You are here: / Family Law
,

CHILD CONCEIVED WITH AN EGG FROM AN ANONYMOUS DONOR AND CARRIED BY A GESTATIONAL SURROGATE PURSUANT TO AN UNPAID SURROGACY CONTRACT MAY BE ADOPTED BY THE BIOLOGICAL FATHER (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Family Court, determined the biological father of a child conceived with an egg from an anonymous donor and carried by a gestational surrogate can adopt the child. Family Court had held that the unpaid surrogacy contract was against public policy and should not be legitimized by adoption. Family Court also held that a biological father cannot adopt his own child. The Second Department rejected both arguments in an extensive opinion which cannot fairly be summarized here:

While commercial surrogacy contracts subject participants, and those who assist in the formation of such contracts, to civil penalties or felony conviction (see Domestic Relations Law § 123; Social Services Law §§ 374[6]; 389), the only sanction against unpaid surrogacy contracts is to treat them as void and unenforceable (see Domestic Relations Law § 122 …). …

… [T]he fact that a child was born as the result of an unenforceable surrogacy agreement does not foreclose an adoption of the resulting child, upon the surrogate’s consent … . …

There is nothing in the text of the Domestic Relations Law which precludes a parent from adopting his or her own biological child. While adoption, as we recognized above, is a statutory creation, the adoption sought here is authorized by the governing statute and there is nothing in the statute which precludes it. Further, to the extent that the Legislature has contemplated this subject, it has permitted adoptions notwithstanding an existing biological connection.

Domestic Relations Law § 110 expressly provides that “[a]n adult or minor married couple together may adopt a child of either of them born in or out of wedlock.”  Matter of John (Joseph G.), 2019 NY Slip Op 05132, Second Dept 6-26-17

 

,

FAMILY OFFENSE OF HARASSMENT UPHELD, SEXUAL MISCONDUCT, ASSAULT SECOND AND CRIMINAL OBSTRUCTION OF BREATHING NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, in this Family Law family offense proceeding, determined the evidence supported harassment second, but did not support one count of sexual misconduct, assault in the second degree, or criminal obstruction of breathing or blood circulation. Petitioner admitted that she expected payment for sex and did not demonstrate a lack of consent with respect to one of the sexual misconduct counts. Biting petitioner’s ear during sex did not constitute assault second (teeth being the dangerous instrument). And restricting petitioner’s breathing during sex was not a crime because respondent stopped immediately when petitioner expressed discomfort. With respect to harassment, the court wrote:

The record shows, inter alia, that respondent threatened petitioner that he would take the steps necessary to cause her to lose her immigration status and rights to the child if she stopped prostituting herself to him, thereby evincing respondent’s intent to harass and alarm petitioner (Penal Law § 240.26[3]) and his inducing petitioner to engage in a sexual relationship with him by instilling fear in her … . Matter of Irena K. v Francesco S., 2019 NY Slip Op 05066, First Dept 6-25-19

 

, ,

THE DIVISION OF MARITAL PROPERTY PURSUANT TO A DIVORCE DOES NOT RENDER ONE FORMER SPOUSE THE JUDGMENT DEBTOR OF THE OTHER, THEREFORE A JUDGMENT DEBTOR WHO DOCKETS A JUDGMENT DOES NOT HAVE PRIORITY PURSUANT TO CPLR 5203 OVER A JUDGMENT OF DIVORCE WHICH HAS NOT BEEN DOCKETED (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Wilson, determined the 2015 judgment of divorce which awarded the wife, Andrea, a percentage of marital property, a home worth $5 million, did not make Andrea a judgment creditor such that the failure to docket the judgment of divorce gave priority to a judgment debtor, Pangea, who had docketed a 2016 judgment:

The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has certified the following question to us: “If an entered divorce judgment grants a spouse an interest in real property pursuant to Domestic Relations Law § 236, and the spouse does not docket the divorce judgment in the county where the property is located, is the spouse’s interest subject to attachment by a subsequent judgment creditor that has docketed its judgment and seeks to execute against the property?” We answer that question in the negative. * * *

