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REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT, ALTHOUGH MISSING SOME TERMS, SATISFIED THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS, SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE ACTION, HOWEVER, SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED, PLAINTIFF FAILED TO DEMONSTRATE THE FINANCIAL ABILITY TO CLOSE ON THE LAW DATE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department agreed with Supreme Court that the real estate purchase contract, although some terms were missing, satisfied the statute of frauds, Therefore the motion to dismiss the action for specific performance was properly denied. However, Supreme Court should not have granted summary judgment because plaintiff failed to demonstrate he had the financial ability to purchase the property on the law date:

“Only reasonable certainty, not absolute certainty, as to the terms of the agreement is required” … . Here, the essential terms of the contract were explicitly contained in the agreement, thus satisfying the requirements of the statute of frauds. The agreement is subscribed by the parties to be charged, identifies the parties to the transaction, describes the property to be sold with sufficient particularity, and states the purchase price, the down payment received, and how the purchase price was to be paid … . Additionally, while some terms, such as the closing date, the quality of title to be conveyed, and the risk of loss between the contract and the closing, are not included within the agreement, the remaining terms are clear and enforceable and, thus, the law will serve to fill in those missing provisions … . …

… [T]he plaintiff’s submissions failed to demonstrate that he had the financial ability to consummate the sale of the property on January 25, 2016, the date which he had set for the closing in his time-is-of-the-essence letter to the defendant. The plaintiff’s submissions highlighted, rather than eliminated, triable issues of fact as to whether he possessed the funds necessary to consummate the sale. In light of the foregoing, the plaintiff did not meet his prima facie burden on his motion, and thus, the motion should have been denied without regard to the sufficiency of the opposition papers … . O’Hanlon v Renwick, 2018 NY Slip Op 08027, Second Dept 11-21-18

REAL ESTATE (REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT, ALTHOUGH MISSING SOME TERMS, SATISFIED THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS, SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE ACTION, HOWEVER, SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED, PLAINTIFF FAILED TO DEMONSTRATE THE FINANCIAL ABILITY TO CLOSE ON THE LAW DATE (SECOND DEPT))/CONTRACT LAW (REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT, ALTHOUGH MISSING SOME TERMS, SATISFIED THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS, SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE ACTION, HOWEVER, SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED, PLAINTIFF FAILED TO DEMONSTRATE THE FINANCIAL ABILITY TO CLOSE ON THE LAW DATE (SECOND DEPT))/SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE (REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT, ALTHOUGH MISSING SOME TERMS, SATISFIED THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS, SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE ACTION, HOWEVER, SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED, PLAINTIFF FAILED TO DEMONSTRATE THE FINANCIAL ABILITY TO CLOSE ON THE LAW DATE (SECOND DEPT))/EVIDENCE (REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT, ALTHOUGH MISSING SOME TERMS, SATISFIED THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS, SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE ACTION, HOWEVER, SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED, PLAINTIFF FAILED TO DEMONSTRATE THE FINANCIAL ABILITY TO CLOSE ON THE LAW DATE (SECOND DEPT))

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PETITIONER’S PUBLIC ASSISTANCE BENEFITS SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN TERMINATED, NOTICE DID NOT SPECIFY SPECIFIC INSTANCES OF A FAILURE TO COOPERATION WITH EMPLOYMENT TRAINING AND SOME EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT THE HEARING WAS NOT INCLUDED IN THE NOTICE, PETITIONER’S DUE PROCESS RIGHTS WERE VIOLATED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing the Commissioner of the New York State Office of Temporary and Disability Assistance, determined the Nassau County Department of Social Services’ notice to petitioner of the termination of her public assistance benefits was defective and violated her right to due process. The notice did not include any specific instance of a refusal to cooperate with the employment training program, and the subsequent hearing considered evidence not mentioned in the notice:

A local agency may not discontinue a recipient’s public assistance benefits unless the recipient’s failure to comply with one of the department’s work rules is found to be willful and without good cause” (,,,see Social Services Law § 341[1]). A social services agency is required to provide an individual whose public assistance benefits are being discontinued with written notice that includes “the specific instance or instances of willful refusal or failure to comply without good cause” with employment requirements (Social Services Law § 341[1][b]). “A notice specifying the wrong charge as the basis for a reduction in benefits does not comply with the regulatory standard, nor with the constitutional standards of due process”… .

Here, the petitioner correctly contends that the agency’s notice was defective because it did not include any specific instances of her willful refusal without good cause to cooperate with the employment training program … . Additionally, at the fair hearing, the agency offered evidence that the petitioner submitted a falsified timesheet indicating that she continued to attend training after her participation in the program was terminated, a charge not included in the notice. Accordingly, because the notice lacked specificity and failed to adequately advise the petitioner of the issues which were the subject of the hearing, the notice violated the petitioner’s right to due process of law … . Matter of Pearl v Imhof, 2018 NY Slip Op 08024, Second Dept 11-21-18

SOCIAL SERVICES LAW (PETITIONER’S PUBLIC ASSISTANCE BENEFITS SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN TERMINATED, NOTICE DID NOT SPECIFY SPECIFIC INSTANCES OF A FAILURE TO COOPERATION WITH EMPLOYMENT TRAINING AND SOME EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT THE HEARING WAS NOT INCLUDED IN THE NOTICE, PETITIONER’S DUE PROCESS RIGHTS WERE VIOLATED (SECOND DEPT))/MUNICIPAL LAW (SOCIAL SERVICES LAW, PETITIONER’S PUBLIC ASSISTANCE BENEFITS SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN TERMINATED, NOTICE DID NOT SPECIFY SPECIFIC INSTANCES OF A FAILURE TO COOPERATION WITH EMPLOYMENT TRAINING AND SOME EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT THE HEARING WAS NOT INCLUDED IN THE NOTICE, PETITIONER’S DUE PROCESS RIGHTS WERE VIOLATED (SECOND DEPT))/CONSTITUTIONAL LAW  (SOCIAL SERVICES LAW, PETITIONER’S PUBLIC ASSISTANCE BENEFITS SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN TERMINATED, NOTICE DID NOT SPECIFY SPECIFIC INSTANCES OF A FAILURE TO COOPERATION WITH EMPLOYMENT TRAINING AND SOME EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT THE HEARING WAS NOT INCLUDED IN THE NOTICE, PETITIONER’S DUE PROCESS RIGHTS WERE VIOLATED (SECOND DEPT))/EVIDENCE (SOCIAL SERVICES LAW, PUBLIC ASSISTANCE BENEFITS, NOTICE, HEARING, PETITIONER’S PUBLIC ASSISTANCE BENEFITS SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN TERMINATED, NOTICE DID NOT SPECIFY SPECIFIC INSTANCES OF A FAILURE TO COOPERATION WITH EMPLOYMENT TRAINING AND SOME EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT THE HEARING WAS NOT INCLUDED IN THE NOTICE, PETITIONER’S DUE PROCESS RIGHTS WERE VIOLATED (SECOND DEPT))

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RESISTING ARREST COUNT RENDERED DUPLICITOUS BY TRIAL TESTIMONY, UNPRESERVED ERROR CONSIDERED IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE, RESISTING ARREST CONVICTION REVERSED (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing defendant’s resisting arrest conviction, determined that the trial evidence rendered the resisting arrest count of the indictment duplicitous. At trial evidence of two separate circumstance where defendant was alleged to have resisted arrest, involving different police officers, was presented. Although the error was not preserved, the court considered the issue under its interest of justice jurisdiction:

“Even if a count facially charges one criminal act, that count is duplicitous if the evidence makes plain that multiple criminal acts occurred during the relevant time period, rendering it nearly impossible to determine the particular act upon which the jury reached its verdict” … . The indictment charged defendant with one count of resisting arrest. According to the record evidence, however, the jury was presented with two instances where defendant resisted an officer’s arrest — one involving the victim that turned violent and the other involving the officers who discovered him in the dumpster. We also note that, during deliberation, the jury asked whether it could consider the incident at the dumpster with respect to the resisting arrest charge or solely defendant’s encounter with the victim. In our view, Supreme Court’s response in rereading count 5 of the indictment failed to dispel any confusion by the jury… . Although this argument is unpreserved for review, we take corrective action in the interest of justice by dismissing count 5 of the indictment with leave to the People to re-present any appropriate charges to a new grand jury … . People v Hilton. 2018 NY Slip Op 07981, Third Dept 11-21-18

CRIMINAL LAW (RESISTING ARREST COUNT RENDERED DUPLICITOUS BY TRIAL TESTIMONY, UNPRESERVED ERROR CONSIDERED IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE, RESISTING ARREST CONVICTION REVERSED (THIRD DEPT))/EVIDENCE (CRIMINAL LAW, RESISTING ARREST COUNT RENDERED DUPLICITOUS BY TRIAL TESTIMONY, UNPRESERVED ERROR CONSIDERED IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE, RESISTING ARREST CONVICTION REVERSED (THIRD DEPT))/APPEAL (CRIMINAL LAW, RESISTING ARREST COUNT RENDERED DUPLICITOUS BY TRIAL TESTIMONY, UNPRESERVED ERROR CONSIDERED IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE, RESISTING ARREST CONVICTION REVERSED (THIRD DEPT))/INDICTMENTS (RESISTING ARREST COUNT RENDERED DUPLICITOUS BY TRIAL TESTIMONY, UNPRESERVED ERROR CONSIDERED IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE, RESISTING ARREST CONVICTION REVERSED (THIRD DEPT))/DUPLICITOUS (CRIMINAL LAW, RESISTING ARREST COUNT RENDERED DUPLICITOUS BY TRIAL TESTIMONY, UNPRESERVED ERROR CONSIDERED IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE, RESISTING ARREST CONVICTION REVERSED (THIRD DEPT))

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FAMILY COURT’S FINDING THAT FREEING THE CHILD FOR ADOPTION WOULD NOT BE IN THE CHILD’S BEST INTERESTS WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY A SOUND AND SUBSTANTIAL BASIS (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Family Court, determined it was in the best interests of the child to free the child for adoption without the consent of father. Mother’s parental rights had terminated, but the court-appointed evaluator testified the relationship with father was positive and should not be terminated. The Second Department held that other evidence which supported freeing the child for adoption was not given sufficient weight:

“This Court will not disturb a Family Court’s determination regarding the best interests of the child unless it lacks a sound and substantial basis in the record” … . Here, the hearing court’s finding that it would be in the best interests of the child to remain in foster care instead of being freed for adoption lacks such a sound and substantial basis. The finding was based primarily on the opinions offered by the court-appointed evaluator, who recommended that the foster mother have custody of the child because she raised him since he was an infant, she has an “extremely close bond” with him, and she is able to take care of the child’s special needs. While the evaluator also opined that the child has a “very positive relationship” with the father, and that it would not be in the best interests of the child to sever that relationship by freeing the child for adoption, the evaluator conceded that the foster mother and the father view each other with “significant distrust,” that the child “hears conflicting information” from the foster mother and the father, that the child “senses their anger and conflict,” and that the conflict was “very stre not determinative … . Based on the record before us, we find that the hearing court gave undue weight to the evaluator’s conclusions with regard to the benefits of the child’s relationship with the father … and failed to accord sufficient weight to the impact on the child of long-term foster care, which would continue to expose him to the distrust between the foster mother and the father, and deprive the child of “a permanent, nurturing family relationship” …  .

Moreover, the Family Court did not give sufficient weight to testimony from the assigned case planner and the foster mother that the child repeatedly had contact with the birth mother during his visits with the father, in violation of the court’s directive precluding such contact with the birth mother. Similarly, the evaluator did not consider either the possibility that the father was exposing the child to the birth mother or the effects on the child of continued contact with the birth mother, information vital to assessing the best interests of the child. Matter of Jasiah T.-V. S.J. (Joshua W.–Shatesse J.), 2018 NY Slip Op 08020, Second Dept 11-21-18

FAMILY LAW (FAMILY COURT’S FINDING THAT FREEING THE CHILD FOR ADOPTION WOULD NOT BE IN THE CHILD’S BEST INTERESTS WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY A SOUND AND SUBSTANTIAL BASIS (SECOND DEPT))/EVIDENCE (FAMILY LAW, FAMILY COURT’S FINDING THAT FREEING THE CHILD FOR ADOPTION WOULD NOT BE IN THE CHILD’S BEST INTERESTS WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY A SOUND AND SUBSTANTIAL BASIS (SECOND DEPT))/SOUND AND SUBSTANTIAL BASIS (FAMILY COURT’S FINDING THAT FREEING THE CHILD FOR ADOPTION WOULD NOT BE IN THE CHILD’S BEST INTERESTS WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY A SOUND AND SUBSTANTIAL BASIS (SECOND DEPT))

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SUPREME COURT SHOULD HAVE PRECLUDED DEFENDANT FROM INTRODUCING CERTAIN EVIDENCE AT TRIAL BECAUSE OF THE FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH DISCOVERY ORDERS, HOWEVER, SUPREME COURT PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANT’S REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES BECAUSE PLAINTIFF IS THE LESS-MONIED SPOUSE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, modifying (reversing) Supreme Court in this action for divorce, determined that defendant’s motion to preclude plaintiff from introducing certain evidence at trial because of the failure to comply with discovery orders should have been granted. Defendant’s request for attorney’s fees was properly denied, however, because plaintiff is the less-monied spouse:

A court may prohibit a party “from producing in evidence designated things or items of testimony” if the party “refuses to obey an order for disclosure or willfully fails to disclose information which the court finds ought to have been disclosed” (CPLR 3126[2] …). Before a court invokes the drastic remedy of precluding evidence, there must be a clear showing that the failure to comply with court-ordered discovery was willful and contumacious … . The willful and contumacious character of a party’s conduct can be inferred from either (1) the repeated failure to respond to demands or comply with court-ordered discovery, without a reasonable excuse for these failures, or (2) the failure to comply with court-ordered discovery over an extended period of time … .

Here, the defendant demonstrated that the plaintiff failed to comply with court-ordered discovery over an extended period of time. The willful and contumacious character of the plaintiff’s conduct may be inferred from her failure to respond to the defendant’s letter … , despite two court orders directing her to do so, and her failure to proffer any excuse for her failure. Accordingly, that branch of the defendant’s motion which was to preclude the plaintiff from producing physical evidence or testimony at trial relating to certain limited items previously requested but not disclosed should have been granted.

We agree, however, with the Supreme Court’s denial of that branch of the defendant’s motion which was to direct the plaintiff to pay interim counsel fees in the sum of $5,000, since the plaintiff is the less-monied spouse … . Maliah-Dupass v Dupass, 2018 NY Slip Op 08018, Second Dept 11-21-18

FAMILY LAW (DIVORCE, SUPREME COURT SHOULD HAVE PRECLUDED DEFENDANT FROM INTRODUCING CERTAIN EVIDENCE AT TRIAL BECAUSE OF THE FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH DISCOVERY ORDERS, HOWEVER, SUPREME COURT PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANT’S REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES BECAUSE PLAINTIFF IS THE LESS-MONIED SPOUSE (SECOND DEPT))/DIVORCE (SUPREME COURT SHOULD HAVE PRECLUDED DEFENDANT FROM INTRODUCING CERTAIN EVIDENCE AT TRIAL BECAUSE OF THE FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH DISCOVERY ORDERS, HOWEVER, SUPREME COURT PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANT’S REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES BECAUSE PLAINTIFF IS THE LESS-MONIED SPOUSE (SECOND DEPT))/CIVIL PROCEDURE (DISCOVERY, SUPREME COURT SHOULD HAVE PRECLUDED DEFENDANT FROM INTRODUCING CERTAIN EVIDENCE AT TRIAL BECAUSE OF THE FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH DISCOVERY ORDERS, HOWEVER, SUPREME COURT PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANT’S REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES BECAUSE PLAINTIFF IS THE LESS-MONIED SPOUSE (SECOND DEPT))/CPLR 3126 (DIVORCE, SUPREME COURT SHOULD HAVE PRECLUDED DEFENDANT FROM INTRODUCING CERTAIN EVIDENCE AT TRIAL BECAUSE OF THE FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH DISCOVERY ORDERS, HOWEVER, SUPREME COURT PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANT’S REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES BECAUSE PLAINTIFF IS THE LESS-MONIED SPOUSE (SECOND DEPT))/EVIDENCE (CIVIL PROCEDURE, PRECLUSION, SUPREME COURT SHOULD HAVE PRECLUDED DEFENDANT FROM INTRODUCING CERTAIN EVIDENCE AT TRIAL BECAUSE OF THE FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH DISCOVERY ORDERS, HOWEVER, SUPREME COURT PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANT’S REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES BECAUSE PLAINTIFF IS THE LESS-MONIED SPOUSE (SECOND DEPT))/ATTORNEYS (FAMILY LAW, DIVORCE, SUPREME COURT SHOULD HAVE PRECLUDED DEFENDANT FROM INTRODUCING CERTAIN EVIDENCE AT TRIAL BECAUSE OF THE FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH DISCOVERY ORDERS, HOWEVER, SUPREME COURT PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANT’S REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES BECAUSE PLAINTIFF IS THE LESS-MONIED SPOUSE (SECOND DEPT))

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DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONAL SERVICES (DOCS) PERSONNEL WERE NOT ACTING AS AGENTS FOR THE POLICE WHEN INVESTIGATING THE PRISON KILLING WITH WHICH DEFENDANT WAS CHARGED, THEREFORE THE PROSECUTOR WAS NOT OBLIGATED TO LEARN ABOUT AND TURN OVER TO THE DEFENSE ANY ALLEGED EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE TURNED UP IN THE DOCS INVESTIGATION (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice McCarthy, determined defendant, an inmate, did not present sufficient proof that Department of Correctional Services (DOCS) personnel acted as agents for the police when investigating a killing in the prison. Defendant alleged that inmates were coerced into testifying against him and evidence of the coercion was Brady material which should have been provided to the defense by the prosecutor. The Third Department found defendant had not met his burden of proof concerning whether the DOCS personnel were acting as agents for the police. Rather, there was evidence that the DOCS investigation and the police investigation were separate and had different purposes. Therefore defendant’s motion to vacate his conviction was properly denied:

Several cases have held that “[e]vidence gathered by prison staff . . . generally is not ‘under the control or in the possession of the People or its agents, but [is] instead in the possession of an administrative agency that was not performing law enforcement functions'”… . That said, whether knowledge of a government official or employee may be imputed to the People appears to turn on whether participation in the criminal probe was an ancillary law enforcement task… or whether the level of cooperation between the employee and law enforcement in a particular criminal investigation renders the employee an agent of the People … . Under agency principles, “acts of agents, and the knowledge they acquire while acting within the scope of their authority are presumptively imputed to their principals”… . For example, “[w]hile social workers are generally not agents of the police,” in situations where they engage in a “joint venture” with police agencies to collaborate on child abuse or sexual abuse investigations, share information and a common purpose, and have a “cooperative working arrangement” with police, an agency relationship may exist such that the social workers’ knowledge is imputed to the People … . …

… [I]t appears that the State Police and IG [the DOCS Investigator General] were conducting parallel investigations — one criminal and one administrative, albeit with some obvious and necessary overlap — addressing different aspects of the situation… . The report from the lead IG investigator — who was not called to testify — reveals that he interviewed inmates with the State Police, gathered information for two months after the incident, conferred with State Police and met with the District Attorney. But the report indicates that the IG closed its case six months before defendant’s criminal trial, based on a finding that there was no evidence of staff misconduct, indicating the administrative focus of the IG’s investigation. People v Lewis, 2018 NY Slip Op 07980, Third Dept 11-21-18

CRIMINAL LAW (DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONAL SERVICES (DOCS) PERSONNEL WERE NOT ACTING AS AGENTS FOR THE POLICE WHEN INVESTIGATING THE PRISON KILLING WITH WHICH DEFENDANT WAS CHARGED, THEREFORE THE PROSECUTOR WAS NOT OBLIGATED TO LEARN ABOUT AND TURN OVER TO THE DEFENSE ANY ALLEGED EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE TURNED UP IN THE DOCS INVESTIGATION (THIRD DEPT))/EVIDENCE (DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONAL SERVICES (DOCS) PERSONNEL WERE NOT ACTING AS AGENTS FOR THE POLICE WHEN INVESTIGATING THE PRISON KILLING WITH WHICH DEFENDANT WAS CHARGED, THEREFORE THE PROSECUTOR WAS NOT OBLIGATED TO LEARN ABOUT AND TURN OVER TO THE DEFENSE ANY ALLEGED EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE TURNED UP IN THE DOCS INVESTIGATION (THIRD DEPT))/ATTORNEYS (CRIMINAL LAW, PROSECUTORS, BRADY MATERIAL, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONAL SERVICES (DOCS) PERSONNEL WERE NOT ACTING AS AGENTS FOR THE POLICE WHEN INVESTIGATING THE PRISON KILLING WITH WHICH DEFENDANT WAS CHARGED, THEREFORE THE PROSECUTOR WAS NOT OBLIGATED TO LEARN ABOUT AND TURN OVER TO THE DEFENSE ANY ALLEGED EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE TURNED UP IN THE DOCS INVESTIGATION (THIRD DEPT))/BRADY MATERIAL (DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONAL SERVICES (DOCS) PERSONNEL WERE NOT ACTING AS AGENTS FOR THE POLICE WHEN INVESTIGATING THE PRISON KILLING WITH WHICH DEFENDANT WAS CHARGED, THEREFORE THE PROSECUTOR WAS NOT OBLIGATED TO LEARN ABOUT AND TURN OVER TO THE DEFENSE ANY ALLEGED EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE TURNED UP IN THE DOCS INVESTIGATION (THIRD DEPT))/AGENCY (CRIMINAL LAW, JOINT INVESTIGATIONS, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONAL SERVICES (DOCS) PERSONNEL WERE NOT ACTING AS AGENTS FOR THE POLICE WHEN INVESTIGATING THE PRISON KILLING WITH WHICH DEFENDANT WAS CHARGED, THEREFORE THE PROSECUTOR WAS NOT OBLIGATED TO LEARN ABOUT AND TURN OVER TO THE DEFENSE ANY ALLEGED EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE TURNED UP IN THE DOCS INVESTIGATION (THIRD DEPT))/VACATE CONVICTION, MOTION TO  (DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONAL SERVICES (DOCS) PERSONNEL WERE NOT ACTING AS AGENTS FOR THE POLICE WHEN INVESTIGATING THE PRISON KILLING WITH WHICH DEFENDANT WAS CHARGED, THEREFORE THE PROSECUTOR WAS NOT OBLIGATED TO LEARN ABOUT AND TURN OVER TO THE DEFENSE ANY ALLEGED EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE TURNED UP IN THE DOCS INVESTIGATION (THIRD DEPT))

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DEFENDANT DEEMED TO HAVE CONSENTED TO THE RECORDING OF PHONE CALLS MADE FROM JAIL AND TO THE PRESENTATION OF THE RECORDINGS AS TRIAL EVIDENCE (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department determined the defendant’s request to preclude recording of phone calls he made from jail was properly denied. Defendant was deemed to have consented to the recordings:

“Defendant impliedly consented to the recording of the call(s) based on his receipt of multiple forms of notice that his calls would be recorded, and he was not entitled to separate notice that the calls might be subpoenaed by prosecutors” … . People v Mason, 2018 NY Slip Op 07944, First Dept 11-20-18

CRIMINAL LAW (EVIDENCE, DEFENDANT DEEMED TO HAVE CONSENTED TO THE RECORDING OF PHONE CALLS MADE FROM JAIL AND TO THE PRESENTATION OF THE RECORDINGS AS TRIAL EVIDENCE (FIRST DEPT))/EVIDENCE (CRIMINAL LAW, PHONE CALLS FROM JAIL, DEFENDANT DEEMED TO HAVE CONSENTED TO THE RECORDING OF PHONE CALLS MADE FROM JAIL AND TO THE PRESENTATION OF THE RECORDINGS AS TRIAL EVIDENCE (FIRST DEPT))/PHONE CALLS (CRIMINAL LAW, JAIL,  DEFENDANT DEEMED TO HAVE CONSENTED TO THE RECORDING OF PHONE CALLS MADE FROM JAIL AND TO THE PRESENTATION OF THE RECORDINGS AS TRIAL EVIDENCE (FIRST DEPT))/RECORDINGS (PHONE CALL, JAIL, CRIMINAL LAW, DEFENDANT DEEMED TO HAVE CONSENTED TO THE RECORDING OF PHONE CALLS MADE FROM JAIL AND TO THE PRESENTATION OF THE RECORDINGS AS TRIAL EVIDENCE (FIRST DEPT))

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EVIDENCE OF SERIOUS PHYSICAL INJURY MET THE LEGALLY SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE APPELLATE REVIEW CRITERIA (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, over a two-judge dissent, determined the evidence of serious physical injury in this first degree assault case met the “legally sufficient evidence” standard of appellate review. The victim was shot in the leg and bullet fragments remain in his body:

The victim testified that he can still “feel [the bullet] poking out,” and that he continues to endure the effects “of the metal inside [his] leg.” Even four years after the shooting, the victim noted that the injury still “disturbs” him at times, and that “something is wrong with [his] leg.” The victim stated that, because the bullet “didn’t come out of [his] leg,” his “life” had been “tampered with.” For instance, he can no longer participate in competitive sports, as the injury would present a “very, very, very, very big risk.” The medical expert further testified that there are “many repercussions” of the type of muscle damage that the victim sustained: “Muscle damage can cause long-term injuries to the kidneys from leakage of chemicals from the muscle, toxic to the kidneys, can cause pain and weakness, difficulty walking.”

As the dissent notes, there is certainly record evidence favorable to the defense that, when viewed in isolation, might have presented an issue of fact for the jury. That said, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the People, as our legal sufficiency standard requires, we have no trouble concluding that the jury acted rationally in finding that the victim’s gunshot wound constituted a “serious physical injury” … . People v Garland, 2018 NY Slip Op 07927, CtApp 11-20-18

CRIMINAL LAW (EVIDENCE OF SERIOUS PHYSICAL INJURY MET THE LEGALLY SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE APPELLATE REVIEW CRITERIA (CT APP))/EVIDENCE (CRIMINAL LAW, EVIDENCE OF SERIOUS PHYSICAL INJURY MET THE LEGALLY SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE APPELLATE REVIEW CRITERIA (CT APP))/APPEALS (CRIMINAL LAW, LEGALLY SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE, EVIDENCE OF SERIOUS PHYSICAL INJURY MET THE LEGALLY SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE APPELLATE REVIEW CRITERIA (CT APP))/SERIOUS PHYSICAL INJURY (CRIMINAL LAW, ASSAULT, EVIDENCE OF SERIOUS PHYSICAL INJURY MET THE LEGALLY SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE APPELLATE REVIEW CRITERIA (CT APP))/LEGALLY SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE (CRIMINAL LAW, APPEALS, EVIDENCE OF SERIOUS PHYSICAL INJURY MET THE LEGALLY SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE APPELLATE REVIEW CRITERIA (CT APP))/ASSAULT (EVIDENCE OF SERIOUS PHYSICAL INJURY MET THE LEGALLY SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE APPELLATE REVIEW CRITERIA (CT APP))

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THE PROSECUTION’S FAILURE TO PRESENT A WITNESS TO THE GRAND JURY, AS REQUESTED BY THE DEFENDANT, DID NOT RISE TO A CONSTITUTIONAL DEFECT, THEREFORE THE ISSUE DID NOT SURVIVE DEFENDANT’S GUILTY PLEA (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, over a two-judge concurrence, determined the defendant’s argument that the integrity of the grand jury proceedings was impaired by the prosecution’s failure to call a witness requested by the defendant did not raise a constitutional issue and therefore was precluded by defendant’s guilty plea:

Defendant does not contend that the evidence before the grand jury was insufficient to support the indictment. Instead, defendant claims that the prosecutor’s conduct impaired the integrity of the grand jury proceeding and argues his motion to dismiss the indictment for defective grand jury proceedings on that ground is not forfeited by his guilty plea. …

… [W]e have explained that even after entering a valid guilty plea, “a defendant may not forfeit a claim of a constitutional [*2]defect implicating the integrity of the process” …  and we have recognized that certain claimed defects in a grand jury proceeding rise to this level … .

Defendant’s claim in this case rests on the purported exclusion of a witness, the substance of whose testimony was contained in an affidavit provided to the courts below. That proffered testimony was largely inadmissible and, in any event, would have inculpated him by establishing that he had a relationship with the complainant and had been in her presence in violation of an order of protection. The exclusion of such testimony before the grand jury does not present “a constitutional defect implicating the integrity of the process”…  and accordingly the claimed violation in this case did not survive defendant’s guilty plea.  People v Manragh, 2018 NY Slip Op 07924, CtApp 11-20-18

CRIMINAL LAW (THE PROSECUTION’S FAILURE TO PRESENT A WITNESS TO THE GRAND JURY, AS REQUESTED BY THE DEFENDANT, DID NOT RISE TO A CONSTITUTIONAL DEFECT, THEREFORE THE ISSUE DID NOT SURVIVE DEFENDANT’S GUILTY PLEA (CT APP))/EVIDENCE (CRIMINAL LAW, GRAND JURY, THE PROSECUTION’S FAILURE TO PRESENT A WITNESS TO THE GRAND JURY, AS REQUESTED BY THE DEFENDANT, DID NOT RISE TO A CONSTITUTIONAL DEFECT, THEREFORE THE ISSUE DID NOT SURVIVE DEFENDANT’S GUILTY PLEA (CT APP))/APPEALS (CRIMINAL LAW, GUILTY PLEA, THE PROSECUTION’S FAILURE TO PRESENT A WITNESS TO THE GRAND JURY, AS REQUESTED BY THE DEFENDANT, DID NOT RISE TO A CONSTITUTIONAL DEFECT, THEREFORE THE ISSUE DID NOT SURVIVE DEFENDANT’S GUILTY PLEA (CT APP))/GUILTY PLEA (APPEALS, HE PROSECUTION’S FAILURE TO PRESENT A WITNESS TO THE GRAND JURY, AS REQUESTED BY THE DEFENDANT, DID NOT RISE TO A CONSTITUTIONAL DEFECT, THEREFORE THE ISSUE DID NOT SURVIVE DEFENDANT’S GUILTY PLEA (CT APP))/GRAND JURY (APPEALS, GUILTY PLEA, THE PROSECUTION’S FAILURE TO PRESENT A WITNESS TO THE GRAND JURY, AS REQUESTED BY THE DEFENDANT, DID NOT RISE TO A CONSTITUTIONAL DEFECT, THEREFORE THE ISSUE DID NOT SURVIVE DEFENDANT’S GUILTY PLEA (CT APP))

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IT IS NOT NECESSARY TO HAVE POSSESSION OF THE MORTGAGE, AS OPPOSED TO THE NOTE, AT THE TIME OF THE COMMENCEMENT OF A FORECLOSURE ACTION, EVIDENCE ADMISSIBLE UNDER THE BUSINESS RECORDS EXCEPTION TO THE HEARSAY RULE RAISED A QUESTION OF FACT ABOUT PLAINTIFF’S STANDING (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department determined plaintiff had raised a question of fact about whether it had standing to bring this foreclosure action. The court noted that it is not necessary to have possession of the mortgage, as opposed to the note, at the time the action is commenced. A question of fact about possession of the note was raised by evidence admissible pursuant to the business records exception to the hearsay rule:

“[T]o have standing, it is not necessary to have possession of the mortgage at the time the action is commenced . . . . [T]he note, and not the mortgage, is the dispositive instrument that conveys standing to foreclose under New York law” … . Plaintiff raised a question of fact as to its possession of the note prior to commencement of the action through the affidavit of Anthony D’Addona, who averred that he reviewed the books and records of plaintiff, kept in the ordinary course of business, and that plaintiff was the holder of the note and mortgage. This affidavit was sworn to on September 28, 2015, prior to commencement of this action. “It is well settled that a business entity may admit a business record through a person without personal knowledge of the document, its history or its specific contents where that person is sufficiently familiar with the corporate records to aver that the record is what it purports to be and that it came out of the entity’s files” … . DLJ Mtge. Capital v Mahadeo, 2018 NY Slip Op 07963, First Dept 11-20-18

FORECLOSURE (IT IS NOT NECESSARY TO HAVE POSSESSION OF THE MORTGAGE, AS OPPOSED TO THE NOTE, AT THE TIME OF THE COMMENCEMENT OF A FORECLOSURE ACTION, EVIDENCE ADMISSIBLE UNDER THE BUSINESS RECORDS EXCEPTION TO THE HEARSAY RULE RAISED A QUESTION OF FACT ABOUT PLAINTIFF’S STANDING (FIRST DEPT))/STANDING (FORECLOSURE, IT IS NOT NECESSARY TO HAVE POSSESSION OF THE MORTGAGE, AS OPPOSED TO THE NOTE, AT THE TIME OF THE COMMENCEMENT OF A FORECLOSURE ACTION, EVIDENCE ADMISSIBLE UNDER THE BUSINESS RECORDS EXCEPTION TO THE HEARSAY RULE RAISED A QUESTION OF FACT ABOUT PLAINTIFF’S STANDING (FIRST DEPT))/BUSINESS RECORDS (FORECLOSURE, IT IS NOT NECESSARY TO HAVE POSSESSION OF THE MORTGAGE, AS OPPOSED TO THE NOTE, AT THE TIME OF THE COMMENCEMENT OF A FORECLOSURE ACTION, EVIDENCE ADMISSIBLE UNDER THE BUSINESS RECORDS EXCEPTION TO THE HEARSAY RULE RAISED A QUESTION OF FACT ABOUT PLAINTIFF’S STANDING (FIRST DEPT))/HEARSAY (BUSINESS RECORDS, FORECLOSURE, (IT IS NOT NECESSARY TO HAVE POSSESSION OF THE MORTGAGE, AS OPPOSED TO THE NOTE, AT THE TIME OF THE COMMENCEMENT OF A FORECLOSURE ACTION, EVIDENCE ADMISSIBLE UNDER THE BUSINESS RECORDS EXCEPTION TO THE HEARSAY RULE RAISED A QUESTION OF FACT ABOUT PLAINTIFF’S STANDING (FIRST DEPT))

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