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Nursing License Not Marital Property/Criteria Explained

The Second Department determined Supreme Court properly found that plaintiff’s nursing license was not marital property.  The Court explained the relevant analytical criteria:

Although the enhanced earnings from academic degrees and professional licenses attained during the marriage are subject to equitable distribution, it is incumbent upon the nontitled party seeking a distributive share of such assets to demonstrate a substantial contribution to the titled party’s acquisition of that marital asset. Where only modest contributions are made by the nontitled spouse toward the other spouse’s attainment of a degree or professional license, and the attainment is more directly the result of the titled spouse’s own ability, tenacity, perseverance and hard work, it is appropriate for courts to limit the distributed amount of that enhanced earning capacity … . Here, there is no evidence that the defendant made a substantial contribution to the plaintiff’s acquisition of her nursing degree. There is no evidence that the defendant made career sacrifices or assumed a disproportionate share of household work as a consequence of the plaintiff’s education; his contributions were minor… . Badwal v Badwal. 2015 NY Slip Op 01910, 2nd Dept 3-11-15

 

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Corroboration Requirements for Child’s Out-of-Court Statements Described

The Second Department agreed with Family Court’s ruling that the child’s out-of-court statements were sufficiently corroborated to be allowed in evidence.  The court explained the analytical criteria:

“A child’s prior out-of-court statements may provide the basis for a finding of abuse, provided that these hearsay statements are corroborated, so as to ensure their reliability'” … . “Any other evidence tending to support the reliability of the previous statements . . . shall be sufficient corroboration” (Family Ct Act § 1046[a][vi]). ” The Family Court has considerable discretion in deciding whether a child’s out-of-court statements alleging incidents of abuse have been reliably corroborated'” … . “The Family Court’s credibility findings must be accorded considerable deference on appeal” … . Matter of Zeeva M. (Abraham M.), 2015 NY Slip Op 01948, 2nd Dept 3-11-15

 

Failure to Cooperate In Formulating Mental Health Treatment Plan for Child Constituted Neglec

The Second Department affirmed Family Court’s finding of neglect based upon the mother’s failure to cooperate in formulating a plan for mental health treatment of the child.  The court explained the analytical criteria:

To establish neglect based upon a parent’s failure to provide adequate medical care, a petitioner must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the child’s physical, mental, or emotional condition has been impaired, or is in imminent danger of becoming impaired, and that the actual or threatened harm to the child is due to the failure of the parent or caretaker to exercise a minimum degree of care in supplying the child with adequate medical care, though financially able to do so (see Family Ct Act §§ 1012[f][i][A]…). A parent’s unwillingness to follow a recommended course of psychiatric treatment which results in the impairment of a child’s emotional health may support a finding of neglect … . Even so, in the context of a petition alleging medical neglect, “the court’s role is not as surrogate parent and the inquiry is not posed in absolute terms of whether the parent has made the right’ or wrong’ decision” … . Rather, in deciding whether a parent has been neglectful by depriving his or her child of adequate medical care, the court must determine whether the parent has provided an acceptable course of treatment in light of all of the surrounding circumstances … .

Here, the mother’s refusal to consent to the course of medical treatment proposed by mental health professionals would not, by itself, have justified a finding of medical neglect. Nonetheless, the credible evidence established that the mother did not merely disagree with the course of medical treatment proposed for [the child], but also refused to cooperate in formulating any appropriate treatment … . Matter of Jaelin L. (Kimrenee C.), 2015 NY Slip Op 01946, 2nd Dept 3-11-15

 

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Criteria for Administrative Expungement of a Report of Child Abuse or Maltreatment Explained

In affirming the dismissal of a petition seeking expungement of a “child abuse or maltreatment report” maintained by the NYS Central Register of Child Abuse or Maltreatment, the Second Department explained the relevant analytical criteria:

At an administrative expungement hearing to determine whether a report of child abuse or maltreatment is substantiated, the allegations in the report must be established by a preponderance of the evidence … . “It is the function of the administrative agency, not the reviewing court, to weigh the evidence or assess the credibility of the witnesses” … .

Judicial review of a determination that a report of maltreatment has been substantiated is limited to whether the determination is supported by substantial evidence in the record … . Substantial evidence “means such relevant proof as a reasonable mind may accept as adequate to support a conclusion or ultimate fact” … .