Pangea’s conception of Andrea as judgment creditor is utterly incompatible with our legislature’s dramatic revision of the Domestic Relations Law in 1980. By incorporating the concept of “marital property” into Domestic Relations Law § 236, “the New York Legislature deliberately went beyond traditional property concepts when it formulated the Equitable Distribution Law” … . … Marital assets are not owned by one spouse or another, and the dissolution of a marriage involving the division of marital assets does not render one ex-spouse the creditor of another. Courts are empowered “not only to make an equitable disposition of marital property between [the spouses], but also to make a distributive award in lieu of or to supplement, facilitate or effectuate the division or distribution of property where authorized in a matrimonial action, and payable in a lump sum or over a period of time” … . …

Andrea therefore cannot properly be considered a judgment creditor of John [her ex-husband]. Thus, CPLR 5203 (a), by its plain terms, has no application here, and Pangea can claim no priority. Pangea Capital Mgt., LLC v Lakian, 2019 NY Slip Op 05059, CtApp 6-25-19

 

,

13-YEAR-OLD WHO, AS A FIRST OFFENSE, PARTICIPATED IN AN ASSAULT (USING A MINI OR SOUVENIR BASEBALL BAT) OF A COUPLE BY HER FATHER AND HER FATHER’S GIRLFRIEND PROPERLY ADJUDICATED A JUVENILE DELINQUENT AND SENTENCED TO A 12-MONTH PERIOD OF PROBATION WITH MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES AND SCHOOL MONITORING, STRONG TWO-JUSTICE DISSENT (FIRST DEPT). ​

The First Department, over an extensive two-justice dissent, determined the juvenile delinquent adjudication, the 12-month probation period, mental health services and school monitoring were appropriate. The dissenters argued an adjournment in contemplation of dismissal (ACD) was the appropriate disposition for this first offense. Appellant was 13 when her father, her father’s girlfriend and an unidentified man assaulted a couple. The father was panhandling in the subway and the couple had allegedly refuse to give the father money. Appellant apparently participated in the assault by striking the woman with a mini or souvenir baseball bat:

Although this was appellant’s first arrest, she was a participant in an unprovoked violent attack on two strangers. There is no dispute that appellant’s father instigated the attack. In the ensuing melee, appellant repeatedly struck the female complainant with a mini or souvenir baseball bat, while the father’s girlfriend continuously punched the complainant. Appellant continued the attack by joining her father and his girlfriend in chasing the two complainants, who were able to seek refuge in a restaurant where they called 911. After the police arrived, the complainants were transported by ambulance to the hospital to be treated for their injuries. The female complainant suffered from anxiety after the attack and continuing to the time of trial, and intended to relocate to another borough as a result of the attack. The dissent parses the incident focusing on the injuries inflicted by appellant, but as part of a group assault she is responsible for the consequences of the attack.

In addition to the seriousness of the offense, the available information supported the conclusions that appellant would benefit from engagement in mental health services and monitoring with regard to her school attendance and her academic performance and that she was in need of a longer period of supervision than the six-month period that an adjournment in contemplation of dismissal would have provided … . We find no abuse of discretion in the decision of the court, which heard the evidence and observed appellant throughout the proceedings. We note that appellant may seek relief from the juvenile delinquent adjudication when she reaches the age of 17 … . Matter of A.V., 2019 NY Slip Op 04996, First Dept 6-20-19

 

, ,

FATHER SHOULD HAVE BEEN GIVEN THE OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD BEFORE THE SUSPENSION OF HIS COMMITMENT TO JAIL FOR NONPAYMENT OF CHILD SUPPORT WAS REVOKED; THE ISSUE IS APPEALABLE EVEN THOUGH FATHER HAS SERVED HIS TERM OF INCARCERATION (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Family Court, determined father should have been given the opportunity to be heard and present witnesses on the issue of whether good cause existed for the revocation of the suspension of his commitment to jail for nonpayment of child support. The court noted that the matter was not academic, even though father has already served his term of incarceration:

… “[D]ue to the enduring consequences which may potentially flow from the revocation of the order suspending the father’s commitment” … , these appeals are not academic, even if the father has served his term of incarceration before the appeals are determined.

