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TITLE TO ARTWORK PURCHASED DURING THE MARRIAGE CANNOT BE DETERMINED BY REFERENCE TO INVOICES ALONE.

The First Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Webber, reversing Supreme Court, held that the person who holds title to artwork purchased during the marriage cannot be determined by reference to invoices alone (as Supreme Court had done). The couple purchased art worth millions of dollars. The prenuptial agreement stated that any art not owned jointly by husband and wife would be deemed to belong to the party holding title without reference to the source of the funds for the purchase:

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An invoice cannot be said to be dispositive of ownership. The purpose of the invoice is not to identify the titled owner. Moreover, there is always the potential unreliability of the information contained on the invoice. For example, for one reason or another, the price of the item(s) purchased may be inflated or deflated or the description of the merchandise or services rendered may be inaccurate or distorted.

The unreliability of an invoice as sole proof of title is evidenced by various invoices in the record before us. The parties concede that some of the invoices are inconsistent on their face, in that the name of the only party listed is not consistent with the name of that party’s account with the auction house of purchase or conflicts with the party to whom the item purchased should have been shipped. For example, the wife points to a jointly acquired and owned Jeff Koons painting, “the Empire State of Scotch, Dewars,” the invoice for which lists only the husband’s name. Anonymous v Anonymous, 2017 NY Slip Op 02613, 1st Dept 4-4-17

 

FAMILY LAW (MARITAL PROPERTY, TITLE TO ARTWORK PURCHASED DURING THE MARRIAGE CANNOT BE DETERMINED BY REFERENCE TO INVOICES ALONE)/MARITAL PROPERTY (MARITAL PROPERTY, TITLE TO ARTWORK PURCHASED DURING THE MARRIAGE CANNOT BE DETERMINED BY REFERENCE TO INVOICES ALONE)/EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION  (MARITAL PROPERTY, TITLE TO ARTWORK PURCHASED DURING THE MARRIAGE CANNOT BE DETERMINED BY REFERENCE TO INVOICES ALONE)/INVOICES (FAMILY LAW, MARITAL PROPERTY, TITLE TO ARTWORK PURCHASED DURING THE MARRIAGE CANNOT BE DETERMINED BY REFERENCE TO INVOICES ALONE)/ARTWORK (FAMILY LAW, MARITAL PROPERTY, , TITLE TO ARTWORK PURCHASED DURING THE MARRIAGE CANNOT BE DETERMINED BY REFERENCE TO INVOICES ALONE)/DIVORCE (MARITAL PROPERTY,  TITLE TO ARTWORK PURCHASED DURING THE MARRIAGE CANNOT BE DETERMINED BY REFERENCE TO INVOICES ALONE)

FAMILY COURT SHOULD HAVE MADE FINDINGS ALLOWING JUVENILE TO PETITION FOR SPECIAL IMMIGRANT JUVENILE STATUS, PARENTAL NEGLECT PRECLUDED REUNIFICATION.

The Second Department, reversing Family Court, determined Family Court should have made findings which would allow the juvenile to petition for special immigrant juvenile status (SIJS). Reunification with a parent was precluded by parental neglect, including excessive corporal punishment, and forcing the juvenile to work rather than attend school:

Pursuant to 8 USC § 1101(a)(27)(J) … and 8 CFR 204.11, a “special immigrant” is a resident alien who, inter alia, is under 21 years of age, is unmarried, and has been legally committed to, or placed under the custody of, an individual appointed by a state or juvenile court. Additionally, for a juvenile to qualify for special immigrant juvenile status, a court must find that reunification of the juvenile with one or both of the juvenile’s parents is not viable due to parental abuse, neglect, abandonment, or a similar basis found under state law … , and that it would not be in the juvenile’s best interests to be returned to his or her native country or country of last habitual residence … .

Based upon our independent factual review, we conclude that the record supports a finding that reunification of the child with one or both of his parents is not a viable option based upon parental neglect, which includes the infliction of excessive corporal punishment and requiring the child to begin working at the age of 12 instead of attending school on a regular basis … . The record further supports a finding that it would not be in the best interests of the child to return to India … . Matter of Palwinder K. v Kuldeep K., 2017 NY Slip Op 02423. 2nd Dept 3-29-17

 

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SORA GUIDELINE WHICH ALLOWS JUVENILE DELINQUENCY ADJUDICATION TO BE CONSIDERED IN THE CRIMINAL HISTORY CALCULATION SHOULD NOT BE FOLLOWED.

The Fourth Department determined the language in the SORA guideline which allows a juvenile delinquency adjudication to be used to calculate points in the criminal history category should not be followed because it conflicts with provisions of the Family Court Act:

The risk assessment guidelines issued by the Board provide that a juvenile delinquency adjudication is considered a crime for purposes of assessing points under the criminal history section of the risk assessment instrument (see Sex Offender Registration Act: Risk Assessment Guidelines and Commentary [Guidelines], at 6 [2006]). Family Court Act § 381.2 (1) provides, however, that neither the fact that a person was before Family Court for a juvenile delinquency hearing, nor any confession, admission or statement made by such a person is admissible as evidence against him or her in any other court. Section 380.1 (1) further provides that “[n]o adjudication under this article may be denominated a conviction and no person adjudicated a juvenile delinquent shall be denominated a criminal by reason of such adjudication.” Given this conflict between the Guidelines and the plain language of the Family Court Act, we agree with the [2nd] Department[ ] … and conclude that the Board “exceeded its authority by adopting that portion of the Guidelines which includes juvenile delinquency adjudications in its definition of crimes for the purpose of determining a sex offender’s criminal history” … . People v Brown, 2017 NY Slip Op 02323, 4th Dept 3-24-17

CRIMINAL LAW (SORA GUIDELINE WHICH ALLOWS JUVENILE DELINQUENCY ADJUDICATION TO BE CONSIDERED IN THE CRIMINAL HISTORY CALCULATION SHOULD NOT BE FOLLOWED)/SEX OFFENDER REGISTRATION ACT (SORA) (SORA GUIDELINE WHICH ALLOWS JUVENILE DELINQUENCY ADJUDICATION TO BE CONSIDERED IN THE CRIMINAL HISTORY CALCULATION SHOULD NOT BE FOLLOWED)/FAMILY LAW (SORA GUIDELINE WHICH ALLOWS JUVENILE DELINQUENCY ADJUDICATION TO BE CONSIDERED IN THE CRIMINAL HISTORY CALCULATION SHOULD NOT BE FOLLOWED)/JUVENILE DELINQUENCY (SORA GUIDELINE WHICH ALLOWS JUVENILE DELINQUENCY ADJUDICATION TO BE CONSIDERED IN THE CRIMINAL HISTORY CALCULATION SHOULD NOT BE FOLLOWED) 

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NEGLECT PETITION ALLEGING EXCESSIVE CORPORAL PUNISHMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED AFTER PRESENTATION OF DIRECT CASE, CHILD’S OUT OF COURT STATEMENTS SUFFICIENTLY CORROBORATED.

The Second Department, reversing Family Court, determined the neglect petition should not have been dismissed at the close of the direct case. There was sufficient evidence of excessive corporal punishment and sufficient corroboration of the child’s out of court statements:

At the fact-finding hearing, the petitioner introduced a recording of two telephone calls to the 911 emergency number, and elicited testimony from a police officer and a caseworker that the mother admitted using a belt against the child. Such evidence was sufficient to corroborate the child’s out-of-court statements to the caseworker that the mother beat her … . Moreover, the absence of physical injury is not dispositive … . In any event, the caseworker’s testimony that the child had stated that her upper right arm hurt from having defended herself, was not undermined on cross examination. Finally, dismissal was not warranted on the ground that the child gave a conflicting statement to the police officer. Matter of Jaivon J. (Patricia D.), 2017 NY Slip Op 01856, 2nd Dept 3-15-17

FAMILY LAW (NEGLECT PETITION ALLEGING EXCESSIVE CORPORAL PUNISHMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED AFTER PRESENTATION OF DIRECT CASE, CHILD’S OUT OF COURT STATEMENTS SUFFICIENTLY CORROBORATED)/EVIDENCE (FAMILY LAW, NEGLECT, NEGLECT PETITION ALLEGING EXCESSIVE CORPORAL PUNISHMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED AFTER PRESENTATION OF DIRECT CASE, CHILD’S OUT OF COURT STATEMENTS SUFFICIENTLY CORROBORATED)/NEGLECT (FAMILY LAW, NEGLECT PETITION ALLEGING EXCESSIVE CORPORAL PUNISHMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED AFTER PRESENTATION OF DIRECT CASE, CHILD’S OUT OF COURT STATEMENTS SUFFICIENTLY CORROBORATED)

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PETITIONER’S PATERNITY CLAIM PROPERLY DISMISSED ON EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL GROUNDS, REINSTATEMENT OF PETITION UPON A PRIOR APPEAL DID NOT PRECLUDE DISMISSAL.

The Second Department determined petitioner was properly estopped from asserting his paternity claim. The Second Department noted that the fact that petitioner’s paternity petition was reinstated upon a prior appeal did not preclude the denial of the petition on equitable estoppel grounds:

The Family Court properly applied the doctrine of equitable estoppel to preclude the petitioner from asserting his paternity claim with respect to the subject child. The evidence at a hearing established that the respondent Gaston R. has established a strong father-daughter relationship with the child. The child has referred to Gaston R. as “daddy” since she was 18 months old and continues to view him as the only father figure in her life. In contrast, the petitioner learned, shortly after the child’s birth, that he was the child’s biological father. Nevertheless, he did not commence the instant paternity proceeding until the child was four years old. The petitioner has not had a parent-child relationship with the child for several years, and the child no longer recognizes the petitioner’s name. Under these circumstances, the court properly determined that it was in the child’s best interests to equitably estop the petitioner from asserting his paternity claim

Contrary to the petitioner’s contention, this Court’s determination on a prior appeal, which, inter alia, reinstated his paternity petition, did not preclude the Family Court from considering the doctrine of equitable estoppel upon remittal … . Matter of Thomas T. v Luba R., 2017 NY Slip Op 01870, 2nd Dept 3-15-17

 

FAMILY LAW (PETITIONER’S PATERNITY CLAIM PROPERLY DISMISSED ON EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL GROUNDS, REINSTATEMENT OF PETITION UPON A PRIOR APPEAL DID NOT PRECLUDE DISMISSAL)/PATERNITY (PETITIONER’S PATERNITY CLAIM PROPERLY DISMISSED ON EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL GROUNDS, REINSTATEMENT OF PETITION UPON A PRIOR APPEAL DID NOT PRECLUDE DISMISSAL)/EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL (FAMILY LAW, PATERNITY, PETITIONER’S PATERNITY CLAIM PROPERLY DISMISSED ON EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL GROUNDS, REINSTATEMENT OF PETITION UPON A PRIOR APPEAL DID NOT PRECLUDE DISMISSAL)/APPEALS (FAMILY LAW, PETITIONER’S PATERNITY CLAIM PROPERLY DISMISSED ON EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL GROUNDS, REINSTATEMENT OF PETITION UPON A PRIOR APPEAL DID NOT PRECLUDE DISMISSAL)

APPELLANT’S LATE APPEARANCE FOR A HEARING DID NOT JUSTIFY A DEFAULT FINDING.

The Second Department determined Family Court should not have denied a motion to vacate an order of protection. Appellant had been slightly late for a hearing on her sister’s request for an order of protection and the order was issued based upon appellant’s default:

In this family offense proceeding, the Family Court issued an order of protection against the appellant and in favor of her sister upon the appellant’s failure to appear at a hearing. The appellant moved to vacate the order of protection entered upon her default, and the Family Court denied her motion. * * *

The Family Court improvidently exercised its discretion in denying the appellant’s motion to vacate the order of protection entered upon her default in appearing at the hearing. The appellant showed no willfulness or intent to default, where she was minimally tardy to the hearing, and the tardiness might have been due, at least in part, to crowded conditions at the courthouse, she attended prior court appearances, she engaged in motion practice through her attorney, and she participated in multiple preparatory conferences with her attorney … . Also, the appellant moved to vacate the order of protection relatively soon after it was issued. Under the circumstances, the appellant demonstrated a reasonable excuse for her failure to appear at the hearing. Further, the appellant demonstrated a potentially meritorious defense to the petition …. . Matter of Williams v Williams, 2017 NY Slip Op 01873, 2nd Dept 3-15-17

 

FAMILY LAW (APPELLANT’S LATE APPEARANCE FOR A HEARING DID NOT JUSTIFY A DEFAULT FINDING)/DEFAULT (FAMILY LAW, APPELLANT’S LATE APPEARANCE FOR A HEARING DID NOT JUSTIFY A DEFAULT FINDING)

PUBLIC POLICY PROHIBITS RECOUPMENT OF OVERPAYMENT OF CHILD SUPPORT.

The Second Department noted that public policy prohibited the recoupment of overpayment of child support by reducing future child support payments. However a commensurate reduction of future payments of educational expenses was okay:

“There is strong public policy in this state, which the [Child Support Standards Act] did not alter, against restitution or recoupment of the overpayment of child support” … . “The reason for this policy is that . . . child support payments are deemed to have been devoted to that purpose, and no funds exist from which one may recoup moneys so expended’ if the award is thereafter reversed or modified” … . Thus, recoupment of child support payments is only appropriate under “limited circumstances” … . * * *

However, “[w]hile child support overpayments may not be recovered by reducing future support payments, public policy does not forbid offsetting add-on expenses against an overpayment'” … . Thus, although the overpayments may not be applied to the father’s child support obligation, he may use the overpayments to offset his share of the add-on expenses, such as the educational expenses … . Matter of McGovern v McGovern, 2017 NY Slip Op 01862. 2nd Dept 3-15-17

 

FAMILY LAW (PUBLIC POLICY PROHIBITS RECOUPMENT OF OVERPAYMENT OF CHILD SUPPORT)/CHILD SUPPORT (PUBLIC POLICY PROHIBITS RECOUPMENT OF OVERPAYMENT OF CHILD SUPPORT)

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CHIDREN WERE HEALTHY AND WELL CARED FOR, NEGLECT PETITION BASED UPON MOTHER’S MENTAL ILLNESS PROPERLY DISMISSED.

The Second Department determined Family Court properly dismissed the neglect petition against mother which was based upon mother’s alleged mental illness:

Although a finding of neglect may be predicated upon proof that a child’s mental, physical, or emotional condition is in imminent danger of becoming impaired as a result of a parent’s mental illness, “proof of mental illness alone will not support a finding of neglect” … .

Here, the petitioner failed to sustain its burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the children’s physical, mental, or emotional condition was in imminent danger of becoming impaired as a result of the mother’s mental illness … . The evidence showed that the children were healthy and well cared for by the mother … . Matter of Jaurelious G. (Gwendolyn J.), 2017 NY Slip Op 01692, 2nd Dept 3-8-17

 

FAMILY LAW (CHIDREN WERE HEALTHY AND WELL CARED FOR, NEGLECT PETITION BASED UPON MOTHER’S MENTAL ILLNESS PROPERLY DISMISSED)/NEGLECT (FAMILY LAW, MENTIAL ILLNESS, CHIDREN WERE HEALTHY AND WELL CARED FOR, NEGLECT PETITION BASED UPON MOTHER’S MENTAL ILLNESS PROPERLY DISMISSED)/MENTAL ILLNESS (FAMILY LAW, NEGLECT, CHIDREN WERE HEALTHY AND WELL CARED FOR, NEGLECT PETITION BASED UPON MOTHER’S MENTAL ILLNESS PROPERLY DISMISSED)

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CHILD’S STATEMENTS ABOUT RESPONDENT PROPERLY EXCLUDED FROM NEGLECT PROCEEDING INVOLVING A DIFFERENT CHILD, NO SHOWING RESPONDENT WAS LEGALLY RESPONSIBLE FOR THE CHILD WHO MADE THE STATEMENTS.

The Second Department determined Family Court properly dismissed the neglect petition without prejudice. The petitioner failed to establish the respondent father was legally responsible for the child whose statements petitioner sought to use as evidence. (The neglect proceedings did not involve the child who made the statements):

Here, the petitioner failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence … . At the fact-finding hearing, the petitioner presented a caseworker as its only witness and documentation of the father’s criminal offenses. The caseworker testified to previous statements allegedly made to her by a child complainant in one of the respondent’s prior criminal cases. Family Court Act § 1046(a)(vi) provides that “previous statements made by the child relating to any allegations of abuse or neglect shall be admissible in evidence” (Family Ct Act § 1046[a][vi]). Such statements are admissible in a child protective proceeding, even when the child is not the subject of the proceeding … . However, child protective proceedings encompass only abuse or neglect by a person who is a parent or other person legally responsible for the child’s care … , and the sections regarding admissibility of previous statements of an abused or neglected child refer to a child in the care of the respondent … .

A person legally responsible includes a custodian of the child, which “may include any person continually or at regular intervals found in the same household as the child when the conduct of such person causes or contributes to the abuse or neglect of the child” … . In determining whether a respondent is such a custodian, the court should consider the particular circumstances, including “the frequency and nature of the contact between the child and respondent, the nature and extent of the control exercised by the respondent over the child’s environment, the duration of the respondent’s contact with the child, and the respondent’s relationship to the child’s parent(s)”… . A person legally responsible is not a caregiver who has fleeting or temporary care of a child, such as a supervisor of a play date … .

Here, the petitioner failed to establish that the respondent was a person legally responsible for the child whose statements it wished to introduce through the testimony of the caseworker … . Matter of Kaliia F. (Jason F.), 2017 NY Slip Op 01691, 2nd Dept 3-8-17

 

FAMILY LAW (CHILD’S STATEMENTS ABOUT RESPONDENT PROPERLY EXCLUDED FROM NEGLECT PROCEEDING INVOLVING A DIFFERENT CHILD, NO SHOWING RESPONDENT WAS LEGALLY RESPONSIBLE FOR THE CHILD WHO MADE THE STATEMENTS)/EVIDENCE (FAMILY LAW, (CHILD’S STATEMENTS ABOUT RESPONDENT PROPERLY EXCLUDED FROM NEGLECT PROCEEDING INVOLVING A DIFFERENT CHILD, NO SHOWING RESPONDENT WAS LEGALLY RESPONSIBLE FOR THE CHILD WHO MADE THE STATEMENTS)/HEARSAY (FAMILY LAW, (CHILD’S STATEMENTS ABOUT RESPONDENT PROPERLY EXCLUDED FROM NEGLECT PROCEEDING INVOLVING A DIFFERENT CHILD, NO SHOWING RESPONDENT WAS LEGALLY RESPONSIBLE FOR THE CHILD WHO MADE THE STATEMENTS)

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NOT NECSSARY TO PROVE WHICH OF TWO CARETAKERS WITH ACCESS TO THE CHILD ACTUALLY INJURED THE CHILD.

The Second Department determined Family Court properly found both mother and caretaker responsible for child abuse. It was not necessary to prove which of the two caused injury to the child:

The Family Court Act defines an abused child, inter alia, as a child whose parent, or other person legally responsible for his or her care, “(i) inflicts or allows to be inflicted upon such child physical injury by other than accidental means which causes or creates a substantial risk of death, or serious or protracted disfigurement, or protracted impairment of physical or emotional health or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily organ or (ii) creates or allows to be created a substantial risk of physical injury to such child by other than accidental means which would be likely to cause [such injury]” … . Family Court Act § 1046(a)(ii) provides that a prima facie case of child abuse or neglect may be established by evidence of (1) an injury to a child that would ordinarily not occur absent an act or omission of the respondents, and (2) that the respondents were the caretakers of the child at the time the injury occurred … . “A parent who stands by while others inflict harm may be found responsible for that harm” … .

Section 1046(a)(ii) “authorizes a method of proof which is closely analogous to the negligence rule of res ipsa loquitur” … . The statute also permits findings of abuse against more than one caretaker where multiple individuals had access to the child in the period in which the injury occurred … . In such cases, the petitioner is not required to establish which caregiver actually inflicted the injury or whether they did so together … . Matter of Zoey D. (Simona D.), 2017 NY Slip Op 01689, 2nd Dept 3-8-17

 

FAMILY LAW (NOT NECSSARY TO PROVE WHICH OF TWO CARETAKERS WITH ACCESS TO THE CHILD ACTUALLY INJURED THE CHILD)/EVIDENCE (FAMILY LAW, CHILD ABUSE, NOT NECSSARY TO PROVE WHICH OF TWO CARETAKERS WITH ACCESS TO THE CHILD ACTUALLY INJURED THE CHILD)/CHILD ABUSE (NOT NECSSARY TO PROVE WHICH OF TWO CARETAKERS WITH ACCESS TO THE CHILD ACTUALLY INJURED THE CHILD)

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