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A HEARING IS NECESSARY TO DETERMINE WHETHER A POSTNUPTIAL AGREEMENT IS UNCONSCIONABLE, CRITERIA EXPLAINED.

The Second Determined a hearing was necessary to determine whether a postnuptial agreement, which appeared to strip the wife of her assets, was unconscionable. The court explained the relevant law:

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Postnuptial agreements are contracts which require consideration … . Although postnuptial agreements are generally subject to ordinary principles of contract law … , the parties, as husband and wife, have a fiduciary relationship to each other … .To warrant equity’s intervention, no actual fraud need be shown, for relief will be granted if the settlement is manifestly unfair to a spouse because of the other’s overreaching … . A motion to set aside an agreement between spouses may be denied without a hearing if the agreement is fair on its face… .

Here, it cannot be said that the agreement is fair on its face. It appears from the record that the defendant has received no benefit from the agreement. It also appears that she relinquished all assets of the marriage, along with her inheritance rights and right to spousal support. Where an agreement appears to be so one-sided and unfair that no rational person exercising common sense would make it, and no fair and honest person would accept it, there should be a hearing to determine whether the agreement is unconscionable in substance … . Further, the circumstances under which the agreement was executed must be examined … A reviewing court examining a challenge to a postnuptial agreement will view the agreement in its entirety and under the totality of the circumstances… . Without a hearing to determine the totality of the circumstances, including the extent of the parties’ assets, and the circumstances surrounding the execution of the agreement, it cannot be determined on this record whether equity should intervene to invalidate the parties’ agreement. Barclay v Barclay, 2017 NY Slip Op 04414, 2nd Dept 6-7-17

 

FAMILY LAW (POSTNUPTIAL AGREEMENT, A HEARING IS NECESSARY TO DETERMINE WHETHER A POSTNUPTIAL AGREEMENT IS UNCONSCIONABLE, CRITERIA EXPLAINED)/CONTRACT LAW (FAMILY LAW, POSTNUPTIAL AGREEMENT, A HEARING IS NECESSARY TO DETERMINE WHETHER A POSTNUPTIAL AGREEMENT IS UNCONSCIONABLE, CRITERIA EXPLAINED)/POSTNUPTIAL AGREEMENT (UNCONSCIONABLE, A HEARING IS NECESSARY TO DETERMINE WHETHER A POSTNUPTIAL AGREEMENT IS UNCONSCIONABLE, CRITERIA EXPLAINED)

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AWARD OF SOLE CUSTODY TO MOTHER NOT SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD, PREFERENCE OF CHILDREN NOT ADEQUATELY CONSIDERED.

The Second Department determined Family Court’s award of sole legal and physical custody to mother was not supported by the record. The court noted that the preference of the children was not adequately considered:

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“Since the Family Court’s custody determination is largely dependent upon an assessment of the credibility of the witnesses and upon the character, temperament, and sincerity of the parents, its determination should not be disturbed unless it lacks a sound and substantial basis in the record”… . “However, an appellate court would be seriously remiss if, simply in deference to the finding of a trial judge, it allowed a custody determination to stand where it lacked a sound and substantial basis in the record”… .

In this case, the Family Court’s determination awarding the mother sole legal and physical custody of the children does not have a sound and substantial basis in the record. Specifically, the court’s finding that the mother was “better equipped to meet the physical, mental and emotional needs of the children” was not supported by the record. The record also fails to support the court’s determination that the father did not indicate a willingness to co-parent with the mother. In addition, while a child’s expressed preference in a custody proceeding is not determinative, it is some indication of what is in the child’s best interests, particularly where, as here, the court’s interview with the sons demonstrated their level of maturity and ability to articulate their preferences … . Here, although the children indicated a preference for living with the father, the court merely indicated that it understood their positions without explaining its reasons for rejecting them … . Matter of Tofalli v Sarrett, 2017 NY Slip Op 04125, 2nd Dept 5-25-17

 

FAMILY LAW (AWARD OF SOLE CUSTODY TO MOTHER NOT SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD, PREFERENCE OF CHILDREN NOT ADEQUATELY CONSIDERED)/CUSTODY (FAMILY LAW, AWARD OF SOLE CUSTODY TO MOTHER NOT SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD, PREFERENCE OF CHILDREN NOT ADEQUATELY CONSIDERED)/APPEALS (FAMILY LAW, AWARD OF SOLE CUSTODY TO MOTHER NOT SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD, PREFERENCE OF CHILDREN NOT ADEQUATELY CONSIDERED)

AUNT DID NOT HAVE STANDING TO SEEK VISITATION, AWARDING ADDITIONAL VISITATION TO GRANDPARENTS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD.

The Third Department, reversing Family Court, determined: (1) the aunt did not have standing to seek visitation because there was a loving and responsible relationship between mother and child; and (2) awarding additional visitation to the grandparents was not supported by the record (no testimony taken from the grandparents):

Turning first to the merits of the aunt’s petition seeking visitation … , we find that Family Court erred in awarding visitation to the aunt inasmuch as the aunt does not have standing to seek such relief … . While the aunt and the attorney for the child contend that extraordinary circumstances exists to confer standing upon the aunt, such rule does not apply to this case … , especially where Family Court found that the mother was a “loving and responsible parent.” We further note that although the mother originally consented to the aunt having minimal visitation with the child, she later changed her position and orally moved to dismiss the aunt’s petition for visitation immediately prior to the commencement of trial … . Accordingly, Family Court erred in granting the aunt visitation with the child over the mother’s objections and the aunt’s petition should have been dismissed … . * * *

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… [W]e conclude that Family Court’s determination to award the grandparents increased visitation lacks a sound and substantial basis in the record. The increased visitation did not stem from the consideration of any documentary evidence or testimony but, instead, from Family Court’s own familiarity with the parties based upon prior petitions. Such information, however, is not part of the record … . Matter of Romasz v Coombs, 2017 NY Slip Op 04001, 3rd Dept 5-18-17

 

FAMILY LAW (AUNT DID NOT HAVE STANDING TO SEEK VISITATION, AWARDING ADDITIONAL VISITATION TO GRANDPARENTS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD)/VISITATION (FAMILY LAW, AUNT DID NOT HAVE STANDING TO SEEK VISITATION, AWARDING ADDITIONAL VISITATION TO GRANDPARENTS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD)

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FATHER SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DEEMED TO HAVE DERIVATIVELY NEGLECTED ALL HIS CHILDREN BASED SOLELY ON HIS GUILTY PLEA TO ENDANGERING THE WELFARE OF ONE OF HIS CHILDREN.

The Second Department, reversing Family Court, determined, in the absence of a fact-finding proceeding, father should not have been deemed to have derivatively neglected his children based solely upon his guilty plea to endangering the welfare of one of his children:

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“A criminal conviction may be given collateral estoppel effect in a Family Court proceeding where (1) the identical issue has been resolved, and (2) the defendant in the criminal action had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue of his or her criminal conduct” … . Family Court Act § 1012(f)(i) defines a neglected child as one “whose physical, mental or emotional condition has been impaired or is in imminent danger of becoming impaired as a result of the failure of his parent or other person legally responsible for his care to exercise a minimum degree of care” … by, inter alia, “unreasonably inflicting or allowing to be inflicted harm, or a substantial risk thereof.” Here, since the father’s conviction for endangering the welfare of a child was based upon the same acts alleged to constitute neglect, the father’s conviction established, prima facie, that Blima M. was a neglected child … . …

However, the Family Court erred in granting that branch of ACS’s [Administration for Children’s Services’] motion which was for summary judgment determining that the father derivatively neglected Hersh M., Jacob M., Aron M., Moshe M., and Dina M. While proof of the neglect of one child shall be admissible evidence on the issue of the neglect of any other child of, or the legal responsibility of, the respondent … , a finding of abuse or neglect as to one sibling does not mandate a finding of derivative abuse or neglect as to the other siblings … . Matter of Blima M. (Samuel M.), 2017 NY Slip Op 03954, 2nd Dept 5-17-17

 

FAMILY LAW (FATHER SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DEEMED TO HAVE DERIVATIVELY NEGLECTED ALL HIS CHILDREN BASED SOLELY ON HIS GUILTY PLEA TO ENDANGERING THE WELFARE OF ONE OF HIS CHILDREN)/NEGLECT (FAMILY LAW, FATHER SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DEEMED TO HAVE DERIVATIVELY NEGLECTED ALL HIS CHILDREN BASED SOLELY ON HIS GUILTY PLEA TO ENDANGERING THE WELFARE OF ONE OF HIS CHILDREN)/DERIVATIVE NEGLECT (FAMILY LAW, FATHER SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DEEMED TO HAVE DERIVATIVELY NEGLECTED ALL HIS CHILDREN BASED SOLELY ON HIS GUILTY PLEA TO ENDANGERING THE WELFARE OF ONE OF HIS CHILDREN)/CRIMINAL LAW (ENDANGERING THE WELFARE OF A CHILD, FAMILY LAW, FATHER SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DEEMED TO HAVE DERIVATIVELY NEGLECTED ALL HIS CHILDREN BASED SOLELY ON HIS GUILTY PLEA TO ENDANGERING THE WELFARE OF ONE OF HIS CHILDREN)

FATHER’S MOTION TO VACATE THE DEFAULT DISMISSAL OF HIS VISITATION PETITION SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED, LIBERAL POLICY IN FAVOR OF VACATING DEFAULT NOTED.

The Second Department, reversing Family Court, determined father’s motion to vacate the default dismissal of his visitation petition should have been granted. The court noted the liberal policy in favor of vacating defaults in this context:

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In custody proceedings pursuant to Family Court Act article 6, this Court has adopted a liberal policy in favor of vacating defaults… . Under the circumstances presented here, and in light of the policy favoring resolution on the merits in child custody proceedings, the father demonstrated a reasonable excuse for his failure to appear on March 1, 2016 … . The father’s absence was not willful. Notably, the father had never missed any prior scheduled Family Court appearances and had been compliant with all of the court’s directives. Moreover, there was no indication that a final determination of the petitions pending before the court would occur on the March 1, 2016, date. Finally, the father filed his motion to vacate within two months of the default. Under the totality of these circumstances, the court improvidently exercised its discretion in denying the father’s motion to vacate the March 2016 orders on the ground that his excuse for his absence was not reasonable … . Matter of Lemon v Faison, 2017 NY Slip Op 03953, 2nd Dept 5-17-17

FAMILY LAW (FATHER’S MOTION TO VACATE THE DEFAULT DISMISSAL OF HIS VISITATION PETITION SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED, LIBERAL POLICY IN FAVOR OF VACATING DEFAULT NOTED)/DEFAULT (FAMILY LAW, FATHER’S MOTION TO VACATE THE DEFAULT DISMISSAL OF HIS VISITATION PETITION SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED, LIBERAL POLICY IN FAVOR OF VACATING DEFAULT NOTED)

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MOTHER’S ATTORNEY APPEARED AND PARTICIPATED IN THE PROCEEDINGS, EXPLAINING MOTHER’S ABSENCE, MOTHER, CONTRARY TO FAMILY COURT’S RULING, WAS NOT IN DEFAULT AND COULD APPEAL THE ORDER.

The Third Department, after noting that orders issued upon default are not appealable, determined mother, contrary to Family Court’s ruling, was not in default and therefore the order could be appealed:

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In the circumstances presented, the mother was not required to seek to vacate the default judgment before taking this appeal. A party may not appeal from an order entered on default (see CPLR 5511), but a party’s absence does not necessarily constitute a default, “particularly where counsel appears upon the absent party’s behalf and offers an explanation for his or her failure to attend” (… . Here, the mother’s counsel appeared and advised Family Court that he had communicated with the mother several times by phone and email, that she was then at a considerable distance in either Florida or South Carolina, and that she had a limited income. The mother’s counsel further advised the court relative to the mother’s position in the matter and participated in the proceedings by consenting to the requested relief, that is, to permit the child to remain temporarily with the father. Counsel also unsuccessfully requested a continuance, and ultimately advised that he did not have authority to consent to a final order of permanent physical placement to the father. In light of these circumstances, we find that the mother was not in default and that the order is appealable … . Matter of Linger v Linger, 2017 NY Slip Op 03822, 3rd Dept 5-11-17

FAMILY LAW (MOTHER’S ATTORNEY APPEARED AND PARTICIPATED IN THE PROCEEDINGS, EXPLAINING MOTHER’S ABSENCE, MOTHER, CONTRARY TO FAMILY COURT’S RULING, WAS NOT IN DEFAULT AND COULD APPEAL THE ORDER)/APPEALS (FAMILY COURT, DEFAULT, MOTHER’S ATTORNEY APPEARED AND PARTICIPATED IN THE PROCEEDINGS, EXPLAINING MOTHER’S ABSENCE, MOTHER, CONTRARY TO FAMILY COURT’S RULING, WAS NOT IN DEFAULT AND COULD APPEAL THE ORDER)/DEFAULT (FAMILY COURT, MOTHER’S ATTORNEY APPEARED AND PARTICIPATED IN THE PROCEEDINGS, EXPLAINING MOTHER’S ABSENCE, MOTHER, CONTRARY TO FAMILY COURT’S RULING, WAS NOT IN DEFAULT AND COULD APPEAL THE ORDER)

FATHER’S REQUEST FOR UNSUPERVISED VISITATION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DENIED, NOTWITHSTANDING THE PENDING PERMANENT NEGLECT PROCEEDINGS.

The First Department, reversing Family Court, over a dissent, determined respondent father had demonstrated good cause for a modification of his visitation to allow “sandwich visits,” a half hour of unsupervised visitation between two periods of supervised visitation … . The fact that there was a pending permanent neglect proceeding was not an impediment to the change in visitation. Although father had a drug problem and had been incarcerated, he was working full time and had been drug free for some time:

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Although respondent has a history of drug abuse, which led to a period of incarceration, he has demonstrated his commitment to counseling and treatment, and has not tested positive for drugs since January 2016. Respondent has also demonstrated a desire to turn his life around, obtaining regular employment and endeavoring to build a relationship with the child, who is now almost six years old, by regularly attending the twice weekly supervised visits. It is undisputed that these visits have been positive for the child and that there are no concerns about the child’s safety in spending time with respondent.

Nor is there any evidence that the limited sandwich visits would be emotionally damaging for the child just because there is a possibility that respondent’s parental rights will be terminated at the end of the permanency proceeding. “No case has been cited for the proposition that a finding of permanent neglect and a goal of adoption are legal impediments to changing the nature of a parent’s visitation or increasing its frequency, and none has been found . . . Until the conclusion of disposition and the rendering of a decision, the outcome of this case remains uncertain” … . Matter of Gerald Y.-C. (Roland Y.), 2017 NY Slip Op 03843, 1st Dept 5-11-17

 

FAMILY LAW (FATHER’S REQUEST FOR UNSUPERVISED VISITATION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DENIED, NOTWITHSTANDING THE PENDING PERMANENT NEGLECT PROCEEDINGS)/VISITATION (FAMILY LAW, FATHER’S REQUEST FOR UNSUPERVISED VISITATION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DENIED, NOTWITHSTANDING THE PENDING PERMANENT NEGLECT PROCEEDINGS)/NEGLECT (FAMILY LAW, FATHER’S REQUEST FOR UNSUPERVISED VISITATION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DENIED, NOTWITHSTANDING THE PENDING PERMANENT NEGLECT PROCEEDINGS)

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ORDER OF PROTECTION ISSUED BY AN INTEGRATED DOMESTIC VIOLENCE COURT AS PART OF A CRIMINAL PROCEEDING CAN BE APPEALED BUT NOT MODIFIED BY MOTION, HERE THE CRIMINAL ORDER OF PROTECTION COULD NOT BE MODIFIED BY A SUBSEQUENT CHILD NEGLECT PROCEEDING ORDER OF PROTECTION ISSUED BY THE SAME COURT.

The Second Department determined father could not move to modify an order of protection issued by the Integrated Domestic Violence (IDV) court in connection with a criminal conviction. The order of protection could be appealed as part of an appeal of the conviction, but the Criminal Procedure Law does not provide for modification of the order. In addition, an order of protection issued by the same court in related child neglect proceedings could not change the terms of the “criminal” order of protection unless that order indicated is was subject to subsequent orders of protection (which was not the case here):

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“[W]here a criminal court order of protection bars contact between a parent and child, the parent may not obtain visitation until the order of protection is vacated or modified by the criminal court”… . The criminal court has authority to determine whether its order of protection is “subject to” subsequent orders pertaining to custody and visitation, and can decline to amend an order of protection to so provide … . Here, the order of protection … that was entered in the criminal action did not state that it was “subject to” subsequent orders pertaining to custody and visitation. Matter of Utter v Usher, 2017 NY Slip Op 03760, 2nd Dept 5-10-17

FAMILY LAW (ORDER OF PROTECTION ISSUED BY AN INTEGRATED DOMESTIC VIOLENCE COURT AS PART OF A CRIMINAL PROCEEDING CAN BE APPEALED BUT NOT MODIFIED BY MOTION, HERE THE CRIMINAL ORDER OF PROTECTION COULD NOT BE MODIFIED BY A SUBSEQUENT NON-CRIMINAL ORDER OF PROTECTION)/CRIMINAL LAW (ORDER OF PROTECTION ISSUED BY AN INTEGRATED DOMESTIC VIOLENCE COURT AS PART OF A CRIMINAL PROCEEDING CAN BE APPEALED BUT NOT MODIFIED BY MOTION, HERE THE CRIMINAL ORDER OF PROTECTION COULD NOT BE MODIFIED BY A SUBSEQUENT NON-CRIMINAL ORDER OF PROTECTION)/ORDERS OF PROTECTION (INTEGRATED DOMESTIC VIOLENCE COURT, ORDER OF PROTECTION ISSUED BY AN INTEGRATED DOMESTIC VIOLENCE COURT AS PART OF A CRIMINAL PROCEEDING CAN BE APPEALED BUT NOT MODIFIED BY MOTION, HERE THE CRIMINAL ORDER OF PROTECTION COULD NOT BE MODIFIED BY A SUBSEQUENT NON-CRIMINAL ORDER OF PROTECTION)/INTEGRATED DOMESTIC VIOLENCE COURT (ORDER OF PROTECTION ISSUED BY AN INTEGRATED DOMESTIC VIOLENCE COURT AS PART OF A CRIMINAL PROCEEDING CAN BE APPEALED BUT NOT MODIFIED BY MOTION, HERE THE CRIMINAL ORDER OF PROTECTION COULD NOT BE MODIFIED BY A SUBSEQUENT NON-CRIMINAL ORDER OF PROTECTION)

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PARENTS REMEDIED THE FILTHY CONDITIONS OF THE HOME AND MADE ARRANGEMENTS TO LIVE WITH GRANDPARENTS, WHO AGREED TO SUPERVISE AND HELP THE PARENTS, FAMILY COURT’S AWARD OF CUSTODY TO AN AUNT REVERSED.

The Third Department, reversing Family Court, determined petitioner, the maternal aunt, did not meet the heavy burden of demonstrating extraordinary circumstances warranting the removal of the child from the parents’ custody and the award of custody to petitioner. Temporary custody was awarded to petitioner on the basis of an abuse allegation that was deemed unfounded. The decision to remove the child from the parents’ custody was made after an investigation revealed the parents’ home was filthy, with feces on the floor and walls and a flea infestation. However, after the home was cleaned up and the parents moved back in the condition of the home remained acceptable. The parents arranged to move in with grandparents and the grandparents agreed to supervise and help the parents:

The ground of persistent neglect warranting disruption of parental custody rights at issue here requires a showing “that the parents engaged in gross misconduct or other behavior evincing an utter indifference and irresponsibility” relative to the parental role …  . This Court has previously held that “allowing . . . children to live in squalor” is among the parental behaviors that, considered together with other undesirable conduct, may constitute gross misconduct rising to the level of extraordinary circumstances … . At the outset, it bears noting that we are sympathetic to Family Court’s determination. The evidence at the fact-finding hearing revealed no mitigating explanation for respondents’ failure to maintain minimum sanitary standards in their home; both were unemployed during the time period before the inspection, and there was no evidence that either was hampered by any illness or disability. Joblessness and poverty undeniably lead to significant difficulties in maintaining adequate housing and hardships in raising children, but are not any cause for subjecting children to feces-strewn homes; such conditions result solely from lack of care. Nevertheless, … based upon all of the record evidence, we cannot find that petitioner satisfied her “heavy burden” to establish the existence of extraordinary circumstances … , and are thus constrained to reverse.

The record reveals that respondents immediately corrected the unsanitary conditions when directed to do so, such that child protective authorities permitted the younger children to return to live there. A caseworker testified that the house “exceeded minimal standards” after this intervention, and that respondents cooperated with child protective authorities throughout the investigation and followed through on everything that was asked of them. The father acknowledged that the previous conditions in the home were unacceptable, and both he and the mother testified that they would not let this happen again. The record does not reveal any further problems or complaints about respondents’ care of their children after the initial home visit. No further child protective actions were taken, the child was permitted to return to respondents’ home for regular visits during the pendency of the fact-finding hearing, and the younger children remained in respondents’ custody without interruption. Matter of Jennifer BB. v Megan CC., 2017 NY Slip Op 03576, 3rd Dept 5-4-17

FAMILY LAW (PARENTS REMEDIED THE FILTHY CONDITIONS OF THE HOME AND MADE ARRANGEMENTS TO LIVE WITH GRANDPARENTS, WHO AGREED TO SUPERVISE AND HELP THE PARENTS, FAMILY COURT’S AWARD OF CUSTODY TO AN AUNT REVERSED)/CUSTODY (NON-PARENT, PARENTS REMEDIED THE FILTHY CONDITIONS OF THE HOME AND MADE ARRANGEMENTS TO LIVE WITH GRANDPARENTS, WHO AGREED TO SUPERVISE AND HELP THE PARENTS, FAMILY COURT’S AWARD OF CUSTODY TO AN AUNT REVERSED)/NEGLECT (FILTHY LIVING CONDITIONS, PARENTS REMEDIED THE FILTHY CONDITIONS OF THE HOME AND MADE ARRANGEMENTS TO LIVE WITH GRANDPARENTS, WHO AGREED TO SUPERVISE AND HELP THE PARENTS, FAMILY COURT’S AWARD OF CUSTODY TO AN AUNT REVERSED)/NON-PARENTS (CUSTODY, PARENTS REMEDIED THE FILTHY CONDITIONS OF THE HOME AND MADE ARRANGEMENTS TO LIVE WITH GRANDPARENTS, WHO AGREED TO SUPERVISE AND HELP THE PARENTS, FAMILY COURT’S AWARD OF CUSTODY TO AN AUNT REVERSED)

PROOF INSUFFICIENT TO DEMONSTRATE INCARCERATED FATHER ABANDONED THE CHILDREN.

The Fourth Department, reversing Family Court, determined the proof did not demonstrate father, who was incarcerated, abandoned the children. The Fourth Department noted that the failure to offer a meaningful plan for the children’s future is not relevant to an abandonment proceeding:

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A child is deemed abandoned where, for the period six months immediately prior to the filing of the petition for abandonment . . . , a parent evinces an intent to forego his or her parental rights and obligations as manifested by his or her failure to visit the child and communicate with the child or [petitioner], although able to do so and not prevented or discouraged from doing so by [petitioner]’ ” … . Here, the evidence established that the father, who was incarcerated for most of the six-month period immediately prior to the filing of the petition, contacted the children or petitioner every month during that period. The father wrote letters to the children and called, met with, and wrote letters to the children’s caseworker. We conclude that the father’s contacts were not minimal, sporadic, or insubstantial … . Moreover, during that period, the father filed a petition seeking custody or visitation with the children, which indicates that he did not intend to forego his parental rights … . Although Family Court’s finding that the father failed to offer a meaningful plan for the children’s future is relevant to a termination proceeding based on permanent neglect… , it is not relevant to a termination proceeding based on abandonment … . Matter of John F. (John F., Jr.), 2017 NY Slip Op 03369, 4th Dept 4-28-17

FAMILY LAW (PROOF INSUFFICIENT TO DEMONSTRATE INCARCERATED FATHER ABANDONED THE CHILDREN)/ABANDONMENT (FAMILY LAW, PROOF INSUFFICIENT TO DEMONSTRATE INCARCERATED FATHER ABANDONED THE CHILDREN)

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