You are here: / Fraud
, ,

PLAINTIFFS SUED A FOSTER-CHILD PLACEMENT SERVICE FOR FRAUD AND NEGLIGENCE AFTER THE FOSTER CHILD SEXUALLY ASSAULTED PLAINTIFFS’ BIOLOGICAL CHILD; THE FRAUD ACTION WAS NOT TIME-BARRED BECAUSE THE PLACEMENT SERVICE’S MERE KNOWLEDGE OF THE FOSTER CHILD’S SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN 2008 DID NOT START THE SIX-YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS, AND THE NEGLIGENCE ACTION WAS SUPPORTED BY A DUTY OWED TO PLAINTIFFS’ BIOLOGICAL CHILD (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department determined the fraud cause of action was not time-barred and the defendant’s owed a duty which supported the negligence cause of action. The plaintiffs, who had a biological child, took in a foster child through Good Shepherd, a placement service. The plaintiffs were not aware that the foster child had a history of animal abuse and sexually inappropriate behavior. One day after plaintiffs’ adoption of the foster child, the child sexually assaulted the biological child. Plaintiffs sued in fraud and negligence and Supreme Court denied Good Shepard’s motion to dismiss:

A defendant’s mere knowledge of something is not an element of a fraud cause of action; instead, a fraud cause of action requires a showing of, inter alia, the false representation of a material fact with the intent to deceive … . Thus, even assuming, arguendo, that Good Shepherd knew of the foster child’s history of animal abuse and engaging in sexually inappropriate behavior as early as May 2008, we conclude that its knowledge thereof did not demonstrate that the alleged fraud occurred at that time. Good Shepherd submitted no evidence that, in May 2008, it falsely represented the foster child’s relevant history with the intent to deceive plaintiffs. Thus, it did not establish as a matter of law that the fraud cause of action accrued in 2008 … . Moreover, Good Shepherd submitted the amended complaint, wherein plaintiffs alleged that, on numerous occasions in early 2012, they contacted Good Shepherd about the foster child’s sexually inappropriate behavior and that, on each occasion, Good Shepherd assured them that the foster child had no history of that type of behavior. We therefore conclude that Good Shepherd failed to meet its initial burden of establishing that the fraud cause of action asserted in 2016 was barred by the applicable six-year statute of limitations (see CPLR 213 [8]). * * *

Although defendants contend that they did not owe the biological child a duty because they lacked control over the foster child during the four years that he lived with plaintiffs, control over a third-person tortfeasor is just one way to establish a duty. … [A]duty may also exist where “there is a relationship . . . between [the] defendant and [the] plaintiff that requires [the] defendant to protect [the] plaintiff from the conduct of others,” and “the key . . . is that the defendant’s relationship with either the tortfeasor or the plaintiff places the defendant in the best position to protect against the risk of harm” … . Stephanie L. v House of The Good Shepherd, 2020 NY Slip Op 04643, Fourth Dept 8-20-20

 

, ,

QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER THE CORPORATE VEIL SHOULD BE PIERCED IN THIS BREACH OF CONTRACT ACTION (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff had raised questions of fact about whether the corporate veil should be pierced in this breach of contract action:

The plaintiff alleged that it contracted with the defendant China Perfect Construction Corp. (hereinafter China Perfect) to perform certain construction work, and that China Perfect breached that contract by performing the work in a substandard manner. The plaintiff alleged that the defendants Rushang Zhao and May Lu … exercised complete dominion and control over the operations of China Perfect and used such dominion and control to commit a fraud or wrong against the plaintiff. In this regard, the plaintiff alleged that the individual defendants created the defendant New Empire Builder Corp. …  solely to avoid the debts and liabilities of China Perfect, and that they transferred the assets of China Perfect to New Empire in order to render China Perfect “judgment-proof.” * * *

