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Environmental Law, Insurance Law

IN THIS GROUNDWATER POLLUTION CASE, THE POLLUTION EXCLUSION IN THE INSURERS’ POLICIES APPLIED AND THE INSURERS ARE NOT OBLIGATED TO DEFEND AND INDEMNIFY THE INSURED OIL COMPANY (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the pollution exclusion in the plaintiffs’ insurance policies applied and plaintiffs were not required to defend and indemnify the defendant, which allegedly caused a gasoline additive (MTBE) to pollute groundwater. The fact that the additive was a legal substance required by the EPA did not matter:

… [I]t is clear that even if MTBE was not a pollutant in the context of its use as a gasoline additive, it was a pollutant in the context of its release into groundwater … . * * *

Qualified pollution exclusions are characterized by an exception for pollution where the discharge or release of the pollutant is “sudden and accidental” … . The terms “sudden” and “accidental” each “have separate meanings, [both] of which must be established for the exception to nullify the pollution coverage exclusion” … .. “[T]he meaning of sudden in the pollution exclusion exception” has a “temporal quality” (id. [emphasis omitted]), which is only met where the discharge occurs “abruptly or within a short timespan, of a significant quantity of the pollutant sufficient to have some potentially damaging environmental effect” … .

Here, with respect to the plaintiffs’ … policies that contained qualified pollution exclusions, the defendant failed to meet its burden to “demonstrate a reasonable interpretation of the underlying complaint[s] potentially bringing the claims within the sudden and accidental discharge exception to exclusion of pollution coverage, or to show that extrinsic evidence exists that the discharge was in fact sudden and accidental” … . In other words, the type of pollution alleged, which occurred undetected over many years, was not sudden within the meaning of the applicable law … . St. Paul Fire & Mar. Ins. Co. v Getty Props. Corp., 2024 NY Slip Op 03510, Second Dept 6-26-24

Practice Point: A “pollution exclusion” in an insurance policy applies where, as here, the pollution occurs over years, as opposed to occurring suddenly and unexpectedly.

Practice Point: A substance can be legal and approved for use in gasoline by the EPA but constitute a “pollutant” when found in groundwater.

 

June 26, 2024
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2024-06-26 09:39:352024-06-30 10:03:29IN THIS GROUNDWATER POLLUTION CASE, THE POLLUTION EXCLUSION IN THE INSURERS’ POLICIES APPLIED AND THE INSURERS ARE NOT OBLIGATED TO DEFEND AND INDEMNIFY THE INSURED OIL COMPANY (SECOND DEPT).
Contract Law, Insurance Law

AVILA WAS INJURED WHEN HER SPOUSE LOST CONTROL OF THE CAR AND STRUCK A PARKED CAR; THE POLICY EXPRESSLY STATED COVERAGE DID NOT EXTEND TO THE INSURED’S SPOUSE; IN THE ABSENCE OF AN EXPRESS PROVISION THE INSURER IS NOT REQUIRED TO COVER THE INSURED’S SPOUSE (SECOND DEPT).

he Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the uninsured motorist claim by the driver’s spouse was precluded based on the policy. Avila was a passenger in a vehicle driven by her spouse who lost control of the car:

Pursuant to Insurance Law § 3420(g)(1), “no policy or contract shall be deemed to insure against any liability of an insured because of death of or injuries to his or her spouse or because of injury to, or destruction of property of his or her spouse unless express provision relating specifically thereto is included in the policy.” “‘[I]n the absence of an express provision in an insured’s policy, a carrier is not required to provide insurance coverage for injuries sustained by an insured’s spouse'” … . This provision creates “a statutory presumption that interspousal liability is excluded from coverage unless an express provision relating specifically thereto is included in the policy” … . Moreover, here, the language of GEICO’s policy provides that its liability coverage does not apply “[t]o any insured for bodily injury to the spouse of that insured.” Thus, Avila’s uninsured motorist claim was precluded … . Matter of Government Employees Ins. Co. v Avila, 2024 NY Slip Op 03481, Second Dept 6-26-24

Practice Point: Here the insured, Avila’s spouse, lost control of the car and hit a parked car. Avila was a passenger and was injured. The policy did not include a provision expressly covering the insured’s spouse. In addition, the policy expressly stated the insured’s spouse was not covered. Avila’s uninsured motorist claim was precluded.

 

June 26, 2024
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2024-06-26 08:57:522024-06-30 09:39:27AVILA WAS INJURED WHEN HER SPOUSE LOST CONTROL OF THE CAR AND STRUCK A PARKED CAR; THE POLICY EXPRESSLY STATED COVERAGE DID NOT EXTEND TO THE INSURED’S SPOUSE; IN THE ABSENCE OF AN EXPRESS PROVISION THE INSURER IS NOT REQUIRED TO COVER THE INSURED’S SPOUSE (SECOND DEPT).
Civil Procedure, Evidence, Insurance Law, Negligence

STATEMENTS DEFENDANT MADE TO HIS INSURANCE CARRIER IN THIS TRAFFIC ACCIDENT CASE ARE NOT DISCOVERABLE (FOURTH DEPT). ​

The Fourth Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court in this traffic-accident case, determined plaintiff’s request for discovery of statements made by defendant to his insurance carrier should have been denied:

The statements sought in plaintiff’s cross-motion constitute materials “produced solely in connection with the report of an accident to a liability insurance carrier . . . with respect to plaintiff’s claim [that] are not discoverable under CPLR 3101 (g), but rather are conditionally immunized from discovery under CPLR 3101 (d) (2)” … . Plaintiff failed to establish either that he has a “substantial need of the materials” or that he is “unable without undue hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent of the materials by other means” (CPLR 3101 [d] [2] …). Fusco v Hansen, 2024 NY Slip Op 03262, Fourth Dept 6-14-24

Practice Point; Here in this traffic-accident case, plaintiff did not demonstrate a need for discovery of statements made by defendant to his insurance carrier (CPLR 3101(d)(2)).

 

June 14, 2024
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2024-06-14 11:23:402024-06-17 11:47:15STATEMENTS DEFENDANT MADE TO HIS INSURANCE CARRIER IN THIS TRAFFIC ACCIDENT CASE ARE NOT DISCOVERABLE (FOURTH DEPT). ​
Insurance Law, Negligence, Vehicle and Traffic Law

THERE IS A QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER PLAINTIFF’S SLIP AND FALL ON ICE AND SNOW AFTER GETTING OUT OF A VEHICLE RESULTED FROM OPERATION OF THE VEHICLE SUCH THAT THE INSURER IS OBLIGATED TO DEFEND THE OWNER OF THE VEHICLE (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, over a partial dissent, determined the insurer, Progressive, was obligated to defend the owner of a vehicle for injuries suffered by a passenger (Malone) who slipped and fell on ice and snow after getting out of the car. The question was whether the injury resulted from “operation” of the vehicle:

“Use of an automobile encompasses more than simply driving it, and includes all necessary incidental activities such as entering and leaving its confines” … . While a claim that an accident occurred during unloading “does not require a showing that the vehicle itself produced the injury . . . , it is insufficient to show merely that the accident occurred during the period of loading or unloading. Rather, the accident must be the result of some act or omission related to the use of the vehicle” … .

… Malone specifically alleged in the underlying action that Anthony (the vehicle-owner’s son) parked his vehicle in a negligent manner on a slippery surface and that such negligence was a proximate cause of her accident. Progressive submitted an affidavit from Malone … in which she stated, “I slipped on the snowy and icy condition as I was taking my first steps toward the house. I dropped my child and my legs slid, along the gradient, underneath the CAPERNA Vehicle.” Progressive further submitted Malone’s deposition testimony in the underlying action, which demonstrated that the door of the vehicle was open and that she had only taken two steps away from the vehicle when she slipped and fell on snow and ice located on the lawn. As such, Progressive failed to establish its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law declaring that the accident was not a covered event, as there is a triable issue of fact as to whether Malone had completed unloading the vehicle. As there are allegations that the vehicle was used negligently and that such negligence contributed to the accident, Progressive was not entitled to summary judgment declaring that it is not obligated to defend or indemnify Arthur (the vehicle owner) in the underlying action … . Matter of Progressive Dr. Ins. v Malone, 2024 NY Slip Op 03178, Second Dept 6-12-24

Practice Point: “Operation” of a vehicle may include parking the vehicle in a manner which makes getting out of it dangerous. Here a passenger slipped and fell on ice and snow after getting out of the parked vehicle and the insurer was obligated to defend the owner of the vehicle.

 

June 12, 2024
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2024-06-12 12:06:252024-06-14 13:08:27THERE IS A QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER PLAINTIFF’S SLIP AND FALL ON ICE AND SNOW AFTER GETTING OUT OF A VEHICLE RESULTED FROM OPERATION OF THE VEHICLE SUCH THAT THE INSURER IS OBLIGATED TO DEFEND THE OWNER OF THE VEHICLE (SECOND DEPT). ​
Civil Procedure, Insurance Law

THE INSURER’S OBLIGATION TO INDEMNIFY SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DETERMINED BASED UPON THE ALLEGATIONS IN THE PLEADINGS (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined that although the insurer (Everest) was required to defend the plaintiff (CCM) in the underlying action, the ruling that Everest must indemnify CCM was premature:

Supreme Court should not have found that Everest was required to indemnify CCM. Although Everest concedes that it must defend CCM, “the duty to defend is broader than the duty to indemnify,” because only the latter “is determined by the actual basis for the insured’s liability to a third person and is not measured by the allegations of the pleadings” … . In the underlying action, there has been no determination whether the plaintiff’s injury was “caused, in whole or in part, by” the acts or omissions of the named insured or of those acting on its behalf … . Therefore, any declaration of the duty to indemnify was premature ( … see … Axis Surplus Ins. Co. v GTJ Co., Inc., 139 AD3d 604, 605 [1st Dept 2016] [“It is after the resolution of that action where the extent of plaintiff’s indemnification obligations can be fully determined”]). Harleysville Ins. Co. v United Fire Protection, Inc., 2024 NY Slip Op 02663, First Dept 5-14-24

Practice Point: An insurer’s obligation to indemnify cannot be determined based on the allegations in the pleadings.

 

May 14, 2024
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2024-05-14 14:04:012024-05-18 14:29:32THE INSURER’S OBLIGATION TO INDEMNIFY SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DETERMINED BASED UPON THE ALLEGATIONS IN THE PLEADINGS (FIRST DEPT).
Insurance Law, Medical Malpractice

THE DEFENDANT INSURANCE COMPANY IS OBLIGATED TO DEFEND PLAINTIFF PEDIATRICIAN IN THE UNDERLYING ACTION BY A FORMER PATIENT ALLEGING SEXUAL ABUSE DURING A PHYSICAL EXAM (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendant insurance company was obligated to defend plaintiff pediatrician who stands accused of the sexual abuse of a former patient:

Supreme Court denied plaintiff’s [summary judgment] motion and granted defendant’s cross-motion [for summary judgment] on the grounds that the complaint in the underlying action did not assert claims arising from a “medical incident” or “professional services,” as those terms are defined in the subject insurance policy, and in any event that the policy’s exclusion for sexual assault precluded coverage. * * *

… [A]lthough the complaint in the underlying action primarily alleges that plaintiff sexually abused his former patient during a medical examination, it also contains “facts or allegations” that bring the claim “potentially within the protection purchased” for claims arising from professional services rendered by plaintiff, thus triggering the duty to defend … . For instance, the underlying complaint alleges that plaintiff improperly diagnosed, cared for and treated the former patient in question, and failed to provide her with “proper and appropriate pediatric care.” The underlying complaint further alleges that plaintiff inserted his finger into the former patient’s vagina “without gloves,” suggesting that perhaps such action would have been medically proper had plaintiff been wearing gloves. Without any context or details regarding the nature of the medical treatment being provided by plaintiff at the time of the alleged improper touching of the former patient, we cannot categorically conclude that the underlying complaint is devoid of facts or allegations that potentially bring the former patient’s claims within the protection purchased by plaintiff in the subject liability policy. Mscichowski v MLMIC Ins. Co., 2024 NY Slip Op 02391, Fourth Dept 5-3-24

Practice Point: As long as some of the allegations in a complaint arguably fall within the protection of the insurance policy, the insurer is obligated to defend the insured.

 

May 3, 2024
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2024-05-03 10:08:072024-05-04 10:28:16THE DEFENDANT INSURANCE COMPANY IS OBLIGATED TO DEFEND PLAINTIFF PEDIATRICIAN IN THE UNDERLYING ACTION BY A FORMER PATIENT ALLEGING SEXUAL ABUSE DURING A PHYSICAL EXAM (FOURTH DEPT).
Civil Procedure, Contract Law, Corporation Law, Insurance Law, Workers' Compensation

A FORUM SELECTION CLAUSE IN AN INSURANCE POLICY WHICH VIOLATES NEW YORK LAW IS NOT ENFORCEABLE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Miller, determined that the forum selection clause in an insurance policy which violates New York law is not enforceable. The opinion is comprehensive and discusses several substantive civil procedure, contract law, corporation law, insurance law, workers’ compensation law and public policy issues which cannot fairly be summarized here:

This action is just one of many such actions commenced across the country alleging that the defendant Applied Underwriters, Inc. (hereinafter Applied Underwriters), and affiliated entities, all subsidiaries of Berkshire Hathaway, Inc., deceptively circumvented state laws and regulations in the marketing and sale of an unlawful workers’ compensation insurance program. Here, the defendants seek to enforce a forum selection clause, in favor of Nebraska, contained in an insurance policy that New York State regulators have found violates New York law. While parties are generally free to select a forum in which to resolve their contractual disputes, here, where it is alleged by the plaintiff, and found by New York State regulators, that New York law has been violated, a foreign corporation may not profit from such violation to the detriment of New York employers and workers. The forum selection clause contained in an illegal insurance policy is not enforceable. As a matter of public policy, New York companies shall not be compelled to litigate in Nebraska to vindicate their rights. Air-Sea Packing Group, Inc. v Applied Underwriters, Inc., 2024 NY Slip Op 02032, Second Dept 4-17-24

Practice Point: A forum selection clause (designating Nebraska as the forum) in an insurance policy which violates New York law is not enforceable.

 

April 17, 2024
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2024-04-17 11:00:032024-04-21 11:24:06A FORUM SELECTION CLAUSE IN AN INSURANCE POLICY WHICH VIOLATES NEW YORK LAW IS NOT ENFORCEABLE (SECOND DEPT).
Insurance Law, Toxic Torts

QUESTIONS OF FACT ABOUT WHETHER THE INSURER WAS TIMELY NOTIFIED OF THE ASBESTOS-EXPOSURE CLAIM AND WHEN THE INJURY-IN-FACT OCCURRED PRECLUDED SUMMARY JUDGMENT (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined there are questions of fact whether the defendant insurer was timely notified of the claim in this asbestos-exposure case, and there are questions of fact, raised by conflicting expert evidence, about when the injury-in-fact occurred:

Defendant contends that the Meissners’ [plaintiffs’] delay of 68 days—from when they were first informed that Ridge Construction [defendant] had excess insurance policies issued by defendant to the date that the Meissners’ counsel wrote to provide defendant notice of the claim—was unreasonable as a matter of law. In response, plaintiff asserts that the delay was reasonable because the Meissners were not aware for the first 63 of those days that Ridge Construction had failed to provide defendant with notice. “The reasonableness of the delay in giving notice is ordinarily a question for the fact-finder” … .

* * * The parties … “dispute when an asbestos-related injury actually begins: plaintiff[ ] assert[s] that injury-in-fact occurs upon first exposure to asbestos, while defendant denies that assertion and instead maintains that injury-in-fact occurs only when a threshold level of asbestos fiber or particle burden is reached that overtakes the body’s defense mechanisms” … . Inasmuch as the parties here submitted conflicting expert opinions as to when the injury-in-fact occurs in an asbestos-related injury, summary judgment on that basis was not proper … . Meissner v Ridge Constr. Corp., 2024 NY Slip Op 01445, Fourth Dept 3-15-24

Practice Point: Whether the insurer was timely notified of the asbestos-exposure claim is a question of fact which should not have been determined as a matter of law at the summary judgment stage.

Practice Point: Here conflicting expert evidence was presented about when the injury-in-fact occurs in an asbestos-exposure case. The issue should not have been determined as a matter of law at the summary judgment stage.

 

March 15, 2024
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2024-03-15 10:10:322024-03-17 10:38:26QUESTIONS OF FACT ABOUT WHETHER THE INSURER WAS TIMELY NOTIFIED OF THE ASBESTOS-EXPOSURE CLAIM AND WHEN THE INJURY-IN-FACT OCCURRED PRECLUDED SUMMARY JUDGMENT (FOURTH DEPT).
Attorneys, Contract Law, Insurance Law, Labor Law-Construction Law, Legal Malpractice

A RETROCESSIONAL INSURER WHICH PAID OUT A SETTLEMENT ON BEHALF OF THE INSURED IN THE UNDERLYING LABOR LAW 240(1) LADDER-FALL CASE, IS ENTITLED TO BRING A LEGAL MALPRACTICE ACTION AGAINST THE LAWYERS FOR THE INSURED (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Kapnick, determined a retrocessional insurer (the reinsurer of a reinsurer) can maintain a legal malpractice claim against lawyers representing the insured in an underlying Labor Law 240(1) (ladder-fall) personal injury action. Plaintiff retrocessional insurer, having paid out on a settlement on behalf of the insured has standing to assert a claim for legal malpractice under a theory of equitable subrogation. (The opinion is too complex to fairly summarize here):

In New York, “[w]e recognize at once the fairness of the proposition that an insurer who has been compelled by his contract to pay to or in behalf of the insured claims for damages ought to be reimbursed by the party whose fault has caused such damages and the principle of subrogation ought to be liberally applied for the protection of those who are its natural beneficiaries” … . “As an equitable doctrine in the context of insurance, an insurance carrier, upon payment of a loss becomes subrogated to the rights and remedies of its assured to proceed against a party primarily liable without the necessity of any formal assignment or stipulation” … . Under the same equitable principles, “an insurer which has been compelled under its policy to pay a loss, ought in fairness to be reimbursed by the party which caused the loss” … . * * *

Where a reinsurer, or retrocessionaire, has paid a claim on behalf of an insured, equitable principles demand that the reinsurer be entitled to equitable subrogation on behalf of the insured. Having pleaded that it was contractually obligated to, and did, pay the majority of the [property owner/general contractor’s] settlement amount in the underlying personal injury action, and that it brings the instant action for legal malpractice as subrogee [of the property owner/general contractor], plaintiff can proceed with this action under the theory of equitable subrogation. Century Prop. & Cas. Ins. Corp. v McManus & Richter, 2024 NY Slip Op 00799, First Dept 2-15-24

Practice Point: Here the retrocessional insurer paid out a settlement on behalf of the insured in an underlying personal injury action. The retrocessional insurer was entitled to bring a legal malpractice action against the lawyers for the insured.

 

February 15, 2024
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2024-02-15 15:19:592024-02-21 19:35:52A RETROCESSIONAL INSURER WHICH PAID OUT A SETTLEMENT ON BEHALF OF THE INSURED IN THE UNDERLYING LABOR LAW 240(1) LADDER-FALL CASE, IS ENTITLED TO BRING A LEGAL MALPRACTICE ACTION AGAINST THE LAWYERS FOR THE INSURED (FIRST DEPT).
Civil Procedure, Insurance Law, Landlord-Tenant, Negligence

FOR PURPOSES OF THE RELATION-BACK DOCTRINE, A LANDLORD AND A TENANT ARE NOT “UNITED IN INTEREST” (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the landlord-tenant relationship between the insured and the defendant building owner, Marion, did not constitute a “unity of interest” such that a negligence action against Marion could be commenced after the statute of limitations had run:

There are three conditions that must be satisfied for a claim asserted against a subsequent defendant such as Marion to relate back to claims asserted against another defendant: (1) both claims must arise out of the same conduct, occurrence, or transaction; (2) the new party must be “united in interest” with the original defendant, and by reason of that relationship can be charged with such notice of the institution of the lawsuit such that he will not be prejudiced in maintaining his defense on the merits; and (3) the new party knew or should have known that, but for a mistake by the plaintiff as to the identity of the proper parties, the action would have been brought against him as well … . * * *

… [A] landlord-tenant relationship, standing alone, does not give rise to vicarious liability or otherwise create unity of interest, which, as the Court of Appeals has recently reaffirmed, requires a situation in which the parties “stand or fall together and the judgment against one will similarly affect the other” … . Kingstone Ins. Co. v Marion Pharm. Inc., 2024 NY Slip Op 00805, First Dept 2-15-24

Practice Point: A landlord and a tenant are not united in interest for purposes of the relation-back doctrine and will not support adding a landlord to a complaint after the statute of limitations has run.

 

February 15, 2024
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2024-02-15 14:55:592024-02-17 15:19:44FOR PURPOSES OF THE RELATION-BACK DOCTRINE, A LANDLORD AND A TENANT ARE NOT “UNITED IN INTEREST” (FIRST DEPT).
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