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ALTHOUGH PLAINTIFF MAY NOT HAVE INTENDED THE RELEASE TO APPLY TO A PENDING FALSE ARREST ACTION, THE PENDING ACTION WAS NOT LISTED IN THE RELEASE AS AN EXCLUSION AND IS THEREFORE PRECLUDED (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals determined that, even if plaintiff did not intend to release the city from the second false arrest action when he signed a release for the first false arrest action, the release must be enforced according to its plain language. The release had a section where any actions not intended to be encompassed by the release must be specifically identified and listed. Plaintiff, with counsel present, signed the release without listing the second false arrest action as an exclusion, so the release precluded the second action:

This Court has repeatedly made clear that “[i]f ‘the language of a release is clear and unambiguous, the signing of a release is a “jural act” binding on the parties’ ” … . “As with contracts generally, the courts must look to the language of a release—the words used by the parties—to determine their intent, resorting to extrinsic evidence only when the court concludes as a matter of law that the contract is ambiguous” … , or where such evidence establishes one of the ” ‘traditional bases for setting aside written agreements, namely, duress, illegality, fraud, or mutual mistake’ ” … . With respect to mutual mistake, a “high order of evidence is required” to overcome the ” ‘heavy presumption that a deliberately prepared and executed written instrument [manifests] the true intention of the parties’ ” … .

Here, the City established its prima facie entitlement to summary judgment based on the clear language of the release, and plaintiff failed to raise any triable question of fact in opposition. The City’s intent to secure a release from plaintiff of “any and all” claims is evidenced by the plain text of the document it transmitted for plaintiff’s signature. As the Appellate Division correctly held, there was nothing “surreptitious” about the way the release was drafted or transmitted … . Although plaintiff, who was represented by counsel, could have excluded this action from the release by the simple act of listing it in the space provided for that purpose, he signed the release without doing so, an objective manifestation of assent that is binding upon him notwithstanding any unilateral mistake or subsequent regret on his part … . Smith v City of New York, 2025 NY Slip Op 07081, CtApp 12-18-24

Practice Point: A release is strictly enforced according to its plain language. If a release includes a section where any exclusions from its reach must be listed, and that section is left blank, the release will preclude any other pending action, even where the failure to list a pending action was unintentional.

 

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CONFLICTING EVIDENCE RAISED QUESTIONS OF FACT IN THIS “NEGLIGENT USE OF EXCESSIVE FORCE,” “FALSE ARREST,” AND “UNLAWFUL IMPRISONMENT” ACTION STEMMING FROM THE STREET STOP, SHOOTING AND ARREST OF THE PLAINTIFF; THE DEFENDANT TRANSIT AUTHORITY’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined conflicting evidence precluded summary judgment in this civil action stemming from the street stop and arrest of the plaintiff. Although plaintiff pled guilty, which usually forecloses any argument that the arrest was not supported by probable cause, here evidence submitted the defendant transit authority raised a question of fact about probable cause. The action alleged the negligent use of excessive force (plaintiff was shot through the windshield of his vehicle), false arrest and unlawful imprisonment:

Excessive force claims are evaluated ” ‘under the Fourth Amendment’s “objective reasonableness” standard’ ” … . * * *

“Because of its intensely factual nature, the question of whether the use of force was reasonable under the circumstances is generally best left for a jury to decide” … .

” ‘The fact that a person whom a police officer attempts to arrest resists, threatens, or assaults the officer no doubt justifies the officer’s use of some degree of force, but it does not give the officer license to use force without limit. The force used by the officer must be reasonably related to the nature of the resistance and the force used, threatened, or reasonably perceived to be threatened, against the officer’ ” … . …

Though “[t]he existence of probable cause serves as a legal justification for the arrest and an affirmative defense to the [false imprisonment cause of action]” … , the issue of probable cause is “generally a question of fact to be decided by the jury, and should ‘be decided by the court only where there is no real dispute as to the facts or the proper inferences to be drawn surrounding the arrest’ ” … . Thomas v Niagara Frontier Tr. Auth., 2025 NY Slip Op 02433, Fourth Dept 4-25-25

