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PETITION WAS PROPERLY DISMISSED BECAUSE IT DID NOT DEMONSTRATE SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION ON ITS FACE, BUT BECAUSE THE MERITS WERE NOT ADDRESSED THE PETITION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department determined Family Court properly dismissed a petition because there was no indication that New York had jurisdiction, the petition should not have been dismissed with prejudice because the merits were not reached:

Upon review of the petition, Family Court, sua sponte, found that the children resided in Georgia and dismissed the petition with prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Petitioner appeals.

In his petition, petitioner alleged that respondent is an aunt of the children who obtained temporary guardianship of them following the mother’s death and, further, that the children reside with respondent in Georgia; notably, however, he did not allege that a New York court had made a prior custody determination involving the children, nor did he allege any circumstances involving the children that would support a specific basis for jurisdiction. Thus, the petition fails to allege any facts that would provide New York with jurisdiction to make the determination in this case … and, therefore, Family Court did not err by dismissing this proceeding without a hearing … . However, inasmuch as Family Court dismissed the proceeding for lack of subject matter jurisdiction based solely upon a review of petitioner’s sparse pro se petition and without reaching the merits, it erred in dismissing the proceeding with prejudice … . Matter of David EE. v Laquanna FF., 2019 NY Slip Op 00336, Third Dept 1-17-19

 

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FAMILY COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE ORDERED A GENETIC MARKER TEST WITHOUT A HEARING AND THE CHILD DID NOT RECEIVE ADEQUATE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department determined Family Court should not have ordered a genetic marker paternity test without a hearing and the child did not receive adequate assistance of counsel:

The attorney for the child (hereinafter AFC) informed the court that, through discussions with the grandmother, the AFC learned that the child might also hold a belief that someone else is his father. The record does not give any indication that the AFC discussed with the child his belief as to who his father is. Beyond a few short and scattered statements, there was no substantive evidence or discussion of who has a parent-child relationship with the child and whether, due to equitable estoppel, a genetic marker test would not be in the child’s best interests. The court’s order is reflective of this, as it strictly relates to how the test is to be carried out and contains no case-specific discussion. Accordingly, Family Court did not possess adequate information to determine the child’s best interests and, as such, it erred in ordering genetic marker testing without first conducting a hearing … .

Additionally, we find that the child did not receive the effective assistance of counsel. The record is bereft of evidence indicating that the AFC consulted with the child, who was from 4½ to 6 years old throughout the time of this litigation … . We recognize that such consultation runs the risk of raising parentage concerns not harbored by the child; nevertheless, a patient, careful and nuanced inquiry is not only possible, but necessary … . “Counsel’s failure to consult with and advise the child to the extent of and in a manner consistent with the child’s capabilities constitutes a failure to meet [his or her] essential responsibilities as the [AFC]” … . Inasmuch as consultation with the child and subsequent communication of the child’s position to Family Court are of the utmost importance … , it is clear that the child did not receive meaningful representation … . Matter of Schenectady County Dept. of Social Servs. v Joshua BB., 2019 NY Slip Op 00335, Third Dept 1-17-19

 

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MOTHER’S MOTION TO AMEND FAMILY COURT’S FINDINGS TO ALLOW THE CHILD TO PETITION FOR SPECIAL IMMIGRANT JUVENILE STATUS AFTER THE UNITED STATES CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES NOTIFIED THE CHILD THAT THE FINDINGS DID NOT ADDRESS THE CHILD’S MEMBERSHIP IN THE MS-13 GANG SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DENIED WITHOUT A HEARING (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Family Court, determined mother’s motion to amend the findings made to allow the child to petition for special immigrant juvenile status (SIJS) should not have been denied without a hearing to address the merits. After Family Court had made the required findings, the child submitted an I-360 petition for special immigrant juvenile status to the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS). USCIS notified the child the petition would be denied because of deficiencies in Family Court’s findings, including the failure to consider the child’s alleged involvement with the MS-13 gang. Mother then made a motion to amend the findings but Family Court denied the motion stating that mother failed to state a sufficient reason for the requested amendments:

Given USCIS’s determination, the Family Court, having granted the mother’s guardianship petition in the first instance, should have considered the merits of the subject motion as to whether an amendment of the specific findings order was appropriate, and, if so, amended the specific findings order. Although “[t]his Court’s power to review the evidence is as broad as that of the hearing court, and where . . . the record is sufficiently complete to make our own factual determinations, we may do so” … , here, the record is insufficient to determine whether the Family Court considered the child’s alleged involvement with the MS-13 gang, which would not necessarily preclude a finding that it is not in the child’s best interests to be returned to El Salvador. Consequently, the matter must be remitted to the Family Court … for a hearing on that issue and a new determination thereafter of the mother’s motion, inter alia, to amend the specific findings order … . Matter of Jose S.J. (Veronica E.J.), 2019 NY Slip Op 00275, Second Dept 1-16-19

 

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PETITION SEEKING FINDINGS ALLOWING THE CHILD TO APPLY FOR SPECIAL IMMIGRANT JUVENILE STATUS (SIJS) SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Family Court, determined the petition for findings to enable the child to petition for special immigrant juvenile status (SIJS) should have been granted:

… [R]eunification of the child with her father is not viable due to parental neglect … . The petitioner testified that after the father came to the United States with the child, they lived in the petitioner’s home, during which time the father would “drink every day,” and that the father eventually returned to El Salvador on his own. The petitioner stated in his affidavit in support of his motion that the father’s drinking caused him to become “aggressive,” “[h]e hit doors, walls, and started to yell at all times of the night,” and that the child became “scared of [the father].” Further, the child stated in her affidavit that the father “[drank] to the point that he could not walk,” and testified in court that she did not believe she could live with the father if she returned to El Salvador due to his excessive drinking. Thus, the record demonstrates that the father repeatedly misused alcoholic beverages to the extent of producing a state of intoxication or a “substantial manifestation of irrationality,” triggering a presumption that the child was neglected by the father … . Since the presumption of neglect was not rebutted, the Family Court should have found that reunification of the child with the father was not viable due to parental neglect. The record also supports a finding that it would not be in the child’s best interests to be returned to El Salvador, where gang members had threatened the father in the presence of the child, made the father “complete tasks and favors for them,” and murdered the child’s cousin … . Matter of Agustin E. v Luis A.E.S., 2019 NY Slip Op 00273, Second Dept 1-16-19

 

THE EVIDENCE PROVIDED BY THE THERAPIST THAT THE CHILDREN SUFFERED FROM PTSD, EXPERIENCED TRAUMA, AND EXPRESSED THEIR DESIRE TO STOP SEEING THEIR FATHER, COUPLED WITH THE CHILDREN’S STATEMENTS THAT THEY WITNESSED ABUSE, WARRANTED TERMINATION OF PARENTAL ACCESS WITH FATHER, FAMILY COURT REVERSED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Family Court, determined the evidence demonstrated supervised parental access with father should have been terminated:

According to [Family Court], there was no legal authority to suspend the father’s parental access with the children premised solely on their therapists’ belief that the children witnessed domestic violence and were sexually abused by the father, when no such transgressions had been alleged in the petitions or proven.

A parent’s parental access, even supervised, should not be suspended unless there is substantial evidence that the parental access would be detrimental to the welfare of the child … . The determination to suspend a parent’s parental access is within the sound discretion of the Family Court based upon the best interests of the child, and its determination will not be set aside unless it lacks a sound and substantial basis in the record … .

Here, the Family Court’s determination lacks a sound and substantial basis in the record, which shows that parental access with the father, even if supervised, would not be in the children’s best interests. The uncontroverted evidence established that the children suffered from PTSD, experienced both physical and mental manifestations of trauma when having parental access with the father, and expressed their desire to cease parental access with him. In addition, each child corroborated the other’s statements regarding the abuse they witnessed in the home. Matter of Mia C. (Misael C.), 2019 NY Slip Op 00270, Second Dept 1-16-19

 

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FAMILY COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE REVIEWED THE SUPPORT MAGISTRATE’S NONFINAL ORDER AND GRANTED FATHER’S OBJECTIONS, FATHER’S ARGUMENT THAT HE WOULD NEED TO PAY ATTORNEY’S FEES AND SPEND TIME AWAY FROM WORK TO LITIGATE THE MATTER DID NOT RISE TO THE LEVEL OF IRREPARABLE HARM NEEDED TO JUSTIFY A REVIEW OF A NONFINAL ORDER (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Family Court, determined that father’s objections to the support magistrate’s nonfinal order should have been denied and explained the relevant criteria:

Pursuant to Family Court Act § 439(e), “[s]pecific, written objections to a final order of a support magistrate may be filed by either party with the court within thirty days after receipt of the order.” “[O]bjections from nonfinal orders made by a Support Magistrate are typically not reviewed unless they could lead to irreparable harm” … . Here, the father’s claim that he would be forced to incur attorney fees and spend time away from work litigating a case that would ultimately be dismissed does not rise to the level of irreparable harm  … . Therefore, the Family Court should have denied the father’s objections to the Support Magistrate’s nonfinal order. Matter of Tobing v May, 2019 NY Slip Op 00286, Second Dept 1-16-19

 

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AWARDING FATHER SOLE LEGAL CUSTODY DID NOT HAVE A SOUND AND SUBSTANTIAL BASIS IN THE RECORD, MOTHER’S PETITION FOR SOLE LEGAL CUSTODY SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Family Court, determined that awarding sole legal custody to father did not have a sound and substantial basis in the record and mother’s petition for sole legal custody should have been granted:

“Findings of the Family Court which have a sound and substantial basis in the record are generally entitled to great deference on appeal because any custody determination depends to a great extent on the court’s assessment of the credibility of the witnesses and the character, temperament, and sincerity of the parties”… . “However, an appellate court would be seriously remiss if, simply in deference to the finding of a trial judge, it allowed a custody determination to stand where it lacked a sound and substantial basis in the record” … .

Here, the Family Court’s determination awarding the father sole legal and physical custody of the child does not have a sound and substantial basis in the record. Contrary to the court’s conclusion, the parties had not been sharing custody of the child equally. Instead, the record reflects that the mother had been the child’s primary caregiver for the majority of his life until the court granted the father’s petition and that, at the time of the hearing, the father had the child on certain weekends. The evidence in the record also demonstrates that the court failed to take into consideration the custody arrangement in place at the time of the hearing, or even the 50/50 arrangement which was requested by the father during the proceeding.

Moreover, the record demonstrates that the mother had taken a proactive role in the child’s well being and development, developing well-thought-out plans to address the child’s issues regarding medical care, schooling, and socialization … . At the time of the hearing, the father had no concrete plans for the child’s education, medical care, or social development. Matter of Lintao v Delgado, 2019 NY Slip Op 00125, Second Dept 1-9-19

 

CALCULATION OF ENHANCED EARNING CAPACITY STEMMING FROM A DEGREE EARNED DURING MARRIAGE IN THE CONTEXT OF ALLOCATING MARITAL PROPERTY IN A DIVORCE PROCEEDING EXPLAINED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined Supreme Court property calculated the amount allocated to plaintiff wife for the enhanced earning capacity of defendant husband stemming from his MBA degree earned during the marriage:

The defendant’s MBA degree is marital property subject to equitable distribution in this case… . The value of the MBA degree is measured by the present value of the enhanced earning capacity which it affords the defendant … . The non-titled spouse is required to establish the value of the enhanced earning capacity and demonstrate that the non-titled spouse made a substantial contribution to the acquisition of the degree … .

Where a holder of an advanced degree has already embarked on his or her career and has acquired a history of actual earnings, the theoretical valuation method, which compares the average lifetime earnings of a college graduate against the average lifetime earnings of a person holding the relevant advanced degree, must be discarded in favor of a more pragmatic and individualized analysis based on the titled spouse’s remaining professional earning potential … . Actual earnings, projected over time, are a recognized proxy for the value of a person’s future earning capacity … . The valuation must be founded in economic reality … . Lynch v Lynch, 2019 NY Slip Op 00105, Second Dept 1-9-19

 

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ALLOCUTION CAST DOUBT ABOUT GUILT IN THIS JUVENILE DELINQUENCY PROCEEDING, AN EXCEPTION TO THE PRESERVATION REQUIREMENT FOR APPEAL (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Family Court, determined that the plea allocution was defective in this juvenile delinquency proceeding. The allocution did not support the elements of the charged offense (grand larceny fourth degree if committed by an adult) and the juvenile’s foster care planner was not questioned about the offense, a defect which cannot be waived. Although no motion to withdraw was made, the allocution cast significant doubt about guilt which constitutes an exception to the the preservation requirement for appeal:

The appellant did not move to withdraw his admission on the grounds raised on appeal … . However, this is one of the ” rare case[s] . . . where the [appellant’s] recitation of the facts underlying the crime pleaded to clearly casts significant doubt upon the [appellant’s] guilt,’ [which] fall[s] into the narrow exception to the preservation requirement”… . In addition, the appellant was not required to preserve his contention that the Family Court erred in failing to obtain an allocution from the foster care case planner, since the statutory requirement of such an allocution may not be waived … . * * *

The Family Court did not elicit any additional details concerning the incident in order to clarify how the appellant came to be in possession of the $5 such that it could be concluded that he took it from the boy’s person within the meaning of Penal Law § 155.30(5). Thus, the court “did not elicit a sufficient factual basis to support [the appellant’s] admission'” … .

In addition, the appellant’s admission was defective since his foster care case planner was present, but the Family Court failed to ascertain through allocution of the foster care case planner, as a person legally responsible for the appellant’s care, “that (a) [the appellant] committed the act or acts to which he [was] entering an admission, (b) he [was] voluntarily waiving his right to a fact-finding hearing, and (c) he [was] aware of the possible specific dispositional orders” … . Matter of Richard S., 2019 NY Slip Op 00130, Second Dept 1-9-19

 

FATHER WAS 40 MINUTES LATE FOR A HEARING, FATHER’S PETITION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Family Court, determined father’s petition should not have been dismissed because he was 40 minutes late for a hearing:

… [T]he father explained that he had miscalendared the time of the hearing. Although we are sensitive to the Family Court’s interest in adhering to its time-specific calendaring process, we find that, in light of the relatively short delay, the proceedings that had already taken place on the petition, the absence of prejudice to the mother, and the public policy in favor of resolving cases on the merits, the court improvidently exercised its discretion in denying the father’s objections … . Moreover, the father showed that he had a potentially meritorious petition … . Matter of Pecoraro v Ferraro, 2019 NY Slip Op 00129, Second Dept 1-9-19

 

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