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POLICE ENTERED HOME ILLEGALLY AND OBTAINED CONSENT TO SEARCH BY MISLEADING THE OCCUPANT, MOTION TO SUPPRESS PROPERLY GRANTED (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, affirming Supreme Court’s suppression of a weapon found in a home, determined the police illegally entered the home and gained consent to search by misleading the woman in the home:

Asked by defense counsel why he entered the home, the officer testified, “An individual who’s known to carry guns entered that house running into that house actually, coming out acting nervous, there’s a baby crying in the house, who is taking care of the baby?” …

… [T]he People correctly concede that the officer entered the home illegally. An illegal entry by the police requires the suppression of the fruits of an ensuing search notwithstanding a voluntary consent, unless the consent attenuates the taint of the illegal entry … . In determining whether the illegal entry is so attenuated, a court is required to consider a variety of factors, including: (1) the temporal proximity of the consent to the illegal entry; (2) whether there were intervening circumstances; (3) whether the purpose underlying the illegal entry was to obtain the consent or the fruits of the search; (4) whether the consent was volunteered or requested; (5) whether the person who gave consent was aware that he or she could refuse consent; and, most importantly, (6) the purpose and flagrancy of the misconduct … .

… The purpose of the illegal entry was to recover a gun that the officer presumed was hidden inside. Any consent obtained thereafter was not volunteered. It was requested, and the woman was not advised that she could refuse consent. … Most importantly, the officer engaged in flagrant misconduct. Without having witnessed any illegality, the officer entered a private residence without permission, after midnight, while a woman in that residence was trying to feed her newborn child, and coerced her into consenting to a search of her home. People v Sweat, 2019 NY Slip Op 02240, Fourth Dept 3-22-19

 

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THE PEOPLE DID NOT PRESENT EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE AT THE DARDEN HEARING THAT THE INFORMANT EXISTED, THEREFORE THE SUPPRESSION MOTION WAS GRANTED AND THE INDICTMENT DISMISSED (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department determined the evidence submitted by the People at the Darden hearing did not establish the existence of an informant with extrinsic evidence. Therefore the motion to suppress was granted and the indictment dismissed. The People presented only a death certificate purporting to demonstrate the informant was dead. No extrinsic evidence of the existence of the informant was presented:

The People must produce a confidential informant for an ex parte hearing upon defendant’s request where, as here, they rely on the statements of the confidential informant to establish probable cause (… People v Darden, 34 NY2d 177, 181 [1974] … ). …

There are, however, exceptions to the requirement that the People produce a confidential informant for a Darden hearing. If the People succeed in making a threshold showing that the informant “is unavailable and cannot be produced through the exercise of due diligence” … , they are permitted instead to establish the existence of the informant by extrinsic evidence … .

Even assuming, arguendo, that the People succeeded here in making such a threshold showing, we conclude that they nevertheless failed to establish the existence of the informant by extrinsic evidence … . The evidence establishes only that a deposition was executed in the name of the alleged confidential informant, that the police obtained a search warrant using the deposition, and that a death certificate was later issued for a person having the same name as the confidential informant. There is no evidence that the alleged informant actually made the statements attributed to her … . The People could have met their burden by offering the testimony of a police witness, which is evidence that is explicitly contemplated in Darden. Yet, they did not. Without it, there is nothing to refute the possibility that the police fabricated the statements in the informant’s purported deposition in order to conceal the fact that information critical to the probable cause inquiry was instead obtained through illegal police action. People v Givans, 2019 NY Slip Op 02220, Fourth Dept 3-22-19

 

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IN THIS ASBESTOS EXPOSURE CASE, A WITNESS’S VIDEOTAPED DEPOSITION TESTIMONY FROM PROCEEDINGS IN OTHER STATES SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ADMITTED IN THE PLAINTIFF’S DIRECT CASE OR IN THE DEFENSE CASE, NEW TRIAL ORDERED (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, ordering a new trial, determined that videotaped deposition testimony from proceedings in other states was not admissible in the New York action. It was alleged that plaintiff’s decedent died from exposure to asbestos in a joint compound made by Georgia-Pacific. An employee of Georgia-Pacific, Charles Lehnert, who was familiar with the formula for the joint compound, gave the videotaped deposition testimony:

CPLR 3117 (a) (3) provides, in relevant part, that “any part or all of a deposition, so far as admissible under the rules of evidence, may be used . . . by any party for any purpose against any other party who was present or represented at the taking of the deposition or who had the notice required under these rules.” Here, defendant was permitted to introduce deposition testimony given by Lehnert in the 2007 Texas state court action for the purpose of demonstrating that it contradicted the 2001 and 2003 testimony that plaintiff had been permitted to introduce as part of its case-in-chief. However, although defendant was a party to the 2007 Texas action, plaintiff was not, and he had no opportunity to be present and cross-examine Lehnert. Thus, this testimony was not admissible under CPLR 3117 (a) (3) … . …

Although defendant did not cross-appeal, our holding reversing Supreme Court’s ruling regarding Lehnert’s 2007 testimony necessarily brings up for review Supreme Court’s denial of defendant’s motion to preclude Lehnert’s 2001 and 2003 testimony (seeCPLR 5501 [a] [1] …). Upon review, we find that none of Lehnert’s deposition testimony should have been admitted into evidence at this trial. Although a live witness may be impeached with prior inconsistent testimony, Lehnert never testified for any party in this action, either at the trial itself or at any pretrial deposition. He was merely a witness who had testified years ago in multiple other states on the subject of the content of Georgia-Pacific joint compound. Rather than calling him (or any other witness) to testify on this topic, both parties resorted to retrieving video of Lehnert’s testimony in those earlier actions and selectively playing those portions they believed supported their respective contentions. The jury was essentially asked to determine whether Lehnert, an empty chair in New York, testified more credibly in Illinois or Texas. In this scenario, CPLR 3117 (a) (2) did not permit plaintiff to introduce the 2001 and 2003 depositions on his case-in-chief, and CPLR 3117 (c) did not permit defendant to impeach those depositions with another deposition. Billok v Union Carbide Corp., 2019 NY Slip Op 02185, Third Dept 3-21-19

 

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DEFENDANT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ASSESSED 20 POINTS FOR A CONTINUING COURSE OF SEXUAL MISCONDUCT, PROOF OF A SECOND INSTANCE OF SEXUAL MISCONDUCT WAS INSUFFICIENT, AN ALLEGATION IN AN INDICTMENT IS NOT, BY ITSELF, EVIDENCE THE INCIDENT OCCURRED (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined that defendant should not have been assessed 20 points for a continuing course of sexual misconduct, noting that a reference in an indictment is not sufficient proof:

Defendant pleaded guilty to one count of having sexual intercourse with the victim and claimed that he only had sex with the victim once. The People presented a sworn statement given to the police by the victim’s mother in which she recounts that, when she confronted the victim concerning her relationship with defendant, the victim told her that they “had sex two times.” Even assuming that this statement constitutes reliable hearsay … there is no indication by the victim as to when the acts of sexual contact occurred. Although the case summary states that the presentence investigation report reflects that acts of sexual contact occurred in May 2013 and September 2013, the only reference to a September 2013 act in that report is when it lists the charges contained in the indictment. Notably, “the fact that an offender was arrested or indicted for an offense is not, by itself, evidence that the offense occurred” (Sex Offender Registration Act: Risk Assessment Guidelines and Commentary at 5 [2006]). Inasmuch as there is no evidence in the record regarding when the second act of sexual contact occurred, we cannot say that there is clear and convincing evidence that two sexual acts occurred that were separated by at least 24 hours … . People v Hinson, 2019 NY Slip Op 02184, Third Dept 3-21-18

 

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DAMAGES AWARDED 69-YEAR-OLD PLAINTIFF FOR PAST AND FUTURE PAIN AND SUFFERING DEEMED EXCESSIVE (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department determined the damages awarded the 69-year-old plaintiff for past and future pain and suffering were too high:

Judgment … upon a jury verdict, which … awarded plaintiff $1.2 million for past pain and suffering, $1 million for future pain and suffering over 10 years, $255,582 for future medical expenses, and $250,000 for future loss of earnings … unanimously modified … to remand the matter for a new trial on damages for past pain and suffering and future pain and suffering, unless plaintiff stipulates … to reduce the awards for past pain and suffering to $1,000,000 and for future pain and suffering to $675,000 … . Dacaj v New York City Tr. Auth., 2019 NY Slip Op 02171, First Dept 3-21-19

 

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CROSS-RACIAL IDENTIFICATION JURY INSTRUCTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN GIVEN, ERROR HARMLESS HOWEVER (FIRST DEPT).

Although the error was deemed harmless, the First Department determined the cross-racial identification jury instruction should have been given:

The trial court denied defendant’s request for a charge on cross-racial identification. Since then, the Court of Appeals decided People v Boone, which held that “when identification is an issue in a criminal case and the identifying witness and defendant appear to be of different races, upon request, a party is entitled to a charge on cross-racial identification” and the trial court must give the charge if a party requests it (30 NY3d 521, 526 [2017]). Since identification was an issue in this case and the victim and defendant were of different races, the motion court should have granted the request for the charge on cross-racial identification. However, we find the error harmless given that the video supports the victim’s testimony about the incident and his familiarity with defendant. Further, the victim told police that the robber had an MTA connection, and defendant was arrested wearing an MTA jacket. The identification testimony was unusually strong and the evidence of defendant’s guilt was overwhelming … . Also, there is no significant probability that defendant would have been acquitted but for this charge error … . People v Patterson, 2019 NY Slip Op 02154, First Dept 3-21-19

 

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DEFENDANT DID NOT ELIMINATE QUESTIONS OF FACT CONCERNING WHETHER IT HAD ACTUAL OR CONSTRUCTIVE KNOWLEDGE OF THE ALLEGEDLY DANGEROUS CONDITION IN THIS ESCALATOR SLIP AND FALL CASE, ANY CONFLICT IN PLAINTIFF’S TESTIMONY DID NOT RENDER IT INCREDIBLE AS A MATTER OF LAW, DEFENDANT’S SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendant’s motion for summary judgment in the escalator slip and fall case should not have been granted:

The defendant’s submissions, which included a transcript of the plaintiff’s deposition testimony, failed to eliminate all triable issues of fact as to whether the defendant had actual or constructive notice of the allegedly dangerous condition of the escalator steps … . Furthermore, the plaintiff testified at his deposition that he slipped and fell on a wet step while he was riding an escalator. In light of this testimony, it cannot be said that the plaintiff was unable to identify the cause of his accident … . Contrary to the defendant’s contention, the plaintiff’s deposition testimony was not incredible as a matter of law, and any conflict in the testimony or evidence presented merely raised an issue of fact for the factfinder to resolve … . Kerzhner v New York City Tr. Auth., 2019 NY Slip Op 02077, Second Dept 3-20-19

 

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DEFECTIVE A-FRAME LADDER ENTITLED PLAINTIFF TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS LABOR LAW 240 (1) ACTION, STATEMENTS IN MEDICAL RECORDS WERE INADMISSIBLE HEARSAY (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined plaintiff was entitled to summary judgment in this Labor Law 240 (1) action. Plaintiff fell from an A-frame ladder which had a defective locking mechanism. The court noted that the evidence in the medical records did not raise a question of fact because the statements in the records were not admissible. The hearsay statements were not attributable to the plaintiff and had nothing to do with treatment:

The plaintiff’s deposition testimony established, prima facie, that the defendant, as the general contractor, violated Labor Law § 240(1) by providing a ladder with a defective lock, which caused the ladder to collapse and the plaintiff to fall to the ground … .

… [T]he notations in the hospital records upon which the defendant relies were not attributed to the plaintiff. As the defendant failed to offer evidence sufficiently connecting the plaintiff to the statements in the hospital records, the party admission exception to the hearsay rule does not apply … . Moreover, none of the notations were germane to the plaintiff’s diagnosis or treatment and, at trial, would not be admissible for their truth under the business records exception to the hearsay rule (see CPLR 4518 … ). While hearsay statements may be used to oppose motions for summary judgment, they cannot, as here, be the only evidence submitted to raise a triable issue of fact … . Gomez v Kitchen & Bath by Linda Burkhardt, Inc., 2019 NY Slip Op 02070, Second Dept 3-20-19

 

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PLAINTIFF WAS STRUCK BY A FACE PLATE WHICH FELL OFF AN AIR CONDITIONER, ALTHOUGH PLAINTIFF MADE OUT A PRIMA FACIE CASE UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF RES IPSA LOQUITUR, DEFENDANTS RAISED QUESTIONS OF FACT ABOUT THE CAUSE AND EXCLUSIVE CONTROL, PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SEOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined that, although a prima facie case was made out under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, the defendant raised questions of fact. Plaintiff was injured when a face plate fell off an air conditioner:

… [A]lthough the plaintiff demonstrated, prima facie, that a face plate falling off an air conditioner is an event of a kind that ordinarily does not occur absent negligence… , the defendants raised a triable issue of fact as to whether the face plate could have fallen off the air conditioner because of the slamming of the door and not as a result of negligence … .

Furthermore, while the plaintiff demonstrated, prima facie, that the elevated air-conditioning unit was in the defendants’ exclusive control … , the defendants raised a triable issue of fact through their submissions, which demonstrated that outside contractors were responsible for the repairs and installations of air conditioning units in the school. Exclusive control is not established when third-party contractors have access to an instrumentality causing injuries … . Dilligard v City of New York, 2019 NY Slip Op 02064, Second Dept 3-20-19

 

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AUDIT TRAIL, I.E., METADATA SHOWING WHO ACCESSED PLAINTIFF’S MEDICAL RECORDS, WHERE AND WHEN THEY WERE ACCESSED, AND ANY CHANGES TO THE RECORDS, WAS DISCOVERABLE IN THIS MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACTION ALLEGING IMPROPER TREATMENT AFTER SURGERY (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined that the so-called “audit trail,” which indicates who accessed plaintiff’s medical records, where and when they were accessed and any changes made to the records (metadata), was discoverable in this medical malpractice action. The complaint alleged failure to properly treat plaintiff after surgery which led to infection and amputation:

The plaintiffs demonstrated, and Wyckoff [medical center] does not dispute, that an audit trail generally shows the sequence of events related to the use of a patient’s electronic medical records; i.e., who accessed the records, when and where the records were accessed, and changes made to the records … . Hospitals are required to maintain audit trails under federal and state law (see 45 CFR 164.312[b]; 10 NYCRR 405.10[c][4][v]). As argued by the plaintiffs, the requested audit trail was relevant to the allegations of negligence that underlie this medical malpractice action in that the audit trail would provide, or was reasonably likely to lead to, information bearing directly on the post-operative care that was provided to the injured plaintiff. Moreover, the plaintiffs’ request was limited to the period immediately following the injured plaintiff’s surgery. The plaintiffs further demonstrated that such disclosure was also needed to assist preparation for trial by enabling their counsel to ascertain whether the patient records that were eventually provided to them were complete and unaltered … .

In response to the plaintiffs’ threshold showing, Wyckoff failed to demonstrate that the requested disclosure was improper or otherwise unwarranted. Although Wyckoff argued that the audit trail may contain information that would not be useful to the plaintiffs, it did not dispute that the audit trail would nevertheless contain information pertaining to the medical care that it provided to the injured plaintiff in the wake of his foot surgery. Vargas v Lee, 2019 NY Slip Op 02142, Second Dept 3-20-19

 

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