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PROOF PRESENTED TO THE GRAND JURY DID NOT SUPPORT ATTEMPTED THIRD OR FOURTH DEGREE LARCENY, APPELLATE DIVISION REVERSED (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, reversing (modifying) the Appellate Division, determined the evidence presented to the grand jury was not sufficient to support attempted third or fourth degree larceny. Apparently defendant used a sticky object to “fish” mail out of a mailbox. Although there were money orders in the mailbox, the money orders were not stuck to the object:

Viewed in the light most favorable to the People, the evidence presented to the grand jury was insufficient to demonstrate that defendant came dangerously close to taking property valued in excess of $3,000 or $1,000. There was no evidence that the items attached to defendant’s mailbox fishing apparatus had any monetary value, no evidence of the volume of the mail contained in the mailbox or whether it was physically possible for defendant to procure the two money orders deposited in the mailbox by the government investigators amidst the other mail, no evidence as to whether the fishing device was immediately reusable, and no evidence that defendant intended to make successive attempts at fishing out the contents of the mailbox in question. Furthermore, the fact that defendant stated he would be paid $100 for each mailbox fished does not establish that he came dangerously close to stealing property valued at more than $3,000 or $1,000. People v Deleon, 2019 NY Slip Op 07522, CtApp 10-22-19

 

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THE POLICE DID NOT HAVE A REASONABLE SUSPICION DEFENDANT WAS CONCEALING DRUGS ON HIS PERSON WHEN THEY CONDUCTED A STRIP SEARCH, DRUGS SEIZED DURING THE STRIP SEARCH SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED (THIRD DEPT). ​

The Third Department, reversing defendant’s drug-possession conviction, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Mulvey, determined that the police did not have a reasonable suspicion defendant was concealing drugs on his person at the time of the strip search. The drugs found in the search should have been suppressed:

Strip searches “cannot be routinely undertaken as incident to all drug arrests,” but must be based on “specific and articulable facts which, along with any logical deductions, reasonably prompted the intrusion” … . Courts consider several factors when determining whether, under the totality of the circumstances, the police had reasonable suspicion to conduct “a strip search, including the defendant’s excessive nervousness, unusual conduct, information showing pertinent criminal propensities, informant’s tips, loose-fitting or bulky clothing, an itinerary suggestive of wrongdoing, incriminating matter discovered during a less intrusive search, lack of employment, indications of drug addiction, information derived from others arrested or searched contemporaneously, and evasive or contradictory answers to questions” … . * * *

Based on the information that Tibbs planned to purchase cocaine from Pinkney, made the round trip to New York City and routinely went to defendant’s apartment after such purchases to cook the powder cocaine into crack cocaine, along with other evidence of the conspiracy that had been ongoing for months, the officers had probable cause to believe that defendant had committed a conspiracy offense.

The evidence at the hearing did not, however, support a strip search. The officers knew that Tibbs had purchased a large quantity of cocaine and that drug traffickers frequently secrete narcotics on their person. Yet they could not identify the other people who were in the vehicle when it returned from New York City, leaving no proof that defendant had accompanied Tibbs to purchase the drugs. People v Turner, 2019 NY Slip Op 07443, Third Dept 10-17-19

 

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BRADY MATERIAL WHICH CONTRADICTED THE PEOPLE’S THEORY OF THE CASE SHOULD HAVE BEEN PROVIDED TO THE DEFENSE, CONVICTION REVERSED (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, reversing defendant’s conviction, determined that defendant should have been provided with exculpatory (Brady) evidence. Eyewitnesses to the assault made statements that there were two perpetrators, which directly contradicted the People’s theory that defendant was the sole perpetrator:

The first two prongs of Brady being satisfied, our inquiry thus turns to whether the suppressed information was material. “In New York, the test of materiality where . . . the defendant has made a specific request for the evidence in question is whether there is a reasonable possibility’ that the verdict would have been different if the evidence had been disclosed” … . … [B]oth witnesses’ statements, if true, would have directly contradicted the People’s theory of the case that defendant was the sole perpetrator. Although the People presented other evidence of defendant’s guilt, the only witness who identified defendant at trial initially told the police that he did not see the perpetrator’s face. Considering that the nightclub owner provided the police with the name of another possible assailant, and based on the other evidence presented at trial, it is clear that access at least to him could have allowed defendant to develop additional facts, which in turn could have aided him in establishing additional or alternative theories to support his defense. Given the substance of the nightclub owner’s statements and the nature of the People’s case, we cannot say—under our less demanding standard—that there was no “reasonable possibility” that the defense’s investigation of the witnesses would not have affected the outcome of defendant’s trial … . People v Rong He, 2019 NY Slip Op 07477, CtApp 10-17-19

 

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PLAINTIFF’S EXPERT’S AFFIDAVIT, ALTHOUGH POORLY DRAFTED, RAISED A QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER DEFENDANTS DEPARTED FROM THE STANDARD OF CARE FOR A SPINAL FUSION PROCEDURE, SUPREME COURT REVERSED (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the expert affidavit submitted in opposition to defendants’ motion for summary judgment, although not well-drafted, raised a question of fact whether defendants’ departed from the standard of care for the placement of hardware in a spinal fusion procedure:

… [P]laintiff submitted the expert affidavit of a board-certified orthopedic surgeon, who opined, based upon his review of the relevant medical records and radiological images, including a CT scan taken shortly after the surgery, that Pedersen had improperly positioned the L4 pedicle screws into the L3-L4 facet joint and that such improper placement constituted a deviation from the standard of care that ultimately caused Yerich to develop spinal and foraminal stenosis at L3-L4. Plaintiffs’ expert asserted that placing pedicle screws through the facet joints causes “damage[ to] the joint, reduces movement, [and] makes the spine unstable[,] which results in . . . spinal stenosis and foraminal stenosis requiring fusion,” as happened here. Although plaintiffs’ expert affidavit is not a model of precise drafting, when viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiffs …, we find that plaintiffs’ expert affidavit raises a question of fact as to whether Pedersen improperly positioned the L4 pedicle screws through the facet joint, thereby causing injury. Yerich v Bassett Healthcare Network, 2019 NY Slip Op 07466, Third Dept 10-17-19

 

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DNA EVIDENCE TO DEMONSTRATE THE COMPLAINANT’S SEXUAL HISTORY PROPERLY EXCLUDED AS A VIOLATION OF THE RAPE SHIELD LAW (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined Supreme Court correctly refused to allow defendant to present DNA evidence to demonstrate the complainant’s sexual history in this sexual offense case:

We agree with the Supreme Court’s determination to preclude the introduction of certain DNA evidence at trial. Introducing evidence of additional DNA donors not linked to the defendant for the purpose of demonstrating the complainant’s sexual history with persons other than the defendant falls “squarely within the ambit of the Rape Shield Law, which generally prohibits [e]vidence of a victim’s sexual conduct’ in a prosecution for a sex offense under Penal Law article 130 (CPL 60.42) because such evidence . . . serves only to harass the alleged victim and confuse the jurors'” … . Moreover, the evidence sought to be admitted was not relevant to any defense … . Contrary to the defendant’s contention, introducing the evidence through a witness other than the complainant does not render the Rape Shield Law inapplicable … . People v Hubsher, 2019 NY Slip Op 07416, Second Dept 10-16-19

 

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SURGEON, WHO HAD NO MEMORY OF PLAINTIFF’S PROCEDURE, SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ALLOWED TO TESTIFY ABOUT HIS USUAL CUSTOM AND PRACTICE IN PERFORMING A HERNIA REPAIR, DEFENSE JUDGMENT REVERSED IN THIS MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACTION (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing the defense verdict in a medical malpractice case, determined the trial court should not have allowed the defendant doctor, who had no independent memory of the hernia surgery he performed on plaintiff, to testify about his usual custom and practice, or habit. The surgery involved placement of a mesh patch on the abdominal wall. In this case a portion of the patch had come off the wall and adhered to internal organs:

“Custom and practice evidence draws its probative value from the repetition and unvarying uniformity of the procedure involved as it depends on the inference that a person who regularly follows a strict routine in relation to a particular repetitive practice is likely to have followed that same strict routine at a specific date or time relevant to the litigation” … . To justify the introduction of habit evidence, “a party must be able to show on voir dire, to the satisfaction of the court, that the party expects to prove a sufficient number of instances of the conduct in question” … . …

Although habit evidence may be admissible in a medical malpractice action where the defendant physician makes the requisite showing, here, the evidence did not demonstrate that the defendant’s suturing of the Kugel Composix mesh patch represented a deliberate and repetitive practice by a person in complete control of the circumstances … . …

Although the defendant testified that he had performed hundreds of hernia repairs using mesh patches, he could not remember how many times he had used the Kugel Composix mesh patch before he performed the injured plaintiff’s surgery. He testified at his deposition that he had used the Kugel Composix mesh patch at least “a couple times” before he performed the injured plaintiff’s procedure. Although the defendant contends that the procedure for suturing the Kugel Composix mesh patch was the same as for other mesh patches, the Kugel Composix mesh patch had features that were different from other mesh patches, including a “pocket” intended to protect the intestines. Martin v Timmins, 2019 NY Slip Op 07391. Second Dept 10-16-19

 

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PLAINTIFF BANK DID NOT PRESENT SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE OF THE LOSS OF THE NOTE IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION; THE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff bank did not present sufficient evidence concerning the allegedly lost note. The bank’s motion for summary judgment in this foreclosure action should not have been granted:

Among the evidence offered by the plaintiff was a lost note affidavit, signed by a representative of Beneficial Homeowner Service Corporation (hereinafter Beneficial), the purported predecessor-in-interest to the plaintiff, stating that the note was deemed lost as of November 14, 2013, and that Beneficial was “in possession of the original Note prior to its whereabouts becoming undeterminable.” The evidence does not establish that the plaintiff was ever in physical possession of the subject note … .

The plaintiff also failed to demonstrate its ownership of the subject note by written assignment. The plaintiff submitted a document dated June 12, 2015, purporting to be a written assignment of the appellants’ mortgage and underlying note to the plaintiff by Beneficial, signed by Caliber Home Loans, Inc. (hereinafter Caliber), as Beneficial’s “attorney in fact.” However, the plaintiff failed to demonstrate as a matter of law the validity of the written assignment, because the plaintiff did not produce sufficient evidence of Caliber’s authority to execute the assignment as Beneficial’s attorney-in-fact … . …

Moreover, the plaintiff failed to demonstrate, prima facie, the facts that prevented production of the lost note … . The affidavit submitted by the plaintiff failed to identify who conducted the search for the lost note … , and failed to explain “when or how the note was lost” … , but instead described only approximately when the search for the note was conducted and when the loss was discovered, which was “on or about” the date the affidavit was executed.

In light of the plaintiff’s failure to satisfy the requirements of UCC 3-804, we need not reach the parties’ further contentions regarding the plaintiff’s standing to commence this action … . U.S. Bank Trust, N.A. v Rose, 2019 NY Slip Op 07440, Second Dept 10-16-19

 

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PLAINTIFF BANK SUBMITTED EVIDENCE IN INADMISSIBLE FORM AND DID NOT DEMONSTRATE COMPLIANCE WITH THE NOTICE CONDITIONS IN THE MORTGAGE; DEFENDANT’S SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined that the evidence submitted by defendant in this foreclosure action was either not in admissible form or did not comply with the requirements of the mortgage:

In support of those branches of its motion which were for summary judgment on the complaint insofar as asserted against the defendant and to appoint a referee, the plaintiff submitted an affidavit of an employee of its loan servicer, Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC (hereinafter Ocwen). The employee attested that she was familiar with business records of Ocwen but failed to lay a proper foundation for the admission of records concerning the defendant’s payment history and default. Accordingly, the plaintiff failed to demonstrate that the records relied upon in the affidavit were admissible under the business records exception to the hearsay rule … .

… [T]he defendant … failed to establish that the required notice of default was mailed by first class mail or actually delivered to the notice address if sent by other means, as required by paragraphs 15 and 22 of the mortgage. U.S. Bank N.A. v Kochhar, 2019 NY Slip Op 07439, Second Dept 10-16-19

 

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DEFENSE COUNSEL’S QUESTIONS WHETHER COMPLAINANTS HAD HIRED LAWYERS AND HAD SUED DEFENDANT-TEACHER AND THE SCHOOL DISTRICT IN THIS CHILD SEX ABUSE CASE DID NOT OPEN THE DOOR TO ALL EVIDENCE OF DEFENDANT’S ALLEGED PRIOR SEXUAL ABUSE OF CHILDREN, CONVICTION REVERSED BECAUSE DEFENDANT WAS DEPRIVED OF A FAIR TRIAL; JUDGE SHOULD NOT HAVE PARTICIPATED IN A READBACK OF TESTIMONY (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing defendant’s conviction in this child sex abuse prosecution, determined that the trial court should not have allowed the prosecution to present all evidence of defendant’s alleged prior sexual abuse of children after defense counsel asked complainants whether they had hired a lawyer and were suing the defendant-teacher and the school district based upon defendant’s alleged sexual abuse of children. Re-direct should have been limited to only the evidence necessary to clarify and explain the reasons for the witness’s hiring a lawyer and bringing a lawsuit. The Second Department also noted that the trial judge should have participated in the readback of testimony and the harmless error analysis is not applicable:

… [D]efense counsel asked questions regarding the civil actions in an attempt to impeach credibility and establish that a motivation for some of the complainants’ testimony against the defendant was monetary gain or a pecuniary interest. This line of inquiry did not open an unfettered passageway for the People to elicit extensive and prejudicial evidence regarding alleged uncharged complaints. The extraneous testimony of alleged uncharged complaints did not serve to explain or clarify whether the civil actions provided certain complainants with a financial incentive to testify.

Moreover, the admission of evidence of alleged uncharged complaints violated the basic principle underlying Molineux and its progeny that “a criminal case should be tried on the facts and not on the basis of a defendant’s propensity to commit the crime charged …”. …

The Court of Appeals has explained that “if in any instance, an appellate court concludes that there has been such error of a trial court, such misconduct of a prosecutor, such inadequacy of defense counsel, or such other wrong as to have operated to deny any individual defendant his fundamental right to a fair trial, the reviewing court must reverse the conviction and grant a new trial, quite without regard to any evaluation as to whether the errors contributed to the defendant’s conviction” … . People v Watts, 2019 NY Slip Op 07426, Second Dept 10-16-19

 

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COURT HAD JURISDICTION TO ISSUE EAVESDROPPING WARRANTS TO INTERCEPT CELL PHONE CALLS AND TEXT MESSAGES SENT AND RECEIVED OUTSIDE NEW YORK STATE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined Supreme Court had jurisdiction to issue eavesdropping warrants to intercept cell phone calls and text messages made and received outside New York State:

“[A]ny justice of the supreme court of the judicial district in which the eavesdropping warrant is to be executed” (CPL 700.05[4]) “may issue an eavesdropping warrant . . . upon ex parte application of an applicant who is authorized by law to investigate, prosecute or participate in the prosecution of the particular designated offense which is the subject of the application” (CPL 700.10[1]). Although the word “execute” is not defined in CPL article 700, the plain meaning of the word “execute” and the use of that word in relevant sections of the Criminal Procedure Law reveal that an eavesdropping warrant is “executed” when a communication is intercepted by law enforcement officers, that is, when the communication is “intentionally overheard or recorded” by law enforcement officers (CPL 700.05[3][a]; see CPL 700.35[1]). Here, the eavesdropping warrants were executed in Kings County, New York, where the communications were intercepted by the New York City Police Department … . Therefore, under the applicable provisions of the Criminal Procedure Law, a Justice of the Supreme Court, Kings County, had jurisdiction to issue the eavesdropping warrants.

Moreover, we reject the defendant’s argument that the eavesdropping warrants, which were authorized for the purpose of investigating crimes that were occurring in New York, constituted an unconstitutional extraterritorial application of New York State law … . People v Schneider, 2019 NY Slip Op 07424, Second Dept 10-16-19

 

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