Practice Point: Consult this decision for an analysis of “negligent use of excessive force,” “false arrest,” and “unlawful imprisonment” causes of action at the summary-judgment stage, in the face of conflicting evidence.​

 

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THERE IS A QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER THE “INSANITY” TOLL OF THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS APPLIES TO THIS ASSAULT AND FALSE ARREST ACTION AGAINST THE CITY AND POLICE OFFICERS; THE TOLL APPLIES WHEN PERSONS ARE UNABLE TO PROTECT THEIR LEGAL RIGHTS BECAUSE OF AN INABILITY TO FUNCTION IN SOCIETY (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department remitted the matter for a determination whether the statute of limitations was tolled because of petitioner’s “insanity” in this assault and false arrest action against the city and police officers:

Pursuant to CPLR 208(a) “[i]f a person entitled to commence an action is under a disability because of . . . insanity at the time the cause of action accrues, and . . . the time otherwise limited [for commencing the action] is less than three years, the time shall be extended by the period of disability.” A toll pursuant to CPLR 208(a) does not toll the necessity of filing a timely notice of claim; rather, it tolls only the time in which to apply for leave to serve a late notice of claim … .

CPLR 208(a) provides no definition of the term “insanity” … . However, the Court of Appeals has concluded that the insanity tolling provision should be narrowly construed and is available “only [to] those individuals who are unable to protect their legal rights because of an over-all inability to function in society” … . “[T]he condition of an individual’s mental capabilities is largely a factual question” … . “The task of determining whether the tolling provision [of CPLR 208] applies ‘is a pragmatic one, which necessarily involves consideration of all surrounding facts and circumstances relevant to the claimant’s ability to safeguard his or her legal rights'” … .

Here, the record before us presents a question of fact as to whether the petitioner was “unable to protect [his] legal rights because of an over-all inability to function in society” during the relevant period, as well as the duration of the alleged insanity … . Matter of Sinclair v City of New York, 2025 NY Slip Op 00453, Second Dept 1-29-25

Practice Point: CPLR 208(a) provides an “insanity toll” of the statute of limitations for persons unable to protect their legal rights because of an inability to function in society.

 

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THE MOTION TO AMEND THE COMPLAINT TO IDENTIFY “JOHN DOE” “JANE DOE” DEFENDANTS AS POLICE OFFICERS IN THIS CIVIL RIGHTS CASE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED; THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS HAD EXPIRED AND THE RELATION-BACK DOCTRINE DOES NOT APPLY (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the motion to amend the complaint to identify police officers as the “John Doe, Jane Doe” defendants in this 18 USC 1983 false arrest and unlawful search case should not have been granted. The statute of limitations had expired and the relation-back doctrine did not apply—police officers are not united in interest with the city:

CPLR 1024 provides that a “party who is ignorant, in whole or in part, of the name or identity of a person who may properly be made a party, may proceed against such person as an unknown party by designating so much of his name and identity as is known. If the name or remainder of the name becomes known all subsequent proceedings shall be taken under the true name and all prior proceedings shall be deemed amended accordingly.” “Yet, ‘parties are not to resort to the “Jane Doe” procedure unless they exercise due diligence, prior to the running of the statute of limitations, to identify the defendant by name and, despite such efforts, are unable to do so. Any failure to exercise due diligence to ascertain the “Jane Doe’s” name subjects the complaint to dismissal as to that party'” … .

Here, the statute of limitations had expired by the time the defendants were identified in the second amended complaint. Contrary to the plaintiff’s contention, the relation-back doctrine does not apply, because the defendants are not united in interest with the City … . The City “cannot be held vicariously liable for its employees’ violations of 42 USC § 1983, and there is no unity of interest in the absence of a relationship giving rise to such vicarious liability” … . Additionally, the plaintiff failed to demonstrate that he made diligent efforts to ascertain the defendants’ identities prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations or that the City hindered any such efforts … . Contrary to the plaintiff’s contentions, the Supreme Court’s prior orders allowing the plaintiff to amend the complaint to add the then-unknown defendants by name within a certain time period are not binding on these issues. The doctrine of the law of the case does not bind an appellate court … . Agosto v Maria, 2024 NY Slip Op 05950, Second Dept 11-27-24

Practice Point: Here the motion to amend the complaint to identify “John Doe” and “Jane Doe” defendants as police officers should have been denied because the statute of limitations had expired and the relation-back doctrine did not apply because police officers are not united in interest with the city which employs them.

 

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RECORDS ASSOCIATED WITH AN ARREST AND PROSECUTION AND PRISON MEDICAL RECORDS ALLEGEDLY RELATING TO AN ATTACK BY CORRECTION OFFICERS WERE NOT SUFFICIENT TO DEMONSTRATE THE RESPONDENT CITY HAD ACTUAL TIMELY NOTICE OF THE ASSOCIATED CLAIMS; LEAVE TO FILE LATE NOTICES OF CLAIM SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Troutman, reversing the Appellate Division, over a two-judge dissent in one case (Jaime) and concurrences in the other (Orozco), determined that the petitions for leave to file a late notice of claim, brought by the same attorney for the two petitioners, should not have been granted. Orozco alleged false arrest and malicious prosecution and Jaime alleged an attack by corrections officers. In neither case was the petition supported by an affidavit from the petitioner. The records associated with Orozco’s arrest and prosecution did not prove the respondent (NYC) had timely actual knowledge of the claim. Because Jaime did not file a grievance about the alleged attack by correction officers and did not provide an affidavit in support of the petition for leave to file late notice, there was no proof the City had actual timely knowledge of the claim:

Insofar as Orozco argued that the City would not be substantially prejudiced by the late filing because it acquired timely actual knowledge, Orozco’s failure to establish actual knowledge is fatal. Orozco’s further argument—that the City would not be substantially prejudiced because it will have to expend resources to defend against his 42 USC § 1983 claims—misapprehends the purpose served by the notice of claim requirement. … [T]he purpose is to afford the municipality the opportunity to investigate the claims and preserve evidence … , not simply to shield municipalities from litigation costs. Moreover, this argument understates the advantage of facing only a section 1983 claim that can be defended on qualified immunity grounds … , as opposed to facing that claim plus additional state law claims. * * *

The City conceded at oral argument that an incarcerated person might not file a grievance concerning a violent attack by a correction officer for fear of reprisal, a fear that may constitute a reasonable excuse for late service of a notice of claim. It would, however, be entirely speculative for us to consider that possibility here given the absence of any relevant evidence. Were Jaime in fact operating under such a fear, he could have submitted an affidavit attesting to the fact. That affidavit would have constituted evidence supporting an arguably reasonable excuse, which might provide at least some support for a court’s discretionary determination to allow late service.

Neither the allegation that Jaime sustained injuries in the attacks for which he sought medical attention in the infirmary, nor the allegation that the DOC created or maintained records relating to those injuries, establishes that the City acquired actual knowledge of the essential facts constituting the claim … . Matter of Jaime v City of New York, 2024 NY Slip Op 01581, CtApp 3-21-24

Practice Point: In these two cases the evidence of an arrest and prosecution in one case and an attack by correction officers in the other was insufficient to demonstrate the respondent City had actual timely knowledge of the facts underlying the claims against the City. The petitioners should not have been granted leave to file late notices of claim.

 

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AFTER A DIVORCE PLAINTIFF SUED THE EX-WIFE AND HER ATTORNEYS ALLEGING FALSE ARREST, MALICIOUS PROSECUTION, INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS AND VIOLATION OF JUDICIARY LAW 487; THOSE CAUSES OF ACTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined the false arrest, malicious prosecution, intentional infliction of emotional distress and Judiciary Law 487 causes of action against defendant attorneys should have dismissed for failure to state causes of action:

The plaintiff and the defendant Janet P. Lezama were married … . … Lezama commenced an action for a divorce … in which she was represented by the defendants Dana Navins and Kass & Navins, PLLC … . After the divorce … , the plaintiff commenced this action against Lezama and the attorney defendants to recover damages for false arrest, malicious prosecution, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and violation of Judiciary Law § 487 based on allegations that the defendants concocted a “plan” to obtain a divorce against the plaintiff and obtain an excessive “financial settlement.” … [P]laintiff alleged that, as part of this plan, Lezama made false allegations of child abuse and criminal conduct against the plaintiff. * * *

“To be held liable for false arrest, [a civilian] defendant must have affirmatively induced the officer to act, such as taking an active part in the arrest and procuring it to be made or showing active, officious and undue zeal, to the point where the officer is not acting of his or her own volition” … . Similarly, to be held liable for malicious prosecution, it must be shown that the defendant played an active role in the prosecution, such as giving advice and encouragement or importuning the authorities to act … . “Merely giving false information to the authorities does not constitute initiation of the proceeding without an additional allegation or showing that, at the time the information was provided, the defendant knew it to be false, yet still gave it to the police or District Attorney” … . * * *

With respect to the intentional infliction of emotional distress cause of action, the improper conduct alleged was not “so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community” … . With respect to the Judiciary Law § 487 cause of action, the plaintiff failed to allege with specificity any material misstatements of fact made by the attorney defendants in the divorce action with the intent to deceive that court … . Tueme v Lezama, 2023 NY Slip Op 03036, Second Dept 6-7-23

Practice Point: The complaint did not state causes of action for false arrest, malicious prosecution, intentional infliction of emotional distress or violation of Judiciary Law 487, criteria explained.

 

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PETITIONER DID NOT DEMONSTRATE THE COUNTY HAD TIMELY KNOWLEDGE OF THE FACTS UNDERLYING THE FALSE IMPRISONMENT AND MALICIOUS PROSECUTION CAUSES OF ACTION; THEREFORE PETITIONER SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED LEAVE TO FILE A LATE NOTICE OF CLAIM (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined petitioner should not have been granted leave to serve a late notice of claim in this false imprisonment/malicious prosecution action because petitioner did not demonstrate the municipality had timely notice of the potential lawsuit:

… [T]he petitioner failed to establish that the respondents acquired actual knowledge of the essential facts constituting his claims within 90 day after the claims arose or a reasonable time thereafter … . Moreover, the petitioner’s ignorance of the law was not a reasonable excuse for his failure to serve a timely notice of claim … . Finally, the petitioner failed to come forward with “some evidence or plausible argument” that the respondents will not be substantially prejudiced in maintaining a defense … . The conclusory assertion of the petitioner’s counsel in an affirmation in support of the petition that the respondents were “not prejudiced in any manner by this delay” was inadequate to satisfy the petitioner’s minimal initial burden with respect to this factor … . Matter of Pil-Yong Yoo v County of Suffolk, 2023 NY Slip Op 02008, Second Dept 4-19-23

Practice Point: Here the petitioner did not demonstrate the county had timely knowledge of the facts underlying the false imprisonment and malicious prosecution causes of action. Therefore petitioner should not have been granted leave to file a late notice of claim.

 

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PROBABLE CAUSE FOR ARREST IS A COMPLETE DEFENSE TO CAUSES OF ACTION FOR FALSE ARREST, FALSE IMPRISONMENT AND BATTERY STEMMING FROM THE ARREST (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court noted that probable cause for arrest is a complete defendant to causes of action for false arrest, false imprisonment and battery association with the arrest:

The Supreme Court should have granted those branches of the municipal defendants’ motion which were for summary judgment dismissing the seventh, eighth, and ninth causes of action, alleging false arrest, false imprisonment, and assault and battery insofar as asserted against them. The existence of probable cause constitutes a complete defense to causes of action alleging false arrest and false imprisonment … . The existence of probable cause is also a complete defense to a cause of action alleging assault and battery based solely on bodily contact during an allegedly unlawful arrest … . Farquharson v United Parcel Serv., 2022 NY Slip Op 01007, Second Dept 2-16-22

 

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FALSE ARREST AND FALSE IMPRISONMENT COMPLAINT PROPERLY DISMISSED AFTER A DEFENSE VERDICT; TWO JUSTICE DISSENT (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, over an extensive two-justice dissent, determined the false arrest and false imprisonment action was properly dismissed after a defense verdict at trial. The police were informed that plaintiff, who was walking away, was involved in an altercation. The officer stood in front of plaintiff to inquire. The plaintiff did not respond and walked into the officer. The officer then made a warrantless arrest for obstruction of justice:

We conclude that the officer’s act of “stepping in front of [plaintiff] in an attempt to engage him was a continuation of the officer’s own common-law right to inquire, not a seizure” … . …

… [W]hile “[a]n individual to whom a police officer addresses a question has a constitutional right not to respond” … , that person does not have the right to attempt to “walk through”—and thereby make physical contact with—the officer … . * * *

From the dissent:

… [T]he officer was not authorized to forcibly stop plaintiff and lacked probable cause to arrest plaintiff for obstructing governmental administration in the second degree for plaintiff’s purported obstruction of such an unauthorized forcible stop. Shaw v City of Rochester, 2021 NY Slip Op 07346, Fourth Dept 12-23-21

 

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PETITIONER ALLEGED HIS ARREST WARRANT WAS BASED UPON FALSE ATTESTATIONS AND SOUGHT TO FILE A LATE NOTICE OF CLAIM ALLEGING FALSE ARREST, FALSE IMPRISONMENT AND MALICIOUS PROSECUTION; THE CITY WAS DEEMED TO HAVE HAD TIMELY NOTICE OF THE ACTION BY VIRTUE OF THE CITY-PERSONNEL’S INVOLVEMENT IN DRAFTING THE WARRANT AND SUBSEQUENT REPORTS; THE REQUEST TO FILE A LATE NOTICE WAS PROPERLY GRANTED (FIRST DEPT). ​

The First Department, over a dissent, determined the petition seeking leave to file a late notice of claim against the respondent City of New York in this false arrest, false imprisonment and malicious prosecution action was properly granted. The main issue was whether the city had timely notice of the claim, and therefore was not prejudiced by the delay. Petitioner alleged the arrest warrant was based upon false information. The First Department noted it was not following its prior 2021 decision:

Respondent’s agents procured the allegedly false warrant upon attestations as to probable cause, executed the allegedly false arrest, and generated the reports pertaining thereto; the prosecutor would have had access to those same records and examined same in connection with preparing its opposition to defendant’s motions and in preparing more generally for trial. Indeed, personnel from the special narcotics prosecutor were present during the arrest. Under these circumstances, “knowledge of the essential facts constituting the claims within the statutory period can be imputed to the City” … . …

Pursuant to investigatory procedures, the officers, agents, assistant district attorneys, and investigators who were involved in petitioner’s arrest, detention, and prosecution were required to contemporaneously record factual details, including those related to any probable cause determination, so that the District Attorney’s Office might properly evaluate the merits of a potential criminal prosecution and draft an accusatory instrument.  …

While the mere existence of a report under certain circumstances might be insufficient to impute actual knowledge, here those reports were generated by those very persons who engaged in execution of the allegedly false arrest warrant and whose conduct forms the basis of petitioner’s suit. To the extent Matter of Singleton v City of New York (198 AD3d 498 [1st Dept 2021]) differs, we decline to follow it. If we are to depart from settled principle, we should do so explicitly and not on the basis of a one-paragraph memorandum opinion that does not cite or discuss the relevant precedent let alone express an intent to overrule it. Matter of Orozco v City of New York, 2021 NY Slip Op 07066, First Dept 12-16-21

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