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Civil Procedure, Constitutional Law, Insurance Law, Medical Malpractice

STAY IMPOSED BY A SOUTH CAROLINA COURT AS PART OF THE LIQUIDATION OF A SOUTH CAROLINA MEDICAL MALPRACTICE INSURANCE CARRIER WAS NOT ENTITLED TO FULL FAITH AND CREDIT IN A NEW YORK ACTION AGAINST DEFENDANTS INSURED BY THE INSOLVENT CARRIER (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Duffy, determined that the stay imposed by a South Carolina court after the medical malpractice carrier, Oceanus, was declared insolvent and dissolved was not entitled to full faith and credit in the New York actions against parties insured by Oceanus. Oceanus was not a party to the New York actions, and due process trumped the Uniform Insurers Liquidation Act (UILA). The opinion is comprehensive and the reasoning cannot be fairly summarized here:

Notwithstanding the goals of the UILA, for the reasons set forth herein, the principles of due process and the right of the plaintiffs to seek redress in the courts in New York for wrongs they allege occurred in New York mandate that the South Carolina order is not entitled to full faith and credit or comity by the courts in New York in this and the related actions. Hala v Orange Regional Med. Ctr., 2019 NY Slip Op 07387, Second Dept 10-16-19

 

October 16, 2019
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2019-10-16 17:21:022020-01-27 11:19:13STAY IMPOSED BY A SOUTH CAROLINA COURT AS PART OF THE LIQUIDATION OF A SOUTH CAROLINA MEDICAL MALPRACTICE INSURANCE CARRIER WAS NOT ENTITLED TO FULL FAITH AND CREDIT IN A NEW YORK ACTION AGAINST DEFENDANTS INSURED BY THE INSOLVENT CARRIER (SECOND DEPT).
Arbitration, Corporation Law, Insurance Law

MASTER ARBITRATOR’S AWARD SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN VACATED, REVIEW POWERS OF MASTER ARBITRATOR AND COURT EXPLAINED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined that the master arbitrator’s award in this no-fault insurance, fraudulent incorporation case should not have been vacated:

“[A]n arbitrator’s rulings, unlike a trial court’s, are largely unreviewable” … . A court reviewing the award of a master arbitrator is limited to the grounds set forth in CPLR article 75, which include, in this compulsory arbitration, the question of whether the determination had evidentiary support, was rational, or had a plausible basis … . Notably, the master arbitrator’s review power is broader than that of the courts’ because it includes the power to review for errors of law … . In contrast, the courts “generally will not vacate an arbitrator’s award where the error claimed is the incorrect application of a rule of substantive law, unless it is so irrational as to require vacatur” … .

Here, since Country-Wide submitted evidence tending to support its fraudulent incorporation defense, it cannot be said that the determination of the master arbitrator affirming the original arbitrator’s award lacked evidentiary support. Nor can it be said that the determination to affirm the original arbitrator, who supported her determination with reasons based on the evidence, lacked a rational basis. Thus, even if it was an error of law to conclude that Country-Wide proved its defense as a matter of law … . Matter of Acuhealth Acupuncture, P.C. v Country-Wide Ins. Co., 2019 NY Slip Op 07246, Second Dept 10-9-19

 

October 9, 2019
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Arbitration, Insurance Law

A FRAMED ISSUE HEARING IS REQUIRED TO DETERMINE IF THE CARRIER PROPERLY DISCLAIMED COVERAGE IN THIS TRAFFIC ACCIDENT CASE ON THE GROUND THAT ITS INSURED’S CAR HAD BEEN STOLEN; THE UNINSURED MOTORIST CARRIER’S PETITION FOR A TEMPORARY STAY OF ARBITRATION SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined that a framed-issue hearing was required to determined if the insurer, National General, properly disclaimed coverage in this traffic accident case. The insured vehicle, owned by Singh, left the scene of the accident. National General disclaimed coverage alleging the vehicle had been stolen at the time of the accident. Santos, the driver of the car struck by the Singh car, then made a demand for arbitration of uninsured motorist against his insurer, Country-Wide. Country-Wide then brought the underlying petition to stay arbitration which was denied. Country-Wide appealed:

“The party seeking a stay of arbitration has the burden of showing the existence of sufficient evidentiary facts to establish a preliminary issue which would justify the stay” … . “Thereafter, the burden is on the party opposing the stay to rebut the prima facie showing” … . “Where a triable issue of fact is raised, the Supreme Court, not the arbitrator, must determine it in a framed-issue hearing, and the appropriate procedure under such circumstances is to temporarily stay arbitration pending a determination of the issue” … .

… [T]the petitioner met its initial burden by submitting evidence establishing that at the time of the accident the Singh vehicle was covered by a policy of insurance issued by National General … . National General’s disclaimer letter, submitted by Country-Wide in support of its petition, constituted prima facie evidence as to the existence of a policy of insurance covering Singh’s vehicle at the time of the accident. That same letter was sufficient to raise a triable issue of fact as to the validity of National General’s disclaimer … . “Vehicle and Traffic Law § 388 creates a strong presumption that the driver of a vehicle is operating it with the owner’s consent, which can only be rebutted by substantial evidence demonstrating that the vehicle was not operated with the owner’s permission” … . “[E]vidence that a vehicle was stolen at the time of the accident may overcome the presumption of permissive use” … . Under these circumstances, a framed-issue hearing is necessary to determine whether National General properly disclaimed coverage of Singh’s vehicle … . Matter of Country-Wide Ins. Co. v Santos, 2019 NY Slip Op 06767, Second Dept 9-25-19

 

September 25, 2019
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Civil Procedure, Insurance Law, Privilege, Securities

A PRIVILEGE UNDER WISCONSIN INSURANCE LAW APPLIED IN THIS NEW YORK ACTION CONCERNING INSURANCE CLAIMS STEMMING FROM THE ISSUANCE OF RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIES (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department determined a privilege under Wisconsin Law protected certain emails and documents generated in a Wisconsin action by the Wisconsin Commissioner of Insurance concerning the payment of insurance claims stemming from the issuance of residential mortgage-backed securities, The decision doesn’t explain the underlying facts:

The Commissioner appointed a Special Deputy Commissioner (SDC) to oversee all activities … from Ambac’s [plaintiffs’] New York offices, and, at the SDC’s direction, plaintiffs commenced this action in New York, asserting claims of fraudulent inducement and breach of contract in connection with the policies Ambac issued on the securitizations sponsored by defendant. When defendant demanded the production of certain emails and other documents maintained by the SDC, plaintiffs responded by claiming the statutory privilege held by the Wisconsin Office of the Commissioner of Insurance (OCI) under Wisconsin law (see Wis Stat § 601.465). Defendant argued that New York law should be applied because, in adjudicating privilege issues, New York courts must apply the law of the place where the evidence will be introduced at trial or where the discovery proceeding is located. Supreme Court, after engaging in an interest-balancing analysis, determined that the Wisconsin statutory privilege was applicable, and denied defendant’s motion to compel. We affirm.

New York courts “routinely apply the law of the place where the evidence in question will be introduced at trial or the location of the discovery proceeding when deciding privilege issues” … . However, there are circumstances in which an interest-balancing analysis is properly undertaken to decide whether another state’s law should govern the evidentiary privilege … .  This is a case that presents such circumstances … . Ambac Assur. Corp. v Nomura Credit & Capital, Inc., 2019 NY Slip Op 06574, First Dept 9-17-19

 

September 17, 2019
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2019-09-17 10:15:142020-01-24 05:48:27A PRIVILEGE UNDER WISCONSIN INSURANCE LAW APPLIED IN THIS NEW YORK ACTION CONCERNING INSURANCE CLAIMS STEMMING FROM THE ISSUANCE OF RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIES (FIRST DEPT).
Contract Law, Insurance Law

ALTHOUGH PLAINTIFF’S COUNSEL SENT A LETTER TO THE INSURED SHORTLY AFTER PLAINTIFF WAS INJURED IN THE INSURED’S HOME REQUESTING THAT THE INSURED NOTIFY HER INSURER, THE INSURER WAS NOT NOTIFIED UNTIL IT RECEIVED THE SUMMONS AND COMPLAINT SIX MONTHS AFTER THE INCIDENT; THE INSURER PROPERLY DISCLAIMED COVERAGE ON THE GROUND IT HAD NOT BEEN TIMELY NOTIFIED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined defendant insurance company (State Farm) properly disclaimed coverage on the ground it was not notified of the underlying incident (plaintiff was injured in an altercation in the insured’s home) until six months after it occurred. Plaintiff was awarded $715,000 after a non-jury trial. Plaintiff then brought a declaratory judgment action against State Farm:

By letter dated October 31, 2007, the plaintiffs’ counsel requested that [defendant] direct her insurance carrier to contact the plaintiffs’ counsel to discuss the subject occurrence. …

In February 2008, the injured plaintiff, and his wife suing derivatively, commenced a personal injury action (hereinafter the underlying action) against, among others, [the insured] to recover damages arising from the September 2007 occurrence. On or about March 13, 2008, State Farm received a copy of the summons and complaint filed in the underlying action. By letter dated April 3, 2008, State Farm disclaimed coverage to [the insured] on the ground, among others, that notice of the occurrence was untimely. …

“[A]n insurer has the right to demand that it be notified of any loss or accident that is covered under the terms of the insurance policy. The purpose of such a requirement is to afford the insurer an opportunity to protect itself by, for example, investigating claims soon after the underlying events” … . Where, as here, an insurance policy requires that notice of an occurrence or loss be given “as soon as practicable,” such notice constitutes a condition precedent to coverage, and notice must be provided within a reasonable time in view of all of the circumstances … . “Where there is no excuse or mitigating factor, the issue [of reasonableness] poses a legal question for the court, rather than an issue for the trier of fact” … . …

… State Farm established its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law declaring that it is not obligated to pay the judgment in the underlying action by demonstrating that it did not receive notice of the occurrence giving rise to the underlying action until approximately six months after the occurrence … . In opposition, the plaintiffs failed to raise a triable issue of fact, including as to whether they made a reasonably diligent effort to ascertain the identity of [defendant’s] insurer … . Henaghan v State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 2019 NY Slip Op 06480, Second Dept 9-11-19

 

September 11, 2019
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2019-09-11 10:12:312020-01-27 14:11:29ALTHOUGH PLAINTIFF’S COUNSEL SENT A LETTER TO THE INSURED SHORTLY AFTER PLAINTIFF WAS INJURED IN THE INSURED’S HOME REQUESTING THAT THE INSURED NOTIFY HER INSURER, THE INSURER WAS NOT NOTIFIED UNTIL IT RECEIVED THE SUMMONS AND COMPLAINT SIX MONTHS AFTER THE INCIDENT; THE INSURER PROPERLY DISCLAIMED COVERAGE ON THE GROUND IT HAD NOT BEEN TIMELY NOTIFIED (SECOND DEPT).
Arbitration, Insurance Law

THE INSURED DID NOT SHOW UP FOR THE SCHEDULED INDEPENDENT MEDICAL EXAMS IN THIS NO-FAULT POLICY CASE, ARBITRATOR’S AWARD IRRATIONALLY IGNORED THE CONTROLLING LAW (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing the arbitrator, granted the insurer’s petition to vacate the arbitration award in this no-fault policy case:

The master arbitrator’s award was arbitrary because it irrationally ignored the controlling law that the no-fault policy issued by petitioner was void ab initio due to respondent’s assignor’s failure to attend duly scheduled independent medical exams … . Matter of Global Liberty Ins. Co. of N.Y. v Top Q. Inc., 2019 NY Slip Op 06445, First Dept 9-3-19

 

September 3, 2019
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Insurance Law, Negligence

IN A TRIAL SUBJECT TO INSURANCE LAW 5102 THE TERM “SERIOUS INJURY” NOT “INJURY” SHOULD BE USED ON THE VERDICT SHEET (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department noted that the term “serious injury” not “injury” should be used on a verdict sheet in a case involving Insurance Law 5102:

… [W]e … note that the first question on the verdict sheet — i.e., “[w]as the accident . . . a substantial factor in causing an injury to [plaintiff]?” — invites the very problem we addressed in Brown v Ng (163 AD3d 1464, 1465 [4th Dept 2018]), where we noted that an interrogatory asking whether the plaintiff sustained an “injury” fails to address the appropriate legal issue, which is whether the plaintiff sustained a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d). The first question on the verdict sheet was unnecessary here inasmuch as the second and third questions asked the jury to determine whether plaintiff sustained a serious injury under the relevant categories that was causally related to the accident. McCulloch v New York Cent. Mut. Ins. Co., 2019 NY Slip Op 06254, Fourth Dept 8-22-19

 

August 22, 2019
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Civil Procedure, Contract Law, Employment Law, Insurance Law, Negligence, Prima Facie Tort

COMPLAINT DID NOT STATE CAUSES OF ACTION FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENT HIRING AND SUPERVISION OR PRIMA FACIE TORT (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff, the assignee of no-fault benefits, did not state valid causes of action against the insurer for breach of contract, negligent hiring and supervision, and prima facie tort. The claims were paid by the defendant and plaintiff alleged flaws and delays in the processing of the claims:

The amended complaint, however, failed to identify the specific insurance contracts that plaintiff had performed services under or the contract provisions that defendant allegedly breached. Inasmuch as bare legal conclusions without factual support are insufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss, we conclude that the amended complaint fails to state a cause of action for breach of contract. …

Although “[a]n employer may be liable for a claim of negligent hiring or supervision if an employee commits an independent act of negligence outside the scope of employment and the employer was aware of, or reasonably should have foreseen, the employee’s propensity to commit such an act”… , the amended complaint failed to allege that the acts of defendant’s employees were committed independent of defendant’s instruction or outside the scope of employment … . …

“There can be no recovery [for prima facie tort] unless a disinterested malevolence to injure [a] plaintiff constitutes the sole motivation for [the] defendant[‘s] otherwise lawful act” … . Here, the amended complaint alleged that defendant acted in “bad faith” and intentionally caused harm to plaintiff by requesting verifications and examinations under oath. Those conclusory allegations, however, failed to state that defendant had ” a malicious [motive] unmixed with any other and exclusively directed to [the] injury and damage of [plaintiff]’ ” … . Furthermore, it is “[a] critical element of [a prima facie tort] cause of action . . . that plaintiff suffered specific and measurable loss” … . Medical Care of W. N.Y. v Allstate Ins. Co., 2019 NY Slip Op 06243, Fourth Dept 8-22-19

 

August 22, 2019
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Civil Procedure, Insurance Law

NONPARTY SUBPOENA SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN QUASHED IN THIS OUT-OF-STATE ASBESTOS-RELATED INSURANCE ACTION, THE NONPARTY HAD BEEN EMPLOYED BY THE INSURER AND MAY POSSESS RELEVANT KNOWLEDGE ABOUT HOW THE INSURANCE POLICIES WERE INTERPRETED AND ENFORCED (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the petition to quash a nonparty subpoena in this out-of-state asbestos-related insurance action should not have been granted:

“CPLR 3101 (a) (4) allows a party to obtain discovery from a nonparty, and provides that [t]here shall be full disclosure of all matter material and necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action, regardless of the burden of proof’ ” … . The phrase “material and necessary” in CPLR 3101 “must be interpreted liberally to require disclosure, upon request, of any facts bearing on the controversy which will assist preparation for trial by sharpening the issues and reducing delay and prolixity’ ” …

“An application to quash a subpoena should be granted [o]nly where the futility of the process to uncover anything legitimate is inevitable or obvious . . . or where the information sought is utterly irrelevant to any proper inquiry” … , and the burden is on the party seeking to quash a subpoena to make such a showing … . …

“[A] witness’s sworn denial of any relevant knowledge …” … is insufficient, standing alone, to establish that the discovery sought is utterly irrelevant to the action or that the subpoena, if honored, will obviously and inevitably fail to turn up relevant evidence  … . … [The nonparty’s] deposition testimony is … potentially relevant because she has personal knowledge of how [the insurer] interpreted and enforced similar “consent” provisions of other excess policies while she was employed by [the insurer]. Matter of Barber v Borgwarner, Inc., 2019 NY Slip Op 05850, Fourth Dept 7-31-19

 

July 31, 2019
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2019-07-31 09:42:512020-01-24 05:53:30NONPARTY SUBPOENA SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN QUASHED IN THIS OUT-OF-STATE ASBESTOS-RELATED INSURANCE ACTION, THE NONPARTY HAD BEEN EMPLOYED BY THE INSURER AND MAY POSSESS RELEVANT KNOWLEDGE ABOUT HOW THE INSURANCE POLICIES WERE INTERPRETED AND ENFORCED (FOURTH DEPT).
Contract Law, Insurance Law

INSURER DID NOT TIMELY NOTIFY THE ADDITIONAL INSUREDS OF THE DISCLAIMER OF COVERAGE, INSURER MUST DEFEND AND INDEMNIFY THE ADDITIONAL INSUREDS IN THIS CONSTRUCTION ACCIDENT CASE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined defendant insurer (Utica) failed to timely disclaim coverage of the additional insureds and was therefore obligated to defend and indemnify the additional insureds in this construction accident case:

… [T]he plaintiff AVR-Powell C Development Corp. (hereinafter AVR-Powell), the owner of and general contractor at a construction site located on Lax Avenue in College Point, entered into a written agreement with nonparty Vinny Construction Corp. (hereinafter Vinny Construction), which was to perform masonry work in connection with the construction project. Pursuant to the agreement, Vinny Construction was required to procure and maintain a commercial general liability insurance policy naming AVR-Powell and the plaintiff Powell Cove Associates, LLC (hereinafter Powell Cove), as additional insureds. The defendant, Utica First Insurance Company (hereinafter Utica), issued a policy to Vinny Construction which included a “Blanket Additional Insured” endorsement specifying that an “[i]nsured also includes . . . [a]ny person or organization whom you are required to name as an additional insured on this policy under a written contract or written agreement.” …

Pursuant to Insurance Law § 3420 (d), an insurer is required to provide its insured and any other claimant with timely written notice of its disclaimer or denial of coverage on the basis of a policy exclusion, and will be estopped from disclaiming liability or denying coverage if it fails to do so … . Furthermore, where, as here, “a primary insurer . . . tenders a claim for a defense and indemnification to an insurer . . . which issued a certificate of insurance to the parties, indicating that they are additional insureds, that insurer must comply with the disclaimer requirements of Insurance Law § 3420(d)(2) by providing written notice of disclaimer of coverage to the additional insureds” … . …

The plaintiffs’ submissions showed that Utica did not provide a disclaimer of coverage directly to its additional insureds until March 20, 2015, approximately six years after the first demand for coverage from Utica. AVR-Powell C Dev. Corp. v Utica First Ins. Co., 2019 NY Slip Op 05758, Second Dept 7-24-19

 

July 24, 2019
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