To establish that maltreatment occurred, the agency must show that the child’s physical, mental, or emotional condition has been impaired or is in imminent danger of becoming impaired as a result of the failure of a parent or other person legally responsible for his or her care to exercise a minimum degree of care … .  Matter of Iacono v New York State Cent. Register of N.Y. State Off. of Children & Family Servs. 2015 NY Slip Op 01802, 2nd Dept 3-4-15

 

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Plaintiff Could Not Show Justifiable Reliance Upon Alleged Misrepresentations in a Stipulation

The Second Department determined the plaintiff, who was seeking to vacate portions of a so-ordered stipulation in a custody matter, failed to show the stipulation was the result of fraud.  In particular, plaintiff failed to show justifiable reliance upon any alleged misrepresentation because attachments to the stipulation reflected the actual facts:

As the party seeking to set aside the stipulation, the plaintiff had the burden of showing that the stipulation was the result of fraud … . “A cause of action alleging fraud requires a plaintiff to establish a misrepresentation or omission of material fact which the defendant knew was false, that the misrepresentation was made to induce the plaintiff’s reliance, the plaintiff’s justifiable reliance on the misrepresentation or material omission, and a resulting injury” … .

In light of the attachments provided with the stipulation, the plaintiff failed to establish the element of justifiable reliance. Where the plaintiff ” has the means available to him of knowing, by the exercise of ordinary intelligence, the truth or the real quality of the subject of the representation, he must make use of those means, or he will not be heard to complain that he was induced to enter into the transaction by misrepresentations'” … . Cervera v Bressler, 2015 NY Slip Op 02441, 2nd Dept 3-25-15

 

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No “Extraordinary Circumstances” Existed to Justify Granting Primary Custody of Child to Grandparents

The Fourth Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Centra, determined Family Court should not have granted primary custody of the child to the grandparents.  Although the grandparents had played a primary role in the child’s care for 10 years, with the mother’s permission and participation, the “extraordinary circumstances” described by the Court of Appeals as necessary to justify awarding custody to nonparents were not present:

As the Court of Appeals held in the seminal case of Matter of Bennett v Jeffreys (40 NY2d 543, 544), “[t]he State may not deprive a parent of the custody of a child absent surrender, abandonment, persisting neglect, unfitness or other like extraordinary circumstances.” The Court thereafter held that, “[s]o long as the parental rights have not been forfeited by gross misconduct . . . or other behavior evincing utter indifference and irresponsibility . .. , the natural parent may not be supplanted” (Matter of Male Infant L., 61 NY2d 420, 427). “The nonparent has the burden of proving that extraordinary circumstances exist, and until such circumstances are shown, the court does not reach the issue of the best interests of the child” … .

…[T]he arrangement between petitioners [the grandparents] and the mother since shortly after the child’s birth and for 10 years thereafter was akin to a joint custody arrangement with petitioners having primary physical custody of the child and the mother visitation. Petitioners established that they took on the bulk of the responsibility for the child’s financial support and education. There was no showing by petitioners, however, that the mother was unfit or that she surrendered or abandoned her child … . The question then is whether they established “other equivalent but rare extraordinary circumstance[s] which would drastically affect the welfare of the child” … .

As we have held, “[w]hat proof is sufficient to establish such equivalent but rare extraordinary circumstances cannot be precisely measured” … . “[T]he fact that [a] parent agreed that a nonparent should have physical custody of the child or placed the child in the custody of a nonparent is not sufficient, by itself, to deprive the parent of custody” … . Here, while the mother allowed petitioners to have primary physical custody of the child for a prolonged period, there were no other factors to show the existence of extraordinary circumstances … . The record establishes that the child is psychologically attached to both petitioners and the mother, and there was no evidence that removing the child from petitioners’ primary custody would result in “psychological trauma . . . grave enough to threaten destruction of the child” … . The evidence at the hearing showed that the child exhibited some signs of stress after May 2012, but the record as a whole, including the Lincoln hearing, supports the conclusion that the child was stressed because of the family conflict, and would not suffer if the mother had custody of the child. Matter of Suarez v Williams, 2015 NY Slip Op 02293, 4th Dept 3-20-15

 

Extraordinary Circumstances Justified Award of Primary Physical Custody to Nonparent–Criteria Described

In affirming Family Court’s award of primary physical custody to the grandmother, the Third Department explained the “extraordinary circumstances” criteria for awarding primary physical custody to a nonparent:

Family Court’s finding of extraordinary circumstances is supported by the record. It is clear and settled that a “parent has a claim of custody of his or her child, superior to that of all others, in the absence of surrender, abandonment, persistent neglect, unfitness, disruption of custody over an extended period of time or other extraordinary circumstances” … . “It is the nonparent’s burden to establish extraordinary circumstances and, when that burden is met, custody is determined based upon the child’s best interests” … . The pertinent factors to be considered in determining whether extraordinary circumstances exist “include the length of time the child has lived with the nonparent, the quality of that relationship and the length of time the biological parent allowed such custody to continue without trying to assume the primary parental role” … , an analysis that considers “the cumulative effect of all issues present in a given case” … . Matter of Curless v McLarney, 2015 NY Slip Op 01680, 3rd Dept 2-26-15

 

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Relatively Low Degree of Corroboration Required to Admit Child’s Out-of-Court Statements Re: Abuse or Neglect

The Third Department, in a custody proceeding, explained the level of corroboration required to render a child’s out-of-court statements admissible:

Both the mother and the attorney for the children contend that the testimony of the father’s psychiatrist … concerning the older child’s out-of-court statements are inadmissible hearsay. We disagree. A child’s out-of-court statements are admissible in a custody dispute if the statements relate to abuse or neglect, provided that such statements are corroborated by other evidence … . “The degree of corroboration required is relatively low” … , and the hearing court “is accorded considerable discretion in determining whether there is sufficient corroboration” … . Heather B v Daniel B, 2015 NY Slip Op 01506, 3rd Dept 2-19-15

 

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Maltreatment Finding Not Supported by Substantial Evidence

The Third Department determined substantial evidence did not support the Office of Children and Family Services finding of maltreatment.  Petitioner spanked the child for eating soap while petitioner was bathing the child.  Petitioner explained what had happened to the child’s day-care provider, who then reported the incident to the Central Register of Child Abuse and Maltreatment:

“‘At an administrative hearing to determine whether a report of child abuse or maltreatment is substantiated, the allegations in the report must be established by a fair preponderance of the evidence'” … . Specifically, “‘[t]o establish that maltreatment occurred, the agency must show that the child’s physical, mental or emotional condition has been impaired or is in imminent danger of becoming impaired as a result of the parent’s failure to exercise a minimum degree of care'” … . In our consideration of the underlying determination, “our focus is whether the determination is rational and supported by substantial evidence” … . * * *

A parent is “entitled to use reasonable physical force to promote discipline” … , however, the application of such force may not “exceed[] the threshold of reasonableness” … . Although a single instance of excessive corporal punishment can suffice for a finding of maltreatment …, here, the record lacks substantial evidence demonstrating that petitioner’s conduct “impaired or was in imminent danger of impairing [the child’s] physical, mental or emotional condition” … . Matter of Maurizio XX v New Y\ork State Off of Children and Family Services, 2015 NY Slip Op 01512, 3rd Dept 2-19-15

 

Family Court Did Not Inform Respondent of His Rights and Did Not Conduct an Adequate Colloquy—PINS Adjudication Reversed

The Third Department reversed respondent’s adjudication as a PINS because Family Court did not advise respondent of his rights and the colloquy prior to Family Court’s acceptance of the consent finding was inadequate:

Family Court erred by failing to advise respondent of his rights. Pursuant to statute, at the initial appearance and at the commencement of any hearing concerning a PINS petition, Family Court must advise the respondent and his or her parent of the respondent’s rights to remain silent and to be represented by counsel of his or her choosing or an assigned attorney (see Family Ct Act § 741 [a]…). Here, the court did not mention these rights at the first appearance on the PINS petition, at which time the court accepted respondent’s consent to a PINS finding, nor at the dispositional hearing. The court’s failure to advise respondent of these rights constitutes reversible error … . Additionally, the court’s colloquy prior to accepting that consent finding was inadequate; respondent merely answered “[y]es” when asked if he had a basic understanding of the proceeding and if he consented to a PINS finding, without any further discussion. To ensure that a PINS admission is knowingly and intelligently entered into, in a proper colloquy “[t]he respondent should at least state and admit the precise act, or acts, which constitutes the admission, and should be made aware on the record of the consequences, the dispositional alternatives, and the waiver of specific rights,” as well as give an assurance of the lack of coercion and that he or she consulted with counsel (Merril Sobie, Practice Commentaries, McKinney’s Cons Laws of NY, Book 29A, Family Ct Act § 741 at 98…). Due to the inadequate colloquy and lack of advisement of rights, reversal is required, respondent’s adjudication as a PINS is vacated and the matter is returned to the preadmission stage. Matter of Aaron UU …, 2015 NY Slip Op 01505, 3rd Dept 2-19-15

 

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