… [T]he defendants failed to affirmatively establish, prima facie, that the individual defendants did not exercise dominion and control over China Perfect to commit a wrong or injustice against the plaintiff, such that the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil is inapplicable … . Sterling Park Developers, LLC v China Perfect Constr. Corp., 2020 NY Slip Op 04340, Second Dept 7-29-20

 

, , ,

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL PROPERLY SERVED VALID SUBPOENAS ON THE VIRTUAL CURRENCY COMPANIES PURSUANT TO GENERAL BUSINESS LAW 352 (MARTIN ACT) IN A FRAUD INVESTIGATION; ONCE THE MOTIONS TO VACATE OR MODIFY THE EX PARTE ORDER RE: THE ISSUANCE OF THE SUBPOENAS WAS DETERMINED, THE COURT NO LONGER HAD ANY AUTHORITY OVER THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S INVESTIGATION; THEREFORE THE VIRTUAL CURRENCY COMPANIES’ SUBSEQUENT MOTION TO DISMISS WAS NOT PROPERLY BEFORE SUPREME COURT OR THE APPELLATE DIVISION (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Gesmer, determined that the Attorney General (petitioner) properly served subpoenas on the virtual currency companies (respondents) pursuant to General Business Law (GBL) 352 (Martin Act) in a fraud investigation. The subpoenas were attacked on several grounds, all of which were rejected: (1) subject matter jurisdiction (arguing the virtual currency is not a commodity or a security): (2) long-arm jurisdiction (arguing insufficient contacts with New York); (3) ex parte order was not certified as required by GBL 352 (court found this a technical not jurisdictional defect). But before addressing the issues raised on appeal, the Second Department held that the court did not have statutory authority under the GBL to address the respondents’ motion to dismiss (which was the basis of the appeal). Under the GBL, once the motions to vacate or modify the subpoenas were determined, the court has no authority over the Attorney General’s investigation:

… [U]nder the Martin Act’s statutory scheme, once Supreme Court has issued an order responding to a GBL 354 application, it has no further role in the Attorney General’s investigation, except to rule on a motion by either party to vacate or modify the order, as respondents made here. Accordingly, once the court issued the order authorized by GBL 354 on April 24, 2019, and modified it by order dated May 16, 2019, the proceeding before it was concluded and there was no action or proceeding for Supreme Court to “dismiss” on May 21, 2019 when respondents filed their motion that resulted in the order now before the court. All that remained was the Attorney General’s ongoing investigation, in which, by statute, the courts have no further role at this stage. Indeed, neither party cites to, and this Court is unaware of, any prior case in which the subject of a Martin Act investigation has moved to “dismiss” an application by the Attorney General for an order pursuant to GBL 354. Matter of James v iFinex Inc., 2020 NY Slip Op 03880, First Dept 7-9-20

 

,

CAYMAN ISLANDS LAW APPLIES IN THIS FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE ACTION, CRITERIA EXPLAINED (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the motion to dismiss this fraudulent conveyance action should have been granted because Cayman Islands law applied and the cause of action was not adequately pled:

“In the context of tort law, New York utilizes interest analysis to determine which of two competing jurisdictions has the greater interest in having its law applied in the litigation” .. . “Given that fraudulent conveyance laws are conduct regulating,’ the law of the jurisdiction where the tort occurred will generally apply because that jurisdiction has the greatest interest in regulating behavior within its borders'” … . ” [T]he locus jurisdiction’s interests in protecting the reasonable expectations of the parties who relied on it to govern their primary conduct[,] and in the admonitory effect that applying its law will have on similar conduct in the future[,] assume critical importance . . . .” … . Further, as “the purpose of fraudulent conveyance laws is to aid creditors who have been defrauded by the transfer of property,” consideration of the residency of the parties, particularly the creditors, is also required to determine their reasonable expectations … . Applying these principles, the law of the Cayman Islands applies to petitioner’s fraudulent conveyance claim. Petitioner, who is the creditor allegedly injured by the fraudulent transfer of the funds at issue, is a Cayman Islands domiciliary. Moreover, petitioner is seeking the return of funds which were allegedly fraudulently transferred to Weston, also a Cayman Islands domiciliary. Additionally, the Cayman Islands has the greatest interest in protecting the reasonable expectations of its residents, both petitioner and respondent Weston, who relied on Cayman Islands law to govern their conduct. Although SIP, the transferor of the funds, is domiciled in Texas, and the bank account into which the funds were transferred is located in New York, it is the Cayman Islands that has the most significant contacts with the matter in dispute. Thus, Cayman Islands law should apply. Matter of Wimbledon Fund, SPC (Class TT) v Weston Capital Partners Master Fund II, Ltd., 2020 NY Slip Op 03279, First Dept 6-11-20

 

, , ,

ALTHOUGH THE REAL ESTATE PURCHASE AGREEMENT ALLOWED THE SELLER TO CANCEL THE CONTRACT IF SELLER COULD NOT CONVEY TITLE, THAT PROVISION REQUIRES THE SELLER TO ACT IN GOOD FAITH; THE COMPLAINT ALLEGED THE SELLER FALSELY CLAIMED TO BE THE SOLE OWNER OF THE PROPERTY WHEN IN FACT SHE OWNED 50%; THE SELLER’S MOTION TO DISMISS THE COMPLAINT SEEKING SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department, reversing Surrogate’s Court, determined the motion to dismiss the complaint seeking specific performance of a real estate purchase agreement should not have been granted. Although the contract allowed the seller to refund the down payment and cancel the contract if the seller is unable to convey title, the seller must do so only in good faith and only if the buyers reject the defective title. Here the complaint alleged the seller fraudulently claimed she was the sole owner of the property, when in fact she owned only 50%:

“Where, as here, a contract for the sale of real property provides that in the event the seller is unable to convey title in accordance with the terms of the contract, the seller may refund the buyer’s down payment and cancel the contract without incurring further liability, that limitation contemplates the existence of a situation beyond the parties’ control and implicitly requires the seller to act in good faith'” … . Contrary to the Surrogate’s Court’s determination, the … complaint set forth cognizable causes of action sounding in breach of contract, fraud, and unjust enrichment, among other things, upon allegations that the seller wilfully failed to supply good and marketable title and rescinded the contract of sale even though the buyer and the appellants did not reject the defective title … . Matter of Valderrama, 2020 NY Slip Op 03236, Second Dept 6-10-20

 

,

DESIGNATING PETITION PERMEATED BY FRAUD INVALIDATED; THREE JUDGE DISSENT (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, in an opinion per curiam, reversing the Appellate Division, over a three-judge dissent, determined the designating petition was permeated by fraud and must be invalidated:

… [W]here appropriate, a court may … conclude that, “because of its magnitude[,]” fraud and irregularity established by clear and convincing evidence “so permeated’ the [designating] petition as a whole to call for its invalidation” … .

Based on the undisputed facts of this matter, which establish, among other things, “that 512 out of 944 signatures submitted in the [designating] petition are backdated to dates preceding the candidate’s receipt of the blank petition pages,” and that “14 of the 28 subscribing witnesses” swore that those signatures were placed on the designating petition before the blank petition pages were obtained from the printer (… cf. Election Law § 6-134 [3]), the lower courts should have concluded that this is one of those rare instances in which the designating petition is so “permeated” by fraud “as a whole as to call for its invalidation” … . Matter of Ferreyra v Arroyo, 2020 NY Slip Op 02994, CtApp 5-21-20

 

,

EVIDENCE OF ALLEGED FRAUD IN THE ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF SIGNATURES WAS NOT SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE INVALIDATION OF THE DESIGNATING PETITION (FOURTH DEPT). ​

The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court. determined respondent’s designating petition should not have been invalidated based on allegations of fraud in acknowledging signatures:

… [T]he court based its determination to invalidate the designating petition on the testimony of a single signatory, who stated that although respondent was the subscribing witness on the petition that she signed, her signature was actually witnessed by a younger man of a different race. While such evidence may warrant invalidation of a designating petition … , cross-examination of the signatory—during which she acknowledged signing four City Court petitions, including one for an individual whose description was similar to that of respondent—called her testimony on direct examination into question. …

… [W]e conclude that respondent’s apparent failure to administer to one signatory “an oath . . . calculated to awaken the conscience and impress the mind of the person taking it in accordance with his religious or ethical beliefs’ ” … did not, on its own, constitute evidence of fraud requiring invalidation of his designating petition … . Matter of Monto v Zeigler, 2020 NY Slip Op 02753, Fourth Dept 5-14-20

 

, ,

PLAINTIFFS STATED A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR FRAUD AND PROPERLY ALLEGED A CIVIL CONSPIRACY (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiffs had, inter alia, stated a cause of action for fraud and properly alleged a related civil conspiracy. Plaintiffs are owners of commercial buildings and defendants included an employee of one of the plaintiffs and several contractors who did work for the plaintiffs. Plaintiffs alleged invoices for work were inflated and the excess payments were split among defendants. With respect to the fraud and civil conspiracy causes of action, the First Department wrote:

To state a cause of action for fraud, a plaintiff must allege “a material misrepresentation of a fact, knowledge of its falsity, an intent to induce reliance, justifiable reliance by the plaintiff and damages” … . Such a claim must be pleaded with particularity (CPLR 3016[b] …). “[A]ctual knowledge[, however,] need only be pleaded generally, [given], particularly at the prediscovery stage, that a plaintiff lacks access to the very discovery materials which would illuminate a defendant’s state of mind” … . …

Here, we find that plaintiffs sufficiently pleaded fraud causes of action with the information available to them in a pre-discovery posture … . They alleged the creation and presentation for payment to plaintiffs of false, forged or inflated purchase orders; that defendants “knew that the work described on the bogus purchase orders or invoices and other contract forms was either falsely stated, overcharged or not provided, and knew that Plaintiffs would rely on these falsified or doctored purchase orders to make unwarranted payments”; that plaintiffs “relied on these purchase orders, invoices and other contract forms in making unnecessary payments to . . . defendants” to their detriment; that such reliance was “justifiable” and “reasonable”; and that plaintiffs were damaged as a result of defendants’ fraud. After discovery, plaintiffs can amplify their pleadings and defendants can renew their motions. But at this stage, plaintiffs should be allowed to probe defendants’ knowledge of the alleged fraudulent scheme. …

Although New York does not recognize an independent cause of action for civil conspiracy, allegations of civil conspiracy are permitted “to connect the actions of separate defendants with an otherwise actionable tort” … . To establish a claim of civil conspiracy, the plaintiff must demonstrate the primary tort, plus the following four elements: an agreement between two or more parties; an overt act in furtherance of the agreement; the parties’ intentional participation in the furtherance of a plan or purpose; and resulting damage or injury … . Plaintiffs pleaded the underlying fraud against defendants …, as well as an agreement that “[d]efendants acted in concert and conspired to defraud [p]laintiffs’ business.” As a result, plaintiffs were damaged because they paid monies to the defendants “for non-existent, unnecessary, and/or overpriced construction and maintenance services.” Cohen Bros. Realty Corp. v Mapes, 2020 NY Slip Op 01440, First Dept 3-3-20

 

, ,

ALTHOUGH MOVING MONEY THROUGH A NEW YORK BANK IS ENOUGH TO CONFER PERSONAL JURISDICTION ON OUT-OF-STATE PARTIES, SUPREME COURT CORRECTLY HELD IT WAS NOT ENOUGH TO MAKE NEW YORK A CONVENIENT FORUM (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department determined that, although using a New York bank for an allegedly fraudulent transaction is sufficient to acquire personal jurisdiction over out-of-state parties, it does not necessarily follow that New York is a convenient forum. Supreme Court properly found New York was not a convenient forum in these actions involving individuals and corporations in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, as well as a Swiss bank:

… [T]he court properly considered the following matters, among others: (1) none of the parties to either action is a New York citizen or resident or (if an entity) is formed under New York law or has its principal place of business in New York; … (2) the alleged conduct at issue primarily occurred in the UAE, Saudi Arabia and Switzerland, with the sole New York connection being the fleeting presence of the bribery funds at a nonparty New York correspondent bank while en route from the UAE to Switzerland; (3) the bulk of the relevant documentary evidence is located in the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Switzerland and BVI, and most witnesses are located outside New York and beyond New York’s subpoena power; (4) there is a likelihood that foreign substantive law will govern; (5) there are alternative fora available (Switzerland and the UAE) with greater connection to the subject matter; and (6) in the Pictet [bank] action, Switzerland has an interest in regulating the conduct of a bank operating within its borders … . …

As Supreme Court correctly recognized … “[o]ur state’s interest in the integrity of its banks . . . is not significantly threatened every time one foreign national, effecting what is alleged to be a fraudulent transaction, moves dollars through a bank in New York. . . . New York’s interest in its banking system is not a trump to be played whenever a party to such a transaction seeks to use our courts for a lawsuit with little or no apparent contact with New York” (Mashreqbank PSC v Ahmed Hamad Al Gosaibi & Bros. Co., 23 NY3d 129, 137 [2014] … ).

In accordance with Mashreqbank, this Court has declined to disturb the motion court’s discretionary determination that New York is not a convenient forum in cases where the sole connection to New York was the passage of wired funds through a correspondent bank in the state … . Al Rushaid Parker Drilling Ltd. v Byrne Modular Bldgs. L.L.C., 2020 NY Slip Op 01277, First Dept 2-25-20

 

, , ,

PLAINTIFFS’ ACTION ALLEGING BREACH OF AN ORAL CONTRACT REGARDING REPAYMENT OF A LOAN SECURED BY A NOTE AND MORTGAGE SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED AS BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS; THE FRAUD AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT CAUSES OF ACTION MUST BE DISMISSED AS DUPLICATIVE OF THE BREACH OF CONTRACT CAUSE OF ACTION (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiffs’ action alleging breach of an alleged oral contract concerning the repayment of a loan secured by a note an mortgage should have been dismissed as barred by the statute of frauds. The fraud and unjust enrichment causes of action must also be dismissed as duplicative of the breach of contract cause of action:

The complaint alleged that contemporaneously with executing the note and mortgage, the plaintiffs and the defendant entered into an oral agreement providing, inter alia, that in exchange for assigning a contract to purchase certain real property to the defendant, the plaintiffs would be responsible for paying only the interest on the loan. The complaint, which asserted causes of action sounding in breach of contract, fraud, and unjust enrichment, sought, among other things, recovery of the settlement amount paid by the plaintiffs in the foreclosure action, less the amount of interest allegedly due pursuant to the oral agreement. The defendant moved pursuant to CPLR 3211(a) to dismiss the complaint. The Supreme Court denied the motion, and the defendant appeals.

Accepting the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, and according the plaintiffs the benefit of every possible inference, dismissal of the breach of contract cause of action should have been granted, since enforcement of the alleged oral agreement, ostensibly to modify the note and mortgage, is barred by the statute of frauds (see General Obligations Law §§ 5-703[1]; 5-1103 … ). Dismissal of the causes of action alleging fraud and unjust enrichment should also have been granted as they are duplicative of the unenforceable contractual cause of action and thus constitute an impermissible attempt to circumvent the statute of frauds … . Botanical Realty Assoc. Urban Renewal, LLC v Gluck, 2020 NY Slip Op 00099, Second Dept 1-8-20

 

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy