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LEAVING A 16 MONTH OLD CHILD UNATTENDED IN A BATHTUB WITH FOUR INCHES OF WATER CONSTITUTED NEGLECT, FAMILY COURT REVERSED (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing Family Court, determined mother’s leaving unattended for several minutes a 16-month-old child in a bathtub with four inches of water constituted neglect. The child drowned:

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In our view, this evidence was more than sufficient to establish a prima facie case of neglect. Fundamentally, a reasonably prudent person would not leave a 16-month-old child unattended in a bathtub filled with four inches of water for any appreciable amount of time … . Through her own statement, respondent estimated that she was absent for 1 to 10 minutes. Doing so was “intrinsically dangerous” and has resulted in a heartbreaking tragedy for this family … . Where, as here, a prima facie case has been established, it became respondent’s obligation to offer “a reasonable and adequate explanation for how the child sustained the injury”… . Respondent opted not to testify and did not call any witnesses. Consequently, we conclude on the record before us that the petition should have been granted. Matter of Leah VV. (Theresa WW.), 2018 NY Slip Op 00201, Third Dept 1-11-18

FAMILY LAW (NEGLECT, LEAVING A 16 MONTH OLD CHILD UNATTENDED IN A BATHTUB WITH FOUR INCHES OF WATER CONSTITUTED NEGLECT, FAMILY COURT REVERSED (THIRD DEPT))/NEGLECT (FAMILY LAW, LEAVING A 16 MONTH OLD CHILD UNATTENDED IN A BATHTUB WITH FOUR INCHES OF WATER CONSTITUTED NEGLECT, FAMILY COURT REVERSED (THIRD DEPT))

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NO INTIMATE RELATIONSHIP, FAMILY COURT DID NOT HAVE JURISDICTION IN THIS FAMILY OFFENSE PROCEEDING, EVEN THOUGH THE ORDER OF PROTECTION HAD EXPIRED APPELLATE REVIEW WAS APPROPRIATE BECAUSE OF THE REPUTATIONAL CONSEQUENCES (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Family Court, determined that the appellant did not have an intimate relationship with petitioner and therefore Family Court did not have jurisdiction over the family offense proceeding against appellant and could not issue an order of protection. Even though the order of protection had expired, the continuing reputational consequences of the order of protection justified determining the appeal:

The petitioner is the live-in girlfriend of the appellant's brother. The petitioner and the appellant live in the same building, on different floors. The petitioner filed a family offense petition against the appellant, alleging that she had physically attacked and verbally threatened her. * * *

The Family Court is a court of limited jurisdiction, and “cannot exercise powers beyond those granted to it by statute”… . “Pursuant to Family Court Act § 812(1), the Family Court's jurisdiction in family offense proceedings is limited to certain prescribed criminal acts that occur between spouses or former spouses, or between parent and child or between members of the same family or household'” … . “[M]embers of the same family or household” include, among others, “persons who are not related by consanguinity or affinity and who are or have been in an intimate relationship regardless of whether such persons have lived together at any time” … . Expressly excluded from the ambit of “intimate relationship” are “casual acquaintance[s]” and “ordinary fraternization between two individuals in business or social contexts” … . Beyond those delineated exclusions, what qualifies as an intimate relationship within the meaning of Family Court Act § 812(1)(e) is determined on a case-by-case basis … . Relevant factors include “the nature or type of relationship, regardless of whether the relationship is sexual in nature; the frequency of interaction between the persons; and the duration of the relationship” … .

Here, the parties have no direct relationship and are only connected through a third party, who is the petitioner's live-in boyfriend and the appellant's brother. Additionally, the parties have never resided together and their contact with one another has been purely by happenstance, as they live in the same building. Accordingly, they do not have an intimate relationship within the meaning of Family Court Act § 812(1)(e). Matter of Royster v Murray, 2018 NY Slip Op 00151, Second Dept 1-10-18

FAMILY LAW (NO INTIMATE RELATIONSHIP, FAMILY COURT DID NOT HAVE JURISDICTION IN THIS FAMILY OFFENSE PROCEEDING, EVEN THOUGH THE ORDER OF PROTECTION HAD EXPIRED APPELLATE REVIEW WAS APPROPRIATE BECAUSE OF THE REPUTATIONAL CONSEQUENCES (SECOND DEPT))/FAMILY OFFENSES (FAMILY COURT, NO INTIMATE RELATIONSHIP, FAMILY COURT DID NOT HAVE JURISDICTION IN THIS FAMILY OFFENSE PROCEEDING, EVEN THOUGH THE ORDER OF PROTECTION HAD EXPIRED APPELLATE REVIEW WAS APPROPRIATE BECAUSE OF THE REPUTATIONAL CONSEQUENCES (SECOND DEPT))/INTIMATE RELATIONSHIP (FAMILY COURT, NO INTIMATE RELATIONSHIP, FAMILY COURT DID NOT HAVE JURISDICTION IN THIS FAMILY OFFENSE PROCEEDING, EVEN THOUGH THE ORDER OF PROTECTION HAD EXPIRED APPELLATE REVIEW WAS APPROPRIATE BECAUSE OF THE REPUTATIONAL CONSEQUENCES (SECOND DEPT))/CRIMINAL LAW (FAMILY OFFENSES, NO INTIMATE RELATIONSHIP, FAMILY COURT DID NOT HAVE JURISDICTION IN THIS FAMILY OFFENSE PROCEEDING, EVEN THOUGH THE ORDER OF PROTECTION HAD EXPIRED APPELLATE REVIEW WAS APPROPRIATE BECAUSE OF THE REPUTATIONAL CONSEQUENCES (SECOND DEPT))/APPEALS (FAMILY LAW, FAMILY OFFENSES, ORDER OF PROTECTION, NO INTIMATE RELATIONSHIP, FAMILY COURT DID NOT HAVE JURISDICTION IN THIS FAMILY OFFENSE PROCEEDING, EVEN THOUGH THE ORDER OF PROTECTION HAD EXPIRED APPELLATE REVIEW WAS APPROPRIATE BECAUSE OF THE REPUTATIONAL CONSEQUENCES (SECOND DEPT))/ORDER OF PROTECTION (APPEALS, FAMILY LAW, FAMILY OFFENSES, ORDER OF PROTECTION, NO INTIMATE RELATIONSHIP, FAMILY COURT DID NOT HAVE JURISDICTION IN THIS FAMILY OFFENSE PROCEEDING, EVEN THOUGH THE ORDER OF PROTECTION HAD EXPIRED APPELLATE REVIEW WAS APPROPRIATE BECAUSE OF THE REPUTATIONAL CONSEQUENCES (SECOND DEPT))

PRENUPTIAL AGREEMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN SET ASIDE AS UNCONSCIONABLE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendant-wife's motion to set aside the prenuptial agreement should have been granted:

“An agreement between spouses or prospective spouses should be closely scrutinized, and may be set aside upon a showing that it is unconscionable, or the result of fraud, or where it is shown to be manifestly unfair to one spouse because of overreaching on the part of the other spouse” …  “An agreement is unconscionable if it is one which no person in his or her senses and not under delusion would make on the one hand, and no honest and fair person would accept on the other, the inequality being so strong and manifest as to shock the conscience and confound the judgment of any person of common sense'”… . An agreement that might not have been unconscionable when entered into may become unconscionable at the time a final judgment would be entered … . The burden of proof as to unconscionability is on the party seeking to set aside the agreement … .

Here, contrary to the Supreme Court's determination, the defendant sustained her burden of establishing that the prenuptial agreement was, at the time this action was before the court, unconscionable. Enforcement of the agreement would result in the risk of the defendant's becoming a public charge. The defendant, who is unemployed, largely without assets, and the primary caregiver for the parties' young children, would, under the prenuptial agreement, receive only $20,000, in full satisfaction of all claims, even though the plaintiff earns approximately $300,000 annually as a physician … . Taha v Elzemity, 2018 NY Slip Op 00188, Second Dept 1-10-18

FAMILY LAW (PRENUPTIAL AGREEMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN SET ASIDE AS UNCONSCIONABLE (SECOND DEPT))/PRENUPTIAL AGREEMENT (FAMILY LAW, PRENUPTIAL AGREEMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN SET ASIDE AS UNCONSCIONABLE (SECOND DEPT))/UNCONSCIONABLE (FAMILY LAW, (PRENUPTIAL AGREEMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN SET ASIDE AS UNCONSCIONABLE (SECOND DEPT))/CONTRACT LAW (FAMILY LAW, PRENUPTIAL AGREEMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN SET ASIDE AS UNCONSCIONABLE (SECOND DEPT))

PRIMA FACIE CASE OF NEGLECT BASED UPON MOTHER’S MENTAL CONDITION HAD BEEN MADE OUT, THE NEGLECT PETITION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED, FACT THAT MOTHER HAD NOT BEEN DIAGNOSED AS SUFFERING FROM A MENTAL ILLNESS WAS NOT DISPOSITIVE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Family Court, determined a prima facie showing of neglect based upon mother's mental condition had been made. Therefore mother's motion to dismiss the neglect petition should not have been granted. The court noted that the fact that mother had not been diagnosed as having a mental illness was not dispositive:

… [T]he petitioner presented a prima facie case of neglect. At the fact-finding hearing, the petitioner introduced into evidence a recording of two 911 calls made by the mother's stepdaughter, in which she reported, among other things, that the mother, while holding the child, was hitting and slapping the mother's sister. She further stated that the mother was manic, yelling, throwing things, and getting violent. Additionally, the petitioner presented the testimony of the attending psychiatrist in the emergency room at Queens Hospital Center who, based upon his assessment of the mother's mental condition, found that she was unable to care for the child and ordered her admission into a psychiatric emergency program that requires frequent observation for at least 24 hours. The mother's hospital records, which the petitioner also introduced into evidence, demonstrated that the mother's mental condition, which was described as paranoid, violent, and lacking in insight and impulse control, had not resolved within 24 hours and necessitated her admission into the extended observation unit. Moreover, “[t]he absence of a diagnosed condition does not preclude a finding of neglect” … . Therefore, although the petitioner did not show that the mother had a specific diagnosed mental illness, the petitioner was not required to make such a showing to avoid dismissal…. . Matter of Catalina A. (Evelyn C.), 2018 NY Slip Op 00135, Second Dept 1-10-18

FAMILY LAW (NEGLECT, PRIMA FACIE CASE OF NEGLECT BASED UPON MOTHER'S MENTAL CONDITION HAD BEEN MADE OUT, THE NEGLECT PETITION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED, FACT THAT MOTHER HAD NOT BEEN DIAGNOSED AS SUFFERING FROM A MENTAL ILLNESS WAS NOT DISPOSITIVE (SECOND DEPT))/NEGLECT (FAMILY LAW, PRIMA FACIE CASE OF NEGLECT BASED UPON MOTHER'S MENTAL CONDITION HAD BEEN MADE OUT, THE NEGLECT PETITION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED, FACT THAT MOTHER HAD NOT BEEN DIAGNOSED AS SUFFERING FROM A MENTAL ILLNESS WAS NOT DISPOSITIVE (SECOND DEPT))/MENTAL ILLNESS (FAMILY LAW, NEGLECT, PRIMA FACIE CASE OF NEGLECT BASED UPON MOTHER'S MENTAL CONDITION HAD BEEN MADE OUT, THE NEGLECT PETITION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED, FACT THAT MOTHER HAD NOT BEEN DIAGNOSED AS SUFFERING FROM A MENTAL ILLNESS WAS NOT DISPOSITIVE (SECOND DEPT))

ALTHOUGH FOSTER MOTHER ENTITLED TO FOSTER CARE BENEFITS AT THE EXCEPTIONAL RATE AFTER THE CHILD WAS DIAGNOSED AS AUTISTIC, SHE WAS NOT ENTITLED TO THE EXCEPTIONAL RATE RETROACTIVELY FOR THE PERIOD OF FOSTER CARE BEFORE THE DIAGNOSIS (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department determined petitioner's (foster mother's) application for retroactive foster care benefits at the “exceptional” rate for the period before the child was diagnosed as autistic was properly denied:

The OCFS's [Office of Children and Family Services'] determination that the child did not meet the relevant criteria to qualify for “exceptional” rate foster care payments during the first 22 months she was in the foster mother's care is supported by substantial evidence, and is not arbitrary and capricious. It is undisputed that during this time no qualified psychiatrist or psychologist certified that the child had severe behavioral problems that required high levels of individualized supervision in the home (18 NYCRR 427.6[d][3]), and that no physician had certified that she required around-the-clock care or had been diagnosed by a physician with a qualifying illness such as autism … . The child was diagnosed with autism by a physician, her pediatrician, in July of 2014, and respondents correctly found that she was entitled to exceptional rate benefits following the time she was diagnosed … . In the absence of a diagnosis from the time the child was placed with the foster mother until the time of her diagnosis 22 months later, however, respondents correctly denied the foster mother's application for exceptional rate benefit … . Matter of Pascall v Poole, 2018 NY Slip Op 00099, First Dept 1-9-18

FAMILY LAW (FOSTER CARE, ALTHOUGH FOSTER MOTHER ENTITLED TO FOSTER CARE BENEFITS AT THE EXCEPTIONAL RATE AFTER THE CHILD WAS DIAGNOSED AS AUTISTIC, SHE WAS NOT ENTITLED TO THE EXCEPTIONAL RATE RETROACTIVELY FOR THE PERIOD OF FOSTER CARE BEFORE THE DIAGNOSIS (FIRST DEPT))/FOSTER CARE ( ALTHOUGH FOSTER MOTHER ENTITLED TO FOSTER CARE BENEFITS AT THE EXCEPTIONAL RATE AFTER THE CHILD WAS DIAGNOSED AS AUTISTIC, SHE WAS NOT ENTITLED TO THE EXCEPTIONAL RATE RETROACTIVELY FOR THE PERIOD OF FOSTER CARE BEFORE THE DIAGNOSIS (FIRST DEPT))/AUTISM (FAMILY LAW, FOSTER CARE, ALTHOUGH FOSTER MOTHER ENTITLED TO FOSTER CARE BENEFITS AT THE EXCEPTIONAL RATE AFTER THE CHILD WAS DIAGNOSED AS AUTISTIC, SHE WAS NOT ENTITLED TO THE EXCEPTIONAL RATE RETROACTIVELY FOR THE PERIOD OF FOSTER CARE BEFORE THE DIAGNOSIS (FIRST DEPT))/EXCEPTIONAL RATE (FOSTER CARE BENEFITS, AUTISM, ALTHOUGH FOSTER MOTHER ENTITLED TO FOSTER CARE BENEFITS AT THE EXCEPTIONAL RATE AFTER THE CHILD WAS DIAGNOSED AS AUTISTIC, SHE WAS NOT ENTITLED TO THE EXCEPTIONAL RATE RETROACTIVELY FOR THE PERIOD OF FOSTER CARE BEFORE THE DIAGNOSIS (FIRST DEPT))

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PLAINTIFF AND HIS ATTORNEY EACH SANCTIONED $5000 FOR FRIVOLOUS ACTION AND APPEAL (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department imposed $5000 sanctions (each) upon plaintiff and his attorney in this matrimonial matter. The underlying action attacking a stipulation (which had already been appealed) and the appeal were deemed frivolous:

We grant defendant's request that we impose sanctions upon plaintiff and his counsel (22 NYCRR 130-1.1[a]). The action below, and the appeal before us now, both of which counsel prosecuted, are plainly without merit (22 NYCRR 130-1.1[c][1]). Moreover, this appeal constitutes plaintiff's third unsuccessful challenge in this Court to the stipulation of settlement, which the parties entered into in 2012 … . In our 2016 decision and order, which affirmed, inter alia, an award of counsel fees to defendant, we held that the award was proper based in part on plaintiff's “multiple, unsuccessful attempts to void or rescind the support provisions contained in the stipulation” … . Where a matrimonial litigant engages in a “relentless campaign to prolong th[e] litigation,” sanctions in this Court are appropriate … . Sonkin v Sonkin, 2018 NY Slip Op 00011, First Dept 1-2-18

ATTORNEYS (PLAINTIFF AND HIS ATTORNEY EACH SANCTIONED $5000 FOR FRIVOLOUS ACTION AND APPEAL (FIRST DEPT))/APPEALS (FRIVOLOUS, PLAINTIFF AND HIS ATTORNEY EACH SANCTIONED $5000 FOR FRIVOLOUS ACTION AND APPEAL (FIRST DEPT))/SANCTIONS (FRIVOLOUS ACTION AND APPEAL, (PLAINTIFF AND HIS ATTORNEY EACH SANCTIONED $5000 FOR FRIVOLOUS ACTION … ND APPEAL (FIRST DEPT))/FAMILY LAW (SANCTIONS, PLAINTIFF AND HIS ATTORNEY EACH SANCTIONED $5000 FOR FRIVOLOUS ACTION AND APPEAL (FIRST DEPT))

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ALTHOUGH THE FINDING MOTHER WAS MENTALLY ILL WAS NOT APPEALABLE AS OF RIGHT, BECAUSE OF THE STIGMA THE COURT DEEMED THE NOTICE OF APPEAL TO BE A REQUEST FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL AND HEARD THE APPEAL (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department noted that a finding mother is mentally ill within the meaning of the Social Services Law is not, as a nondispositional order, appealable as of right. However, because of the stigma attached to the finding, the court deemed the notice of appeal to be a request for leave to appeal and granted it. The mental illness finding was affirmed:

Although this nondispositional order is not appealable as of right (see Family Ct Act § 1112[a]), the finding that the mother is mentally ill within the meaning of Social Services Law § 384-b constitutes a permanent and significant stigma that might impact her status in future proceedings … . Accordingly, the Court, on its own motion, deems the notice of appeal to be a request for leave to appeal, and hereby grants leave to appeal … . Matter of Chad Nasir S. (Charity Simone S.), 2018 NY Slip Op 00026, First Dept 1-2-18

APPEALS (FAMILY LAW, SOCIAL SERVICES LAW, ALTHOUGH THE FINDING MOTHER WAS MENTALLY ILL WAS NOT APPEALABLE AS OF RIGHT, BECAUSE OF THE STIGMA THE COURT DEEMED THE NOTICE OF APPEAL TO BE A REQUEST FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL AND HEARD THE APPEAL (FIRST DEPT))/FAMILY LAW (APPEALS, SOCIAL SERVICES LAW, ALTHOUGH THE FINDING MOTHER WAS MENTALLY ILL WAS NOT APPEALABLE AS OF RIGHT, BECAUSE OF THE STIGMA THE COURT DEEMED THE NOTICE OF APPEAL TO BE A REQUEST FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL AND HEARD THE APPEAL (FIRST DEPT))/MENTAL ILLNESS (APPEALS, FAMILY LAW, ALTHOUGH THE FINDING MOTHER WAS MENTALLY ILL WAS NOT APPEALABLE AS OF RIGHT, BECAUSE OF THE STIGMA THE COURT DEEMED THE NOTICE OF APPEAL TO BE A REQUEST FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL AND HEARD THE APPEAL (FIRST DEPT))/SOCIAL SERVICES LAW (APPEALS, MENTAL ILLNESS, FAMILY LAW, ALTHOUGH THE FINDING MOTHER WAS MENTALLY ILL WAS NOT APPEALABLE AS OF RIGHT, BECAUSE OF THE STIGMA THE COURT DEEMED THE NOTICE OF APPEAL TO BE A REQUEST FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL AND HEARD THE APPEAL (FIRST DEPT))

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ADMISSION AND ALLOCUTION DID NOT MEET THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE FAMILY COURT ACT, JUVENILE DELINQUENCY PETITION DISMISSED (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, dismissing the juvenile delinquency petition, determined the juvenile’s admission to endangering the welfare of a child did not meet the criteria required by the Family Court Act:

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Family Court “shall not consent to the entry of an admission unless it advises the respondent of his or her right to a fact-finding hearing and, further, ascertains through allocution of the respondent and his or her parent that the respondent committed the acts underlying the admission, is voluntarily waiving a fact-finding hearing and is aware of the possible specific dispositional orders” … . Even though Family Court partially complied with Family Ct Act § 321.3, we agree with respondent that the allocution was insufficient overall … .

At the hearing, Family Court merely asked respondent whether he “engaged in conduct that was likely to pose a risk of injury to a child.” Although Family Court specified the date and the location of the alleged crime, the court did not mention any other specific underlying fact forming the basis of the alleged crime… .. As such, Family Court did not “elicit a sufficient factual basis to support respondent’s admission” … . Furthermore, while Family Court advised respondent of his right to a hearing and his right to remain silent, the record does not indicate that respondent was advised of his right to present witnesses on his behalf, his right to confront witnesses and that the presentment agency had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he committed the alleged act, which if committed by an adult, would constitute a crime … . Nor do we find that merely asking respondent’s mother as to whether respondent’s admission to the charge of endangering the welfare of the child was done with her approval constituted a sufficient allocution of respondent’s parent as required by Family Ct § 321.3 (1) … . Matter of Kameron Vv., 2017 NY Slip Op 09215, Third Dept 12-28-17

FAMILY LAW (JUVENILE DELINQUENCY, ADMISSION AND ALLOCUTION DID NOT MEET THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE FAMILY COURT ACT, JUVENILE DELINQUENCY PETITION DISMISSED (THIRD DEPT))/JUVENILE DELINQUENCY (FAMILY LAW, ADMISSION AND ALLOCUTION DID NOT MEET THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE FAMILY COURT ACT, JUVENILE DELINQUENCY PETITION DISMISSED (THIRD DEPT))/CRIMINAL LAW (JUVENILE DELINQUENCY, FAMILY LAW, ADMISSION AND ALLOCUTION DID NOT MEET THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE FAMILY COURT ACT, JUVENILE DELINQUENCY PETITION DISMISSED (THIRD DEPT))/ADMISSION (JUVENILE DELINQUENCY, FAMILY LAW, ADMISSION AND ALLOCUTION DID NOT MEET THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE FAMILY COURT ACT, JUVENILE DELINQUENCY PETITION DISMISSED (THIRD DEPT))/ALLOCUTION (JUVENILE DELINQUENCY, FAMILY LAW,  ADMISSION AND ALLOCUTION DID NOT MEET THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE FAMILY COURT ACT, JUVENILE DELINQUENCY PETITION DISMISSED (THIRD DEPT))

MOTHER, ALTHOUGH A FIT AND LOVING PARENT, WAS PROPERLY STRIPPED OF LEGAL CUSTODY, DISSENT DISAGREED (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, over a two-justice partial dissent, determined mother was properly stripped of joint legal custody:

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The evidence reveals the parties’ inability to communicate effectively regarding the child. Notwithstanding their numerous discussions, occurring both in court and out of court, the mother continued to undermine the father and to act contrary to his express wishes. The mother testified that she “knew [the father] was not in agreement” with allowing the child’s continued contact with the boy and that she did not make a “joint decision[].” Nonetheless, she unilaterally decided to permit the child to have physical contact with the boy, and to attend the church where he served as her youth leader and his baseball game. She further acknowledged that a message that she had sent to the father “threaten[ed] to file court papers if he didn’t allow [the child] to do what she wanted on his time.” In sum, although the parties are able to communicate, there is scant evidence that the mother is willing to accept or act upon that communication; instead, after speaking with the father, she disregards his requests and opinion regarding essential parenting issues, and fails to acknowledge that it is important to do so.

Upon this record, a sound and substantial basis supports the determination awarding the parents equal shared physical custody and the father sole legal custody, while directing him to “solicit and reasonably consider” the mother’s input regarding any major decisions … . Similarly, the record supports Family Court’s finding that the mother willfully violated the 2011 order by her admitted failure to bring the child to visitation and by her discussion of court proceedings with the child, as well as the court’s bench order by permitting the child to have further contact with the boy and returning her cell phone … .

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From the Dissent:

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As the majority recognizes, the mother and the father were not on the same page regarding the issue of the child’s relationship with the 15-year-old boy and the extent and manner in which she should be disciplined for her alleged transgressions. Nevertheless, this is not a situation where the parties’ joint decision making has so broken down that joint legal custody is no longer feasible … . Indeed, the record established that, despite their significantly different parenting styles, the parties had been successfully following the previous order, communicating in the best interests of the child for several years and operating “in harmony” under the concept of “[my] house, [my] rules, [your] house, [your] rules” — a concept that was, notably, introduced by the father. Matter of Thompson v Wood, 2017 NY Slip Op 09219, Third Dept 12-28-17

 

FAMILY LAW (CUSTODY, MOTHER, ALTHOUGH A FIT AND LOVING PARENT, WAS PROPERLY STRIPPED OF LEGAL CUSTODY, DISSENT DISAGREED (THIRD DEPT))/CUSTODY (FAMILY LAW, LEGAL CUSTODY, MOTHER, ALTHOUGH A FIT AND LOVING PARENT, WAS PROPERLY STRIPPED OF LEGAL CUSTODY, DISSENT DISAGREED (THIRD DEPT))/LEGAL CUSTODY (FAMILY LAW,  MOTHER, ALTHOUGH A FIT AND LOVING PARENT, WAS PROPERLY STRIPPED OF LEGAL CUSTODY, DISSENT DISAGREED (THIRD DEPT))

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FATHER’S VISITATION RIGHTS SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN INDEFINITELY SUSPENDED WITHOUT A HEARING, UNTESTED EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT CONFERENCES NOT SUFFICIENT (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Family Court, determined father’s visitation rights should not have been suspended indefinitely without a hearing. Family Court had relied on untested evidence presented at conferences:

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Generally, where a facially sufficient petition has been filed, modification of a Family Ct Act article 6 custody and visitation order requires a full and comprehensive hearing at which a parent is to be afforded a full and fair opportunity to be heard … . A decision regarding child custody and visitation should be based on admissible evidence … . Here, the Family Court relied on information provided at the court conferences, and the hearsay statements and conclusions of mental health providers whose opinions and credibility were untested by either party … .

Under the circumstances of this case, the Family Court erred when it, without a hearing, in effect, denied the father’s petition for increased visitation and indefinitely suspended his visitation with the child … . Matter of Edmunds v Fortune, 2017 NY Slip Op 09126, Second Dept 12-27-17

 

FAMILY LAW (FATHER’S VISITATION RIGHTS SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN INDEFINITELY SUSPENDED WITHOUT A HEARING, UNTESTED EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT CONFERENCES NOT SUFFICIENT (SECOND DEPT))/EVIDENCE (FAMILY LAW, FATHER’S VISITATION RIGHTS SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN INDEFINITELY SUSPENDED WITHOUT A HEARING, UNTESTED EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT CONFERENCES NOT SUFFICIENT (SECOND DEPT))/VISITATION (FAMILY LAW, FATHER’S VISITATION RIGHTS SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN INDEFINITELY SUSPENDED WITHOUT A HEARING, UNTESTED EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT CONFERENCES NOT SUFFICIENT (SECOND DEPT))

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