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ONLY SERIOUS MISCONDUCT, NOT CONFLICTS OF INTEREST, JUSTIFIES REMOVAL OF NAMED EXECUTORS, SURROGATE’S COURT REVERSED, MATTER SENT BACK FOR A HEARING (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing Surrogate’s Court, determined that the petition seeking letters of administration on the ground that respondents, who were the named executors, had conflicts of interest and had breached their fiduciary duties, should not have been granted. The court explained that named executors can be removed only for serious misconduct, not conflicts of interest. The matter was sent back for a hearing:

“‘[I]t is actual misconduct, not a conflict of interest, that justifies the removal of a fiduciary'”… . Simply put, “a conflict does not make a fiduciary ineligible under SCPA 707, and public policy zealously protects the decedent’s right to name a fiduciary, even one with a conflict” … . Thus, petitioners’ remedy for the alleged conflict of interest lies not in the ineligibility provisions of SCPA 707, but in the provisions of SCPA 702 authorizing the issuance of limited and restricted letters of administration under certain enumerated circumstances.

To that end, SCPA 702 (9) specifically provides for the issuance of limited letters of administration to a party for the purpose of commencing “any action or proceeding against the fiduciary, in his or her individual capacity, or against anyone else against whom the fiduciary fails or refuses to bring such a proceeding.” Indeed, this subdivision is designed to preserve a decedent’s choice of fiduciary “by permitting the appointment of a second limited administrator instead of requiring the disqualification or removal of original fiduciaries where their conflicts of interests preclude them from pursuing claims against themselves or others to the prejudice of other persons interested in the estate” … . For these reasons, we conclude that the conflict alleged did not render respondents ineligible to serve as fiduciaries of decedent’s estate under SCPA 707. Matter of Bolen, 2018 NY Slip Op 08001, Third Dept 11-21-18

TRUSTS AND ESTATES (EXECUTORS, ONLY SERIOUS MISCONDUCT, NOT CONFLICTS OF INTEREST, JUSTIFIES REMOVAL OF NAMED EXECUTORS, SURROGATE’S COURT REVERSED, MATTER SENT BACK FOR A HEARING (THIRD DEPT))/FIDUCIARY DUTY (TRUSTS AND ESTATES, EXECUTORS, ONLY SERIOUS MISCONDUCT, NOT CONFLICTS OF INTEREST, JUSTIFIES REMOVAL OF NAMED EXECUTORS, SURROGATE’S COURT REVERSED, MATTER SENT BACK FOR A HEARING (THIRD DEPT))/EXECUTORS (TRUSTS AND ESTATES, ONLY SERIOUS MISCONDUCT, NOT CONFLICTS OF INTEREST, JUSTIFIES REMOVAL OF NAMED EXECUTORS, SURROGATE’S COURT REVERSED, MATTER SENT BACK FOR A HEARING (THIRD DEPT))

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UK LAW REQUIRING COURT PERMISSION TO BRING A SHAREHOLDER DERIVATIVE ACTION WAS PROCEDURAL AND THEREFORE DID NOT APPLY IN THIS NEW YORK ACTION AGAINST LONDON-BASED HSBC FOR FAILURE TO IMPLEMENT MONEY-LAUNDERING PROTECTIONS, COMPLAINT DEMONSTRATED THE FUTILITY OF FIRST SEEKING REDRESS FROM THE CORPORATION, DOCTRINE OF FORUM NON CONVENIENS DID NOT APPLY, COMPLAINT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the shareholder derivative action against HSBC (bank) alleging breach of a fiduciary duty to implement money laundering prevention safeguards should not have been dismissed. The nominal defendant, HSBC Holdings, is organized under the laws of the United Kingdom and is headquartered in London. The motion to dismiss alleged the failure to seek permission for the action from the English High Court, as well as the failure to demonstrate the futility of seeking redress from the corporation, and the doctrine of forum non conveniens, required dismissal of the complaint. The Second Department held that the rule requiring permission of the English court was procedural and therefore the law of the forum (New York), not the United Kingdom, applied. The Second Department further held that the complaint demonstrated the futility of first seeking redress from the corporation and New York was the proper forum:

… [T]he Court of Appeals decided Davis v Scottish Re Group Ltd. (30 NY3d 247), which held that a Cayman Islands court rule requiring plaintiffs in shareholder derivative actions to first apply to the Cayman Islands Grand Court for leave to continue the action is a procedural rule of the Cayman Islands, and “therefore does not apply where, as here, a plaintiff seeks to litigate his derivative claims in New York” … . … Based upon the analysis set forth in Davis, we find that the judicial-permission requirement set forth in the UK Companies Act is a procedural rule applicable only in England and Wales, or Northern Ireland. …

As an alternative ground for affirmance … , the nominal defendants contend that the plaintiff lacks standing under New York law pursuant to Business Corporation Law § 626(c) because the amended complaint fails to allege that the plaintiff made efforts to secure initiation of the action by the board itself or set forth the reasons for not making such effort … . * * *

In view of the illegal purpose, magnitude, and duration of the alleged wrongdoing, as well as the identity of beneficiaries to the transactions, the allegations were such that the transactions should have come to the attention of senior management and the board of directors … . * * *

… [G]iven that the allegations of wrongdoing occurred in New York, that only 21 of the 75 individual defendants live and work outside of New York, and that 3 of the nominal defendants are either incorporated or headquartered in New York, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in determining that the nominal defendants were not entitled to dismissal on the ground of forum non conveniens [CPLR 327]. Mason-Mahon v Flint, 2018 NY Slip Op 07716, Second Dept 11-14-18

CORPORATION LAW (UK LAW REQUIRING COURT PERMISSION TO BRING A SHAREHOLDER DERIVATIVE ACTION WAS PROCEDURAL AND THEREFORE DID NOT APPLY IN THIS NEW YORK ACTION AGAINST LONDON-BASED HSBC FOR FAILURE TO IMPLEMENT MONEY-LAUNDERING PROTECTIONS, COMPLAINT DEMONSTRATED THE FUTILITY OF FIRST SEEKING REDRESS FROM THE CORPORATION, DOCTRINE OF FORUM NON CONVENIENS DID NOT APPLY, COMPLAINT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED (SECOND DEPT))/CIVIL PROCEDURE (CORPORATION LAW, UK LAW REQUIRING COURT PERMISSION TO BRING A SHAREHOLDER DERIVATIVE ACTION WAS PROCEDURAL AND THEREFORE DID NOT APPLY IN THIS NEW YORK ACTION AGAINST LONDON-BASED HSBC FOR FAILURE TO IMPLEMENT MONEY-LAUNDERING PROTECTIONS, COMPLAINT DEMONSTRATED THE FUTILITY OF FIRST SEEKING REDRESS FROM THE CORPORATION, DOCTRINE OF FORUM NON CONVENIENS DID NOT APPLY, COMPLAINT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED (SECOND DEPT))/BANKING LAW  (UK LAW REQUIRING COURT PERMISSION TO BRING A SHAREHOLDER DERIVATIVE ACTION WAS PROCEDURAL AND THEREFORE DID NOT APPLY IN THIS NEW YORK ACTION AGAINST LONDON-BASED HSBC FOR FAILURE TO IMPLEMENT MONEY-LAUNDERING PROTECTIONS, COMPLAINT DEMONSTRATED THE FUTILITY OF FIRST SEEKING REDRESS FROM THE CORPORATION, DOCTRINE OF FORUM NON CONVENIENS DID NOT APPLY, COMPLAINT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED (SECOND DEPT))/FIDUCIARY DUTY (CORPORATION LAW, UK LAW REQUIRING COURT PERMISSION TO BRING A SHAREHOLDER DERIVATIVE ACTION WAS PROCEDURAL AND THEREFORE DID NOT APPLY IN THIS NEW YORK ACTION AGAINST LONDON-BASED HSBC FOR FAILURE TO IMPLEMENT MONEY-LAUNDERING PROTECTIONS, COMPLAINT DEMONSTRATED THE FUTILITY OF FIRST SEEKING REDRESS FROM THE CORPORATION, DOCTRINE OF FORUM NON CONVENIENS DID NOT APPLY, COMPLAINT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED (SECOND DEPT))/SHAREHOLDER DERIVATIVE ACTION (UK LAW REQUIRING COURT PERMISSION TO BRING A SHAREHOLDER DERIVATIVE ACTION WAS PROCEDURAL AND THEREFORE DID NOT APPLY IN THIS NEW YORK ACTION AGAINST LONDON-BASED HSBC FOR FAILURE TO IMPLEMENT MONEY-LAUNDERING PROTECTIONS, COMPLAINT DEMONSTRATED THE FUTILITY OF FIRST SEEKING REDRESS FROM THE CORPORATION, DOCTRINE OF FORUM NON CONVENIENS DID NOT APPLY, COMPLAINT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED (SECOND DEPT))/MONEY LAUNDERING (BANKING LAW, UK LAW REQUIRING COURT PERMISSION TO BRING A SHAREHOLDER DERIVATIVE ACTION WAS PROCEDURAL AND THEREFORE DID NOT APPLY IN THIS NEW YORK ACTION AGAINST LONDON-BASED HSBC FOR FAILURE TO IMPLEMENT MONEY-LAUNDERING PROTECTIONS, COMPLAINT DEMONSTRATED THE FUTILITY OF FIRST SEEKING REDRESS FROM THE CORPORATION, DOCTRINE OF FORUM NON CONVENIENS DID NOT APPLY, COMPLAINT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED (SECOND DEPT))/CPLR 327  (UK LAW REQUIRING COURT PERMISSION TO BRING A SHAREHOLDER DERIVATIVE ACTION WAS PROCEDURAL AND THEREFORE DID NOT APPLY IN THIS NEW YORK ACTION AGAINST LONDON-BASED HSBC FOR FAILURE TO IMPLEMENT MONEY-LAUNDERING PROTECTIONS, COMPLAINT DEMONSTRATED THE FUTILITY OF FIRST SEEKING REDRESS FROM THE CORPORATION, DOCTRINE OF FORUM NON CONVENIENS DID NOT APPLY, COMPLAINT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED (SECOND DEPT))/BUSINESS CORPORATION LAW 626 (UK LAW REQUIRING COURT PERMISSION TO BRING A SHAREHOLDER DERIVATIVE ACTION WAS PROCEDURAL AND THEREFORE DID NOT APPLY IN THIS NEW YORK ACTION AGAINST LONDON-BASED HSBC FOR FAILURE TO IMPLEMENT MONEY-LAUNDERING PROTECTIONS, COMPLAINT DEMONSTRATED THE FUTILITY OF FIRST SEEKING REDRESS FROM THE CORPORATION, DOCTRINE OF FORUM NON CONVENIENS DID NOT APPLY, COMPLAINT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED (SECOND DEPT))

