH A UNANIMOUS VERDICT; NEW TRIAL ORDERED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing defendant’s conviction and ordering a new trial, determined the judge should have ordered a mistrial after the jury’s repeated communications stating they could not reach a unanimous verdict:

The jury sent its third note regarding deadlock on the fourth day of deliberations, which not only stated that the jurors were “hopelessly deadlocked,” but also that “[a] unanimous decision would only be able to be achieved by the abandonment” of the jurors’ “firm . . . convictions,” and that “any change in their decisions would be untrue and unjust” … . Thus, the jury unequivocally informed the court that any unanimous verdict would be the result of jurors abandoning their genuine beliefs about the defendant’s guilt or innocence in order to achieve a unanimous verdict, which demonstrated that it would have served no purpose to provide additional instructions to the jury to continue deliberating … . Moreover, portions of the court’s instructions delivered after that note were potentially coercive, including the court’s statements that “some of you are locked into your positions and you’re fixed in those positions and inflexible and that’s contrary to what jurors have to do during jury deliberations,” and that “when you were selected as jurors you promised me that you would deliberate and discuss your views with your other jurors, so if you refuse to deliberate or close off your mind then you’re violating your promise and your oath to me” … . Notably, the jury returned a unanimous verdict later on the same day the court gave those instructions. Thus, under the circumstances, the court should have discharged the jury and declared a mistrial. People v Calixte, 2024 NY Slip Op 04079, Second Dept 7-31-24

Practice Point: Here the jury sent out three articulate and detailed notes explaining they could not reach a unanimous verdict. The judge should have declared a mistrial.

 

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A WITNESS IS NOT UNAVAILABLE TO TESTIFY AT A TRIAL BASED UPON THE FEAR OF COMMITTING PERJURY DURING THAT TRIAL; NEW TRIAL ORDERED (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing the judgment and ordering a new trial, determined a witness was not be unavailable to testify at the trial based upon her fear she would commit perjury at the trial:

“A witness may not claim the privilege of the [F]ifth [A]mendment out of fear that he [or she] will be prosecuted for perjury for what he [or she] is about to say. The shield against self-incrimination in such a situation is to testify truthfully, not to refuse to testify on the basis that the witness may be prosecuted for a lie not yet told” … . “Fear of a perjury prosecution can typically form a valid basis for invoking the Fifth Amendment only where the risk of prosecution is for perjury in the witness’ past testimony” … .

“[T]he court focuses inquiry on what a truthful answer might disclose, rather than on what information is expected by the questioner” … . Simply put, the Fifth Amendment “does not permit a witness to invoke the privilege on the ground that he [or she] anticipates committing perjury sometime in the future” … . There is “no doctrine of ‘anticipatory perjury’ ” … . * * *

We … conclude that the court erred in declaring the victim unavailable and allowing her testimony from the first trial to be read to the jury at the retrial. Inasmuch as the victim was the only person who identified defendant as the person who shot her, we cannot conclude that the evidence of defendant’s guilt is overwhelming, and therefore the error cannot be deemed harmless … . People v Smith, 2024 NY Slip Op 03973, Fourth Dept 7-26-24

Practice Point: The Fifth Amendment does not permit a witness to invoke the self-incrimination privilege on the ground the witness anticipates committing perjury in the future.

 

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THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR APPOINTED TO HANDLE DEFENDANT’S CASE DID NOT MEET THE QUALIFICATIONS IN THE COUNTY LAW; CONVICTIONS REVERSED AND INDICTMENT DISMISSED (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department reversed the convictions and dismissed the indictment because the special prosecutor appointed to handle the case did not meet the statutory qualifications:

“County Law § 701 (1) allows a court to appoint a special district attorney in situations where the district attorney is ‘disqualified from acting in a particular case to discharge his or her duties at a term of any court’ ” … . The Court of Appeals, “[a]cknowledging that a court’s authority under County Law § 701 ‘to displace a duly elected [d]istrict [a]ttorney’ raises separation of power concerns, [has] cautioned that ‘[t]his exceptional superseder authority should not be expansively interpreted’ ” … . As relevant here, section 701 (1) (a) explicitly limits the superseding authority of a court to “appoint[ing] some attorney at law having an office in or residing in the county, or any adjoining county, to act as special district attorney.” Where, as here, a court exceeds its authority by appointing a special district attorney who does not meet those statutory requirements, “[t]he indictment must be dismissed to preserve the integrity of a statute designed narrowly by its terms and by its purpose to fill emergency gaps in an elected prosecutorial official’s responsibility” … . People v Callara, 2024 NY Slip Op 03969, Fourth Dept 7-26-24

Practice Point: If the special prosecutor appointed to handle defendant’s case does not meet the qualifications in the County Law, the convictions will be reversed and the indictment dismissed.

 

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DEFENDANT WAS ERRONEOUSLY DENIED HIS RIGHT TO BE PRESENT AT THE SANDOVAL HEARING, NEW TRIAL ORDERED (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing defendant’s convictions and ordering a new trial, determined defendant was erroneously deprived of his right to be present for the Sandoval hearing:

Where a defendant is denied the right to be present during a Sandoval hearing, reversal of defendant’s conviction is required (… see … CPL 260.20), unless “defendant’s presence at the hearing would have been superfluous” … . Here, it cannot be said that defendant’s presence at the hearing would have been superfluous because the court’s ruling was a compromise and thus, it was not “wholly favorable to defendant” … . People v Anderson, 2024 NY Slip Op 04042, Fourth Dept 7-26-24

Practice Point: Defendant was erroneously denied his right to be present at the Sandoval hearing, new trial ordered.

 

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FAMILY COURT DID NOT GIVE RESPONDENT ANY TIME TO PREPARE FOR THE CHILD SUPPORT HEARING AND INDICATED SHE HAD PREDETERMINED THE OUTCOME; ORDER REVERSED (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing Family Court, determined the judge should have given respondent mother time to prepare for the child-support hearing. In addition, the Fourth Department noted the judge had improperly “predetermined” the case:

Family Court erred when it determined that his alleged violation of the child support order was willful and sentenced him to incarceration because the court did not afford respondent the right to a fair hearing … . Although “[n]o specific form of a hearing is required, . . . at a minimum the hearing must consist of an adducement of proof coupled with an opportunity to rebut it” … , and the court must provide “counsel reasonable opportunity to appear and present respondent’s evidence and arguments” … . Here, the court denied respondent’s assigned counsel an adjournment to allow her time to prepare for the hearing, for which she had no prior notice, and further prohibited her from conferring with respondent before the court attempted to swear in respondent to testify, and the court in so doing denied respondent his right to counsel and, thus, denied him a fair hearing, prior to sentencing him to a period of incarceration … .

Further, the record demonstrates that the court “had a predetermined outcome of the case in mind during the hearing” … and “took on the function and appearance of an advocate” … . Specifically, the court, inter alia, sua sponte transformed what was scheduled as an appearance for a “[r]eport” into a hearing, over the objection of respondent’s assigned counsel; exhorted that, “[i]f [respondent] wants to be cheeky with me, we’ll be cheeky”; advised the parties in advance that the hearing was only “going to take ten minutes”; sought to call respondent as a witness for the court’s own line of questioning regarding his employment and inquired of respondent’s counsel whether respondent would “like to answer my questions now or would he like to go to jail today”; and asked respondent if he had “clean underwear on,” thereby implying that he would be going directly to jail after the hearing. Matter of Onondaga County v Taylor, 2024 NY Slip Op 04040, Fourth Dept 7-26-24

Practice Point: Here the Family Court judge was reversed because she did not give respondent mother time to prepare for the child support hearing and indicated to respondent she had predetermined the outcome of the hearing.​

 

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DEFENDANT WAS NOT IN “CLOSE PROXIMITY” TO THE DRUGS WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE “ROOM” OR “DRUG FACTORY” PRESUMPTION; NEW TRIAL ORDERED (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing defendant’s possession-of-drugs convictions and ordering a new trial, determined the “room” or “drug factory” presumption was not applicable:

… [S]ection 220.25 (2) provides that “[t]he presence of a narcotic drug . . . in open view in a room . . . under circumstances evincing an intent to unlawfully mix, compound, package or otherwise prepare for sale such controlled substance is presumptive evidence of knowing possession thereof by each and every person in close proximity to such controlled substance at the time such controlled substance was found.” “Penal statutes ‘must be construed according to the fair import of their terms to promote justice and effect the objects of the law’ ” … . The drug factory presumption is “intended to allow police in the field to identify potentially culpable individuals involved in a drug business, under circumstances that demonstrate those individuals’ participation in a drug operation” … . According to its drafters, the presumption is “designed to remedy that situation wherein police execute a search warrant on a premises suspected of being a ‘drug factory,’ only to find dangerous drugs and/or drug paraphernalia scattered about the room. The occupants of such ‘factories,’ who moments before were diluting or packaging the drugs, usually proclaim their innocence and disclaim ownership of, or any connection with, the materials spread before them. Police, under such circumstances, are often uncertain as to whom to arrest. In addition, with the present burden of proof of knowing possession of dangerous drugs on the [P]eople, successful prosecution of persons other than the owner or lessee of such premises is extremely rare” … . …

… [T]he phrase “close proximity” in Penal Law § 220.25 (2) means “when the defendant is sufficiently near the drugs so as to evince defendant’s participation in an apparent drug sales operation, thus supporting a presumption of defendant’s knowing possession” … . “[T]he proximity determination requires careful consideration of the underlying facts related to defendant’s location on the premises” … . Thus, a defendant need not be apprehended within the same room as the drugs in order to satisfy the element of “close proximity” … , and the presumption applies to a defendant caught while trying to flee the premises upon the sudden entry by police … .  …

… [D]efendant was not apprehended in close proximity to the drugs as contemplated by the drug factory presumption, i.e., he was not “sufficiently near the drugs so as to evince defendant’s participation in an apparent drug sales operation, thus supporting a presumption of defendant’s knowing possession” … . Defendant was not apprehended in the room with the drugs, he was not apprehended fleeing from that room, and he was not apprehended within or outside of the home while attempting to hide from police. Thus, he was not apprehended under circumstances suggesting that he had, just “moments before,” been engaged in drug distillation or packaging … . People v Campbell, 2024 NY Slip Op 03995, Fourth Dept 7-26-24

Practice Point: Consult this decision for an explanation of the “room” or “drug factory” presumption re: the possession of drugs.​

 

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THE CHILD DID NOT WANT PARENTAL ACCESS WITH FATHER; IT WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION TO ORDER VISITATION WITH FATHER WITHOUT CONDUCTING AN IN CAMERA INTERVIEW OF THE CHILD (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Family Court, determined, under the circumstances of this case, it was an abuse of discretion to order father’s visitation with the child without an in camera interview of the child:

“Absent extraordinary circumstances, where visitation would be detrimental to the child’s well-being, a noncustodial parent has a right to reasonable visitation privileges” … . Although an appeal may be taken by the attorney for the child, “the child does not have full-party status and cannot veto a settlement reached by the parents and force a trial after the attorney for the child had a full [and] fair opportunity to be heard” … . However, “[t]he decision to conduct an in camera interview to determine the best interests of the child is within the discretion of the hearing court” … .

Under the circumstances of this case, the Family Court improvidently exercised its discretion in failing to conduct an in camera interview of the child, particularly given the child’s position, as stated by the attorney for the child, regarding his fear and hatred of the father, his expressed concerns about the father’s lifestyle, and his strong wishes not to have parental access with the father … . The record reflects that the child is of such an age and maturity that his preferences are necessary to create a sufficient record to determine what parental access would be in his best interests … . While the attorney for the child recounted the child’s objections on the record, in the absence of an in camera interview, the court did not have sufficient information to assess what parental access arrangement would be in the child’s best interests … . Matter of Dionis F. v Daniela Z., 2024 NY Slip Op 03822, Second Dept 7-17-24

Practice Point: Here the child objected to visitation with father. Visitation should not have been ordered without an in camera interview of the child.

 

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FAMILY COURT HAD THE AUTHORITY TO ORDER VISITATION WITH THE CHILDREN’S FORMER FOSTER MOTHER; A STRONG DISSENT ARGUED THE COURT DID NOT HAVE THE POWER TO ORDER VISITATION WITH A “LEGAL STRANGER” (FIRST DEPT). ​

The First Department, over an extensive and comprehensive dissent, determined Family Court properly allowed visitation with the children by their former foster mother. The dissent argued the court did not have the power to order visitation with the former foster mother, a “legal stranger:”

Commonly, visitation plans for children in foster care involve parents, grandparents or siblings, all of whom have standing to commence visitation proceedings. However, in this case, there was no visitation petition or proceeding before the court at the time of the permanency hearing. Rather,the court ordered visitation between the children and the former foster mother in order to advance the children’s “well-being” as it is required to do under Family Court Act § 1086. To accomplish that, the court gave special attention to the unique, undisputed circumstances of these children: (1) the children suffered from PTSD and other mental health issues following removal from their biological mother in 2016; (2) they each improved remarkably during the nearly six years they were cared for by the former foster mother; (3) removal from her care in December 2021 was traumatic for them; (4) at the time of the order, the children had only been in their current foster home for a few months; (5) ACS [Administration for Children’s Services] and the foster care agency had previously consented to and facilitated visits with the former foster mother for approximately two years; and (6) the children remained strongly bonded to her as the only adult who had been a consistent positive presence in their lives at the time of the 2023 permanency hearing that resulted in the order.

… [A]s Family Court explained on the record, “there is no legal path where the children end up in [the] care” of the former foster mother. However, the court expressed concern that discontinuing all contact with her at this time would be contrary to their well-being. The court noted that it was troubled “that we didn’t have more details [presented at the hearing] about the children’s therapy and medication” and that there was no testimony that “cutting off all contact with [the former foster mother] . . . is therapeutically beneficial.” Under these circumstances, Family Court’s continuation of visitation with the former foster mother was an appropriate exercise of its authority under Family Court Act § 1089, was tailored to the particular circumstances of these children, and was in keeping with the legislative goal of ensuring foster children’s well-being. Matter of AL.C., 2024 NY Slip Op 03799, First Dept 7-11-24

Practice Point: Here Family Court properly ordered visitation with the children by their former foster mother, based primarily upon the children’s improvement while in her care and the strong bond between her and the children. The dissent argued the court did not have the authority to order visitation with a “legal stranger.”

 

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