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Contract Law, Insurance Law

EVEN IF THE MISREPRESENTATION THE HOME WAS TO BE OWNER-OCCUPIED WAS INNOCENTLY MADE, RESCISSION OF THE FIRE INSURANCE POLICY WAS JUSTIFIED.

The Second Department determined defendant insurer properly rescinded the plaintiffs’ fire insurance policy based upon the plaintiffs’ misrepresentation the residence would be owner-occupied. The court noted that a misrepresentation can be innocently made and still trigger rescission. The court also found that the broker had no obligation to make sure the insurance application was properly filled out by the plaintiffs:

Here, [the insurer] established its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by submitting evidence demonstrating that the plaintiffs’ application for insurance contained a misrepresentation regarding whether the premises would be owner occupied and that it would not have issued the subject policy if the application had disclosed that the subject premises would not be owner occupied … .

In opposition, the plaintiffs failed to raise a triable issue of fact. The plaintiffs admit that, at the time the application was completed, they did not intend to occupy the premises. Thus, contrary to the plaintiffs’ contentions, although the application was completed prior to closing and prior to the inception of the policy, the representation therein that the premises was an owner-occupied primary residence established, in effect, a material misrepresentation of a then existing fact that the premises would be owner occupied, which was sufficient for rescission under Insurance Law § 3105 … . Joseph v Interboro Ins. Co., 2016 NY Slip Op 08050, 2nd Dept 11-30-16

 

INSURANCE LAW (EVEN IF THE MISREPRESENTATION THE HOME WAS TO BE OWNER-OCCUPIED WAS INNOCENTLY MADE, RESCISSION OF THE FIRE INSURANCE POLICY WAS JUSTIFIED)/CONTRACT LAW (INSURANCE POLICY, EVEN IF THE MISREPRESENTATION THE HOME WAS TO BE OWNER-OCCUPIED WAS INNOCENTLY MADE, RESCISSION OF THE FIRE INSURANCE POLICY WAS JUSTIFIED)/MATERIAL MISREPRESENTATION (INSURANCE POLICY, EVEN IF THE MISREPRESENTATION THE HOME WAS TO BE OWNER-OCCUPIED WAS INNOCENTLY MADE, RESCISSION OF THE FIRE INSURANCE POLICY WAS JUSTIFIED)

November 30, 2016
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Fraud, Insurance Law, Securities

MISREPRESENTATION CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST BEAR STEARNS RE COLLATERALIZED DEBT OBLIGATIONS AND RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIES SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

The First Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Richter, determined (1) plaintiff’s misrepresentation cause of action was properly dismissed because of a lack of specificity in the allegations, (2) the cause of action should not have been dismissed with prejudice, (3) and the specificity provided in the appellate briefs may support an amended complaint. Plaintiff, a stock insurance company, alleged it was induced to insure collateralized debt obligations (CDO’s) by misrepresentations made by Bear Stearns:

[P]laintiff CIFG Assurance North America, Inc., a stock insurance company, alleges that Bear Stearns & Co. Inc., a predecessor of defendant J.P. Morgan Securities LLC, made material misrepresentations that induced CIFG to provide financial guaranty insurance in connection with two collateralized debt obligations (CDOs). According to CIFG, Bear Stearns had on its books a large number of high-risk residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBSs), and embarked on a scheme to rid itself of these toxic assets by offloading them into the two CDOs, and marketing the CDOs’ securities to investors. * * *

… [T]he claim should not have been dismissed with prejudice, but rather, CIFG should be given the opportunity to replead. A request for leave to amend a complaint should be “freely given, and denied only if there is prejudice or surprise resulting directly from the delay, or if the proposed amendment is palpably improper or insufficient as a matter of law” … . CIFG Assur. N. Am., Inc. v J.P. Morgan Sec. LLC, 2016 NY Slip Op 08029, 1st Dept 11-29-16

 

INSURANCE LAW (STOCK INSURANCE, MISREPRESENTATION CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST BEAR STEARNS RE COLLATERALIZED DEBT OBLIGATIONS AND RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIES SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE)/SECURITIESMISREPRESENTATION CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST BEAR STEARNS RE COLLATERALIZED DEBT OBLIGATIONS AND RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIES SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE/FRAUD (MISREPRESENTATION CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST BEAR STEARNS RE COLLATERALIZED DEBT OBLIGATIONS AND RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIES SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE)/COLLATERALIZED DEBT OBLIGATIONS (MISREPRESENTATION CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST BEAR STEARNS RE COLLATERALIZED DEBT OBLIGATIONS AND RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIES SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE)/RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIES  (MISREPRESENTATION CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST BEAR STEARNS RE COLLATERALIZED DEBT OBLIGATIONS AND RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIES SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE)

November 29, 2016
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Insurance Law

COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO APPLY THE “MADE WHOLE” RULE IN THIS SUBROGATION ACTION.

The Fourth Department determined Supreme Court erred when it refused to apply the “made whole” rule in this subrogation action. After settling for the full amount of the policy, respondent insurer sought the full amount paid to plaintiff by another insurer. The matter was sent back because it was unclear whether the settlement made plaintiff whole:

Plaintiff contends that, under the “made whole” rule, respondent has no right of subrogation because plaintiff’s damages exceed the amount of the settlement. By way of background, the “made whole” rule provides that, if “the sources of recovery ultimately available are inadequate to fully compensate the insured for its losses, then the insurer—who has been paid by the insured to assume the risk of loss—has no right to share in the proceeds of the insured’s recovery from the tortfeasor” … . “In other words, the insurer may seek subrogation against only those funds and assets that remain after the insured has been compensated. This designation of priority interests . . . assures that the injured party’s claim against the tortfeasor takes precedence over the subrogation rights of the insurer” … . Although we agree with plaintiff that the court erred in refusing to apply that rule, on this record, it is unclear whether the settlement made plaintiff whole. Grinage v Durawa, 2016 NY Slip Op 07429, 4th Dept 11-10-16

INSURANCE LAW (COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO APPLY THE “MADE WHOLE” RULE IN THIS SUBROGATION ACTION)/MADE WHOLE RULE (INSURANCE LAW, COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO APPLY THE “MADE WHOLE” RULE IN THIS SUBROGATION ACTION)/SUBROGATION (INSURANCE LAW, COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO APPLY THE “MADE WHOLE” RULE IN THIS SUBROGATION ACTION)

November 10, 2016
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Corporation Law, Fiduciary Duty, Insurance Law

COMPLAINT STATED A CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST BROKER INDIVIDUALLY FOR NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION AND FOR BREACH OF A FIDUCIARY DUTY AGAINST THE BROKER’S CORPORATION.

The Second Department, reversing (modifying), Supreme Court determined the complaint stated a cause of against for negligent misrepresentation against an insurance broker (Weiss) individually and for breach of fiduciary duty against the broker’s corporation (JDW). It was alleged that the defendants failed to add plaintiff’s landlord as an additional insured and the broker signed a certificate which falsely indicated the landlord had been added to the policy:

Here, the Supreme Court erred in determining, upon reargument, that the complaint failed to state a cause of action sounding in negligent misrepresentation against Weiss individually. … [W]e note that the complaint, as amplified by the evidentiary materials submitted by the plaintiffs, alleged that Weiss personally signed a certificate of insurance falsely stating that the plaintiffs’ landlord had been added as an additional insured on a certain commercial general liability insurance policy, and forwarded this certificate to the plaintiffs, knowing that it was required by the plaintiffs’ landlord. This is sufficient, for purposes of CPLR 3211(a)(7), to state a cause of action against Weiss, based on his personal participation in the commission of a tort … . * * *

The common-law rule is that “an insurance broker acting as an agent of its customer has a duty of reasonable care to the customer to obtain [specifically] requested coverage within a reasonable time after the request, or to inform the customer of the agent’s inability to do so, [but] the agent owes no continuing duty to advise, guide or direct the customer insured to obtain additional coverage” … . However “[w]here a special relationship develops between the broker and client, . . . [the] broker may be liable, even in the absence of a specific request, for failing to advise or direct the client to obtain additional coverage” … . The Court of Appeals has identified three “exceptional situations” which may give rise to such a special relationship: ” (1) the agent receives compensation for consultation apart from payment of the premiums; (2) there was some interaction regarding a question of coverage, with the insured relying on the expertise of the agent; or (3) there is a course of dealing over an extended period of time which would have put objectively reasonable insurance agents on notice that their advice was being sought and specially relied on'” … .