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IN A DISPUTE BETWEEN A HOSPITAL AND A DOCTOR CONCERNING A CHARITABLE GIFT TO THE HOSPITAL, DISQUALIFICATION OF THE DOCTOR’S LAW FIRM WAS PROPER, A LAWYER AT THE FIRM WAS ON THE HOSPITAL’S BOARD OF TRUSTEES (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined the petitioner hospital's motion to disqualify an attorney. The underlying matter concerned a revocable trust related to a charitable gift to the hospital in the amount of $75 million. The oncologist, Williams, who treated the man who made the gift hired a law firm to represent him in the trust proceedings. A lawyer at the firm, Glassman, was on the hospital's board of trustees. The complaint … alleges … that the hospital and its executives are harassing Williams and trying to terminate his relationship with the hospital in order to take control of the gift in violation of the terms of the trust:

… [W]hile Glassman's status as member of the hospital's Board of Trustees did not constitute a traditional attorney-client relationship, there existed “sufficient aspects of such relationship”—notably the fiduciary duty owed by Glassman to the hospital—to trigger inquiry into the potential conflict arising from Fox Rothschild's simultaneous representation of Williams in litigation against the hospital … . Moreover, the hospital established that Glassman, as a member of the hospital's Board of Trustees, had access to confidential information regarding the gift and the ongoing dispute with Williams, both before and after this proceeding was commenced … . Matter of Blackman, 2018 NY Slip Op 06528, Second Dept 10-3-18

ATTORNEYS (CONFLICT OF INTEREST, IN A DISPUTE BETWEEN A HOSPITAL AND A DOCTOR CONCERNING A CHARITABLE GIFT TO THE HOSPITAL, DISQUALIFICATION OF THE DOCTOR'S LAW FIRM WAS PROPER, A LAWYER AT THE FIRM WAS ON THE HOSPITAL'S BOARD OF TRUSTEES (SECOND DEPT))/CONFLICT OF INTEREST (ATTORNEYS, IN A DISPUTE BETWEEN A HOSPITAL AND A DOCTOR CONCERNING A CHARITABLE GIFT TO THE HOSPITAL, DISQUALIFICATION OF THE DOCTOR'S LAW FIRM WAS PROPER, A LAWYER AT THE FIRM WAS ON THE HOSPITAL'S BOARD OF TRUSTEES (SECOND DEPT))/DISQUALIFICATION (ATTORNEYS, CONFLICT OF INTEREST, IN A DISPUTE BETWEEN A HOSPITAL AND A DOCTOR CONCERNING A CHARITABLE GIFT TO THE HOSPITAL, DISQUALIFICATION OF THE DOCTOR'S LAW FIRM WAS PROPER, A LAWYER AT THE FIRM WAS ON THE HOSPITAL'S BOARD OF TRUSTEES (SECOND DEPT))/TRUSTS AND ESTATES (ATTORNEYS, CONFLICT OF INTEREST, IN A DISPUTE BETWEEN A HOSPITAL AND A DOCTOR CONCERNING A CHARITABLE GIFT TO THE HOSPITAL, DISQUALIFICATION OF THE DOCTOR'S LAW FIRM WAS PROPER, A LAWYER AT THE FIRM WAS ON THE HOSPITAL'S BOARD OF TRUSTEES (SECOND DEPT))

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NO CAUSE OF ACTION FOR BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY AGAINST INDIVIDUAL COOPERATIVE BOARD MEMBERS, MEMBERS OF THE BOARD DID NOT PARTICIPATE IN A CORPORATE TORT (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department determined plaintiff shareholder in a cooperative could not bring a “breach of fiduciary duty” cause of action against individual members of the cooperative board. Plaintiff alleged her cooperative apartment was damaged by water from a greenhouse above the apartment. The first department found that that was no corporate tort for which individual members of the board could be liable:

It is well-settled that a breach of fiduciary duty claim does not lie against individual cooperative board members where there is no allegation of “individual wrongdoing by the members . . . separate and apart from their collective actions taken on behalf of the” cooperative … .  Here, the complaint does not allege that any of the individual board members committed an independent wrong that was distinct from the actions taken as a board collectively. Thus, the breach of fiduciary duty claim is not viable. …

Contrary to plaintiff’s contention, this result is entirely consistent with Fletcher v Dakota, Inc. (99 AD3d 43 [1st Dept 2012]). In Fletcher, we concluded that “although participation in a breach of contract will typically not give rise to individual director liability, the participation of an individual director in a corporation’s tort is sufficient to give rise to individual liability” (id. at 47). Thus, we declined to dismiss claims against a cooperative board director who was alleged to have participated in the cooperative’s violation of the State and City Human Rights Laws.

Here, in contrast, there is no viable corporate tort alleging breach of fiduciary duty, because a corporation owes no fiduciary duty to its shareholders … . Thus, in the absence of a corporate tort in which the individual board members could have participated, the breach of fiduciary duty claim as against them was properly dismissed. Indeed, Fletcher made this very point by dismissing the breach of fiduciary duty cause of action against an individual board director, while at the same time sustaining Human Rights Law claims against him. Hersh v One Fifth Ave. Apt. Corp., 2018 NY Slip Op 05522, First Dept 7-26-18

FIDUCIARY DUTY, BREACH OF (COOPERATIVES, NO CAUSE OF ACTION FOR BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY AGAINST INDIVIDUAL COOPERATIVE BOARD MEMBERS, MEMBERS OF THE BOARD DID NOT PARTICIPATE IN A CORPORATE TORT (FIRST DEPT))/COOPERATIVES (NO CAUSE OF ACTION FOR BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY AGAINST INDIVIDUAL COOPERATIVE BOARD MEMBERS, MEMBERS OF THE BOARD DID NOT PARTICIPATE IN A CORPORATE TORT (FIRST DEPT))/CORPORATION LAW (COOPERATIVES,  NO CAUSE OF ACTION FOR BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY AGAINST INDIVIDUAL COOPERATIVE BOARD MEMBERS, MEMBERS OF THE BOARD DID NOT PARTICIPATE IN A CORPORATE TORT (FIRST DEPT))/NEGLIGENCE (COOPERATIVES, CORPORATE TORT,  NO CAUSE OF ACTION FOR BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY AGAINST INDIVIDUAL COOPERATIVE BOARD MEMBERS, MEMBERS OF THE BOARD DID NOT PARTICIPATE IN A CORPORATE TORT (FIRST DEPT))

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THERE ARE QUESTIONS OF FACT WHETHER THE BROKER REPRESENTED BOTH SELLERS AND BUYER WITHOUT DISCLOSING THE DUAL REPRESENTATION, A BREACH OF A FIDUCIARY DUTY, AND THERE ARE QUESTIONS OF FACT WHETHER THE SELLERS WERE FRAUDULENTLY INDUCED BY THE BROKER TO ENTER THE PURCHASE AGREEMENT, BROKER’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined there was a question of fact whether defendant real estate broker, JRMR, breached a fiduciary duty owed to the sellers of real property, and whether JRMR fraudulently induced the sellers to enter the purchase agreement. Although JRMR represented the sellers, emails between JRMR and the buyer raised a question of fact whether JRMR was acting on behalf of both the buyer and the sellers without disclosing the dual representation (a breach of a fiduciary duty):

It is well settled that, “because of a broker’s fiduciary duties, he [or she] has the affirmative duty not to act for a party whose interests are adverse to those of the principal, unless he [or she] has the consent of the principal given after full knowledge of the facts . . . Accordingly, he [or she] cannot act as agent for both seller and purchaser of property in a real estate transaction” … . “Where a broker’s interests or loyalties are divided due to . . . [the] representation of multiple parties, the broker must disclose to the principal . . . the material facts illuminating the broker’s divided loyalties”… . Indeed, “[a] failure to disclose any interest tending to influence the [broker] . . . constitutes a breach of [the broker’s] fiduciary obligation and precludes [the broker] from recovering for services rendered” … . * * *

… [The sellers’] evidence raised issues of fact whether [the broker] made misrepresentations to them concerning the value of their properties and the willingness of [the buyer] to purchase different property, and whether [the broker] knew of the falsity of those statements and made them with the intent to induce [the sellers’] reliance on them. [The sellers] also submitted evidence raising triable issues of fact whether they justifiably relied on [the broker’s] misrepresentations and suffered damages as a result. Northland E., LLC v J.R. Militello Realty, Inc., 2018 NY Slip Op 05078, Fourth Dept 7-6-18

​REAL ESTATE (THERE ARE QUESTIONS OF FACT WHETHER THE BROKER REPRESENTED BOTH SELLERS AND BUYER WITHOUT DISCLOSING THE DUAL REPRESENTATION, A BREACH OF A FIDUCIARY DUTY, AND THERE ARE QUESTIONS OF FACT WHETHER THE SELLERS WERE FRAUDULENTLY INDUCED BY THE BROKER TO ENTER THE PURCHASE AGREEMENT, BROKER’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FOURTH DEPT))/FRAUD (REAL ESTATE, THERE ARE QUESTIONS OF FACT WHETHER THE BROKER REPRESENTED BOTH SELLERS AND BUYER WITHOUT DISCLOSING THE DUAL REPRESENTATION, A BREACH OF A FIDUCIARY DUTY, AND THERE ARE QUESTIONS OF FACT WHETHER THE SELLERS WERE FRAUDULENTLY INDUCED BY THE BROKER TO ENTER THE PURCHASE AGREEMENT, BROKER’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FOURTH DEPT))/BROKERS (REAL ESTATE, THERE ARE QUESTIONS OF FACT WHETHER THE BROKER REPRESENTED BOTH SELLERS AND BUYER WITHOUT DISCLOSING THE DUAL REPRESENTATION, A BREACH OF A FIDUCIARY DUTY, AND THERE ARE QUESTIONS OF FACT WHETHER THE SELLERS WERE FRAUDULENTLY INDUCED BY THE BROKER TO ENTER THE PURCHASE AGREEMENT, BROKER’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FOURTH DEPT))/FIDUCIARY DUTY (REAL ESTATE, BROKERS, THERE ARE QUESTIONS OF FACT WHETHER THE BROKER REPRESENTED BOTH SELLERS AND BUYER WITHOUT DISCLOSING THE DUAL REPRESENTATION, A BREACH OF A FIDUCIARY DUTY, AND THERE ARE QUESTIONS OF FACT WHETHER THE SELLERS WERE FRAUDULENTLY INDUCED BY THE BROKER TO ENTER THE PURCHASE AGREEMENT, BROKER’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FOURTH DEPT))

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SIX YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS FOR FRAUD APPLIES TO A CONVERSION ACTION, ALTHOUGH THE FRAUD BEGAN IN 1998 PLAINTIFF COULD NOT HAVE BECOME AWARE OF IT UNTIL 2013, PLAINTIFF’S ACTION IS TIMELY (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined plaintiff’s action for conversion and breach of a fiduciary duty was timely. Plaintiff was the beneficiary of a structured settlement with payments which were to begin in 1998 and continue for the rest of his life. Defendant, who was the custodian of the structured settlement while plaintiff was minor, did not inform the plaintiff of the settlement and used the funds for her own purposes. The Second Department held that conversion sounds in fraud. Therefore the six-year statute of limitations applied and the statute did not begin to run until plaintiff became aware of fraud in 2013:

Contrary to the defendant’s contentions, since the cause of action for conversion is based upon fraud, it is governed by the statute of limitations period for fraud set forth in CPLR 213(8) … . The limitations period for fraud under CPLR 213(8) also applies to the breach of fiduciary duty causes of action inasmuch as the allegations of fraud are essential to those claims … .

Pursuant to CPLR 213(8), “the time within which the action must be commenced shall be the greater of six years from the date the cause of action accrued or two years from the time the plaintiff or the person under whom the plaintiff claims discovered the fraud, or could with reasonable diligence have discovered it.” “A cause of action based upon fraud accrues, for statute of limitations purposes, at the time the plaintiff possesses knowledge of facts from which the fraud could have been discovered with reasonable diligence'” … .

Here, the plaintiff established that he could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered the fraud until 2013, when he learned for the first time that he was the beneficiary of a structured settlement from which he was entitled to receive millions of dollars in monthly and periodic lump-sum payments. Monteleone v Monteleone, 2018 NY Slip Op 04317, Second Dept 6-13-18

​FRAUD (STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS, SIX YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS FOR FRAUD APPLIES TO A CONVERSION ACTION, ALTHOUGH THE FRAUD BEGAN IN 1998 PLAINTIFF COULD NOT HAVE BECOME AWARE OF IT UNTIL 2013, PLAINTIFF’S ACTION IS TIMELY (SECOND DEPT))/CONVERSION  (STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS, SIX YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS FOR FRAUD APPLIES TO A CONVERSION ACTION, ALTHOUGH THE FRAUD BEGAN IN 1998 PLAINTIFF COULD NOT HAVE BECOME AWARE OF IT UNTIL 2013, PLAINTIFF’S ACTION IS TIMELY (SECOND DEPT))/CIVIL PROCEDURE (STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS, FRAUD, CONVERSION, SIX YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS FOR FRAUD APPLIES TO A CONVERSION ACTION, ALTHOUGH THE FRAUD BEGAN IN 1998 PLAINTIFF COULD NOT HAVE BECOME AWARE OF IT UNTIL 2013, PLAINTIFF’S ACTION IS TIMELY (SECOND DEPT))/STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS (FRAUD, CONVERSION, SIX YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS FOR FRAUD APPLIES TO A CONVERSION ACTION, ALTHOUGH THE FRAUD BEGAN IN 1998 PLAINTIFF COULD NOT HAVE BECOME AWARE OF IT UNTIL 2013, PLAINTIFF’S ACTION IS TIMELY (SECOND DEPT))/FRAUD (STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS, CONVERSION, SIX YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS FOR FRAUD APPLIES TO A CONVERSION ACTION, ALTHOUGH THE FRAUD BEGAN IN 1998 PLAINTIFF COULD NOT HAVE BECOME AWARE OF IT UNTIL 2013, PLAINTIFF’S ACTION IS TIMELY (SECOND DEPT))/CONVERSION (STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS, FRAUD,  SIX YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS FOR FRAUD APPLIES TO A CONVERSION ACTION, ALTHOUGH THE FRAUD BEGAN IN 1998 PLAINTIFF COULD NOT HAVE BECOME AWARE OF IT UNTIL 2013, PLAINTIFF’S ACTION IS TIMELY (SECOND DEPT))/CPLR 213 (STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS, FRAUD, CONVERSION, SIX YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS FOR FRAUD APPLIES TO A CONVERSION ACTION, ALTHOUGH THE FRAUD BEGAN IN 1998 PLAINTIFF COULD NOT HAVE BECOME AWARE OF IT UNTIL 2013, PLAINTIFF’S ACTION IS TIMELY (SECOND DEPT))

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AN ACTION AGAINST A NOT FOR PROFIT CORPORATION FOR BREACH OF A FIDUCIARY DUTY MUST ALLEGE THE FAILURE TO ACT IN GOOD FAITH ON BEHALF OF THE CORPORATION OR ITS MEMBERS, NOT, AS HERE, THE FAILURE TO ACT IN A MEMBER’S PERSONAL BEST INTEREST (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department noted that an action against a not for profit corporation (here a yacht club) for breach of a fiduciary duty must allege the failure to act in good faith on behalf of the corporation or its members, not the failure to act in good faith in a member’s (plaintiff’s) personal best interest. The board had excluded plaintiff’s domestic partner, who was not a member, from the club:

The elements of a cause of action to recover damages for breach of fiduciary duty are (1) the existence of a fiduciary relationship, (2) misconduct by the defendant, and (3) damages directly caused by the defendant’s misconduct … . The directors of a not-for-profit corporation like the Club “have the fiduciary obligation to act on behalf of the corporation in good faith and with reasonable care so as to protect and advance its interests” … . Here, however, the complaint did not allege that the Club defendants failed to act in good faith on behalf of the Club or its members’ collective interests, but merely alleged that they failed to act in [plaintiff’s] personal best interest … . Accordingly, the complaint did not state a cause of action to recover damages for breach of fiduciary duty. Nachbar v Cornwall Yacht Club, 2018 NY Slip Op 02795, Second Dept 4-25-18

​CORPORATION LAW (AN ACTION AGAINST A NOT FOR PROFIT CORPORATION FOR BREACH OF A FIDUCIARY DUTY MUST ALLEGE THE FAILURE TO ACT IN GOOD FAITH ON BEHALF OF THE CORPORATION OR ITS MEMBERS, NOT, AS HERE, THE FAILURE TO ACT IN A MEMBER’S PERSONAL BEST INTEREST (SECOND DEPT))/NOT FOR PROFIT CORPORATION (AN ACTION AGAINST A NOT FOR PROFIT CORPORATION FOR BREACH OF A FIDUCIARY DUTY MUST ALLEGE THE FAILURE TO ACT IN GOOD FAITH ON BEHALF OF THE CORPORATION OR ITS MEMBERS, NOT, AS HERE, THE FAILURE TO ACT IN A MEMBER’S PERSONAL BEST INTEREST (SECOND DEPT))/YACHT CLUB (CORPORATION LAW, AN ACTION AGAINST A NOT FOR PROFIT CORPORATION FOR BREACH OF A FIDUCIARY DUTY MUST ALLEGE THE FAILURE TO ACT IN GOOD FAITH ON BEHALF OF THE CORPORATION OR ITS MEMBERS, NOT, AS HERE, THE FAILURE TO ACT IN A MEMBER’S PERSONAL BEST INTEREST (SECOND DEPT)/FIDUCIARY DUTY (CORPORATION LAW, AN ACTION AGAINST A NOT FOR PROFIT CORPORATION FOR BREACH OF A FIDUCIARY DUTY MUST ALLEGE THE FAILURE TO ACT IN GOOD FAITH ON BEHALF OF THE CORPORATION OR ITS MEMBERS, NOT, AS HERE, THE FAILURE TO ACT IN A MEMBER’S PERSONAL BEST INTEREST (SECOND DEPT))

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FORUM SELECTION CLAUSE APPLIES TO NONSIGNATORY ATTORNEY BASED UPON ATTORNEY’S RELATIONSHIP WITH THE PARTIES, PARTIES’ FAILURE TO CAREFULLY READ THE AGREEMENTS BLAMED ON ATTORNEY’S FRAUDULENT ASSURANCES, FRAUD, FRAUD IN THE INDUCEMENT, BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY AND BREACH OF CONTRACT ALLEGATIONS AGAINST ATTORNEY STATED CAUSES OF ACTION (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department determined the defendants’ counterclaims against their attorney, David, stated causes of action for fraud, fraud in the inducement, breach of fiduciary duty and breach of contract. Defendants alleged that David’s assurances led defendants to sign joint venture agreements to their detriment without carefully reading them. The court noted that, although David was not a signatory to the agreements, the forum selection clauses applied to him because of his relationship with the defendants, as expressed in an email:

The allegations of the complaint state a cause of action for fraudulent inducement … . The well settled principle relied on by David that a party claiming fraudulent inducement cannot be said to have justifiably relied on a representation negated by the plain terms of the contract they signed does not apply here, since his alleged assurances and fraud were the very cause of defendants’ failure to review the documents carefully. As it was reasonable for defendants to rely on the advice of counsel, we also reject David’s arguments premised on the plain language of the agreements that defendants admit they did not read carefully.

Defendants’ allegations describing their attorney-client relationship with David state a cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty. For example, they allege that he served as their attorney for years, both before and during the instant transaction, negotiating unrelated contracts and handling unrelated lawsuits and trusts and estates matters.

While in support of the fraudulent inducement claim defendants allege that the agreements were “brought about by fraud,” because, inter alia, David held himself out as their attorney and caused them to sign unfavorable agreements that he drafted, in contrast, in support of the fraud claim defendants focus on events following the execution of the agreements, namely, David’s “scheme to manufacture a bogus default” of the loan so as to seize valuable collateral without paying for it. These allegations state a cause of action for fraud … . Suttongate Holdings Ltd. v Laconm Mgt. N.V., 2018 NY Slip Op 02424, First Dept 4-10-18

​FRAUD (FORUM SELECTION CLAUSE APPLIES TO NONSIGNATORY ATTORNEY BASED UPON ATTORNEY’S RELATIONSHIP WITH THE PARTIES, PARTIES’ FAILURE TO CAREFULLY READ THE AGREEMENTS BLAMED ON ATTORNEY’S FRAUDULENT ASSURANCES, FRAUD, FRAUD IN THE INDUCEMENT, BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY AND BREACH OF CONTRACT ALLEGATIONS AGAINST ATTORNEY STATED CAUSES OF ACTION (FIRST DEPT))/CONTRACT LAW (FORUM SELECTION CLAUSE APPLIES TO NONSIGNATORY ATTORNEY BASED UPON ATTORNEY’S RELATIONSHIP WITH THE PARTIES, PARTIES’ FAILURE TO CAREFULLY READ THE AGREEMENTS BLAMED ON ATTORNEY’S FRAUDULENT ASSURANCES, FRAUD, FRAUD IN THE INDUCEMENT, BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY AND BREACH OF CONTRACT ALLEGATIONS AGAINST ATTORNEY STATED CAUSES OF ACTION (FIRST DEPT))/FORUM SELECTION CLAUSE (FORUM SELECTION CLAUSE APPLIES TO NONSIGNATORY ATTORNEY BASED UPON ATTORNEY’S RELATIONSHIP WITH THE PARTIES, PARTIES’ FAILURE TO CAREFULLY READ THE AGREEMENTS BLAMED ON ATTORNEY’S FRAUDULENT ASSURANCES, FRAUD, FRAUD IN THE INDUCEMENT, BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY AND BREACH OF CONTRACT ALLEGATIONS AGAINST ATTORNEY STATED CAUSES OF ACTION (FIRST DEPT))/ATTORNEYS  (FORUM SELECTION CLAUSE APPLIES TO NONSIGNATORY ATTORNEY BASED UPON ATTORNEY’S RELATIONSHIP WITH THE PARTIES, PARTIES’ FAILURE TO CAREFULLY READ THE AGREEMENTS BLAMED ON ATTORNEY’S FRAUDULENT ASSURANCES, FRAUD, FRAUD IN THE INDUCEMENT, BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY AND BREACH OF CONTRACT ALLEGATIONS AGAINST ATTORNEY STATED CAUSES OF ACTION (FIRST DEPT))/FIDUCIARY DUTY, BREACH OF (ATTORNEYS, FORUM SELECTION CLAUSE APPLIES TO NONSIGNATORY ATTORNEY BASED UPON ATTORNEY’S RELATIONSHIP WITH THE PARTIES, PARTIES’ FAILURE TO CAREFULLY READ THE AGREEMENTS BLAMED ON ATTORNEY’S FRAUDULENT ASSURANCES, FRAUD, FRAUD IN THE INDUCEMENT, BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY AND BREACH OF CONTRACT ALLEGATIONS AGAINST ATTORNEY STATED CAUSES OF ACTION (FIRST DEPT))

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ALTHOUGH THE COMPLAINT BY SHAREHOLDERS AGAINST DIRECTORS DID NOT SUFFICIENTLY ALLEGE THE BREACH OF A FIDUCIARY DUTY, IT DID ALLEGE A BREACH OF THE SUFFICIENT INFORMATION DUTY (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, modifying Supreme Court, determined that, although it did not sufficiently allege the breach of a fiduciary duty, the complaint by shareholders alleged the breach of the “sufficient information duty” owed to shareholders by the directors:

The complaint … fails to allege “a special factual relationship between the directors and the shareholders … bring[ing] the directors of the company into direct and close contact with the shareholders in a manner capable of generating fiduciary obligations” with regard to either the dividend policy that is the subject of the third cause of action or the merger transaction that is the subject of the fourth cause of action … .

However, to the extent the director defendants gave shareholders an information statement providing information and recommendations about the merger transaction, they owed the shareholders a “sufficient information duty” … . This is not a duty of loyalty, which would require the directors to subordinate their interests to the shareholders’ interests, but “if [the directors] are going to invite the shareholders to a meeting, common fairness requires that they explain what the purpose of the meeting is” in a “clear and comprehensible” manner … .

The complaint alleges that the information statement failed to disclose that two directors on the special committee negotiating merger terms had ties to the investor defendants, who proposed the merger, that it failed to disclose any details about the search for alternate proposals, which was illusory, that it failed to provide a meaningful valuation of ordinary shares using industry standards for the insurance business, and that it failed to disclose the impact on the stock value of a parallel bond transaction. Moreover, the complaint alleges that, while the information statement warned that the investor defendants could wipe out the ordinary shareholders by redeeming their convertible cumulative preferred participating shares, it misrepresented the likelihood of that occurrence. Davis v Scottish Re Group Ltd., 2018 NY Slip Op 01867, First Dept 3-20-18

CORPORATION LAW (ALTHOUGH THE COMPLAINT BY SHAREHOLDERS AGAINST DIRECTORS DID NOT SUFFICIENTLY ALLEGE THE BREACH OF A FIDUCIARY DUTY, IT DID ALLEGE A BREACH OF THE SUFFICIENT INFORMATION DUTY (FIRST DEPT))/SHAREHOLDERS (CORPORATION LAW, ALTHOUGH THE COMPLAINT BY SHAREHOLDERS AGAINST DIRECTORS DID NOT SUFFICIENTLY ALLEGE THE BREACH OF A FIDUCIARY DUTY, IT DID ALLEGE A BREACH OF THE SUFFICIENT INFORMATION DUTY (FIRST DEPT))/DIRECTORS (CORPORATION LAW, ALTHOUGH THE COMPLAINT BY SHAREHOLDERS AGAINST DIRECTORS DID NOT SUFFICIENTLY ALLEGE THE BREACH OF A FIDUCIARY DUTY, IT DID ALLEGE A BREACH OF THE SUFFICIENT INFORMATION DUTY (FIRST DEPT))/SUFFICIENT INFORMATION DUTY (CORPORATION LAW, ALTHOUGH THE COMPLAINT BY SHAREHOLDERS AGAINST DIRECTORS DID NOT SUFFICIENTLY ALLEGE THE BREACH OF A FIDUCIARY DUTY, IT DID ALLEGE A BREACH OF THE SUFFICIENT INFORMATION DUTY (FIRST DEPT))

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ALL RISK ARTWORK INSURANCE DID NOT COVER DEFECTIVE TITLE, ALLEGATIONS DID NOT DEMONSTRATE A FIDUCIARY RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INSURED AND BROKERS (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department determined an all-risk artwork insurance policy did not cover contractual liability to purchasers of stolen art which was returned to the owner. In addition, the court determined the allegations in the complaint against the insurance brokers were insufficient to allege a fiduciary relationship:

“[D]efective title is clearly not a physical loss or damage . . . from any external cause” … . Despite the fact that the phrase “loss or damage” in the policy was not qualified by terms such as “direct” or “physical,” “[w]e may not, under the guise of strict construction, rewrite a policy to bind the insurer to a risk that it did not contemplate and for which it has not been paid” … . “Title insurance has been regarded as a separate type of contract not falling within any of the three basic classes of insurance. . . . It is not reasonable to interpret a policy so broadly that it becomes another type of policy altogether” … . …

The … causes of action, against the insurance broker defendants, were properly dismissed, with leave to replead  … for a “special relationship” with the broker defendants … . “Although the parties’ relationship lasted a considerable period of time and defendant [broker] assured plaintiff that his insurance needs were being met, these circumstances are not so exceptional as to support imposition of a fiduciary duty upon defendant”… . A longstanding relationship alone is insufficient to establish a special relationship between plaintiff and the broker defendants. Dae Assoc., LLC v AXA Art Ins. Corp., 2018 NY Slip Op 01026, First Dept 2-13-18

INSURANCE LAW (ALL RISK ARTWORK INSURANCE DID NOT COVER DEFECTIVE TITLE, ALLEGATIONS DID NOT DEMONSTRATE A FIDUCIARY RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INSURED AND BROKERS (FIRST DEPT))/ARTWORK, STOLEN (INSURANCE LAW, STOLEN ARTWORK, ALL RISK ARTWORK INSURANCE DID NOT COVER DEFECTIVE TITLE, ALLEGATIONS DID NOT DEMONSTRATE A FIDUCIARY RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INSURED AND BROKERS (FIRST DEPT))/BROKERS (INSURANCE LAW, ALL RISK ARTWORK INSURANCE DID NOT COVER DEFECTIVE TITLE, ALLEGATIONS DID NOT DEMONSTRATE A FIDUCIARY RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INSURED AND BROKERS (FIRST DEPT))/FIDUCIARY DUTY (INSURANCE LAW, BROKERS, ALL RISK ARTWORK INSURANCE DID NOT COVER DEFECTIVE TITLE, ALLEGATIONS DID NOT DEMONSTRATE A FIDUCIARY RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INSURED AND BROKERS (FIRST DEPT))/TITLE (INSURANCE LAW, STOLEN ARTWORK, ALL RISK ARTWORK INSURANCE DID NOT COVER DEFECTIVE TITLE, ALLEGATIONS DID NOT DEMONSTRATE A FIDUCIARY RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INSURED AND BROKERS (FIRST DEPT))/SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP (INSURANCE LAW, BROKERS, ALL RISK ARTWORK INSURANCE DID NOT COVER DEFECTIVE TITLE, ALLEGATIONS DID NOT DEMONSTRATE A FIDUCIARY RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INSURED AND BROKERS (FIRST DEPT))

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