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COLLEGE’S DETERMINATION STUDENT VIOLATED THE CODE OF STUDENT CONDUCT SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE, EVIDENTIARY STANDARD DEFINED (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, reversing the Appellate Division, determined that the college’s determination that petitioner-student violated  the code of student conduct was supported by substantial evidence:

“We emphasize that [t]he substantial evidence standard is a minimal standard” … , and “demands only that a given inference is reasonable and plausible, not necessarily the most probable”… . Stated differently, “[r]ationality is what is reviewed under the substantial evidence rule” …; substantial evidence is “such relevant proof as a reasonable mind may accept as adequate to support a conclusion or ultimate fact” . Where substantial evidence exists, the reviewing court may not substitute its judgment for that of the agency, even if the court would have decided the matter differently … .

“[O]ften there is substantial evidence on both sides of an issue disputed before an administrative agency” … . Where substantial evidence exists to support a decision being reviewed by the courts, the determination must be sustained, “irrespective of whether a similar quantum of evidence is available to support other varying conclusions”… . Moreover, hearsay is admissible as competent evidence in an administrative proceeding, and if sufficiently relevant and probative may constitute substantial evidence even if contradicted by live testimony on credibility grounds … . …

Contrary to petitioner’s argument, the hearsay evidence proffered at the administrative hearing, along with petitioner’s testimony, provides substantial evidence in support of the finding that he violated respondents’ code of conduct. The hearing board also could have reasonably interpreted some of petitioner’s conceded behavior as consciousness of guilt and concluded that his version of the events was not credible. Ultimately, it was the province of the hearing board to resolve any conflicts in the evidence and make credibility determinations. The Appellate Division improperly engaged in a re-weighing of the evidence when it substituted its own factual findings for those of respondents … . Matter of Haug v State Univ. of N.Y. at Potsdam, 2018 NY Slip Op 06964, CtApp 10-18-18

EDUCATION-SCHOOL LAW (COLLEGE’S DETERMINATION STUDENT VIOLATED THE CODE OF STUDENT CONDUCT SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE, EVIDENTIARY STANDARD DEFINED (CT APP))/EVIDENCE (EDUCATION-SCHOOL LAW, COLLEGE’S DETERMINATION STUDENT VIOLATED THE CODE OF STUDENT CONDUCT SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE, EVIDENTIARY STANDARD DEFINED (CT APP))/ADMINISTRATIVE LAW  (EDUCATION-SCHOOL LAW, COLLEGE’S DETERMINATION STUDENT VIOLATED THE CODE OF STUDENT CONDUCT SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE, EVIDENTIARY STANDARD DEFINED (CT APP))/COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES (DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS, COLLEGE’S DETERMINATION STUDENT VIOLATED THE CODE OF STUDENT CONDUCT SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE, EVIDENTIARY STANDARD DEFINED (CT APP))/SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE (ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, COLLEGE’S DETERMINATION STUDENT VIOLATED THE CODE OF STUDENT CONDUCT SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE, EVIDENTIARY STANDARD DEFINED (CT APP))

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MOTHER’S PETITION FOR CUSTODY AND PERMISSION TO RELOCATE TO TEXAS SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing Family Court, determined mother’s request to relocate should have been granted:

We find that Family Court’s determination denying the mother’s relocation request and granting the parties joint legal custody is not supported by a sound and substantial basis in the record. If not permitted to relocate, the mother’s only potential resource — besides public assistance — would be the father. Given the father’s significant criminal history — which includes domestic violence against the mother — this is not a situation we can countenance. Further, there is nothing in the record to suggest that the father is willing or able to assist the mother or the child in any way. The undisputed evidence was that the father’s financial support and parenting time was limited, sporadic and offered at his whim. Indisputably, the mother has been the child’s primary caretaker, the father provided almost no financial support and his very limited relationship with the child existed only through the mother’s efforts. Moreover, given the father’s history and evidence of domestic violence, we do not believe that joint legal custody is in the child’s best interests … . We note that, although not dispositive, the trial attorney for the child did not oppose the mother’s petition or her relocation request … .

We are mindful that our holding results in the child residing a significant distance from the father. The record indicates that the mother has consistently made the effort to remain in contact with the father, to send pictures and to initiate telephone calls and visits. We discern no basis upon which to conclude that she will not continue to do so. As the child grows, such contact will become more important and have a greater impact on the father’s ability to establish and maintain a relationship with the child. Accordingly, we remit this matter to Family Court to establish an appropriate schedule for telephone calls and parenting time with the father. Matter of Fisher v Perez, 2018 NY Slip Op 07014, Third Dept 10-18-18

FAMILY LAW (MOTHER’S PETITION FOR CUSTODY AND PERMISSION TO RELOCATE TO TEXAS SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (THIRD DEPT))/CUSTODY (FAMILY LAW, MOTHER’S PETITION FOR CUSTODY AND PERMISSION TO RELOCATE TO TEXAS SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (THIRD DEPT))/RELOCATE (FAMILY LAW, MOTHER’S PETITION FOR CUSTODY AND PERMISSION TO RELOCATE TO TEXAS SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (THIRD DEPT))/EVIDENCE (FAMILY LAW, CUSTODY, RELOCATE, (MOTHER’S PETITION FOR CUSTODY AND PERMISSION TO RELOCATE TO TEXAS SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (THIRD DEPT))

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MOTHER WAS NOT GIVEN THE CHANCE TO ADEQUATELY RESPOND TO THE ALLEGATIONS FORMING THE BASIS OF FAMILY COURT’S FINDING THAT MOTHER VIOLATED A VISITATION ORDER, MATTER REMITTED (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, remitting the matter, determined that mother never got the chance to respond to allegations which were the basis for granting father’s violation petition. Father alleged mother denied the father parenting time in violation of the temporary order of custody and visitation:

We agree with the mother that she was not given adequate notice of the allegation forming the basis of Family Court’s determination. In granting the father’s violation petition, Family Court found that the mother violated the June 2015 order by denying the father parenting time on January 22, 2017. Any denial of visitation on this specific date, however, was never alleged by the father in either his violation petition or his emergency application. Rather, this claim was raised for the first time when the parties appeared before Family Court on January 23, 2017. Moreover, Family Court did not entertain any proof with respect to the actual allegations in the father’s pleadings. In this regard, when the mother’s counsel inquired as to the purpose of the January 23, 2017 hearing, Family Court responded that it was to address specifically what transpired on January 22, 2017. Furthermore, there is no indication in the record that the father moved to amend his pleadings to add an allegation relating to the January 22, 2017 incident … or moved to conform the pleadings to the proof adduced at the hearing after the parties testified … . Matter of Pike v Bigelow, 2018 NY Slip Op 07006, Third Dept 10-18-18

FAMILY LAW (MOTHER WAS NOT GIVEN THE CHANCE TO ADEQUATELY RESPOND TO THE ALLEGATIONS FORMING THE BASIS OF FAMILY COURT’S FINDING THAT MOTHER VIOLATED A VISITATION ORDER, MATTER REMITTED (THIRD DEPT))/EVIDENCE (FAMILY LAW, MOTHER WAS NOT GIVEN THE CHANCE TO ADEQUATELY RESPOND TO THE ALLEGATIONS FORMING THE BASIS OF FAMILY COURT’S FINDING THAT MOTHER VIOLATED A VISITATION ORDER, MATTER REMITTED (THIRD DEPT))

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FAMILY COURT SHOULD HAVE HELD A HEARING TO DETERMINE WHETHER THE MATERNAL GRANDPARENTS HAD STANDING TO SEEK VISITATION AND WHETHER VISITATION WOULD BE IN THE CHILD’S BEST INTERESTS, FAMILY COURT HAD MADE FINDINGS BASED UPON PRIOR PROCEEDINGS THAT WERE NOT PART OF THE RECORD (THIRD DEPT).

The Second Department held that a hearing was necessary to determine whether the maternal grandparents had standing to seek visitation and whether such visitation would be in the child’s best interests. Family Court, based on prior proceedings that were not part of the record, had found that the maternal grandparents had standing but visitation would not be in the best interests of the child:

A grandparent may establish a statutory right to visitation where “circumstances show that conditions exist which equity would see fit to intervene” … . To determine whether visitation is appropriate, a court must first decide whether the grandparent has standing to seek visitation before deciding whether visitation is in the child’s best interests … . Standing is established where the grandparent demonstrates that there is “a sufficient existing relationship with the[] grandchild . . . [or] a sufficient effort to establish one, so that the court perceives it as one deserving the court’s intervention”… . The sufficiency of the grandparent’s efforts in this regard “must always be measured against what [he or she] could reasonably have done under the circumstances” … . If standing is established, the court’s best interests determination “requires evaluation of a variety of factors, including the nature and extent of the existing relationship between the grandparent and child, the basis and reasonableness of the parent’s objections, the grandparent’s nurturing skills and attitude toward the parent[], the attorney for the child’s assessment and the child’s wishes” … . Matter of Ferguson v Weaver, 2018 NY Slip Op 07005, Third Dept 10-18-18

FAMILY LAW (VISITATION, FAMILY COURT SHOULD HAVE HELD A HEARING TO DETERMINE WHETHER THE MATERNAL GRANDPARENTS HAD STANDING TO SEEK VISITATION AND WHETHER VISITATION WOULD BE IN THE CHILD’S BEST INTERESTS, FAMILY COURT HAD MADE FINDINGS BASED UPON PRIOR PROCEEDINGS THAT WERE NOT PART OF THE RECORD (THIRD DEPT))/EVIDENCE (FAMILY LAW, VISITATION, FAMILY COURT SHOULD HAVE HELD A HEARING TO DETERMINE WHETHER THE MATERNAL GRANDPARENTS HAD STANDING TO SEEK VISITATION AND WHETHER VISITATION WOULD BE IN THE CHILD’S BEST INTERESTS, FAMILY COURT HAD MADE FINDINGS BASED UPON PRIOR PROCEEDINGS THAT WERE NOT PART OF THE RECORD (THIRD DEPT))/APPEALS (FAMILY LAW, VISITATION,  FAMILY COURT SHOULD HAVE HELD A HEARING TO DETERMINE WHETHER THE MATERNAL GRANDPARENTS HAD STANDING TO SEEK VISITATION AND WHETHER VISITATION WOULD BE IN THE CHILD’S BEST INTERESTS, FAMILY COURT HAD MADE FINDINGS BASED UPON PRIOR PROCEEDINGS THAT WERE NOT PART OF THE RECORD (THIRD DEPT))/VISITATION (FAMILY COURT SHOULD HAVE HELD A HEARING TO DETERMINE WHETHER THE MATERNAL GRANDPARENTS HAD STANDING TO SEEK VISITATION AND WHETHER VISITATION WOULD BE IN THE CHILD’S BEST INTERESTS, FAMILY COURT HAD MADE FINDINGS BASED UPON PRIOR PROCEEDINGS THAT WERE NOT PART OF THE RECORD (THIRD DEPT))

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MATTER REMITTED FOR FINDINGS CONCERNING WHETHER NEW YORK IS THE MORE APPROPRIATE OR CONVENIENT FORUM FOR THE CUSTODY PROCEEDINGS, CUSTODY PROCEEDINGS WERE PENDING IN A MISSISSIPPI COURT (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing and remitting the matter to make a record, determined that Family Court properly communicated with the Mississippi court in which mother had also commenced a pending custody proceeding but did not make a sufficient record in finding that Mississippi court retained jurisdiction of the custody:

The Mississippi court’s statements during the conference confirm that a child custody proceeding was still pending in that state and had been commenced prior to the mother’s Family Court proceeding, as those terms are defined by the UCCJEA [Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act] … . Because the custody portion of the divorce action was still pending in Mississippi when the mother filed her custody modification petition in Family Court, the applicable provision of the UCCJEA is Domestic Relations Law § 76-e, entitled “[s]imultaneous proceedings.” Pursuant to that statute, a New York court may not exercise jurisdiction if, at the time the New York proceeding is commenced, a custody proceeding concerning the same child has been commenced in another state having jurisdiction under the UCCJEA, unless a court in the other state terminates or stays that proceeding because a New York court constitutes a more convenient forum under Domestic Relations Law § 76-f … . Procedurally, if a New York court determines that a custody proceeding has been commenced in another court in accordance with the UCCJEA, the New York court must stay its proceeding, communicate with the other court and, if the other court does not determine that New York is the more appropriate forum, dismiss the proceeding (see Domestic Relations Law § 76-e [2]). …

Although Family Court stated in its order that the Mississippi court “has retained jurisdiction,” that does not sufficiently answer the jurisdictional question under the UCCJEA. The Mississippi court, as the court where the first of two simultaneous child custody proceedings was filed, had to determine whether New York would be a more appropriate or convenient forum … . Matter of Hiles v Hiles, 2018 NY Slip Op 07004, Third Dept 10-18-18

FAMILY LAW (MATTER REMITTED FOR FINDINGS CONCERNING WHETHER NEW YORK IS THE MORE APPROPRIATE OR CONVENIENT FORUM FOR THE CUSTODY PROCEEDINGS, CUSTODY PROCEEDINGS WERE PENDING IN A MISSISSIPPI COURT (THIRD DEPT))/CUSTODY (FAMILY LAW, MATTER REMITTED FOR FINDINGS CONCERNING WHETHER NEW YORK IS THE MORE APPROPRIATE OR CONVENIENT FORUM FOR THE CUSTODY PROCEEDINGS, CUSTODY PROCEEDINGS WERE PENDING IN A MISSISSIPPI COURT (THIRD DEPT))/CIVIL PROCEDURE (FAMILY LAW, CUSTODY, MATTER REMITTED FOR FINDINGS CONCERNING WHETHER NEW YORK IS THE MORE APPROPRIATE OR CONVENIENT FORUM FOR THE CUSTODY PROCEEDINGS, CUSTODY PROCEEDINGS WERE PENDING IN A MISSISSIPPI COURT (THIRD DEPT))/UNIFORM CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION AND ENFORCEMENT ACT (UCCJEA) MATTER REMITTED FOR FINDINGS CONCERNING WHETHER NEW YORK IS THE MORE APPROPRIATE OR CONVENIENT FORUM FOR THE CUSTODY PROCEEDINGS, CUSTODY PROCEEDINGS WERE PENDING IN A MISSISSIPPI COURT (THIRD DEPT))

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FATHER REBUTTED THE STATUTORY PRESUMPTION THAT THE CHILD’S MEDICAL CONDITION WAS THE RESULT OF NEGLECT AND ABUSE, NEGLECT AND ABUSE FINDINGS REVERSED (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing Family Court, determined the respondent father had rebutted the presumption that the child’s medical condition was caused by abuse with medical evidence. Because the neglect and abuse petition relied entirely on the statutory presumption, the neglect and abuse findings were not supported:

Family Ct Act § 1046 (a) (ii) provides that petitioner may establish “a prima facie case of child abuse or neglect . . . through evidence that the child sustained an injury that would ordinarily not occur absent an act or omission of the respondent, and that the respondent was the caretaker of the child at the time that the injury occurred” … . Contrary to respondent’s contention, petitioner did so here. It was undisputed that respondent was alone with the child when she stopped breathing, and the consulting pediatrician testified to her involvement in the child’s case and the reasons that she became convinced that recent, nonaccidental trauma was the only explanation for the child’s condition.

This prima facie case did not guarantee a finding of abuse or neglect, but “establish[ed] a rebuttable presumption of parental culpability which the court may or may not accept based upon all the evidence in the record”… . Petitioner must still prove abuse or neglect by a preponderance of the evidence and, importantly, proof of “a reasonable explanation for the child’s injuries” will rebut the presumption of culpability … . As such, before relying upon the presumption set forth by Family Ct Act § 1046 (a) (ii), “the court should consider such factors as the strength of the prima facie case and the credibility of the witnesses testifying in support of it, the nature of the injury, the age of the child, relevant medical or scientific evidence and the reasonableness of the caretaker’s explanation in light of all the circumstances” … . Matter of Liana HH. (Christopher HH.), 2018 NY Slip Op 07001, Third Dept 10-18-18

FAMILY LAW (NEGLECT, ABUSE, FATHER REBUTTED THE STATUTORY PRESUMPTION THAT THE CHILD’S MEDICAL CONDITION WAS THE RESULT OF NEGLECT AND ABUSE, NEGLECT AND ABUSE FINDINGS REVERSED (THIRD DEPT))/NEGLECT (FAMILY  LAW, FATHER REBUTTED THE STATUTORY PRESUMPTION THAT THE CHILD’S MEDICAL CONDITION WAS THE RESULT OF NEGLECT AND ABUSE, NEGLECT AND ABUSE FINDINGS REVERSED (THIRD DEPT))/ABUSE (FAMILY  LAW, FATHER REBUTTED THE STATUTORY PRESUMPTION THAT THE CHILD’S MEDICAL CONDITION WAS THE RESULT OF NEGLECT AND ABUSE, NEGLECT AND ABUSE FINDINGS REVERSED (THIRD DEPT))/EVIDENCE (FAMILY LAW, NEGLECT, ABUSE, FATHER REBUTTED THE STATUTORY PRESUMPTION THAT THE CHILD’S MEDICAL CONDITION WAS THE RESULT OF NEGLECT AND ABUSE, NEGLECT AND ABUSE FINDINGS REVERSED (THIRD DEPT))

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BANK’S EVIDENCE OF STANDING TO BRING THE FORECLOSURE ACTION INSUFFICIENT (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined that plaintiff bank did not demonstrate standing to bring the foreclosure action:

Where, as here, the note has been endorsed in blank, the purported holder of the note must establish its standing by demonstrating that the original note was physically delivered to it prior to the commencement of the action (see UCC 3-202[1]; 3-204[2]…). The plaintiff attempted to establish its standing through the affidavit of Jonathan Manko, an officer of Bank of America, N.A., the purported servicing agent for the plaintiff. Manko averred that he reviewed all of the documents attached to his affidavit and “authenticate[d] them as coming directly from the loan file at issue herein and kept in the ordinary course of business.” Manko averred that this action was commenced on December 30, 2010, and at that time, the plaintiff was in possession of the original note and mortgage. However, the plaintiff failed to demonstrate that the records Manko relied upon were admissible under the business records exception to the hearsay rule (see CPLR 4518[a]) because Manko, an officer of Bank of America, N.A., did not attest that he was personally familiar with the plaintiff’s record-keeping practices and procedures … . Bank of N.Y. Mellon v Selig, 2018 NY Slip Op 06874, Second Dept 10-17-18

FORECLOSURE (BANK’S EVIDENCE OF STANDING TO BRING THE FORECLOSURE ACTION INSUFFICIENT (SECOND DEPT))/CIVIL PROCEDURE (FORECLOSURE, STANDING, BANK’S EVIDENCE OF STANDING TO BRING THE FORECLOSURE ACTION INSUFFICIENT (SECOND DEPT))/EVIDENCE (FORECLOSURE, STANDING, BANK’S EVIDENCE OF STANDING TO BRING THE FORECLOSURE ACTION INSUFFICIENT (SECOND DEPT))/HEARSAY (FORECLOSURE, BANK’S EVIDENCE OF STANDING TO BRING THE FORECLOSURE ACTION INSUFFICIENT (SECOND DEPT))/BUSINESS RECORDS EXCEPTION TO HEARSAY RULE (FORECLOSURE, BANK’S EVIDENCE OF STANDING TO BRING THE FORECLOSURE ACTION INSUFFICIENT (SECOND DEPT))

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PLAINTIFF OFFERED DIFFERENT EXPLANATIONS OF THE CAUSE OF HIS FALL, COURT HELD PLAINTIFF COULD NOT IDENTIFY THE CAUSE OF HIS FALL, REQUIRING DISMISSAL (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined plaintiff’s action in this slip and fall case was properly dismissed. Plaintiff had offered several different allegations about the cause of his fall. The court held plaintiff was unable to identify the cause of his fall:

The defendant established its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by demonstrating, through the submission, inter alia, of the plaintiff’s deposition testimony and amended bill of particulars, that the plaintiff could not identify the cause of his fall without engaging in speculation … . In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact. The plaintiff’s sworn statement, submitted in opposition to the defendant’s motion, that he expected the floor of the diner to be “level with the landing,” presented what appears to be a feigned issue of fact designed to avoid the consequences of his prior deposition testimony … . Pasqualoni v Jacklou Corp., 2018 NY Slip Op 06928, Second Dept 10-17-18

NEGLIGENCE (SLIP AND FALL, PLAINTIFF OFFERED DIFFERENT EXPLANATIONS OF THE CAUSE OF HIS FALL, COURT HELD PLAINTIFF COULD NOT IDENTIFY THE CAUSE OF HIS FALL, REQUIRING DISMISSAL (SECOND DEPT))/SLIP AND FALL (PLAINTIFF OFFERED DIFFERENT EXPLANATIONS OF THE CAUSE OF HIS FALL, COURT HELD PLAINTIFF COULD NOT IDENTIFY THE CAUSE OF HIS FALL, REQUIRING DISMISSAL (SECOND DEPT)

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PLAINTIFF IN THIS LABOR LAW 240 (1) ACTION WAS INJURED WHEN THE ROOF OF THE BUILDING COLLAPSED, HIS ACTION AGAINST HIS EMPLOYER (A DEMOLITION COMPANY) WAS BARRED BY THE EXCLUSIVITY PROVISIONS OF THE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW, QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER THE COLLAPSE WAS FORESEEABLE IN THE ACTION AGAINST THE BUILDING OWNER, EVIDENCE THAT BEAMS HAD BEEN CUT WAS INADMISSIBLE HEARSAY (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined plaintiff’s Labor Law 240 (1) action against his employer (a demolition company) was barred by the exclusivity provisions of the Workers’ Compensation Law. Plaintiff fell when the roof of the building collapsed. Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment against the owner of the building was properly denied because there was a question of fact whether the collapse of the roof was foreseeable:

In order for liability to be imposed under Labor Law § 240(1), there must be “a foreseeable risk of injury from an elevation-related hazard . . . , as defendants are liable for all normal and foreseeable consequences of their acts'” … . In support of his motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff failed to demonstrate, prima facie, that the partial collapse of the roof and, in turn, the need for safety devices to protect the plaintiff from that hazard, were foreseeable … . The plaintiff’s deposition testimony that he was told that the roof collapsed because the beams from the third-floor ceiling had been cut constituted inadmissible hearsay … . Paguay v Cup of Tea, LLC, 2018 NY Slip Op 06926, Second Dept 10-17-18

LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW (PLAINTIFF IN THIS LABOR LAW 240 (1) ACTION WAS INJURED WHEN THE ROOF OF THE BUILDING COLLAPSED, HIS ACTION AGAINST HIS EMPLOYER (A DEMOLITION COMPANY) WAS BARRED BY THE EXCLUSIVITY PROVISIONS OF THE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW, QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER THE COLLAPSE WAS FORESEEABLE IN THE ACTION AGAINST THE BUILDING OWNER (SECOND DEPT))/WORKERS’ COMPENSATION  (PLAINTIFF IN THIS LABOR LAW 240 (1) ACTION WAS INJURED WHEN THE ROOF OF THE BUILDING COLLAPSED, HIS ACTION AGAINST HIS EMPLOYER (A DEMOLITION COMPANY) WAS BARRED BY THE EXCLUSIVITY PROVISIONS OF THE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW, QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER THE COLLAPSE WAS FORESEEABLE IN THE ACTION AGAINST THE BUILDING OWNER (SECOND DEPT))/EVIDENCE (HEARSAY, PLAINTIFF IN THIS LABOR LAW 240 (1) ACTION WAS INJURED WHEN THE ROOF OF THE BUILDING COLLAPSED, HIS ACTION AGAINST HIS EMPLOYER (A DEMOLITION COMPANY) WAS BARRED BY THE EXCLUSIVITY PROVISIONS OF THE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW, QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER THE COLLAPSE WAS FORESEEABLE IN THE ACTION AGAINST THE BUILDING OWNER, EVIDENCE THAT BEAMS HAD BEEN CUT WAS INADMISSIBLE HEARSAY (SECOND DEPT))/HEARSAY (PLAINTIFF IN THIS LABOR LAW 240 (1) ACTION WAS INJURED WHEN THE ROOF OF THE BUILDING COLLAPSED, HIS ACTION AGAINST HIS EMPLOYER (A DEMOLITION COMPANY) WAS BARRED BY THE EXCLUSIVITY PROVISIONS OF THE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW, QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER THE COLLAPSE WAS FORESEEABLE IN THE ACTION AGAINST THE BUILDING OWNER, EVIDENCE THAT BEAMS HAD BEEN CUT WAS INADMISSIBLE HEARSAY (SECOND DEPT))

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CUSTODY MODIFICATION PETITION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED WITHOUT A HEARING (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, remitting the matter for a hearing, determined that Family Court should not have granted mother's modification and violation petitions without holding a hearing:

Where a facially sufficient petition has been filed, modification of orders relating to custody and visitation generally require a full and comprehensive hearing at which a parent is to be afforded a full and fair opportunity to be heard … . A decision regarding child custody and parental access should be based on admissible evidence … . Here, in making its determination, the Family Court relied solely on information provided at court conferences, and the hearsay statements and conclusions of the forensic evaluator, whose opinions and credibility were untested by either party … . The court should have conducted a hearing to ascertain the child's best interests before it modified the … Order … . Matter of Migliore v Santiago, 2018 NY Slip Op 06911, Second Dept 10-17-18

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