Turning to the merits, “[t]he court may suspend an order of commitment upon reasonable conditions and is also authorized to revoke such suspension at any time for good cause shown” (… see Family Ct Act § 455[1]). However, given the liberty interest at stake, the Family Court, before revoking a suspension, must provide to a respondent an opportunity to be heard and to present witnesses on the issue of whether good cause exists to revoke the suspension … . Here, because the father was deprived of this opportunity, we must reverse the orders appealed from and remit the matter to the Family Court, Kings County, for a hearing and a determination thereafter of whether good cause exists to revoke the suspension. Matter of Zhuo Hong Zheng v Hsin Cheng, 2019 NY Slip Op 04958, Second Dept 6-19-19

 

, ,

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE ISSUE OF MOTHER’S NEGLECT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Family Court, determined petitioner’s motion for summary judgment against mother on the issue of neglect should have been denied:

“[I]n an appropriate case, the Family Court may enter a finding of neglect on a summary judgment motion in lieu of holding a fact-finding hearing upon the petitioner’s prima facie showing of neglect as a matter of law and the respondent’s failure to raise a triable issue of fact in opposition to the motion” … . “Summary judgment, of course, may only be granted in any proceeding when it has been clearly ascertained that there is no triable issue of fact outstanding; issue finding, rather than issue determination, is its function” … .

Here, in support of that branch of its motion which was for summary judgment against the mother on the issue of neglect of the subject child, the petitioner included the evidence submitted at a hearing held pursuant to Family Court Act § 1028. At that hearing, the mother, who is deaf and communicated through a sign language interpreter, gave various explanations for the scratches and other marks on the child’s skin. The mother testified that she had difficulty controlling the child, who has been diagnosed with attention deficit hyperactivity disorder and oppositional defiant disorder, and that she accidentally scratched the child while trying to restrain him. Under these circumstances, the evidence at the hearing revealed triable issues of fact as to whether the mother neglected the child. Matter of Joseph Z. (Yola Z.), 2019 NY Slip Op 04957, Second Dept 6-19-19

 

,

MOTHER’S MOTION TO VACATE A FACT-FINDING OF NEGLECT WITHOUT ADMISSION SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Family Court, determined mother’s motion to vacate a neglect fact-finding without admission:

… [T]he mother moved pursuant to Family Court Act § 1061 to vacate so much of the order of fact-finding and disposition as, upon her consent to the entry of an order of fact-finding without admission pursuant to Family Court Act § 1051(a), found that she neglected the children and imposed certain conditions upon her custody of them. The Family Court denied the mother’s motion, and the mother appeals.

Pursuant to Family Court Act § 1061, the Family Court may, for good cause shown, set aside, modify, or vacate any order in the course of a proceeding under article 10 of the Family Court Act … . “As with an initial order, the modified order must reflect a resolution consistent with the best interests of the children after consideration of all relevant circumstances, and must be supported by a sound and substantial basis in the record” … .

Here, the mother demonstrated good cause to vacate so much of the order of fact-finding and disposition as, upon her consent to the entry of an order of fact-finding without admission pursuant to Family Court Act § 1051(a), found that she neglected the children and imposed certain conditions upon her custody of them. The mother demonstrated that she had successfully completed the court-ordered programs, that she had fully complied with the conditions of the order of disposition, and that the requested modification of the order of fact-finding and disposition was in the best interests of the children … . Matter of Emma R. (Evelyn R.), 2019 NY Slip Op 04948, Second Dept 6-19-19

 

, ,

A FAMILY COURT PROCEEDING IS CIVIL IN NATURE AND THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE APPLIES ONLY IN CRIMINAL MATTERS, THEREFORE DOCUMENTS WRITTEN BY A PSYCHIATRIST WHO DID NOT TESTIFY WERE ADMISSIBLE (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department determined father’s right to confront witnesses in this termination-of-parental-rights proceeding was not violated by the admission in evidence of two documents written by a psychiatrist who did not testify. A Family Court proceeding is civil in nature and the Confrontation Clause applies only in criminal matters:

Although the father’s contention is framed in terms of a violation of his right to confront the witnesses against him, “Family Court matters are civil in nature and the Confrontation Clause applies only to criminal matters” … . In addition, while every litigant has a right, guaranteed by the Due Process Clauses of both the Federal and State Constitutions, to confront the witnesses against them … , “this right is not absolute” in civil actions … . The Family Court Act permits the admission of hearsay at dispositional hearings if such evidence is “material and relevant” … . Here, because the father did not object to either the relevancy or materiality of the challenged exhibits, we conclude that the exhibits were properly admitted in evidence … . Matter of Ramon F. (Wilson F.), 2019 NY Slip Op 04852, Fourth Dept 6-14-19

 

,

THE FAMILY OFFENSE PETITION DID NOT ALLEGE ALL THE ELEMENTS OF HARASSMENT SECOND DEGREE AND WAS PROPERLY DISMISSED (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department determined the portion of the family-offense petition which charged harassment in the second degree was properly dismissed because it did not allege all the elements of the offense:

A person commits harassment in the second degree under Penal Law § 240.26 (3) when he or she, “with intent to harass, annoy or alarm another person[,] engages in a course of conduct or repeatedly commits acts which alarm or seriously annoy such other person and which serve no legitimate purpose” … . Thus, “[t]o be viable under the circumstances here, the [petition was] required to allege that respondent[, inter alia,] engaged in a course of conduct that did alarm or seriously annoy petitioner and the conduct served no legitimate purpose” … . Although the petition before us accuses respondent of engaging in a course of conduct that annoyed and alarmed petitioner, nowhere does it allege that respondent’s alleged course of conduct “serve[d] no legitimate purpose” (§ 240.26 [3]). Thus, the petition does not adequately plead an allegation that respondent committed harassment in the second degree under section 240.26 (3), and the court therefore properly dismissed the petition to that extent … . Matter of Rohrback v Monaco, 2019 NY Slip Op 04851, Fourth Dept 6-14-19

 

PETITIONER HAD AN EXTRAMARITAL AFFAIR WITH MOTHER WHO REMAINS MARRIED, PETITION FOR GENETIC TESTING PROPERLY DENIED BASED UPON THE PRESUMPTION OF LEGITIMACY AND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department determined Family Court properly denied the petitioner’s request for genetic testing, citing the presumption of legitimacy and the best interests of the child. Petitioner had an extramarital affair with mother, who remains married:

The testimony at the hearing established that respondents were married at all relevant times, including when the child was conceived and when the child was born. The husband was present at the child’s birth and was named on the child’s birth certificate as the father. Since the birth of the child, who was three years old at the time of the hearing, it is undisputed that the husband has taken an active role as a parent and has developed a strong and loving bond with the child … . The mother testified that she believes the husband to be the child’s biological father and, to date, the husband is the only father that the child has known. Although petitioner’s expert and the school social worker who testified on respondents’ behalf disagreed on the ultimate question of whether genetic testing should be performed, petitioner’s expert specifically qualified his recommendation, stating that, although he believed genetic testing should be performed, he “would not want that to suddenly mean that the child has to find [the results] out” and opined that, to do so at such a young age, would be “ill-advised” and that any such revelation should occur sometime “within [10] years” and “before puberty,” with the aid of “counseling or consultation.” Meanwhile, the social worker opined that, given the child’s young age, it would be confusing, traumatic and potentially disruptive to his development and ability to form proper attachments throughout the rest of his life should such information be revealed at the present time. Family Court also appropriately considered the hostility that petitioner harbors toward respondents in determining that granting petitioner’s application would only serve to create uncertainty and unnecessarily disrupt the child’s otherwise stable, loving and established family dynamic … . Matter of Mario WW. v Kristin XX., 2019 NY Slip Op 04798, Third Dept 6-13-19

 

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy