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THE REFEREE’S FAILURE TO PROVIDE NOTICE AND A HEARING TO THE DEFENDANT DID NOT REQUIRE REVERSAL OF THE JUDGMENT OF FORECLOSURE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined the referee’s failure to provide notice and a hearing to the defendant in this foreclosure action did not require reversal of the judgment of foreclosure:

It is undisputed that the referee failed to provide notice to the defendant pursuant to CPLR 4313, or to hold a hearing on the issues addressed in the referee’s report. However, as long as a defendant is not prejudiced by the inability to submit evidence directly to the referee, a referee’s failure to notify a defendant and hold a hearing is not, by itself, a basis to reverse a judgment of foreclosure and sale and remit the matter for a hearing and a new determination of amounts owed … . Where, as here, a defendant had an opportunity to raise questions and submit evidence directly to the Supreme Court, which evidence could be considered by the court in determining whether to confirm the referee’s report, the defendant is not prejudiced by any error in failing to hold a hearing … . Bank of N.Y. Mellon v Viola, 2020 NY Slip Op 01895, Second Dept 3-18-20

 

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DEFENDANT’S PARTICIPATION IN A SETTLEMENT CONFERENCE DID NOT WAIVE HIS RIGHT TO SEEK DISMISSAL OF THE FORECLOSURE ACTION AS ABANDONED (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the defendant in this foreclosure action did not waive his right to seek dismissal of the complaint by participating in a settlement conference. The plaintiff bank had abandoned the action:

CPLR 3215(c) states that “if [a] plaintiff fails to take proceedings for the entry of judgment within one year after the default, the court shall not enter judgment but shall dismiss the complaint as abandoned…upon its own initiative or on motion.” The language of CPLR 3215(c) is not discretionary, and a claim for which a default judgment is not sought within the requisite one-year period will be deemed abandoned … . Notwithstanding, a claim will not be deemed abandoned if the party seeking a default judgment provides sufficient cause as to why the complaint should not be dismissed (CPLR 3215[c]). Here, plaintiff waited almost three years to seek a default judgment, and it failed to provide sufficient cause as to why the complaint should not be dismissed. As such, plaintiff’s complaint is dismissed as abandoned.

Plaintiff’s argument that defendant waived his right to seek dismissal pursuant to 3215(c) because he participated in the settlement conferences is equally unavailing. Although a party may waive it rights under CPLR 3215(c) “by serving an answer or taking any other steps which may be viewed as a formal or informal appearance”…,  defendant’s participation in settlement conferences did not constitute either a formal or an informal  appearance “since [he] did not actively litigate the action before the Supreme Court or participate in the action on the merits” … . Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v Martinez, 2020 NY Slip Op 01693, First Dept 3-12-20

 

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THE REFEREE’S FINDINGS WERE BASED UPON INADMISSIBLE HEARSAY, JUDGMENT OF FORECLOSURE REVERSED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the referee’s findings in this foreclosure action were based upon inadmissible hearsay:

“The report of a referee should be confirmed whenever the findings are substantially supported by the record, and the referee has clearly defined the issues and resolved matters of credibility” … . Here, contrary to the plaintiff’s contention, the affidavit of its document execution specialist, submitted for the purpose of establishing the amount due and owing under the subject mortgage loan, constituted inadmissible hearsay and lacked probative value because the affiant did not produce any of the business records he purportedly relied upon in making his calculations … . Under the circumstances, the referee’s findings with respect to the total amount due upon the mortgage were not substantially supported by the record … . Nationstar Mtge., LLC v Cavallaro, 2020 NY Slip Op 01624, Second Dept 3-11-20

 

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THE BANK’S MOTION TO RESTORE THE 2009 FORECLOSURE ACTION WHICH HAD BEEN ADMINISTRATIVELY, BUT NOT FORMALLY, DISMISSED SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED; THE BANK HAD PREVIOUSLY STATED ITS INTENTION TO DISCONTINUE THE 2009 FORECLOSURE BUT THE MOTION TO RESTORE WAS NOT PRECLUDED BY THE JUDICIAL ESTOPPEL DOCTRINE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff bank should have been allowed to restore a 2009 foreclosure action which had been administratively, but not formally, dismissed. The court noted that the bank’s prior statement of its intention to discontinue the 2009 action did not trigger the judicial estoppel doctrine:

While, in an effort to successfully prosecute the 2015 foreclosure action, the Bank represented that it would seek to discontinue the 2009 action, it is not judicially estopped from changing its position. ” [A] party who assumes a certain position in a prior legal proceeding and secures a favorable judgment therein is precluded from assuming a contrary position in another action simply because his or her interests have changed'” … . The Bank did not obtain a favorable judgment in the 2015 foreclosure action.

The Supreme Court should have granted that branch of the Bank’s motion which was to restore the 2009 action to the active calendar. The 2009 action was never formally dismissed, as the marking-off procedures of CPLR 3404 do not apply to pre-note of issue actions such as this one … . Since the 2009 action could not properly be marked off pursuant to CPLR 3404, the Bank was not required to move to restore within any specified time frame and was not obligated to demonstrate a reasonable excuse and a potentially meritorious claim … . Further, there was neither a 90-day notice pursuant to CPLR 3216 … , nor an order dismissing the complaint pursuant to 22 NYCRR 202.27 … . Finally, [defendant] does not contend that the 2009 action was dismissed pursuant to CPLR 3215(c). Deutsche Bank Natl. Trust Co. v Gambino, 2020 NY Slip Op 01476, Second Dept 3-4-20

 

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MOTION TO DISCONTINUE STATE FORECLOSURE ACTION WHILE FORECLOSURE WAS PURSUED IN FEDERAL COURT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED WITHOUT PREJUDICE BECAUSE THERE WAS NO SHOWING OF PREJUDICE ON THE PART OF DEFENDANT (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff’s motion to discontinue the foreclosure action should not have been granted with prejudice because there was no showing of prejudice on the part of the defendant (Jach):

… [T]he plaintiff commenced this action … seeking to foreclose the subject mortgage. After interposing an answer, in which he alleged lack of standing as an affirmative defense, Jach moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against him, and the plaintiff cross-moved, inter alia, for summary judgment on the complaint. The Supreme Court referred the action to a referee to hear and report on the issue of standing. After conducting a hearing, the referee issued a report finding, in effect, that the plaintiff had failed to establish its standing for purposes of its cross motion for summary judgment on the complaint.

… [W]ith this action still pending and the referee’s report not yet confirmed, the plaintiff commenced an action in federal court seeking to foreclose the subject mortgage. Subsequently, … the plaintiff moved before the Supreme Court, among other things, for leave to discontinue the action without prejudice, which Jach opposed.

In the order appealed from, the Supreme Court, inter alia, in effect, upon granting that branch of the plaintiff’s motion which was for leave to discontinue the action, did so with prejudice. The plaintiff appeals.

The Supreme Court, in granting that branch of the plaintiff’s motion which was for leave to discontinue the action, should have done so without prejudice. Pursuant to CPLR 3217(b), “an action shall not be discontinued by a party asserting a claim except upon order of the court and upon terms and conditions, as the court deems proper.” As a general rule, “a plaintiff should be permitted to discontinue an action without prejudice unless the defendant would be prejudiced thereby” … . Here, there was no evidence that Jach would be prejudiced by a discontinuance … . Onewest Bank, FSB v Jach, 2020 NY Slip Op 01357, Second Dept 2-26-20

 

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THE MORTGAGE-PAYMENT MODIFICATION AGREEMENT DID NOT CONSTITUTE AN ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF THE MORTGAGE DEBT WITHIN THE MEANING OF GENERAL OBLIGATIONS LAW 17-101; THEREFORE THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS DID NOT START ANEW; THE FORECLOSURE ACTION IS TIME-BARRED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendant’s trial payments as a condition for entering a mortgage-payment modification agreement (the Plan) did not amount to an acknowledgment of the debt such that the statute of limitations would start running anew:

” General Obligations Law § 17-101 effectively revives a time-barred claim when the debtor has signed a writing which validly acknowledges the debt'” … . “The writing, in order to constitute an acknowledgment, must recognize an existing debt and must contain nothing inconsistent with an intention on the part of the debtor to pay it” … . “In order to demonstrate that the statute of limitations has been renewed by a partial payment, it must be shown that the payment was accompanied by circumstances amounting to an absolute and unqualified acknowledgment by the debtor of more being due, from which a promise may be inferred to pay the remainder'” … . * * *

… [T]he Plan did not constitute an “unconditional and unqualified acknowledgment of [the] debt” sufficient to reset the statute of limitations … . While the writing arguably acknowledged the existence of indebtedness, the defendant merely agreed to make three trial payments so as to receive a permanent modification offer. Any intention to repay the debt was conditioned on the parties reaching a permanent modification agreement, which condition did not occur. Under these circumstances, it cannot be said that the writing contained “nothing inconsistent with an intention on the part of the debtor to pay” the debt … . Indeed, the defendant represented in the Plan that he was unable to afford the mortgage payments. Nationstar Mtge., LLC v Dorsin, 2020 NY Slip Op 01354, Second Dept 2-26-20

 

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SUPREME COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE, SUA SPONTE, DISMISSED THE COMPLAINT IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION, THEREBY DEPRIVING PLAINTIFF OF AN OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff bank’s motion to vacate the default in this foreclosure action should have been granted. Supreme Court had, sua sponte, dismissed the complaint without affording plaintiff an opportunity to be heard:

Following the plaintiff’s failure to move for an order of reference … , the Court Attorney Referee found … that the plaintiff failed to show good cause for its failure to move for the order of reference as directed and recommended that the action be dismissed. … Supreme Court directed dismissal of the action.

“A court’s power to dismiss a complaint, sua sponte, is to be used sparingly and only when extraordinary circumstances exist to warrant dismissal” … . As no such extraordinary circumstances were present in this case, we disagree with the Supreme Court’s determination to sua sponte direct dismissal of the complaint, without affording the plaintiff notice and opportunity to be heard … , which “amounted to a denial of the plaintiff’s due process rights” … . Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have granted those branches of the plaintiff’s motion which were to vacate the October 4, 2016, order and to restore the action to active status … . Deutsche Bank Natl. Trust Co. v Winslow, 2020 NY Slip Op 01325, Second Dept 2-26-20

 

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PLAINTIFF BANK DID NOT COMPLY WITH RPAPL 1306; DEFENDANT’S CROSS-MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff bank’s failure to comply with RPAPL 1306 required that defendant’s cross-motion for summary judgment be granted:

“RPAPL 1306 provides, in pertinent part, that within three business days of the mailing of the foreclosure notice pursuant to RPAPL 1304(1), every lender or assignee shall file’ certain information with the superintendent of financial services, including at a minimum, the name, address, last known telephone number of the borrower, and the amount claimed as due and owing on the mortgage, and such other information as will enable the superintendent to ascertain the type of loan at issue'” … . “Any complaint served in a proceeding initiated pursuant to [RPAPL article 13] shall contain, as a condition precedent to such proceeding, an affirmative allegation that at the time the proceeding is commenced, the plaintiff has complied with . . . this section” (RPAPL 1306[1]). Compliance with RPAPL 1306 is a condition precedent to the commencement of a foreclosure action.

RPAPL 1306(1) became effective on February 13, 2010 (see L 2009, ch 507, § 5), one month before this action was commenced. Contrary to the plaintiff’s contention, it was not absolved from compliance with the statute by virtue of the fact that its RPAPL 1304 notices were purportedly mailed prior to the effective date of RPAPL 1306. …

… [I]t is … clear from the face of the complaint that it contains no “affirmative allegation that at the time the proceeding [wa]s commenced, the plaintiff ha[d] complied with” RPAPL 1306 … . Deutsche Bank Natl. Trust Co. v Spanos, 2020 NY Slip Op 01324, Second Dept 2-26-20

 

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PROOF OF POSSESSION OF THE NOTE WHEN THE ACTION WAS COMMENCED WAS HEARSAY; PLAINTIFF BANK DID NOT DEMONSTRATE STANDING TO FORECLOSE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff bank did not demonstrate standing to bring the foreclosure action. The assertions that the note was in plaintiff’s possession when the action was commenced were hearsay and were not supported by business records:

… [T]he plaintiff, to establish its standing to commence this mortgage foreclosure action, submitted an affirmation of Amber A. Jurek, a lawyer with Gross Polowy, LLC (hereinafter Gross Polowy), the plaintiff’s counsel. Jurek stated that she was familiar with Gross Polowy’s records and record-keeping practices. Jurek stated that on January 28, 2015, Gross Polowy received the plaintiff’s file, which included the original endorsed note. Gross Polowy commenced this action on the plaintiff’s behalf on February 26, 2015. According to Jurek, “[o]n that date, Gross Polowy, on behalf of Plaintiff, remained in physical possession of the collateral file, including the original endorsed Note dated March 20, 2012.” The plaintiff also submitted the note, which bore an undated endorsement to the plaintiff. However, Jurek did not set forth any facts based on her personal knowledge to support her statement that the note in the plaintiff’s file was the original endorsed note. Further, the plaintiff failed to attach the business records upon which Jurek relied in her affirmation, and since Jurek did not state that she personally witnessed Gross Polowy receive the plaintiff’s file, her statement is inadmissible hearsay … .

The plaintiff also submitted an affidavit of April H. Hatfield, vice president of loan documentation for the plaintiff. Hatfield stated that she was familiar with the plaintiff’s records and record-keeping practices. Although Hatfield attached the records upon which she relied, she did not state that the plaintiff had possession of the endorsed note at the time the action was commenced. Rather, she relied on Jurek’s affidavit for that fact. Accordingly, Hatfield’s affidavit was also insufficient to establish the plaintiff’s standing.

Finally, the plaintiff did not attach a copy of the note to the complaint when commencing this action. Therefore, the plaintiff failed to establish, prima facie, that it had standing to commence this action … . Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v Bakth, 2020 NY Slip Op 01382, Second Dept 2-26-20

 

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NOTICE REQUIREMENTS OF RPAPL 1304 NOT PROVEN; PLAINTIFF BANK’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION (SECOND DEPT)

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the proof of compliance with the RPAPL 1304 notice requirements was deficient:

… [T]he plaintiff failed to submit an affidavit of service or any evidence of mailing by the post office demonstrating that it properly served the defendant pursuant to the terms of RPAPL 1304 … . Contrary to the plaintiff’s contention, the affidavit of a representative of its loan servicer was insufficient to establish that the notice was sent to the defendant in the manner required by RPAPL 1304, as the representative did not provide evidence “of a standard office mailing procedure designed to ensure that items are properly addressed and mailed” … , and provided no independent evidence of the actual mailing … . U.S. Bank N.A. v Herzberg, 2020 NY Slip Op 01201, Second Dept 2-19-20

 

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