Here, contrary to the defendants’ contention, the complaint sufficiently alleged that there was a course of dealing between JDW and the plaintiffs over an extended period of time, which may have given rise to a special relationship between them … . JT Queens Carwash, Inc. v JDW & Assoc., Inc., 2016 NY Slip Op 07295, 2nd Dept 11-9-16

 

INSURANCE LAW (COMPLAINT STATED A CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST BROKER INDIVIDUALLY FOR NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION AND FOR BREACH OF A FIDUCIARY DUTY AGAINST THE BROKER’S CORPORATION)/CORPORATION LAW (INSURANCE LAW, COMPLAINT STATED A CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST BROKER INDIVIDUALLY FOR NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION AND FOR BREACH OF A FIDUCIARY DUTY AGAINST THE BROKER’S CORPORATION)/NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION (INSURANCE LAW, COMPLAINT STATED A CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST BROKER INDIVIDUALLY FOR NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION AND FOR BREACH OF A FIDUCIARY DUTY AGAINST THE BROKER’S CORPORATION)/FIDUCIARY DUTY (INSURANCE LAW, COMPLAINT STATED A CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST BROKER INDIVIDUALLY FOR NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION AND FOR BREACH OF A FIDUCIARY DUTY AGAINST THE BROKER’S CORPORATION)

November 9, 2016
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Insurance Law

DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE PROPERLY INCLUDED THE COSTS OF SUB-ALLOCATED PROGRAMS (ADMINISTERED BY OTHER DEPARTMENTS) IN ITS ASSESSMENTS OF OPERATING EXPENSES TO BE PAID BY INSURERS.

In an extensive, detailed opinion by Justice Clark (too detailed to be fairly summarized here), the Third Department determined statutes requiring insurers to pay pro rata shares of the annual operating expenses of the Department of Finance (formerly the Insurance Department), including expenses associated with certain programs administered by other departments (sub-allocated programs), are constitutional. The Third Department further found the assessments imposed on the insurers, which included the costs of the sub-allocated programs, were not arbitrary and capricious and were not imposed in excess of the authority of the Department of Finance. New York Ins. Assn., Inc. v State of New York, 2016 NY Slip Op 07076, 3rd Dept 10-27-16

 

INSURANCE LAW (DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE PROPERLY INCLUDED THE COSTS OF SUB-ALLOCATED PROGRAMS (ADMINISTERED BY OTHER DEPARTMENTS) IN ITS ASSESSMENTS OF THE DEPARTMENT’S OF OPERATING EXPENSES TO BE PAID BY INSURERS)/FINANCE, DEPARTMENT OF (DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE PROPERLY INCLUDED THE COSTS OF SUB-ALLOCATED PROGRAMS (ADMINISTERED BY OTHER DEPARTMENTS) IN ITS ASSESSMENTS OF THE DEPARTMENT’S OF OPERATING EXPENSES TO BE PAID BY INSURERS)

October 27, 2016
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Insurance Law

INSURER WAS NOTIFIED OF PLAINTIFFS’ LAWSUIT BY THE INJURED PLAINTIFFS NOT THE INSURED; DISCLAIMER ONLY ADDRESSED INSURED’S NOTIFICATION FAILURE AND WAS THEREFORE INEFFECTIVE AGAINST PLANTIFFS.

The Second Department determined the insurer’s disclaimer was ineffective against the injured plaintiffs. The policy required that the insured, here the snow removal contractor (Florite), notify the insurer of any lawsuit by an injured party. The insured did not notify the insurer of the plaintiffs’ suit. After the plaintiffs were awarded a judgment, the plaintiffs notified the insurer. The insurer disclaimed coverage based solely on the insured’s failure to notify it, but did not disclaim based upon any flaw in the plaintiffs’ notification. In this situation, a disclaimer must address any flaws in both the insured’s and the injured plaintiffs’ notification:

Provisions of an insurance policy requiring an insured to provide notice of an occurrence or suit as soon as practicable have been uniformly interpreted to require that notice be given within a reasonable time under all the circumstances … . Where the required notice of suit is not provided by the insured, but rather by the injured party, the insurer’s notice of disclaimer must address with specificity the grounds for disclaiming coverage applicable to the injured party as well as the insured, “because notice of an occurrence by the injured party constitutes prima facie compliance with the notice requirements of the policy and, if unchallenged, relieves the insured of its contractual duty to provide proper notice” … .

Here, notice of the underlying action was not provided by Florite, but was provided directly by the plaintiffs in September 2010. In its subsequent notice of disclaimer, however, the insurer addressed only Florite’s failure to provide notice of the underlying action, and did not directly address the notice provided by the plaintiffs.  Pollack v Scottsdale Ins. Co., 2016 NY Slip Op 06693, 2nd Dept 10-12-16

 

INSURANCE LAW (DISCLAIMER, INSURER WAS NOTIFIED OF PLAINTIFFS’ LAWSUIT BY THE INJURED PLAINTIFFS NOT THE INSURED; DISCLAIMER ONLY ADDRESSED INSURED’S NOTIFICATION FAILURE AND WAS THEREFORE INEFFECTIVE AGAINST PLANTIFFS)/DISCLAIMERS (INSURER WAS NOTIFIED OF PLAINTIFFS’ LAWSUIT BY THE INJURED PLAINTIFFS NOT THE INSURED; DISCLAIMER ONLY ADDRESSED INSURED’S NOTIFICATION FAILURE AND WAS THEREFORE INEFFECTIVE AGAINST PLANTIFFS)

October 12, 2016
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Attorneys, Insurance Law

INSURED NOT ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY’S FEES IN AN AFFIRMATIVE ACTION TO SETTLE THE INSURED’S RIGHTS UNDER THE POLICY.

The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined that the plaintiff (the insured) was not entitled to attorney’s fees in an action brought to settle its rights under a policy:

This case is governed by the general rule that attorneys’ fees and other litigation expenses are “incidents of litigation” that the prevailing party may not collect “from the loser unless an award is authorized by agreement between the parties or by statute or court rule” … . Indeed, it is well established that “an insured may not recover the expenses incurred in bringing an affirmative action against an insurer to settle its rights under the policy” … . Here, there is nothing in the insurance policy that obligates defendant to reimburse or indemnify plaintiff for attorneys’ fees incurred by it in prosecuting an action to enforce the property coverage provisions of the policy, nor does plaintiff refer to any statute or a court rule authorizing its recovery of attorneys’ fees from defendant. Zelasko Constr., Inc. v Merchants Mut. Ins. Co., 2016 NY Slip Op 06328, 4th Dept 9-30-16

 

September 30, 2016
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Insurance Law

ANTISUBROGATION RULE DID NOT PRECLUDE RECOVERY TO THE EXTENT RECOVERY EXCEEDED THE LIMITS OF THE RELEVANT POLICY.

The Fourth Department determined the antisubrogation rule prohibited the insurer from recovering under the relevant $1,000,000 policy. But there was no showing that recovery under a $25,000,000 umbrella policy was prohibited by the antisubrogation rule. Therefore recovery to the extent recovery exceeded $1,000,000 was not precluded by the rule:

… [U]nder the antisubrogation rule, “an insurer has no right of subrogation against its own insured for a claim arising from the very risk for which the insured was covered . . . even where the insured has expressly agreed to indemnify the party from whom the insurer’s rights are derived’ ” … . Conversely, where “the monetary limit of the insurance provided by the . . . policy is for a lesser sum than that sought by the plaintiff as damages, the motion [for summary judgment dismissing] the third-party complaint should have been granted only up to the applicable limits of that policy” … , because “[i]t is black letter law that New York law does not bar insurance companies from seeking indemnification for settlements or judgments that exceed the limits of an insurance policy” … . Mitchell v NRG Energy, Inc., 2016 NY Slip Op 06359, 4th Dept 9-30-16

INSURANCE LAW (ANTISUBROGATION RULE DID NOT PRECLUDE RECOVERY TO THE EXTENT RECOVERY EXCEEDED THE LIMITS OF THE RELEVANT POLICY)/ANTISUBROGATION RULE (INSURANCE LAW, ANTISUBROGATION RULE DID NOT PRECLUDE RECOVERY TO THE EXTENT RECOVERY EXCEEDED THE LIMITS OF THE RELEVANT POLICY)

September 30, 2016
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Contract Law, Employment Law, Insurance Law

QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER THE TERM “INSURANCE” IN A NONCOMPETE AGREEMENT ENCOMPASSES SURETY BONDS.

The First Department, over an extensive dissent, determined the word “insurance” in a noncompete agreement was susceptible of two meanings, thereby precluding summary judgment. Defendant signed a noncompete agreement which prohibited the “brokering or placement of insurance.” After plaintiff started a new job during the time-period covered by the noncompete agreement with his previous employer, he brokered two “surety bonds” for two companies which had been clients of his former employer. Plaintiff argued the term “insurance” encompassed “surety bonds.” Defendants argued the term “insurance” did not encompass “surety bonds:”

… [T]the evidence produced by each side does not show that the interpretation urged by each is inevitable; rather, it shows that the language of the letter agreement is “on its face . . . reasonably susceptible of more than one interpretation” … . Accordingly, the motion court properly denied the motions for summary judgment. Frenkel Benefits, LLC v Mallory, 2016 NY Slip Op 06109, 1st Dept 9-21-16

 

INSURANCE LAW (QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER THE TERM INSURANCE IN A NONCOMPETE AGREEMENT ENCOMPASSES SURETY BONDS)/CONTRACT LAW (QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER THE TERM INSURANCE IN A NONCOMPETE AGREEMENT ENCOMPASSES SURETY BONDS)/NONCOMPETE AGREEMENTS (QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER THE TERM INSURANCE IN A NONCOMPETE AGREEMENT ENCOMPASSES SURETY BONDS)/SURETY BONDS (QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER THE TERM INSURANCE IN A NONCOMPETE AGREEMENT ENCOMPASSES SURETY BONDS)/EMPLOYMENT LAW (QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER THE TERM INSURANCE IN A NONCOMPETE AGREEMENT ENCOMPASSES SURETY BONDS)

September 21, 2016
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Contract Law, Insurance Law

AMENDMENT TO STATUTE CHANGING THE LIMITATIONS PERIOD FOR ACTION ON A PAYMENT BOND DID NOT APPLY RETROACTIVELY, CRITERIA EXPLAINED.

The Second Department determined an action by a subcontractor seeking payment under a payment bond for environmental clean-up work was time-barred. Plaintiff subcontractor had submitted invoices to the contractor which were not paid. Whether the action on the payment bond was time-barred depended upon whether an amendment to State Finance Law 137 applied retroactively. The court found the amendment did not apply retroactively and explained the analytical criteria:

” In determining whether statutory enactments should be given retroactive effect, there are two axioms of statutory interpretation'”  … . ” Amendments are presumed to have prospective application unless the Legislature’s preference for retroactivity is explicitly stated or clearly indicated. However, remedial legislation should be given retroactive effect in order to effectuate its beneficial purpose'” … . ” These axioms are helpful guideposts, but the reach of the statute ultimately becomes a matter of judgment made upon review of the legislative goal'” … .

Here, the Legislature did not explicitly state or clearly indicate, either in the amendment itself or in the legislative materials, that the 2011 amendment should be applied retroactively … . Thus, “we presume at the outset that the amendment was to have prospective application” … . Additionally, the 2011 amendment did not create a new right or a new class of individuals who could assert a cause of action under a payment bond. Instead, the amendment was simply intended to clarify the limitations period for bringing a payment bond claim. Given these circumstances, the amendment cannot be characterized as remedial, and need not be applied retroactively to achieve its purpose … . Clean Earth of N. Jersey, Inc. v Northcoast Maintenance Corp., 2016 NY Slip Op 06056, 2nd Dept 9-21-16

 

INSURANCE LAW (PAYMENT BOND,AMENDMENT TO STATUTE CHANGING THE LIMITATIONS PERIOD FOR ACTION ON A PAYMENT BOND DID NOT APPLY RETROACTIVELY, CRITERIA EXPLAINED)/CONTRACT LAW (PAYMENT BOND, AMENDMENT TO STATUTE CHANGING THE LIMITATIONS PERIOD FOR ACTION ON A PAYMENT BOND DID NOT APPLY RETROACTIVELY, CRITERIA EXPLAINED)/PAYMENT BOND (STATE FINANCE LAW, AMENDMENT TO STATUTE CHANGING THE LIMITATIONS PERIOD FOR ACTION ON A PAYMENT BOND DID NOT APPLY RETROACTIVELY, CRITERIA EXPLAINED)/STATE FINANCE LAW (PAYMENT BOND, AMENDMENT TO STATUTE CHANGING THE LIMITATIONS PERIOD FOR ACTION ON A PAYMENT BOND DID NOT APPLY RETROACTIVELY, CRITERIA EXPLAINED)/STATUTES (STATE FINANCE LAW, AMENDMENT TO STATUTE CHANGING THE LIMITATIONS PERIOD FOR ACTION ON A PAYMENT BOND DID NOT APPLY RETROACTIVELY, CRITERIA EXPLAINED

September 21, 2016
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